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Thinking and theorizing about film is almost as old as the medium itself. Within
a few years of the earliest film shows in the 1890s, manifestos and reflections
began to appear which sought to analyze the seemingly vast potential of film.
Writers in France, Russia and Britain were among the first to enter this field,
and their texts have become cornerstones of the literature of cinema. Few na-
tions, however, failed to produce their own statements and dialogues about the
nature of cinema, often interacting with proponents of Modernism in the tradi-
tional arts and crafts. Film thus found itself embedded in the discourses of mo-
dernity, especially in Europe and Soviet Russia.
“Film theory,” as it became known in the 1970s, has always had a historical
dimension, acknowledging its debts to the pioneers of analyzing film texts and
film experience, even while pressing these into service in the present. But as
scholarship in the history of film theory develops, there is an urgent need to
revisit many long-standing assumptions and clarify lines of transmission and
interpretation. The Key Debates is a series of books from Amsterdam University
Press which focuses on the central issues that continue to animate thinking
about film and audiovisual media as the “century of celluloid” gives way to a field
of interrelated digital media.
Initiated by Annie van den Oever (the Netherlands), the direction of the series
has been elaborated by an international group of film scholars, including Domin-
ique Chateau (France), Ian Christie (UK), Laurent Creton (France), Laura Mulvey
(UK), Roger Odin (France), Eric de Kuyper (Belgium), and Emile Poppe (Bel-
gium). The intention is to draw on the widest possible range of expertise to pro-
vide authoritative accounts of how debates around film originated, and to trace
how concepts that are commonly used today have been modified in the process
of appropriation. The book series may contribute to both the invention as well as
the abduction of concepts.





Technē/Technology is not a book organized around a single thesis – except the as-
sertion that technique is a major concern for film and media scholars, whether
we approach this in terms of philosophy, techno-aesthetics, semiotics, apparatus
theory, (new) film history, media archaeology, the industry or sensory/cognitive
experience. It deliberately includes contributions by scholars working in very dif-
ferent ways on a wide range of technology-related issues; but it does so in the
spirit of the series, The Key Debates, in which Technē/Technology marks the start of a
second phase of unique transnational co-operation, centrally between the Neth-
erlands, France and the UK. The series has already supported a number of stimu-
lating symposia and workshops in all three countries, and produced three collec-
tions: Ostrannenie (2010), Subjectivity (2011), and Audiences (2012). The series, like
this particular book, owes much to Ian Christie, who never fails to generously
add precision, critical insight and overview to a discussion, and to our loyal third
series editor, Dominique Chateau, who, in one of our Paris meetings, was the
first to stress that a book on technology was paramount in our series, not only
because the topic is debated so often and so eagerly in our field of studies, but
also because philosophies of technologies tend to reflect recent and past techno-
logical transitions and in turn have transformed film theory and some of its key
concepts.
One of the real challenges of this project was to bring an international group
of scholars together from a variety of countries, speaking different languages,
and coming from different disciplines and academic traditions. The real plea-
sure was to see all the different inputs come together, challenge and contradict
each other, to form a coherent whole. The ongoing dialogues with all the
authors from which the book grew were in themselves inspirational. Therefore I
wish to express my sincere gratitude to both the contributors to this book as
well as to the members of the Editorial Board and some other colleagues for
their enthusiastic and unrelenting support and extremely generous intellectual
contributions to our book series in every phase of its becoming, and to this
book in particular. For their contributions to this book, I sincerely thank Geof-
frey Winthrop-Young, Martin Lefebvre, Robert Sinnerbrink, Annemone Ligensa,
Benoît Turquety, Patrick Crogan, Markus Stauff, Céline Scemama, Pasi Väliaho,
Laurent Jullier, Nanna Verhoeff, Heidi Rae Cooley, Malte Hagener, Karel Dib-
11
bets, Francesco Pitassio, Ed Tan, Andreas Fickers, and André Gaudreault. Some
of the Editorial Board members were already present at the very first meeting
which helped to shape the series and they still help us to move ahead. I once
again like to thank Laura Mulvey, Roger Odin, Francesco Casetti, Laurent Cre-
ton, Jane Gaines, Frank Kessler, András Bálint Kovács, Eric de Kuyper, Patricia
Pisters, Emile Poppe, Pere Salabert, Heide Schlüpmann and Vivian Sobchack. I
also like to thank Janet Staiger for accepting our invitation to become a member
of our Advisory Board to fill the empty space which was so sadly left open by
Miriam Hansen’s passing.
In addition to thanking all the authors who responded to a tight deadline,
acknowledgment is due to the previous publisher of one contribution which is
reprinted here; I cordially thank Ariane de Pree from Stanford University Press
for allowing the reprint of “What Are Media?” and its author Lambert Wiesing
for his extremely generous support to our project.
The project has also depended vitally on generous funding from the Nether-
lands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO), and on sympathetic support
from Birkbeck College, University of London; the University of Groningen; and
Université Paris 1, Panthéon-Sorbonne. I am grateful to colleagues at the Univer-
sity of Groningen who have supported and made possible my involvement in this
project, particularly the Head of the Groningen Research Institute for the Study
of Culture (ICOG), Liesbeth Korthals Altes, and ICOG’s eternally supportive ex-
ecutive, Gorus van Oordt. I am also particularly grateful for our ongoing debates
on film, media, and art-related topics to Barend van Heusden and the Depart-
ment of Arts, Culture, and Media; to Pascal Gielen and Thijs Lijster from the
Centre for Arts in Society; and last, but certainly not least, to the Film team and
the Film Archive’s team of the University of Groningen. In the series of exhibi-
tions and workshops we organized so far, our February 2013 Symposium on the
Film Archive as a Research Laboratory, hosted with Giovanna Fossati as Head
Curator of the EYE Film Institute, The Netherlands, stands out as an intellectually
inspiring enterprise from which I have learned a great deal, some of which has
helped shape this book. I wish to thank Sabine Lenk, Susan Aasman, Andreas
Fickers, Heide Schlüpmann, Eef Masson, Jan Holmberg, Annelies van Noortwijk,
Anna Backman Rogers, Miklós Kiss, Julian Hanich, Axel Roch, Johan Stadtman,
Jaukje van Wonderen and the unrelenting Giovanna Fossati for support and in-
spiration.
Finally, I must pay tribute to Viola ten Hoorn, without whose immense help
and wonderful precision the book would not have been assembled so joyfully in
such a short time; and to publisher Jeroen Sondervan, who has been extremely
supportive of the whole series, as well as this volume. I sincerely thank Amster-
dam University Press. This also includes the staff members who did wonderful
work for this and the proceeding books: Magdalena Hernas for International
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Marketing, Chantal Nicolaes for editing, and Sabine Mannel, who, once again,
designed the cover.




Introduction: Researching Cinema and
Media Technologies
Annie van den Oever
In an anthology of terms presented in a Surinam newspaper on February 25,
1898,1 an anonymous journalist summed up the more than fifty different terms
which were used by technicians to label the new technical inventions (and pa-
tents) which they came up with after the amazingly successful Lumière invention
of the kinematograph. The long list of terms clearly indicates the powerful im-
pact of the new Lumière technology on other technicians’ imaginary:
[…] kinegraaf, kinetograaf, kinematograaf, kinematoterm, kineoptoskoop, ki-
neoptikon, kinematoskoop, kinebleposkoop, kinegrafoskoop, kinevivagraaf,
kinesetograaf, photokinematograaf, photoskoop, motophotoskoop, phoio-
troop, mutoskoop, motorgraaf, movendoskoop, mouvementoskoop, mani-
matoskoop , theatograaf, vitagraaf, vitaskoop , vitaphostoskoop, eieroskuop,
kathoskoop, magniskoop, mutoskoop, phonendoskoop, gerialgraaf, steriop-
tikon, fammograat, zoograaf, biograaf, heligraaf, velegraaf, rollograaf, arto-
graaf, vivendograaf, vitamotograaf, kinestereograaf, badizograaf, heliecine-
graaf, phautograaf, panoramograaf, pantobiograaf, pantomimograaf,
chronophotograaf, photochronograaf, scenamatograaf, pictorialograaf.2
The journalist’s point was to show how deeply the Lumière kinematograph had
affected and inspired the other inventors and also how quick they were to jump
on the bandwagon in hopes to profit from this lucrative invention themselves by
slightly changing the new technology and putting the seemingly new invention
under the protection of a new patent of their own. The long list of terms also
suggests the many different ways in which technicians envisioned the new tech-
nology to be further developed for a great variety of future uses. Clearly, the
“truly new” Lumière innovation evoked all sorts of new ideas in the minds of
other inventors, artists as well as technicians, and triggered an energetic torrent
of copying activities and some further vibrant experiments, producing a stream
of minor and major inventions. It created one of those intervals of bliss with new
technological inventions that affected people far beyond the circle of engineers.
As the writer of War and Peace and Anna Karenina, Lev Tolstoy, for instance re-
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marked in his diary entry of April 26, 1895, describing a day in which he took his
daughter Sasha and a friend to the theater, the little girls were apparently so
excited and affected by the electric lights that they could hardly take in much
more of the matinée.3 If it is largely by technology that contemporary society
hangs together, as philosophers have stated,4 then it should not surprise us that
technology also caught quite a bit of attention of philosophers. For similar rea-
sons did it attract attention from film and media scholars. Not only had the
young practice called “cinema”5 from its early years onwards been saturated
with hardware, people in the industry had also been quick to understand that the
new technological inventions demanded a skilful and artful use. The Greek word
τεχνικός (technikos) means “of or pertaining to art, artistic, skilful.” The term
“technikos,” as the etymological root of “technique,” situates the technical in
the field between art and hardware, in other words, between technology (as
knowledge of techniques) and knowledge of a skilful or artful use.6 There are
film scholars who have argued that film history is the history of technology (for
an overview, see Benoît Turquety in this book). Moreover, the history of theories
of film certainly is punctuated with theories of technology. In all these theories,
the impact of cinema’s technologies on the viewers played a crucial role. To
name but a few: Louis Delluc, Germaine Dulac, Jean Epstein and others theorized
on photogénie and the close-up; Sergei Eisenstein, Vsevolod Pudovkin, Dziga Ver-
tov on montage; Rudolph Arnheim on techno-perception; Jean Baudry and Chris-
tian Metz on the “apparatus” of the cinema. They affected film studies in major
ways. Furthermore, some major 20th-century philosophers and media scholars,
who were made to rethink the impact of (media) technologies on culture, had a
considerable impact on the fields of film studies and media archaeology. An ob-
vious example is Walter Benjamin, who was to reassess the rupture in perception
and aesthetics created by the new cinema machine and more in general the ef-
fects of mechanical reproduction on the aura of the artwork. Another example is
Marshall McLuhan, who was as much inspired by the new era of television as he
was by Harold Innis, when he coined the famous slogan that the “medium is the
message.” A third example, from the new era of digital media of the 1990s, is
Friedrich Kittler, who inspired attention for the medium’s materiality and the
distinction between technische Medien (technical media) such as photo and cinema-
tographic media, and other communication media such as language. Yet others
like Bernard Stiegler, who constructed a post-phenomenological account of the
mediated experience, and Paul Virilio, who explored the “logistics of perception”
and the ways in which media technologies and wars are tied together, also had a
considerable impact on the fields of film and media studies.
One of the questions to be addressed in this book is how the new philosophies
(of technology) created in relation to major technological transformations – such
as the new philosophies of technology formulated by Benjamin, Heidegger,
McLuhan, Kittler, Stiegler, or Virilio – could or did contribute in turn to the
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modification of film theory and some of its key concepts. A second question is
whether there is perhaps something distinctly cyclical to this, meaning that the
intervals in which theorizing on technology took priority were intercut by inter-
vals of relative silence with regard to the question of technology. A third question
to be addressed is whether the theoretical shifts instigated by Benjamin, Heideg-
ger, Kittler and others could be made productive for the field of film studies.
These questions are even more pressing when we take into account that the cin-
ema (as suggested above) is generally perceived of as a practice ruled by hard-
ware, and that film as an artifact and a medium were often firstly affected on a
very practical level by the introduction of new technologies, but once these tech-
nologies were well and truly appropriated, they, secondly, called into question
the very underpinnings of the field. For instance: Did the new digital simulation,
recording, editing and projecting technologies not call into question theories of
“realism” in film, suggesting they had reached their expiry date? Since the early
1990s, which saw the beginning of the digital era, many contemporary scholars
have been preoccupied by theoretical issues related to the context of media tech-
nologies. Film history and film theory were reassessed by them over and over
again. It is the objective of this book to contribute to this enterprise.
introduction: researching cinema and media technologies 17
Fig. 1: Details from a Zeis Ikon 35 mm projector. Photo made by Johan
Stadtman. Courtesy of the Film Archive, University of Groningen.
About this Book
Part I opens with Dominique Chateau’s “The Philosophy of Technology in the
Frame of Film Theory,” in which he returns to Walter Benjamin’s famous essay
on “The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility.” This semi-
nal text has repeatedly been a source for reflections on the birth of the cinema
and the impact of technology on culture in the past twenty years. Chateau’s con-
tribution to the discussion of technology envisioned in this book, however, uses
Benjamin’s text as a case to study the reciprocal relation between technological
and theoretical innovation. He starts with a question which is of fundamental
interest for the field at this point in time: If major technological transitions felt
by everyone tend to trigger new theories or philosophies of technology, then the
question raised is also whether the new cluster of ideas related to such technolo-
gical transitions in turn have contributed to the transformation of film theory and
several of its key concepts. Chateau first of all demonstrates that “The Work of
Art” provides a substantial ground for this discussion, as Benjamin presents a
series of answers to the very question he raises with a degree of relevance for the
different time periods in which they were reassessed. Chateau does not present a
linear reading of “The Work of Art.” He sees the essay as “a network of con-
cepts” whose interrelations offer a “matrix” which one can use to interpret the
implications of the invention of cinema as well as the advent of the digital revo-
lution.
In “Toward an Archaeology of the Cinema/Technology Relation: From Me-
chanization to ‘Digital Cinema’” Benoît Turquety looks at the historiography of
the cinema from the outside in, as if he were not part of it, in an attempt to re-
establish the history and historiography of the cinema within the now often for-
gotten context of the social sciences of the time. He starts with the statement that
the history of the cinematic medium has established itself from the very begin-
ning as a technological history. According to Turquety, the patents regarding cin-
ematic innovations issued during the early phase of the cinema and their eco-
nomic and patriotic implications; and the scientific curiosity from which sprung
many of those innovations that shaped the cinema as we now know it, are tell-
tale signs of the preoccupation of the cinema with technology. Not surprisingly,
motion picture-oriented publications between 1895 and 1925 all focused on de-
scribing the “evolution of the machines,” and the “historical-ideological determi-
nation” of important innovations. In addressing such issues, Turquety lays bare
the complex, multi-faceted relation between the history of cinema and the history
of technology, where cinema is characterized through technology, and vice versa.
In the forties and early fifties, an era marked by television and the atom bomb
and a cascade of new devices that ushered in the new era of consumerism in the
West, Martin Heidegger reflected on the complex relation between technology
and humanity. His Die Frage nach der Technik [The Question Concerning Technol-
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ogy] has become a classic of indisputable value. In “Technē and Poiēsis: On Hei-
degger and Film Theory,” film philosopher Robert Sinnerbrink assesses Heideg-
ger’s (potential) impact on film theory. First of all, Sinnerbrink acknowledges
that although Heidegger’s philosophy of subjectivity and his re-thinking of the
“question of Being” have transformed modern thought, and despite the fact that
it is obvious that existential phenomenology, hermeneutics, deconstruction and
French poststructuralism all “owe a debt to Heidegger’s work,” Heidegger ap-
pears to be a philosopher who has little to offer contemporary film scholars.
After all, he rarely commented on the topic of film. Nevertheless, despite his
skepticism concerning photography (and by association, cinema), Heidegger
was notorious as a critic of the modern age. In “Technē and Poiēsis,” Sinnerbrink’s
objective is to show the significance of Heidegger’s thought for contemporary
film and media theory and the philosophy of cinema by addressing two impor-
tant facets of Heidegger’s view: the “question of technics” in modernity and its
meaning for audiovisual media; and the idea of a “Heideggerian poetics” of mod-
ern art, “having the poetic power to disclose new horizons and worlds,” an idea
with substantial implications for re-thinking what cinema can be.
Bernard Stiegler is a philosopher of technology with a keen interest in time. In
“Stiegler’s Post-Phenomenological Account of Mediated Experience,” Patrick
Crogan argues that in Technics and Time Stiegler developed a substantial critical
renovation of phenomenological approaches to experience by focusing on the
mediation and transmission of experience through techniques and artifacts.
More specifically, Crogan examines Stiegler’s notion of the “industrial temporal
object.” To assess the significance of Stiegler’s new theorization of cinema in the
context of his wider project, Crogan presents an overview of Stiegler’s account of
the role played by technics in general (and mnemotechnics, in particular) in the
dynamics of human life as a form of “technical life.” Digital (including digital
audiovisual) media forms having emerged recently, the current period is ap-
proached as “post-cinematic,” lying between the epoch of analog and digital sys-
tems of recording, representation, communication and simulation. Crogan ar-
gues that Stiegler’s philosophical views on the cinematic experience of
“disorientation,” and its critical and cultural potentials are invaluable to film the-
ory today, not only because they offer a reconsideration of cinema as a technocul-
tural form that has transformed human life globally, but also because they offer
insights into “how the post-cinematic digital media are transforming the condi-
tions of the production of experience today.”
Media technologies have saturated the current practices of communication and
representation. These technologies urgently demand research from media stud-
ies; moreover, a critical reassessment of the ways in which media studies have
defined “media” so far. In “What Are Media?” Lambert Wiesing poses the ques-
tion of how to define media in a provocative way. “When we look at the current
state of media studies, we might well think that it may be better not to ask the
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question, What are media? but rather, What isn’t a medium? Indeed the situation
seems to be such that media studies is determined by a rather large number of
concepts of media that are, however, equally wide, in part even unlimited.” A
second problem, as he argues, is that research in media studies is determined
“by concepts of media that to a worrisome degree have moved away from the
everyday understanding of the medium as a means of communication.” (Com-
munication, understood by Wiesing, includes all forms of exchange of informa-
tion, even representations and the arts.) To demonstrate his point, he analyzes
the main theses of the media theories that dominate media studies: the technical-
oriented approach of Marshall McLuhan; the system-theoretical approach of Nik-
las Luhmann; and phenomenological media theories (with elaborate quotes ta-
ken from Merleau-Ponty). A crucial problem Wiesing brings forward is the
“transparency” of the medium (e.g., Merleau-Ponty’s classical example of lan-
guage: when simply used as a means to transmit meaning, the medium itself
will go unnoticed). If “transparency” is taken as a pivotal feature of media, as
media phenomenologists tend to do, the notion of a “medium” inevitably is
broadened in a problematic way, to include all “means that remain unthematized
during their employment.” In the second half of his chapter, Wiesing rethinks
the notion of “medium” in terms of the classical idea of Husserl’s phenomenol-
ogy, the distinction between genesis and validity, with remarkable results. First of
all, he argues that media are “tools that make it possible to separate genesis from
validity.” Secondly, he defines media accordingly, as “tools or means that are
transparent during their employment; but they are also specific tools that are
capable of something that other tools cannot achieve, namely a separation of
genesis and validity.” Thirdly, he explains the complex notion of “validity” (as
used by Husserl) to conclude that media “are precisely those tools that make it
possible that not just something equivalent but also the very same thing can be seen,
heard, and thought at different times, in different places, by different people –
and this likely is the reason why media can hardly be overestimated in their
anthropological significance.”
Part II presents a series of reflections on cinema and media technologies, de-
scribing and assessing the ways in which the relations between the “hardware,”
the “software” and the “wetware” are visualized, schematized, hypothesized and
conceptualized in current cinema research as well as in past theories. One objec-
tive is to explore the impact of particular (new) cinema technologies (e.g., 3D;
digital technologies) on audiences in terms of perceptual impact, cognitive pro-
cesses, affects and emotions. Another objective is to determine if and how new
developments of the hardware and new practices of usages may have affected
theorizing and how the combined factors of technological, cultural and social
aspects have been approached in theories (e.g., on television, on early cinema,
on new and digital media) in the last decades. This part of the book opens with a
reassessment of the “history of vision”-debate by Annemone Ligensa and a re-
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flection on the so-called modernity thesis and early cinema studies. The basic
assumptions of the “history of vision”-debate have had a considerable impact on
cinema and media research. According to Ligensa, its assumptions are particu-
larly relevant today, because of the similarities between early cinema’s historical
emergence as a modern, commercial mass medium and our current, global “di-
gital revolution.” The assumptions developed in the context of early cinema stud-
ies regarding the considerable (perceptual) impact of the cinema machine on
viewers – highly influential since the late 1980s – have been challenged by scho-
lars from the fields of cognitive and evolutionary psychology, who argue that
perception is biologically determined and thus fairly stable. As Ligensa shows,
some scholars have argued that this debate is “mostly due to differences in the
definition of ‘perception’ (the content vs. the process of perception, sensory per-
ception vs. apperception etc.).” Understanding the basic psychological processes
of media reception, regardless of their unchangeable or changeable nature, Li-
gensa argues, is important when studying contemporary or historical audiences.
She therefore proposes to take an interdisciplinary stance to the study of media-
related behavior, following John L. Sherry’s plea for a “neuroscience paradigm”
that offers a “systemic model of behavior that would investigate the interaction of
biology and culture.” The “history of vision”-debate, Ligensa contends, has been
fierce and polemics have not always been subtle, but at least it has opened up
discussions between scholars from various disciplinary fields which can certainly
benefit cinema and media studies.
Ian Christie’s chapter on 3D, “Will the 3D Revolution Happen?,” offers a de-
tailed analysis of the arguments and positions taken in the 3D debate by critics,
viewers and theorists alike, ranging from the recent and substantial defense and
promotion by Avatar director James Cameron, to the fierce and vicious attacks
in articles and blogs by Roger Ebert and other disapproving critics, to the very
elegant and well-argued pieces on “stereoscopy” in the works of Bazin and Ei-
senstein. Some crucial questions are: What does 3D (stereoscopy) do exactly?
And is what the new 3D technologies can do, or claim to do, effective? Moreover,
Is it appreciated by the audiences (who have to pay extra)? Is the new technology
put to good use by the directors? Interestingly, both Bazin and Eisenstein, early
on, produced rich and highly interesting essays on the topic. These essays are
nevertheless relatively unknown, and thus remained understudied in the field of
film studies, which is even more surprising as Bazin and Eisenstein are among
the best-known and well-read theorists of the cinema worldwide. Christie care-
fully analyzes Bazin’s and Eisenstein’s arguments within the context of their
work. Besides addressing the current, and perhaps already waning, “3D boom”
in cinema, Christie focuses on the late 1940s and early 1950s, a brief period when
3D again successfully emerged in the cinema, in part as a response to the new
rival on the scene; the mass medium of television. The very detailed analysis of
the development of 3D that Christie explores shows that although the entertain-
introduction: researching cinema and media technologies 21
ment and leisure industry was initially responsible for the appropriation of
stereoscopic technology from the pre-cinema era onwards, unsuspected fields
such as medicine and warfare also made use of the technology.
In “Television’s Many Technologies: Domesticity, Governmentality, Geneal-
ogy,” television scholar Markus Stauff demonstrates that research on television
provides interesting provocations to existing definitions of technology as found
in film and media studies, and most clearly with respect to television’s latest
transformations, which undermine any clear technical definition of the medium.
Technological innovations change and challenge the identity of the medium –
but this may be a truth all too obvious, Stauff argues. Hence he proceeds to look
at the period where technological innovations and radical transformations per-
haps seem less pronounced: the “seemingly more simple television landscape
between the 1960s and 1990s.” Thus “classic” research on (mainstream) televi-
sion is a good place to start. Interestingly, however, the everyday medium that
came into existence in that specific period, simple as it may seem, Stauff argues,
triggers some highly relevant reflections on the question of technology in media
development precisely because of its “domestic character.” Moreover, as televi-
sion combines the “day-to-day use of highly complex machinery” with constantly
changing connections with other domestic technologies, the medium as such
poses “quite different questions than the more public use of technology in cin-
ema” or “the mobile always-connectedness of digital media.” In his overview,
Stauff carefully analyzes the “intricate relationship between technology as techni-
cal system, as material object, as social practice, and as techniques of the body.”
In “Postmodern Hi-fi vs. Post-Cool Lo-fi: An Epistemological War,” Laurent
Jullier addresses the question, How can I know, as a spectator of a fictional nar-
rative, what a Napoleonian battle was like? In other words, does a film displaying
an 18th-century battle allow the spectator access to a “real” believable knowledge
of the world?; and which technological devices does film employ to provide this
kind of realism? Thus, Jullier aims to show the way in which the antagonistic
cinematic hi-fi and lo-fi apparatuses (high fidelity, low fidelity) are trying to pro-
vide some reliable “real” knowledge to the spectator. In a detailed case study
exploring the epistemological dichotomy of hi-fi and lo-fi technology, Jullier
shows that computer-generated imagery (CGI) is usually associated with the hi-
fi device to provide an often photo-realistic bird-eye view of the world, whereas
the lo-fi device usually implies the use of a hand-held shaky camera to record the
world in a “run-and-gun style” that manages to put the spectator right at the
heart of the battlefield. The hi-fi apparatus, Jullier explains, refers to a postmo-
dern exocentric type of encoding environment data: “It allows a kind of disembo-
died experience in order to embrace the wholeness of a scene.” The lo-fi appara-
tus, on the other hand, refers to a, what Jullier labels, “post-cool,” egocentric type
of encoding environment data. These two competing types of encoding are not
mutually exclusive, Jullier indicates, as both aim to describe “a scene with the
22 annie van den oever
most possible accuracy.” Therefore it should not come as a surprise that hi-fi and
lo-fi technologies are more and more intermingled in each new release. Using
these devices to achieve “realism” does come at a price, Jullier argues, especially
in France, where (orthodox) modernist cinephiles still tend to favor getting ab-
sorbed in the diegesis over being wowed by audiovisual excesses they simply do
not feel comfortable with. Another threat to the harmony between audience and
aesthetic features, Jullier argues, is the ageing of technology. Just as the popular
use of zoom-in telephoto lenses of the 1970s, 3D CGI, too, will someday lose its
evocative power and become an outmoded device in the history of film style.
Thus, the way we interpret technological effects, Jullier explains, “varies through
time and depends on cinephile communities.” Nevertheless, filmmakers and
spectators do not refrain from airing their preferences for “the so-called lo-fi or
hi-fi ways of making images,” which in turn leaves film scholars with an array of
interesting arguments that phrase these preferences.
Pasi Väliaho opens Part III of the book by recalling that the histories and the-
ories of cinema are in most cases approached in terms of the technology of pro-
jection, in line with the pre-cinema tradition of optical spectacles and magic
theaters. An alternative conception of cinema is created by the focus on the tech-
nologies for the recording of movement as pointed out in the context of the late-
19th-century life sciences in particular. Well documented (by Marta Braun, Mary
Ann Doane, etc.), it was in this context that pre-cinematic devices such as chron-
ophotographic apparatuses as well as graphic self-recording machines were de-
veloped to track down the living object in terms of its dynamic expressions. A
whole complex of various kinds of machines was produced to capture and repro-
duce “movement,” which was seen as the essence of life. This series of machines
was epitomized by the “chronophotographic gun” Étienne-Jules Marey made in
1882, as Väliaho indicates. In his “Marey’s Gun: Apparatuses of Capture and the
Operational Image,” he explores the alternative trajectory of cinema’s history as
indicated to account for the medium as a specific kind of apparatus (Michel Fou-
cault, Giorgio Agamben, Jean-Louis Déotte) of knowing and reproducing the
moving and the living. He analyzes how cinema and pre-cinematic technologies
gave rise to a particular kind of “diagrammatic vision,” the function and purpose
of which was “to track down, automate, abstract as well as take control of the
dynamics of living beings.” On a more philosophical level, he discusses the rela-
tionships between technology, perception and power, which Väliaho sees in rela-
tion to scientific technologies of visualization and modernity’s biopolitical proj-
ect (the notion of “biopolitical” refers to Foucault’s idea of the apparatus). Lastly,
Pasi Väliaho points out links between the late-19th-century diagrammatic vision
and today’s screen-based systems of control of populations, e.g., automated ma-
chine-perception as well as digital face recognition technologies.
Early Soviet film is in many ways exemplary of technē in action, if only because
the pivotal figures (Sergei Eisenstein, Dziga Vertov, Vsevolod Pudovkin, Alexan-
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der Dovshenko) tended to learn the trade by partaking in the extensive practice of
re-editing films made by (often famous) foreign directors (Griffith among them),
whose films, regardless of their qualities and reputations, were put back on the
montage table and cut in shape before they were found suitable by new Soviet
Union’s censors to be distributed for screening to post-revolutionary Soviet audi-
ences. Being invited to cut up movies other (brilliant) directors made – was that
not considered an avant-garde dream? Moreover, this was part of a variety of
ephemeral activities, ranging from alternative screening practices (e.g., film fes-
tivals), teaching, publishing, to film collecting, known as film culture today, as
Malte Hagener has shown in his study Moving Forward, Looking Back (2007). In
“Re-editing as Psychotechnique: Montage and Mediality in Early Soviet Cinema,”
he shows how the specific avant-garde context gave rise to a creative employment
of the medium’s possibilities. Although in different ways, Vertov and Eisenstein
both put the materiality and mediality of film at center stage. Analyzing them
from this perspective, Hagener argues that Eisenstein’s [early] thinking on mon-
tage “can be summarized as a series of ideas on psychotechnics and biomecha-
nics related to how film technology and mental activity intersect.” Hagener
mostly focuses on the years directly after the Russian revolution, 1919-1924, just
before Eisenstein, Pudovkin and Dovshenko “suddenly and seemingly out of no-
where bursts onto the scene.” The cases and context Hagener presents here allow
him to “to rethink the nexus of style and technology as a complex negotiation in
which neither side dominates the other, thus avoiding any kind of determinism.”
The Italian film theorist Francesco Pitassio devotes his attention to the inter-
war period in Italy, more specifically the “technophobic” tendency in Italian film
theory in the 1920s and 1930s triggered by, or feeding on, Italian idealism. In
“Technophobia and Italian Film Theory in the Interwar Period,” Pitassio states
that Italian film scholars of the interwar period were “technophobic” in that they
feared the effects of technology. Their attitude stands in sharp contrast to the
keen interest in cinema’s technological innovations eagerly discussed within
early European film theory (certainly in the 1920s) at large; one need only think
of the French debate on photogénie or the Russian debate on montage. As opposed
to this, Italian film theorists according to Pitassio shied away from the European
technology debate by framing their theories in terms of the mainly idealist prem-
ises and concepts handed to them by the prominent Italian philosophers of the
time. Moreover, Italian film theorists tried to define and examine cinema within
the broader context of media systems as an apparatus belonging to modern life.
In addition to previous research done on the period, Pitassio aims at providing an
in-depth analysis of the institutional, philosophical and political frames which
determined Italian film theory in relation to technology in the interwar period.
Video is perhaps the technological invention of the post-war era that was to
affect the field of film studies more than any other technology, if only because it
gave the field a device to easily rewind and reassess films for the first time in its
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history. In Death 24x a Second (2006), Laura Mulvey already reflected on its pro-
found and lasting impact on the field, cleverly alluding to Jean-Luc Godard’s use
of video in her book title. His masterpiece of the early 1980s, Histoire(s) du
Cinéma, has the ominous subtitle Cogito ergo video. Even though his transforma-
tion of the Cartesian phrase – “Cogito ergo video” – is sometimes considered hu-
morous, as Godard-expert Céline Scemama argues in this book, it is nevertheless
a founding principle for him and his film provides a discourse on his method.
How could one present a history of the cinema before the existence of video?
How to collect, select, assess, play and rewind all the fragments that make up
the history of the cinema (for Godard)? How to creatively play with the new pos-
sibilities video allows and invites? In part, Histoire(s) du Cinéma is Godard’s
reassessment of the relations between technē and poiēsis in the field of film. Many
philosophers and film theorists reflected on the topic before him and many of
them are referred to by Godard. One of them, Béla Balázs, referred to here by
Scemama, once wrote, “Technological inventions bring the idea of a new art
form. But once the idea exists, [...] it inspires technology in turn, gives it a direc-
tion and a specific mission.” Scemama argues that what matters is not so much
whether Godard’s interest in new technologies put him ahead of his time, but
rather the way in which he instantly thought of using them to serve his outlook
on the times.
In “Performativity/Expressivity: The Mobile Micro Screen and Its Subject,”
Nanna Verhoeff and Heidi Rae Cooley reflect on the performative and expressive
qualities of current-day technologies such as mobile screens that presently satu-
rate private and public life and their impact on the subject. They ask themselves,
in what way performativity and subjectivity are central to an understanding of
technology. Their reflections are informed by a tradition of cinema and visual
culture studies on the one hand, and science and technology studies and new
materialism on the other. In order to theorize new media technologies and re-
lated practices, Verhoeff and Cooley mobilize Peircean semiotics in their explora-
tion of the performative and expressive features of ubiquitous mobile technolo-
gies. They argue that it is in these performative and expressive inscriptions that
technologies have cultural, social and historical embedding and meaning. In
their chapter, they explore how the specific “dispositif of mobility,” and the
“fluid spatio-temporality of emergence” – which they see as the underpinnings
of the new “visual regime of navigation” created by mobile screens – require that
theorists and media scholars acknowledge that technologies, practices and sub-
jects are now in a particularly dynamic relationship.
Part IV is devoted to two discussions, one on Friedrich Kittler as a major media
theorist, who had a considerable impact on the field of film studies and the
young discipline of media archaeology; and a second discussion on Christian
Metz and his so-called “apparatus theory.” These discussions have the form of a
dialogue. “Rethinking the Materiality of Technical Media: Friedrich Kittler, Enfant
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Terrible with a Rejuvenating Effect on Parental Discipline” presents a dialogue
with media expert and Kittler translator Geoffrey Winthrop-Young. The second
dialogue, “Revisiting Christian Metz’s ‘Apparatus Theory,’” presents a discus-
sion with film theorist and Metz expert Martin Lefebvre, who has had access to
the Metz archive since 2008 and is able to consult Metz’s personal writings to
contextualize the apparatus theory. These two dialogues are meant to discuss
and reassess the work of these two major thinkers and their productivity for film
and media studies today. For further introductions, see the beginning of Part IV.
In Part V the future of film and media studies is envisioned in two radically
different chapters. The first one is written by André Gaudreault and is entitled
“The Future History of a Vanishing Medium.” In a playful, tongue-in-cheek way,
he reflects on the so-called “digital revolution” and the question of the “death of
cinema,” which is announced and mourned each and every time a major new
technology presents itself in the field to rival the cinema. Gaudreault specifically
aims at envisioning the possible impact on future film historiography by the an-
nounced disappearance of celluloid under the influence of the current digital
revolution of which we have not yet seen the end. “We too are also in the midst of a
process of mutation. We as film viewers, but also as active members of the small
community of film studies scholars.” The question is: How profoundly will the cin-
ema change and how will cinema studies change in its wake? Gaudreault’s analy-
sis and vision are voiced by a stand-in of a younger generation, who speaks to us
from a distant point in the future.
The last chapter in this book, “Experimental Media Archaeology: A Plea for
New Directions,” is written by media historian Andreas Fickers and me. It envi-
sions a future for film and media studies in the form of a plea. Acknowledging
that media studies and the young discipline of media archaeology have done im-
portant work to put the study of media on the map in the humanities, and that
media-saturated life at this point in time implores researchers to address impor-
tant media-related questions head-on, we plead for a further step in terms of
studying the materiality of media. Inspired by the idea of historical re-enactment,
we provide a theory and a method to study media practices and the ways in which
use is inscribed in media head-on and hands-on. We envision ways not only to
close the gap between media studies in the humanities and the sciences, but also
to use the immense collections of media apparatuses (l’appareil de base) waiting in
film and other archives for further research. Ultimately, we would like to initiate
and stimulate a dialogue between the academic community of film and media
scholars with engineers, curators, archivists and the millions of media amateurs,
collectors and other technical experts who wish to share their expertise and
knowledge in online platforms and home pages.






The Philosophy of Technology in the
Frame of Film Theory:
Walter Benjamin’s Contribution
Dominique Chateau
Many contemporary authors have been preoccupied by theoretical issues related
to the context of media that has surrounded us since the beginning of the digital
era, and because of which we will experience a period of transition that will last
as long as digitization keeps developing and involving more and more aspects of
our daily lives. However, what has already been changed and established provides
a good basis for certain conjectures. One may wonder, for instance, if the new set
of facts and ideas related to such technological transformations could possibly
contribute in turn to the transformation of film theory and some of its key con-
cepts. The persistence of cinema is indeed obvious: films are still being made as
audiovisual works destined to entertain audiences, among other functions. It is
nonetheless just as obvious that the digital revolution has had an important im-
pact on this persistence.
In the following, I will try to show how Walter Benjamin’s well-known essay,
“The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility,” can provide a
serious ground of discussion for this issue, as it contains answers to a large
number of questions raised by it. This does not mean that it would suffice to
directly apply Benjamin’s propositions to the current situation. Indeed, those
propositions have been regularly re-evaluated, not only with regard to their inter-
nal logic, but also to their degree of relevance in the light of the different time
periods in which they were reassessed. A collection of texts entitled The Work of
Art in the Digital Age1 examines Benjamin’s arguments one by one and re-evaluates
his propositions in the light of our digital modernity. I, for one, have given the
aura concept a close examination, along with the argumentation from which it
came.2 This led me to be more attentive to the concept of aestheticization and to
realize that my opinion was not so much altered by the value of those previously
studied arguments as it was by the viewpoint from which they had to be exam-
ined.
I then thought it would prove advantageous to abandon a strictly linear reading
of “The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility” and rather
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consider the text as a network of concepts, whose interrelations offered an ex-
emplary – and by no means intangible – matrix, which could be used to interpret
the consequences of the invention of cinema and the advent of the digital revolu-
tion. This being said, I am fully aware that studying this text requires certain
transpositions, which a simple analysis of its title might already reveal, as my
topic is not so much “the work of art” as films in general. Nevertheless, it is
significant that Benjamin, instead of limiting the scope of his study to artistic
films, takes into account the birth of new art forms, or at least of new more or
less artistic forms of production which appeared in the context of the democrati-
zation of culture and its accessibility to the masses. Neither is my topic about
“technological reproducibility” – if reduced to analogical processes, at least –
but about digital technology, which still involves analogy at the same time as it
is based on a generalized digital coding of visual and auditory signals, since the
digital transmission of a signal does not prevent the latter from appearing on a
screen and, as such, requires a visual transcoding system and, for the viewer, an
analogical decoding process.
Last of all, when considering “Benjamin’s text,” one must think of it as a pa-
limpsest, and not a single finished work. Indeed, which specific text is one con-
sidering exactly? One of the two existing German versions or their French coun-
terpart? All the versions were written in 1935-1936 and present very slight
variations – whether small lacunas or alternative formulations. For convenience’s
sake, I will mainly be referring to the second version of the text – unpublished
during the author’s lifetime – translated by Edmund Jephcott and Harry Zohn, as
it appears in the collection of Benjamin’s texts published by Harvard University
Press.3 I will also be quoting from Benjamin’s own version in French, “L’Œuvre
d’art à l’époque de sa reproduction mécanisée,” in the Gallimard edition en-
riched with paralipomena and variations, from “The Work of Art in the Age of
Mechanical Reproduction,” Andy Blunden’s translation of this French version4
and, at last, from the French translation, which presents the German version of
the text in its most complete form.5
The Benjaminian Matrix
Benjamin’s essay is one of those singular texts which give the impression of
being written as one reads along. Hence the feeling of rediscovery one gets at
each rereading, because of some previously unnoticed difficulty or brilliant new
idea. To my eyes, weary from pouring over “The Work of Art...” so many times,
this feeling is due to the fact that Benjamin’s text not only accumulates a large
number of ideas, not only interlaces a great number of themes in a sometimes
chaotic argumentation, but also superimposes and disseminates several types of
reflection one seldom finds associated with one another. The Reader may feel
somewhat discouraged by the first part of the text – presented as a Preface in
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certain versions – which seems to set him/her on a dubious path leading to the
commonplace Marxist concept of the relationship between infrastructure and
superstructure or, more simply put, of the relationship between culture – or art –
and production. The reader may also be annoyed by the militant undertones
which can be felt in the first pages – regarding the “revolutionary demands in
the politics of art,”6 as opposed to those advocated by Fascism – and in the
book’s final part – sometimes presented as an epilog – where, as an antidote to
the aestheticization that Fascism is once again accused of, we find the proclama-
tion: “Communism replies by politicizing art.”7
It is obvious that such readers, judging the text in the light of their ideological
prejudices – as they may well be antifascist and not necessarily Marxist – is liable
to put down the book and read no further. That, however, would be a shame.
Actually, any reader – whether ideologically biased or not – could be justified in
feeling such discomfort: it is normal to see a divergence of opinion between one
who looks at a glass as half-full and one who considers it half-empty, and it is
above all the many difficulties contained in the first few pages that might be held
responsible for the reader’s skepticism. The militant undertones we mentioned
above accompany the first difficulty one comes across, as the book’s first theme
– reproduction – is explored. The lateness of culture as compared to production
is here mentioned in reference to the “capitalist mode of production” and the
economic system of capitalism, which the “thesis defining the tendencies of the
development of art under the present conditions of production”8 should be con-
nected to. What is at stake here is no less than the renewal of art theory, a renew-
al which Benjamin wields as an antifascist weapon. Epistemology and ideology
thus merge in a way that may seem irrelevant to an upholder of epistemological
neutrality, and superfluous to an antifascist activist. The reader who dislikes
questions of ideology will of course be reassured once the preface is over, as the
political theme of capitalist production makes way for the technological issue of
reproduction. In fact, it is precisely such a shift that the same reader – a bit fussy
on epistemological matters – might want to criticize.
Instead of trying to carry out an autopsy of Benjamin’s text, one should endea-
vor to do justice to its persistent dynamism and accept its countless shifts from
one form of argumentation to another, inasmuch as they succeed in simulta-
neously establishing the dialectic of the text on several planes: that of technology
and media theory, of art and cinema, of the history of human production, of
cultural history, and finally, that of politics, both as theory and praxis. And here
is our matrix, so to speak... As far as politics is concerned, one should also bear
in mind the dramatic context with which the author was confronted at the time,
and remember the odd analogies that Horkheimer and Adorno, while living in
exile in the United States, both noted between the situations in their host country
and that in Germany: the analogy, for instance, between the radio broadcasting
of concerts conducted by Toscanini and of the Führer’s speeches.9 Retrospec-
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tively, it is in no way surprising to observe that Marx and Engels, when they
prophesized an end to the division of labor and announced that “in a communist
society, there are no painters but at most people who engage in painting among
other activities,”10 gave us a foretaste of the current postmodern discourse which
keeps harping on about the fusion of art in the realm of culture, the advent of
which, paradoxically enough, is considered as a result of the development and
triumph of our liberal-capitalist society!
To the multidisciplinary matrix of the various intellectual modalities through
which Benjamin’s thought progresses, there corresponds the matrix of the
themes which he tackles with remarkable freedom and an intellectual luxuriance
that probably explains the fascination that Benjamin still exerts over us. Four
main notions can be distinguished: first, technology, along with its modes – re-
production included – and effects; secondly, aura, taken as the central concept of
an art theory in the process of being reformulated – given its former importance
and acknowledged decline; art for the masses (and especially cinema), considered
as a cultural dominant feature gradually replacing the traditional definition of art
– as in the status of painting, for instance; finally, in Benjamin’s own terms,
aestheticization, which, in a singular and striking way, includes the metamorphosis
of superstructure submitted to the influence of political forces that have inte-
grated the aesthetic function in the representations they manipulate. All four no-
tions will be developed here, although unevenly, while bearing in mind the inde-
fectible ties that bind them to one another inside the Benjaminian matrix.
The Question of Aesthetic Values in Front of Technology
While dealing with the issues that Benjamin – after Marx – chose to deal with,
one tends to oscillate between the diagnosis and the prognosis. Greek physicians
used to content themselves with anticipating disease outcome – recovery or death
– for lack of adequate diagnoses. The latter indeed require certain material con-
ditions – a stethoscope, for instance – and a sufficient amount of time for their
consequences to be effective. When applied to our topic, this idea translates into
the famous theme of the lateness of superstructure as compared to infrastruc-
ture. According to Marx, the question is not of knowing why such an art form
exists in such historical condition defined by such mode of production, but why
the art of the past – Greek art, for instance – still provides pleasure in the indus-
trial era.11 According to Benjamin, the time has come to establish the diagnosis
of the transformations of culture – that is, to forge the concepts of a new theory
of art.
This is why, in the beginning of his essay, Benjamin quotes from a text by Paul
Valéry, “The Conquest of Ubiquity,”12 where the French poet examines the future
of art in the light of a daring hypothesis regarding technological innovations.
Benjamin was undoubtedly interested in the fact that Valéry prognosticated the
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metamorphosis of art along with the invention of a new kind of device, the main
function of which was to enable remote data transmission – a sort of television,
in fact: “Just as water, gas and electricity are brought into our houses from far off
to satisfy our needs in response to a minimal effort, so we shall be supplied with
visual or auditory images, which will appear and disappear at a simple movement
of the hand, hardly more than a sign.”13 Regarding such transformation of art,
Valéry’s proposition already contained the seeds of a theory of the dematerializa-
tion of artworks, that can “appear and disappear at a simple movement of the
hand” – as when one uses a remote control! – and, more generally, “will not
merely exist in themselves but will exist wherever someone with a certain appara-
tus happens to be.”
Valéry also wonders if “a philosopher has ever dreamed of a company engaged
in the home delivery of Sensory Reality.” Indeed, such a poetic and philosophic
dream appears to come straight out of a science-fiction story, but it is nonethe-
less significant that, through the type of vocabulary he uses, Valéry indicates that
his hypothesis, instead of being presented as a mere fantasy sprung from his
imagination, is related to real, concrete technological properties appealing to
our senses. In the extract quoted by Benjamin,14 Valéry mentions “a physical com-
ponent […] which cannot remain unaffected by our modern knowledge and
power” and claims that “it will be possible to send anywhere or to re-create any-
where a system of sensations, or more precisely a system of stimuli, provoked by some
object or event in any given place.” He also adds that “we shall find it perfectly
natural to receive the ultra-rapid variations or oscillations that our sense organs
gather in and integrate to form all we know.”
If Benjamin only quotes a short fragment from Valéry’s text, it is nevertheless
obvious that he is bearing in mind the text as a whole, and more specifically three
of its main themes: the invention of a transmission device, the changes brought
about in the sensory relation of human beings to the world, and the transforma-
tion of art. One may even add that the arguments displayed in “The Conquest of
Ubiquity” proceed from earlier ideas outlined in some of Valéry’s previous texts.
Regarding the issue of sense and sensibility, it appears in two contexts concern-
ing the definition of aesthetics. First of all, during a discussion questioning the
relevance of this discipline hypothetically defined as “a Science of the Beautiful,”
Valéry condemns the Beautiful, which he considers as “a kind of corpse” that
“novelty, intensity, strangeness, – in a word, all the values of surprise have sup-
planted,” and declares: “People are more and more occupied with the most un-
stable and immediate characteristics of the psychic and sensitive life.”15
This translation poses a problem regarding an issue that Benjamin enables us
to grasp more fully. According to Valéry, the Beautiful was supplanted by “valeurs
de choc”: why not translate choc as “shock” instead of “surprise”? This would in-
deed imply a semantic field including not only surprise, but also emotion and,
most importantly, a wide range of relations to the world involving the physical
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fact in itself – whether electric discharge, vehicle collision or, in the medical
realm, all types of trauma. “The sense of shock is as much a sense of resisting as
of being acted upon. So it is when anything strikes the senses. The outward ex-
citation succeeds in producing its effect on you,” writes Charles S. Peirce while
defining “struggle,” his second phenomenological category.16 Benjamin most
spectacularly relates Dadaism to film, and both of the latter to the sense of
shock:
From an alluring visual composition or an enchanting fabric of sound, the
Dadaist turned the artwork into a missile. It jolted the viewer, taking on a
tactile quality. It thereby fostered the demand for film, since the distancing
element in film is also primarily tactile, being based on successive changes of
scene and focus which have a percussive effect on the spectator. Film has freed
the physical shock effect – which Dadaism had yet wrapped, as it were, inside the moral
shock effect – from this wrapping.17
Leaving tactility aside – a theme we shall come back to later – it is interesting to
note that Benjamin – although unconsciously – draws on the vocabulary of fire-
arms to describe the shock produced by images. Neither the French verb filmer
nor the German verb filmen have the polysemous meaning of the English to shoot:
hence the metaphor of the gangster shooting at the audience in the last shot of
The Great Train Robbery (Edwin S. Porter, 1903), or the ambivalence of the
title of John Ford’s film, The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance (1962),
which, as Jean-Louis Leutrat observes,18 can be either translated as “the man
who killed Liberty Valance” or “the man who filmed ...,” and may thus be said to
refer to the duel between James Stewart and Lee Marvin – shown twice, but each
time from different camera angles – as well as to John Ford himself.
Moreover, in a note, Benjamin once again corroborates Valéry’s theory by his
use of the vocabulary of shock to distinguish the activity of the film spectator and
that of someone looking at a painting, and to link such activity to the “profound
changes in the apparatus of apperception” experienced by all “in big-city traffic”
or while struggling against “the present social order”:
The image on film-screen changes, whereas the image on the canvas does
not. The painting invites the viewer to contemplation; before it, he can give
himself up to this train of associations. Before a film image, he cannot do so.
No sooner has he seen it than it has already changed. It cannot be fixed on.
The train of associations in the person contemplating it is immediately inter-
rupted by new images. This constitutes the shock effect of film, which, like all
shock effects, seeks to introduce heightened attention. Film is the art form corre-
sponding to the pronounced threat to life in which people live today.19
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The “Technesthesic” Viewpoint
In his inaugural lesson at the Collège de France in 1945, a context in which the
question of aesthetics was accepted at face value, Valéry suggested dividing into
two categories the books in his library dealing with this topic: “poietics,” on the
one hand, which would include “everything that has to do with the production of
artworks,” and “esthesics,” on the other, which would include “everything relat-
ing to the reception of artworks.”20 Born from the substitution of the letter “s” to
the letter “t” in “esthetics” (or “aesthetics”), the word “esthesics” (or “aesthe-
sics”) – coming from the Greek aisthesis – enables one to perceive, within the
eponymous discipline itself, whatever relates to sensation, sense perception and
sensibility21 – even though the ancient Greeks also used the word to designate
intellectual perception. If Plato is above all famous for subordinating the sensible
world under the intelligible world, he also offers us one of the most striking
occurrences of sensibility-related aisthesis in the Apology of Socrates, when wonder-
ing if a dead man, being deprived of all forms of aisthesis, has absolutely no ex-
istence at all, or if he passes to another level of existence, therefore migrating
from this world to another.22 It should be noted as well that the concept of aisth-
esis, even though it was not always given priority in the epistemology of aes-
thetics, nevertheless played an important role in the 18th century. At this time
Christian Wolff – who distinguished sensibility from understanding, as he held
the former as inferior to the latter – initiated the acknowledgement of sensibility
as such, and of its specificity as a faculty in itself. In his Psychologia empirica
(1732), Wolff already made way for the creation of a scientific discipline devoted
to this inferior faculty.23 Baumgarten took a step further by naming Aesthetica the
“science of sensual cognition” in 1750. Although Kant, in his First Critique,
seemed to follow in Baumgarten’s footsteps with his concept of “transcendental
aesthetics” (which he defined as “the science of all the principles of sensibility a
priori”24), he nevertheless demoted Baumgarten by breaking off with what he
deemed to be a flaw in the latter’s method: inducing the principles of empirical
experience, instead of searching through the faculties of the mind.
Concerning modern and contemporary artistic forms, a return to Baumgarten
is now often advocated, along with the further development of the concept of
esthesics. Of course, this concept may be considered strictly in terms of recep-
tion: in “L’infini esthétique,” Valéry explains that the purpose of art is the end-
less stimulation of sensibility, as opposed to ordinary sensations – such as, for
instance, the feeling of hunger that dies down after eating.25 However, “The
Conquest of Ubiquity” also suggests we pay close attention to the properties of
the transmission device imagined by the writer, insofar as it has an impact on
human sensibility. In the light of what has already been said about shocks, we
may formulate the hypothesis that such an impact will initiate a new mode of
perception, or, better still, that each technology has its own sensible characteris-
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tics, which lay the accent on the sensory data they select and process, as much as
on the way our own receptive device integrates them. Esthesics may thus be dif-
ferentiated according to the various reproduction technologies: there exists an
“esthesic experience,” says Edmond Couchot, based on the properties of technol-
ogies which “are not only modes of production,” but “also modes of perception,
and essential forms of representation.”26 The esthesic experience hence becomes
“technesthesic,” which may be seen both as a differentiation within the field of
sensibility and as the enlargement of the latter, as exemplified by digital art.
Technesthesics – to use Couchot’s neologism – is a central theme indeed for
Benjamin who, at the end of “The Work of Art...,” mentions “the artistic gratifi-
cation of a sense of perception altered by technology,”27 regarding the glorifica-
tion of war by Fascism and Marinetti – which brings to light how the different
themes in his matrix are constantly intertwined, and how each new stage of his
intellectual quest echoes the different steps that led to it. It is the theme of
aesthetization that, at the end of the essay, condenses all the rest, and it is in the
light of aesthetization that the link between esthesics and politics clearly ap-
pears. For the time being, it is interesting for us to question the relevance of the
emphasis laid on technesthesics, leaving aside the confirmation brought about
by the concept that Couchot came up with in the context of his research on new
technologies. We may thus postulate that there exists an esthesic difference be-
tween video and cinema, and between digital technology and cinema, in the same
way as there exists such a difference between photography and cinema, this dif-
ference being of course more or less subtle: indeed, the gap which separates the
dynamism of film from the stasis of photography is probably wider and more
present than that which separates video and cinema. Yet, whatever the degree of
difference might be, the esthesic factor acting on the constitutions of the various
technologies also modifies the way those technologies filter and alter reality
when recording it – this being said, without even taking into account the specifi-
cities of “augmented reality” and computer-generated imagery. The fixity of pix-
els in a digital rendering, for instance, differs from the tremor of photographic
grain on celluloid film.
The technesthesic issue is not only a chapter of technological explanations one
might find in a professional handbook; its historical and anthropological impact
is highly characteristic of Benjamin’s thought: “Just as the entire mode of exis-
tence of human collectives changes over long historical periods, so too does their
mode of perception. The way in which human perception is organized – the me-
dium in which it occurs – is conditioned not only by nature but by history.”28 It is
in such light that Benjamin relates the decline of the aura to social causality.
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Reproduction and Art for the Masses
Returning to the inaugural theme of reproduction, when Benjamin leaves tem-
porarily aside the general Marxist theme of the means of production developed
by man to consider – more prosaically, as it were – the technological means of
production. In the late nineteen-sixties, in France, there was a debate about the
ideological impact of such technological means of production in themselves, a
debate which presented the double risk of lapsing into determinism, on the one
hand, and of failing to explain how representations could invest neutralized tech-
nologies, on the other. This discussion could have led to a fruitful outcome if it
had drawn upon some of Benjamin’s concepts. Most curiously, however, Benja-
min was kept away from the debate, in spite of his – indeed critical – attachment
to Marxism. In a similar way, the debaters criticized Bazin’s ontological realism
without realizing that Benjamin had preceded them with his precise analysis of
cinema as a reproductive art based on illusion. What enables Benjamin to steer
clear of the two risks mentioned above is the fact that, while relating the techno-
logical and ideological levels, he involves – implicitly at first, then more blatantly
– the basis that technology represents, not only as such – the characteristics of
the reproductive arts in themselves – but as an essential part of the superstruc-
ture – culture – which, instead of being reduced to the all too simplistic theory of
reflection, is conceived of as a support and modality for social behaviors.
It is well-known that Benjamin considers two facts as being of paramount im-
portance: firstly, the advent of the mechanized reproduction of artworks – that of
a painting on a poster, for instance; secondly, the emergence of arts of which the
production technology is reproduction itself – namely, photography and cinema.
Art for the masses, as a theme, is the direct outcome of this first-level reproduc-
tion process: indeed, if reproducing a work of art – from a technological point of
view – amounts to degrading the original by turning it into a copy – through
which the original loses its aura – this already implies the possibility of a massive
distribution of copies. In other words, the recession of the artwork’s aura and the
emergence of mass diffusion are simultaneous correlative phenomena that pro-
ceed from technological innovation and also participate in the causality sur-
rounding the latter.
In a text on the advent of the watermill in the Middle Ages – taken from a 1935
journal directed by Lucien Febvre and given over to the history of technology29 –
the French historian Marc Bloch observed the discrepancy existing between a
technological invention and its concrete application: “the watermill, invented in
Antiquity, is medieval regarding its actual expansion.” Marc Bloch defended a
theory of a relationship between the technological and social realms, according
to which “an invention spreads only if it is the object of a large social neces-
sity.”30 In the same issue, Bloch discussed Lefebvre des Noëttes’s thesis, accord-
ing to which inventing the collar harness instead of the throat-and-girth harness
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– which caused severe injuries to horses – would have led to the decline of slav-
ery. Bloch applied the same principle as stated above and suggested to invert the
causality, arguing that when “modern harnessing entered history [in the 10th
century], the great social revolution was already over.”31 Regarding the invention
of watermills, the controversy is to this day unresolved – as Roman watermills
were found at a later stage, for instance. This ancient topic serves our present
purpose insofar as it emphasizes the complexity of the relationships between
technology and the state and transformations of society.
One must beware of causalism, especially when it attributes to technological
evolutions an automatic effect on social transformations. Such causalism is re-
sponsible for the fantasy induced by the threat of disappearance – that of cinema,
for instance. One becomes even more rigorous when one enters a systemic rep-
resentation and therefore transcends this simplified type of causalism which
merely relates one phenomenon to another. Regarding the impact of audiovisual
technological innovation on the history of film, it consists in a theory of complex
systems defined by a plurality of factors, whether technological, industrial, socio-
logical, aesthetic and so forth. This theory of systems appears clearly when one
correlatively considers the advent of television, movie theater attendance levels,
the broadcast of movies on television, the appearance of multiplex theaters in
shopping malls, the advent of new media – such as VHS or DVD – and new
means of broadcasting – mobile phones, video on demand, Internet – movie
theater economics, the recession of the celluloid film industry in a context of
growing digitization, or the perspectives offered by stereoscopic 3D technology.
In any event, and notwithstanding such technological and economical mutations,
cinema has apparently endured – at least until now – as a form of collective
entertainment.
How does Benjamin develop his own idea of historical relativism with regard
to the technesthesic theme? With a leap into the past, which verges on the same
anachronism as can be found in my earlier reference to Marc Bloch:
The era of the migration of peoples, an era which saw the rise of the late-Ro-
man art industry and the Vienna Genesis, developed not only an art different
from that of antiquity but also a different perception. The scholars of the
Viennese school Riegl and Wickhoff, resisting the weight of the classical tra-
dition beneath which this art has been buried, were the first to think of using
such art to draw conclusions about the organization of perception at the time
the art was produced.32
One may of course wonder about the presence, in a reflection on cinema, of such
references to an early-6th-century manuscript – the oldest Bible codex still pre-
served – and to Riegl and Wickhoff, two eminent members and founders of the
Vienna school of art history in the late 19th century? The link, in fact, can be
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easily established: Benjamin paid close attention to both authors because he was
highly interested in their idea on the emergence of a Kunstindustrie – an art indus-
try – in the Late Roman Empire, as explained in Riegl’s Die spätrömische Kunstindus-
trie published in Vienna in 1901. This also reminds one of the importance the art
historian attached to the concept of haptik – haptic, tactile – a fruitful idea that
circulated from Riegl’s thesis on the historical evolution of sensibility from hap-
tics to optics ever since Egyptian art, to the haptic interfaces in the field of virtual
and augmented reality, via J.J. Gibson’s theories on texture perception and Gilles
Deleuze’s study of Francis Bacon.
While dealing with the theme of shock, we have already observed the influence
of the haptic or tactile concept on the development of “The Work of Art in the
Age of Its Technological Reproducibility.” Shock characterizes the fact of moving
closer to an object, instead of watching it from afar. This can also be observed in
the paradigmatic opposition Benjamin establishes in the next paragraph, when




Absorption by the work Absorption of the work
Optical Tactical
Contemplation34 Habit
In this excerpt, the author shows a hesitation that can be found all through the
text, and even all of Benjamin’s writings, where distraction is in turn presented in
a positive or negative way. On the one hand, Benjamin criticizes the underlying
ideology of the paradigm of painting, notably by accusing the distraction/concen-
tration opposition of being “commonplace.”35 On the other hand, by pushing
his analysis further, he expands the paradigm and seems to justify its pertinence.
This is a crucial point for understanding Benjamin’s thought and its relevance to
contemporary debates. Whereas certain authors refer to his thought in the de-
fense of new technologies, which they claim to valorize by emphasizing the de-
cline of the notion of art, others denounce the fact that, by using the very means
he criticizes, he does not succeed in parting with an outdated conception of art
and culture.
Such controversy will be put aside, not being the purpose of this essay, and we
will return to one of the most interesting features of Benjamin’s analysis, namely
the reference to the tactile. We may once again observe the fecundity of Benja-
min’s indirect approach and detour via architecture. Someone contemplating a
painting, says Benjamin, “is absorbed by it,” whereas “the distracted masses ab-
sorb the work of art into themselves.”36 He also adds: “Their waves lap around it;
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they encompass it with their tide. This is most obvious with buildings. Architec-
ture has always offered the prototype of an artwork that is received in a state of
distraction and through the collective.” Once again, Benjamin bases his consid-
erations of cinema on a kind of genealogy of art: whereas other art forms – such
as tragedy – have declined – and as far as painting is concerned, “nothing guar-
antees its uninterrupted existence” – Benjamin underlines the anthropological
permanence of architecture, and that of the “need for shelter.” Hence the idea of
presenting architecture as a model for technesthesic definition – “buildings are
received in a twofold manner: by use and by perception,” “better: tactilely and
optically” – all the more so as, in our relationships to buildings – apart from the
touristic relationship – the tactile characteristic imposes itself upon the optical
dimension: “Tactile reception comes about not so much by way of attention as by
way of habit.” In fact, this also characterizes the activity of “the human apparatus
of perception” in those crucial tasks humanity must fulfill, as well as it condi-
tions the attitude of absent-mindedness – meaning that we generally better suc-
ceed on a task without thinking too much about it – and concerns art itself
which, by becoming an agent of habit and mass mobilization, “finds in film its
true training ground.”37 If a film is endowed with such technesthesic power, it is
“by virtue of its shock effects,” those multiple interruptions of its visual or audio-
visual continuum: a “constant, sudden change” breaking up “the spectator’s pro-
cess of association.”38 Hence the following paradoxical celebration of the theore-
tical role played by cinema: “In this respect, too, it proves to be the most
important subject matter, at present, for the theory of perception which the
Greeks called aesthetics.”39 Architecture, for all time, and cinema, for the pre-
sent, are the models of technesthesic thought.
The Singular Case of Cinema
Benjamin’s detour via architecture gives us a clear idea of how his thought pro-
gresses. His digressions have sometimes been considered as a breach of logical
rationality. However, such detours generally indicate that Benjamin was search-
ing for a mediation in the development of his reflection, a mediation which he
very often sought in history. Benjamin’s digressions are “passages” – a word
which instantly brings to mind the “dialectical fairyland” of his study of the Paris
arcades,40 even more so as one of the main theses of this study is the inversion of
the relation between history and the present: namely, moving from history to the
present – in this specific case, from architecture to cinema – instead of looking
back at history in the light of the present. Apparently, Benjamin avoids making
the recurring mistake so typical of postmodern thought, which consists in mak-
ing a clean break with everything that preceded, on the pretext of the so-called
cultural and theoretical superiority of a modernity that keeps on repeating itself
along the metamorphoses of history and, from one modernity to the next, is like
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an endless elevation toward an ever-receding peak. When considering those suc-
cessive modernities one should, on the contrary, turn to relativism. That which is
at stake here is the idea that such topics as the watermill and the art of the Late
Roman Empire are not obsolete references but historical moments where the
theoretical issue of the relationship between technology and society was already
present. In a similar frame of mind – after Baudelaire defined the notion of mo-
dernity which characterized the second half of the 19th century – Stendhal rightly
claimed that the Greeks had their own modernity.41
However, reaching such a consciousness of modernity – through the creation
of the word and invention of its concept – also indicates the possibility of an
actual ideological progress from one historical period to the next. Benjamin ob-
serves that both art historians Riegl and Wickhoff had a limited viewpoint –
being restricted to formal characteristics – that did not enable them to see the
“the social upheavals manifested in these changes in perception,”42 whereas “to-
day, the conditions for an analogous insight are more favorable.” And Benjamin
adds: “if changes in the medium of present-day perception can be understood as
a decay of the aura, it is possible to demonstrate the social determinants of that
decay.” In this case, he clearly seems to be leaning toward Marc Bloch’s social
determinism. Indeed, he draws upon certain theses elaborated in his own Little
History of Photography43 to depict the decline of the aura by photographic reduc-
tion as a consequence of “the increasing emergence of the masses and the grow-
ing intensity of their movements.”
There are in fact two levels concerning such causality: firstly, that of the conse-
quences directly deducible from technology which, as it happens, induces a rela-
tionship of proximity to the object and the mastery of its unicity, as opposed to
the relationship to nature, that “unique apparition of a distance, however near it
may be”;44 secondly, that of a referential social system in which such modes of
relation to reality operate at the same time as new technologies are being imple-
mented. Although it appeared long after Benjamin’s time, the word “technology”
is most appropriate here, insofar as it introduces an intellectual dimension –
with the suffix -logy – that adds up to the technical meaning of the word. In the
defense of mechanical arts he presented in his Encyclopedia, Diderot already de-
clared that “every art has its speculative and its practical aspect”45 – the word
“art,” at the time, like the Latin word ars, was an approximate equivalent of the
Greek technē. At any rate, what matters above all is to integrate the theory of its
application into technology itself, and not reduce this theory to a modus operandi
imposed by technology by expressly taking into account the sociocultural condi-
tions that surround the latter. Consequently, the return of a haptic relationship in
the realm of smartphones, tablet computers and computers in general pertains to
some technological innovation and the frantic quest for novelty in the competi-
tive context of a ruthless market, or even with regard to the “genius” of such and
such computer engineer. However, it is also highly plausible that this return to
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tactility, to a sense of contact, has to do with the state and evolution of our so-
called postmodern society.
In an article from The Guardian covering the exhibition “Postmodernism: Style
and Subversion, 1970-1990,” which took place at the Victoria and Albert Museum
in London, in September 2011, Hari Kunzru observes that the word “Internet”
has largely replaced “postmodern” in the most frequent Google occurrences,
which he interprets as a sign announcing the return of the exciting fantasies of
postmodernism in everyday reality: “It’s as if the culture was dreaming of the net,
and when it arrived, we no longer had any need for those dreams, or rather, they
became mundane, part of our everyday life. We have lived through the end of
postmodernism and the dawning of postmodernity.”46 In fact, in the field of
contemporary art – architecture, fine arts, music and dance – the postmodern
ideology still decides who will be designated “a candidate for appreciation,” as
George Dickie once put it. However, until further notice, there is one art that has
managed to resist the postmodern wave and the alleged normalization brought
about by the Internet: the art of film. Its resistance regarding both its form of
existence and modes of presentation is indeed a remarkable fact. Whereas con-
temporary art produces devaluated works – in the sense of autonomous forms –
cinema still produces feature films and probably has the chance of remaining
unashamed of the artworks it gives rise to! It is indeed remarkable that this may
still be the case, despite the technological mutations, new modes of access to
images and the popularization of the Internet, which obviously have an impact
on cinema by opening the latter to new forms of practice.47 This is one aspect of
the reflection on causality that deserves to be further looked into, notably regard-
ing a film’s mode of presentation – that of a projection in a dark room – and,
beyond that audiovisual assemblage through which a film is made, that particu-
lar kind of “social relationship between people, mediatized by images” – accord-
ing to Guy Debord’s definition of “spectacle.”48
The singularity of cinema – in the wider category of reproductive arts – along
with the importance of the spectacular component in its definition, are two of
the most prominent features of Benjaminian thought. It was said above that the
transformation of technique was simultaneous to a sociocultural mutation result-
ing in the massive democratization of art – or whatever may pass itself off as
such. In fact, both characteristics are literally and singularly intertwined in the
reproductive arts, and more particularly the latter’s most achieved form: cinema.
The implementation of reproduction is not a mere potentiality, but a process
akin to contamination, so that, “to an ever-increasing degree, the work repro-
duced becomes the reproduction of a work designed for reproducibility.”49 A
film reaches its destination in its quintessence: “In film, the technological repro-
ducibility of the product is not an external condition of its mass dissemination,
as it is, say, in literature or in painting. The technological reproducibility of films is
based directly on the technology of their production. This not only makes possible the mass
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dissemination of films in the most direct way, but actually enforces it.”50 Benjamin now
seems to take the opposite view of Marc Bloch. Art for the masses is now seen,
not only as an imposition on art, in the old sense of a new cultural condition –
as, for instance, when reproducing a masterpiece painting and distributing it in
an infinity of copies – but as intrinsically corresponding to its production techni-
que. Cinema is the ultimate art produced for the masses, inasmuch as “the techno-
logical reproducibility of the artwork changes the relation of the masses to art.”51 Never-
theless, if the latter idea seems to be leaning toward causalism, Benjamin also
writes, a few pages later: “The masses are a matrix from which all customary
behavior toward works of art is today emerging newborn.”52 In a chiasmus pre-
senting a condensed version of such dialectics, he mentions “the alignment of
reality with the masses and of the masses with reality.”53
This is really the popular problem of the hen and the egg, which one cannot
solve without incurring the two aforementioned dangers. This poses the question
of the relationship of technology and culture – or society – which every innova-
tion seems to initiate. In the video era, we imagined the disappearance of the
collective cinematic spectacles – of movie theaters, that is – to the benefit of a
family entertainment around the television set. Today, one may be tempted to
adopt a similar line of argument with regard to the digitization of theaters, flat-
panel displays, home theater systems and the interconnection between TVs and
computers. As a way of warding off an all-too simplistic type of causalism, one
may express reservations to such a disappearance, when considering the kind of
sociality this art form represents, beyond the question of its technological as-
pects.54 For similar reasons, we may criticize Benjamin’s evaluation of cinema
against art: drawing upon the idea that the new medium represents “the liquida-
tion of the value of tradition in the cultural heritage,” he calls on “the great his-
torical films” and reminds us of a declaration that Abel Gance made in 1927:
“Shakespeare, Rembrandt, Beethoven will make films…”55 As a matter of fact,
Gance meant quite the opposite: he presented himself as the inheritor of Great
Art, in which film would come to replace literature, painting and music, and
gradually take over.
This has nothing to do with bad faith. Benjamin leaves us facing a dilemma:
because of its singularity, cinema – the most evolved and comprehensive form of
reproductive technique – either falls outside the realm of art, or is destined to
replace art. This reminds one of the hesitation characteristic of contemporary,
postmodern thought, between the absorption of art by the cultural realm and its
renewal thanks to the cultural realm. Then why should one persist in calling this
“art,” if the characters that enabled its definition are now considered as obsolete?
Benjamin’s answer – or rather, the answer formulated by Benjaminian thought –
to this question certainly implies a renewed reflection on the interweaving of
technological and sociological conditions. Benjamin’s essay seems to oscillate
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from one extremity to the other, each of which can alternately be seen as the
starting point or point of arrival of Benjamin’s reflection.
The Notion of “Découpage”
Generally speaking, “the age of technological reproducibility separated art from
its basis in cult.”56 But what is this separation about? Is it the same for both
photography and cinema? The difference between these two media clearly ap-
pears in a comparison which one might think of as off balance, since photogra-
phy is not considered for its own sake but as the reproduction of a painting, and
cinema is examined as a reproduction of reality:
To photograph a painting is one kind of reproduction, but to photograph an
action performed in a film studio is another. In the first case, that which is
reproduced is a work of art, while in the act of producing it is not. The cam-
eraman’s performance with the lens no more creates an artwork than a con-
ductor’s baton; at most it creates an artistic performance. This is unlike the
process in a film studio. Here, what is reproduced is not an artwork, and the
act of reproducing it is no more such a work than in the first case. The work
of art is produced only by means of montage. And each individual component
of this montage is a reproduction of a process which neither is an artwork nor
gives rise to one through photography.57
Leaving aside the disparate treatment of both means of expression, it is never-
theless interesting to focus on what Benjamin has to say about cinema – particu-
larly regarding the question of vocabulary – where one may detect the influence
of film editing theory, and notably of Soviet montage theory. Editing indeed is
the main characteristic of cinema, and an indispensable condition for the latter
to be considered an art form. However, in the French version of the essay, one
may notice that the word editing – montage in French – was replaced by découpage,
a notion specifically – not to say exclusively – pertaining to the vocabulary of
French critics and technicians. It may either refer to the layout of a text – the
screenplay – organized into divisions presenting the – sometimes numbered –
descriptions of shots and scenes, or to the division of the film itself in fragments,
pictures, shots and scenes. The division of the screenplay is a textual foresha-
dowing of the film, and the division of the film realizes the division of the
screenplay in cinematic language. Of course, the subsequent shooting and edit-
ing of a film may come to contradict its textual anticipation, whereas a film with-
out any preliminary screenplay still involves the notion of découpage. By substitut-
ing découpage for montage, Benjamin gives the reader a clear idea of what he
means. Whereas montage is known as an operation resulting in the assembly of
parts into a unified whole – whereby the fragmented film is mended (or so to
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speak) – découpage reintroduces fragmentation: it designates a series of fragments
in a state of co-presence which, according to Benjamin, leaves them just outside
the realm of art.
Benjamin at once advocates the superiority of the whole over the parts and
presents a criticism of elementary realism in a resolutely anti-Bazinian frame of
mind: “[…] the vision of immediate reality [is] the Blue Flower in the land of
technology.”58 Such rejection seems to result from Benjamin’s vision of editing
as an artistic principle: “The illusory nature of film is of the second degree; it is
the result of editing.” In this case, the English translators have chosen the Eng-
lish word “editing” instead of “montage,” referred to as “résultat du découpage”59
in the French version – a highly significant choice, since all the different versions
present the same corresponding definition: “In the film studio the apparatus has
penetrated so deeply into reality that a pure view of that reality, free of the foreign body of
equipment, is the result of a special procedure – namely the shooting by the specially adjusted
photographic device and the assembly of that shot with others of the same kind.”60 And in
the French version, the word “assembly” is translated as “montage.”61 This en-
ables the dissociation of the fragmented shots from their filmic recomposition,
as well as the dissociation of the heterogeneous shots themselves from an assem-
bly leading to a homogeneous result. One may thus consider that “the equip-
ment-free aspect of reality has here become the height of artifice.”62
From a technesthesic viewpoint – which at once characterizes the receiver’s
sensibility and the esthesic specificity of the technological device – the fragmen-
tation caused by the découpage reacts on each individual fragment and interposes a
specific sensitive filter between the actor and his recorded image. The film actor
being involved in the mediation imposed by the reproductive device, “for the first
time – and this is the effect of film – the human being is placed in a position
where he must operate with his whole living person, while foregoing its aura.”63
To emphasize this observation, Benjamin compares the actor’s situation in front
of the camera to that of an athlete: a comparison pertaining to the general notion
of expertise which, in Benjamin’s thought, recurs to characterize both the recep-
tion and production of films: “It is inherent in the technology of film, as of
sports, that everyone who witnesses these performances does so as a quasi-ex-
pert.”64 The actor, like the athlete, performs before “a group of specialists” –
“executive producer, director, cinematographer, sound recordist, lighting de-
signer, and so on.”65 Likewise, the selected shot is akin to an athlete’s record,
and the real event, when filmed, becomes a fictitious event which calls to mind
“the competitive throwing of a discus in a sports arena.” The analogy has its
limit, nevertheless: the athlete measures up to nature, and the actor to a techno-
logical device – which also recalls the “mechanized tests” on an assembly line, or
the tests run by the “agencies for testing professional aptitude.” The latter com-
parison is developed in a note which does not appear in the second version of the
essay:
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By broadening the field of all that may be submitted for testing, the role
played by technological devices in the presentation of films is analogous to
the role played, for an individual, by those economic circumstances which, as
a whole, gave way to an extraordinary increase of the contexts where he is
liable to be tested. Professional aptitude tests, for instance, seem to be grow-
ing in importance. The latter consist in a number of découpages operated on an
individual’s performances. Both film shootings and professional aptitude
tests take place before a learned assembly of technicians, and the film editor
in his studio is in the exact same situation as the controller running a profes-
sional aptitude test.66
One may once again notice – and even admire – the mediations which the author
uses to clarify and explain his meaning. By doing so, Benjamin enables one to
understand that a precise examination of technological mediation, by transcend-
ing the mere question of analogy, may lead to the social substrate itself. Cinema,
sports and tests are not only contemporary phenomena – in our time, with its
ever-growing emphasis on mediatized sports and notation systems targeting
people (university professors included) as well as nations – they all belong to the
same sociocultural and historical context.
Aestheticization67
Benjamin raises three questions in the field of art theory. The first one concerns
the aesthetic issue – that of values – with regard to the notion of aura, the power
of which reaches a peak in hieratic art forms, and declines through the process
of reproduction: “These changed circumstances may leave the artwork’s other
properties untouched, but they certainly devalue the here and now of the art-
work.”68 The second question involves semiotic and aesthetic issues that prolong
and renew their theoretical legacy. According to Benjamin, “in even the most
perfect reproduction, one thing is lacking: the here and now of the work of art –
its unique existence in a particular place.”69 This statement may be interpreted
two ways: the beginning of the sentence lays emphasis on the deficiency of the
reproduced image with regard to reality – an idea long defended by the theory of
imitation about the image itself. The rest of the sentence deals with the loss of
value, the loss of the aura – the halo that, according to Benjamin, surrounds a
work of art proportionately to its unicity and originality: a concept that turns the
mere observation of an image’s semiotic deficiency into a value judgment of an
aesthetic order. The third question concerns sociology and history – since repro-
duction involves “the liquidation, of the value of tradition in the cultural herit-
age”70 – and the correlative issue of the advent of art for the masses seen as a
double reversal: the paradoxical promotion of art for the masses in the cultural
sphere, and in the political sphere, the question of aestheticization – a topic that
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deserves more than a few words at the end of an article. In Benjamin’s text, it
appears almost furtively, at the end of the essay, in what is probably one of its
most fragile yet enlightening passages.
To aestheticize means aestheticizing something unaesthetic, a phrase that
leads one back to Aristotle and instantly brings to mind the notion of embellish-
ment found in his Poetics (chapter 4): although we may be disgusted by the sight
of some repulsive animals, we may also find pleasure in their representation,
whereby they are embellished. Benjamin, as we have seen, extends the principle
to “the artistic gratification of a sense of perception altered by technology,”71
regarding, in this case, the glorification of war by Fascism and Marinetti, the
Futurist painter. As an example of aestheticization, Benjamin quotes from a man-
ifesto where the latter claims that “war is beautiful.”72 Consequently, war is to a
repulsive animal what a poem about war is to an etching representing a spider or
a snake. However, the purposes of embellishment and aestheticization are differ-
ent. According to Aristotle, the purpose of embellishment is cognitive: insofar as
the vector of representation enables us to contemplate an otherwise unbearable
sight, it also permits us to analyze the latter, go beyond its appearance and have
access to its form – the key to knowing a thing. Benjamin moves on from the
question of cognitive gain to the political field, and his development on artistic
and sport expertise could give us more food for thought on the topic. At the end
of the essay, the notion of aestheticization rather refers to the alienation of the
masses by a totalitarian strategy: it is associated to war, violence, politics and
extended to art through the example of Marinetti. However, if the latter adheres
to Fascism, and if his manifestos – notably “the manifesto for the colonial war in
Ethiopia”73 – may be read as pamphlets promoting this kind of ideology, Futur-
ism, as a formalist avant-garde, does not meet the criteria of aestheticization.
By the end of his essay, Benjamin has shown that, in the context of art forms
that are either generated by reproduction or suffer from the latter, the work’s
aura regresses as elite art is progressively being replaced by art for the masses.
Futurism, as a matter of fact, belonged to elite art, and its repeated attacks
against artistic institutions pertained to specific strategies inside the realm of
art. Even though certain Futurist artists adhered to Fascist ideology, their cultural
effectiveness as artists only incidentally intersected the totalitarian strategies
aimed at alienating the masses. On the contrary, it was mostly in the sphere of
art for the masses – and especially cinema – that such strategies were carried out,
as well as in cultural and sporting events. One of the particularities of those
alienation strategies again implied representation, as great popular events –
sporting and otherwise – worked as a mirror offering the masses an embellished
image of themselves, an aestheticized image provided by Fascism: “Mass reproduc-
tion is especially favored by the reproduction of the masses. In great ceremonial proces-
sions, giant rallies and mass sporting events, the masses come face to face with
themselves.”74
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The antidote to the aestheticization of politics and violence is supposed to be
found in the politicization of art.75 In fact, reproductive technology implies the
replacement of the individual relationship to an artwork – required by painting,
for instance – by an attitude of collective reception in conditions of reproducibil-
ity that modify the attitude of the masses themselves: “the extremely backward atti-
tude toward a Picasso painting changes into a highly progressive reaction to a Chaplin film,”
and “the same public which reacts progressively to a slapstick comedy inevitably
displays a backward attitude toward Surrealism.”76 Whereas Benjamin relates
Futurism to contemporary Fascist ideology, he assimilates Cubism and Surreal-
ism to an elitism of the past. And the now progressive masses are nevertheless
the same masses hypnotized by the Fascist mirror of their alienation. In that res-
pect, it is obvious that the contextual use of certain examples express strategic
choices. For instance, one could mention Chaplin’s Modern Times – shot in
1935, the year Benjamin wrote his essay – and its criticism of mechanic modern-
ism. Regarding Picasso, one could mention Guernica – as an emblem of the poli-
ticization of art – about which the artist declared: “The Spanish Civil War is a war
waged by the reaction against the people, against freedom. My whole life as an
artist has been nothing else than a perpetual fight against the reaction and the
death of art. In the painting I am working on – which I will entitle ‘Guernica’ –
and in all my recent pieces, I clearly express the horror I feel toward the military
caste that has sunk Spain into an ocean of suffering and death.”77
Aestheticization nevertheless remains an enlightening notion, inasmuch as it
highlights the dark aspects of technology and politics, as well as their collusions,
for better or for worse. More particularly, the “Blue Flower” of the realistic ideol-
ogy of reproduction may be found in an idyllic vision of art for the masses which,
while apparently realizing a democratic ideal by depriving the bourgeoisie of its
position of social domination – autonomous art being one of the aspects of this
position – may also serve as an instrument of mass alienation, all the more so as
the masses are being gratified with an embellished image of themselves – a pro-
cess virulently criticized by a certain elite art, including a certain type of cinema.
Today, the aestheticization of violence appears in the bloody fight scenes of the
movie blockbusters the masses eagerly consume. It appears in the themes and
fictions of such films, but also in their forms and pyrotechnic explosions, which
so marvelously exemplify the power of technology.
Conclusion
Certain films leave us with a strange feeling: we may have experienced some dis-
comfort – maybe even disgust – while watching them, but in the end we keep a
globally positive impression. In such cases, the film has managed to seep into us,
to impose itself upon us, and the repulsion we may have felt has finally receded.
This is the kind of impression Benjamin’s text leaves me with: in spite of certain
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passages I occasionally disagree with, I globally appreciate it. I even think it is
one of the most important texts written in the field of aesthetics. My ambivalent
feeling is probably due to the palimpsestic dimension I mentioned in the begin-
ning of this article, and the many pitfalls we must learn to circumvent in order to
appreciate an exceptional thought elaborated in a brilliant and close interlacing
of technological-aesthetic and sociopolitical themes which, in the light of Benja-
min’s modernity, will help us understand our own.
Aestheticization is a highly fragile and stimulating theme, for those who use
the Benjaminian matrix to reconsider the present-day situation. Aestheticization
may also be found in the realm of contemporary art, where art in the old sense of
the word – the auratic sense – has been regressing to the benefit of all kinds of
products more or less thrown together in a spirit of ready-made or kitsch, and
generally exhibited as if they were artworks but without being officially presented
as such – as someone who denies being good-looking but likes to hear other
people call him/her so... In the meantime, the art of film has accumulated a
number of works in the old sense of the word. The heirs of Picasso present non-
works in contexts that still confer upon them a certain aura of artistic distinction.
On the other hand, the heirs of Chaplin present “old-fashioned” art forms,
closed entities all dedicated to the expression of a single artist – works in the
sense of Picasso’s paintings and the films of Charles Chaplin. The art of film
sometimes resists the spectacular condition that tends to dilute it into mass cul-
ture, to which it nevertheless continues to belong.
Translated by Maxime Shelledy
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Toward an Archaeology of the Cinema/
Technology Relation: From
Mechanization to “Digital Cinema”1
Benoît Turquety
“The Last Machine?”: The Digital Age and the 1930s
Considering the historiography of the cinema from the outside – that is, re-es-
tablishing it within the context of the social sciences of the time – strange coin-
cidences emerge.
As is well known, the history of the cinematic medium has established itself
from the very beginning as a technological history. The reasons for this fact are
numerous and complex: from patents and their economic – or patriotic – impli-
cations, to the pedagogy of the mechanisms of the illusion to the curious. In any
case, all the historical essays on moving pictures published between 1895 and
around 1925 conceive their task as the description of the evolution of the ma-
chines, and the historical-ideological determination of the important innova-
tions. The history of the medium began to be conceived differently when it began
to be perceived as an art form, a transformation that can already be sensed in
Terry Ramsaye’s book of 1926, and is completed in Paul Rotha’s 1930 volume
and Bardèche and Brasillach’s 1935 history of film.2
But in fact, during that time, the history of technology as a discipline was not
yet founded. Its project was constructed precisely during these early 1930s. So
there seems to be an odd historical delay or missed beat between the evolutions
of the history of cinema and of the history of technology, the first being techno-
logically oriented before the second emerged, and then turning away from the
machines. A strange coincidence.
Actually, the 1930s emerges as a crucial moment regarding the general pres-
ence of technology in culture. It was a time when technology entered the sciences
as a major theme, in nearly all disciplines. So how come historians of cinema lost
interest in technology precisely at the moment when technology caught the at-
tention of other historians, philosophers, scientists, etc.?
These coincidences raise a number of questions, and particularly that of the
existence and nature of a link, in the 1920s and 1930s culture and sciences, be-
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tween cinema and technology. If cinema is perceived as a technological art, it
may also be that at the time, technology itself was perceived within a conceptual
sphere centered on the cinema. The cinema would have acted as a cultural model
to represent technology in a wider sense, embodying some of its most character-
istic features: mechanical, modern, involving speed and vision, the cinema would
be “the last machine.” This, after all, may be the reason why the transition from
analog photochemical inscription to digital encoding suddenly makes the me-
dium unsure of its own identity: if it is still a “technological art,” it may well be
that what we mean now by technology is not what was meant by the term when
cinema was institutionalized. And it may well be that our contemporary concept
of technology has shifted to another conceptual sphere, where the cinema’s place
is not central – if it exists at all. At the time of mechanization, technique and tech-
nology were cinematic notions; in the digital era, the link between the cinema and
those concepts has changed, because the paradigms have changed around them,
perhaps the episteme itself.
I would like to approach this problem by proposing an exploration of the mod-
alities of the penetration of technological issues in the scientific field of the time,
especially in France and Germany, with a particular attention to the place and
function that cinema may have had in this penetration.
The French in the 1930s show – like people in other countries – an obsession
for technology. Its most obvious form is the recurrence of debates on mechan-
ization. Ironically, the constant repetition of the theme in the writings of the time
is reproved in each of the texts that participate to the phenomenon. The problem
of the machine is of course not new. It could be traced back at least to the Re-
naissance, in the filiation of the medieval “mechanical arts,” to then grow
through many historical variations, as can be observed in the works of Filippo
Brunelleschi or Leonardo da Vinci, in the numerous and massive “machine thea-
ters” of the 16th and 17th centuries, the exhibitions of models of machines from
the 17th century onwards, the theories of La Mettrie or Descartes on the “man-
machine,” Vaucanson and Jaquet-Droz’s automatons, the Encyclopédie ou Diction-
naire raisonné des Sciences, des Arts et des Métiers, etc.
This question of the machine became of particular, structural importance for
the 19th century, on several levels. During the first years of the century, a new
branch of knowledge was formulated, notably with the first lessons given at the
French École Polytechnique by Gaspard Monge: kinematics. The purpose of this
science is the systematic study of machines, and especially the classification of
their basic elements: mechanisms. It kept developing through the century mainly
within the framework of engineering schools, producing several important
works with Charles Laboulaye or Franz Reuleaux. In the opening of his 1885
course of “Pure Kinematics” at the Faculté des sciences in Paris, Henri Poincaré
gave the following, beautiful definition: “Kinematics is the study of movements
regardless of the causes that produce them, or to be more exact, it is the study of
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all possible movements.”3 But this science, aiming first at the education of a
technological elite, deals above all with description and classification, sometimes
analysis: the historical dimension, as well as the construction of a coherent theo-
retical framework, are out of its scope.
Besides, the second half of the 19th century is the time when the motif of the
machine penetrated deeper and deeper into the literary and artistic field, from the
novels of Emile Zola, Jules Verne or Villiers de l’Isle Adam, to the avant-gardes of
the first decades of the 20th century.
This progressive cultural impregnation seemed to end up, during these 1930s,
in a form of explosion of the question affecting all the areas of culture – as well
as politics. This certainly had to do with the expansion of Taylorism in the orga-
nization of work within the industry, as well as with the proliferation of ma-
chines in everyday living, which gave a new dimension to the theme. Is the ma-
chine liberating, a source of well-being and an embodiment of progress? Or is it
enslaving, imposing its rhythms to the worker and its obtuse materiality to the
thinker? Chaplin’s 1936 Modern Times is only the tip of a huge iceberg of
productions of all natures – including films, with the works of Eisenstein (Star-
oye i Novoye, 1929), Vertov (Chelovek s Kinoapparatom, 1929), but also
Ralph Steiner (Mechanical Principle, 1930), Eugène Deslaw (La Marche
des machines, 1927), Joris Ivens (Philips Radio/Symphonie indus-
trielle, 1931), etc. A condensation of the questions involved could be found in
the concluding chapter of Bergson’s 1932 Two Sources of Morality and Religion,
bearing on the relation between “Mechanics and Mysticism,”4 or in the title of
Lewis Mumford’s Technics and Civilization (1934) – that “and” being in fact more
threatening than one could think…
Machine, Technique, Technology
Before proceeding, two rather important distinctions have to be made, in order
to specify cultural differences and intellectual traditions. The first is between ma-
chine and technique, and the second between technique and technology. In the various
linguistic areas concerned by those questions, the dominant vocabulary is not
always the same. For instance, if the machine can be considered as an obviously
central object in the French cultural field of the time, this does not apply to tech-
nique. This last notion seems then barely constituted as such, hardly visible. It is
during this 1930s decade that it will undergo a rapid expansion.
In English-speaking countries, this terminology has a rather different history.
As Leo Marx summarized it in a 2010 essay:
The word technology, which joined the Greek root techne (an art or craft) with
the suffix ology (a branch of learning), first entered the English language in
the seventeenth century. At that time, in keeping with its etymology, a technol-
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ogy was a branch of learning, or discourse, or treatise concerned with the
mechanic arts. […] [T]he word then referred to a field of study, not an object
of study.5
Marx then goes on to assert that this sense of the word technology is “now archa-
ic,” being replaced around 1900 by “the now familiar sense of the word – the
mechanic arts collectively.”6 In an earlier essay, Eric Schatzberg describes “the
current characterization of technology as the methods and material equipment of
the practical arts,” a meaning whose domination in the English language goes
for him back to the 1930s, following the works of Thorstein Veblen.7 In the field
of film theory however – or of the theory of cinema history – Rick Altman has
complained about another confusion. According to him, technique designates and
should only designate ways of doing, whereas technology deals with the machin-
ery, and should be strictly restricted to this area. That, for him, is a crucial dis-
tinction, as:
The important thing to remember is that a dialectical understanding of history
is destroyed from the start by any theory which reduces to one those practices
that interact as two.8
But if technical objects and technical practices do have specific differences in
their evolutions, the philosophy of technique has shown, from André Leroi-
Gourhan to Gilbert Simondon, that their studies cannot be separated, for rea-
sons that Altman himself partly suggests (“technology often automatizes an ac-
cepted technique”9). In fact, the history and theory of techniques have, at least in
the French-speaking area, built themselves on that principle: techniques are both
the machines and the ways those machines are used. And if the restriction of
technology to the logos about techniques sounds now obsolete in English – as well
as in common French uses, I must say – it has remained effective and fully perti-
nent for the French-speaking scientific tradition. In this perspective, technology
designates the discourses about techniques, whether scientific or prescriptive,
discourses which can be studied as a cultural object in themselves. This article
here dealing mostly with the French tradition, I will stick to this terminology –
but readers should keep in mind that devices are techniques.
(Cinema and) the Emergence of the History of Techniques
The foundation of the history of techniques as a discipline was provoked in
France by objects that sound a bit far from the mechanization problem at first,
but can in fact not entirely be separated from it. In the June 1926 issue of the
Revue de synthèse historique a review by Marc Bloch was published of an essay by
Major Lefebvre des Noëttes, “La Force motrice animale à travers les âges” [Ani-
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mal Traction through the Ages]. The book by this “former cavalry officer who
had the fine idea of contributing his professional skills to historical studies”10
discussed the history of the horse harness, showing “the flaws of the antique
harness” and emphasizing the elaboration of new techniques during the 11th
century. The theme could evoke a somewhat austere book, were it not for the
author’s daring hypothesis, thus summarized by Bloch:
Strictly limited in their use of animal motive force through traction [by the
flaws of their harnessing systems], the antique civilizations have had to resort
to a very extensive use of human motive force, that is to say of slave labor. […]
Reciprocally, western Europe has been spared the return of such atrocities
thanks to the great inventions of the eleventh century.11
Entitled “Techniques et évolution sociale. De l’histoire de l’attelage, et de celle de
l’esclavage” [Techniques and Social Evolution: About the History of the Harness,
and That of Slavery], Bloch’s review elaborated straightaway a certain number of
the crucial problems of the historiography of techniques, which the book raises.
Or, Bloch wrote:
Perhaps would it be more exact to say that it raises only one, but very impor-
tant [problem]: it leads us to wonder how technical development is related to
economic evolution and to the transformations of social organization.12
Apart from specific methodological questions, the central problem of the history
of techniques appears then as the problem of technological determinism, con-
sisting in attributing, in a simple and unambiguous manner, cultural and politi-
cal (or aesthetic) transformations to technical innovations. Mankind freed from
slavery by harnessing techniques or enslaved again by the machinations of the
industry is, centuries apart, twice the same problem. Technological determinism
remained a central interrogation in film historiography, this time on the aes-
thetic level.
Those questions led Bloch and Lucien Febvre in 1935 to the realization of the
first thematic issue of the Annales d’histoire économique et sociale, the journal they
had founded in 1929. The issue dealt precisely with technology, titled “Techni-
ques, History and Life.” The issue was introduced by a programmatic and
groundbreaking text by Lucien Febvre, “Reflections on the History of Techni-
ques.” It began with these sentences:
Technique: one of those many words whose history hasn’t been written. His-
tory of techniques: one of those many disciplines which must still be entirely
created – or almost.13
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The volume as a whole leaves the reader with the strong feeling of the conscious
opening of an entirely new field, with the obvious enthusiasm that it can arouse,
as well as the pressing need to set its methodological and theoretical framework.
In parallel, Marc Bloch published in 1931 the book Les Caractères originaux de
l’histoire rurale française, translated by Janet Sondheimer in 1966 as French Rural His-
tory: An Essay on Its Basic Characteristics.14 He specified in the introduction the prin-
ciples of the “regressive method” that he proposed to apply to the landscapes of
the French countryside, in order to be able to grasp “life itself, which is nothing
but movement.” The introduction closed on an analogy:
To the recent past, the regressive method, used with measure, does not ask
for a photography which would then merely need to be projected, always re-
maining the same, to get the frozen image of ages more and more remote;
what it aims at grasping is the last reel of a film which it tries to unroll back-
wards, resigned to discover more than one gap, but resolved to respect its
mobility.15
The cinema, then, does not appear in Bloch’s work as a possible object of his-
tory, but as a model for historical work. The cinematic machinery combines in
the most striking way several abilities of interest to the historian: it can go back
in time; it can preserve the essential movement and instability of its object; and it
can work in spite of gaps, not inventing false continuities to make up for its
flaws, but taking advantage on the contrary of its fundamental discontinuity.
One feels strangely close here to Walter Benjamin’s theses “on the concept of
history.” History in itself should become cinematic: an epistemological transfor-
mation is at stake, which is exactly contemporary with the birth of techniques as
a historical object.
But history is not the only discipline then affected by the emergence of an
awareness of technical issues. Closely related disciplines, such as archaeology,
undergo a similar movement. In 1936 André Leroi-Gourhan published one of his
first important texts, “Man and Nature: An Essay in Compared Technology,” in
the seventh volume of the Encyclopédie française permanente, edited by Lucien Febvre.
“Compared Technology” is conceptualized as a new method, the study of tools
and ways of doing in different cultures. This turn in ethnology is then fully in
touch with the most contemporary artistic problems, as appears through journals
like Documents, edited by Georges Bataille in 1929-1930, and Minotaure between
1933 and 1939, where ethnographically oriented texts and photographs by Michel
Leiris, Marcel Griaule and others were regularly printed.
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“Techniques of the Body”: Sociology, Psychology and the Cinema
In another area of social sciences, Marcel Mauss – of whom Leroi-Gourhan had
been a student – presented in 1934 to the French Society of Psychology a paper
entitled “Techniques of the Body,” which was published two years later in the
Journal de psychologie.16 He explored the idea that our bodily and gestural habits,
our ways of walking, swimming, sleeping, are not chiefly natural or personal, but
chiefly collective: they “form a social idiosyncrasy – they are not simply a product
of some purely individual, almost completely psychic, arrangements and mecha-
nisms.”17 They are transmitted and learned, “the facts of education are domi-
nant”:18 “In them, we should see […] techniques.”19 This leads Mauss to redefine
technique, and differentiate the notion from the objects to which it is too com-
monly reduced: “I made, and went on making for several years, the fundamental
mistake of thinking that there is technique only when there is an instrument.”20
Mauss then proposes a definition: “I call ‘technique’ an action that is effective and
traditional”;21 it is “a series of assembled actions [actes montés], and assembled
[montés] for the individual not by himself alone but by all his education, by the
whole society to which he belongs, in the place he occupies.”22 The term “mon-
tés” echoes with “the notion we have of the activity of the consciousness as being,
above all, a system of symbolic assemblages [montages].”23 The choice of the
term montage for the technical cinematic operation of cutting and splicing –
which is evoked here by the “series of assembled [montés] actions” – appears
through Mauss’s text as a moment of a wider circulation of the notion, linked
with this context of reflection on mechanization.
The cinema does explicitly appear within this paper, as one of the means of
this collective transmission that characterizes gestures as techniques:
A kind of revelation came to me in the hospital. I was ill in New York. I won-
dered where I had seen girls walking the way my nurses walked. I had the
time to think about it. At last I realized that it was in movies. Returning to
France I realized how common this gait was, especially in Paris; the girls
were French and they too were walking in this way. In fact, American walking
fashions had begun to arrive over here, thanks to the movies.24
I would love to comment extensively on this anecdote, which intertwines the
motifs of the cinema, America, the gaze, the walk and the girl in a particularly
rejoicing way, but that might lead us away from our subject. Let us only note that
the cinema here is not a technical object – a machinery that can be used for
instance for a chronophotographic analysis of the human walk – but a mass me-
dia and a vector of transmission. It produces cultural transformations by diffus-
ing social models, in particular those “body techniques,” collective gestural con-
structions unconsciously disciplining our bodies.
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The Engineer and the Media: “Mechanology”
So it appears that in some cases, the transformations occurring in various scien-
tific fields in relation with technical matters can be linked with a certain presence
of the cinema in the intellectual culture of the time, either as a technical appara-
tus, or as means of massive diffusion of images. The question of technique ma-
terializes then on several levels, but it never entirely vanishes. In fact, these ele-
ments can be perceived beyond social sciences. A renewal of the conceptions of
the machine is already taking place among engineers. An interesting example of
such a change, Réflexions sur la science des machines, has been published in 1932 by
the engineer Jacques Lafitte, whom Gilbert Simondon later recognized as an an-
ticipator of sorts of his own work. Lafitte also proposed the foundation of a new
discipline, the third such foundation in the few years studied in this article after
Febvre’s history of techniques and Leroi-Gourhan’s compared technology: “me-
chanology.” Lafitte renewed the principles of kinematics from within the disci-
pline’s tradition. He didn’t classify mechanisms according to the movement
transformations that they operate anymore, but according to the complexity of
their relations to their environment. At the simplest level of this relation, Lafitte
considered architectural constructions as machines, which singularly alters the
way that the problem of “mechanization” can be seen.
But in the context of this essay, our attention is particularly drawn by Lafitte’s
short introduction to his book. These austere considerations of a technician im-
passioned by his objects, but who also appreciates Samuel Butler, H.G. Wells
and Edgar Allan Poe, are presented to the reader through a double sort of media-
tion, by a piquing little scene. Here are the first sentences of the book:
I own a phonograph and I have the rarer and charmingly provincial pleasure
of having a philosopher as a friend. He is wise, though sometimes taken away
by his disposition. He then becomes of sudden judgment.
We had played a few records and I was preparing the machine again when
he exploded:
“No – he said – no, and again no. I definitely cannot bear that sort of music
which is now distributed to us. And I think that you are, you and your kind,
outstanding criminals. You cannot but invent and take us, each day more, in
the network of the artifice. With your science, your progress, your machines,
you go destroying, a little more each day, what is left of simplicity in the
world. You smother in us the primal and divine spark, and because of you,
each day, we are a little less free. Submitted to the machine, we suffer the
narrow subjection to the products of our own creation.”25
The crank thus suspended by philosophic furor, the narrator must leave there his
records and engage in a plea for a better understanding of machines, which leads
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him to let his friend and the reader know his reflections on a mechanological
science. But “canned music” is not by chance the opener of the book: an impor-
tant part of the debates of the time about mechanization does not bear on its
directly political dimension – the way it affects the body of the worker – but on
the danger of its cultural implications – a more metaphoric or symbolic enslav-
ing, that concerns the mind and cultivated classes. When Élie Faure publishes in
1933 his “Défense et illustration de la machine” in the Mercure de France, he insists
on that point: the opposition to mechanization is above all “the revolt of a whole
class against the machine – for it’s the ruling class who, after having created the
machine, repudiates the incipient monster about to devour it.”26 The machine is
for those opponents the sign of a new culture, where the artist is killed by the
engineer, and the craftsman replaced by the worker. To this condemnation of the
machine, “all take part,” writes Faure, “sociologists and philosophers, poets and
novelists, playwrights, and even filmmakers, God forgive me.”27
The cinema and the phonograph – to which the radio must be added – are thus
the major instruments of this destruction of culture by the machine, a destruc-
tion of the mind itself, l’esprit, to quote the term then mostly used.
Epistemology, Technique and the Aesthetics of Mechanized
Reproduction
Physics and epistemology are also concerned by the double problem of the ma-
chine and of the technique – and there again, cinema finds itself playing a sig-
nificant role. Gaston Bachelard’s first doctoral thesis, “Essai sur la connaissance
approchée” [Essay on Approximate Knowledge], defended in 1927, includes a
chapter entitled “Knowledge and Technique: Approximate Realization.” Bache-
lard questions science and technique’s relations to the real and to rationality, to
individuality and to generality, to accuracy and to approximation, to precision
and to looseness. The manufactured, industrial object appears central to the text,
defined by its characteristic properties of usefulness and convenience, its balance
between “level of finish” and cost price, its “perfect generality.”28 The study of
this object is the concern of kinematics, “a formal science of undeniable pur-
ity,”29 writes Bachelard. In the essay, this industrial object is immediately linked
with movement, and with its pure aesthetic enjoyment. According to Bachelard,
“manufactured objects” possess,
[A] schematic grace […] of the same order as the Bergsonian grace that finds,
following curvy lines and avoiding angles, a feeling of ease within perception,
the easy anticipation of a movement, “the pleasure of arresting as it were the
march of time and of holding the future within the present.”30
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The object contains “the aesthetic history of the fabrication,” and founds an “oc-
casional aesthetics,” an aesthetics of “sharpness,” of “clarity,” which essentially
lies in the rejection of detail and ornamentation in favor of the pure line. This
new aesthetics, reminding one of Adolf Loos, seemed paradoxical to Bachelard
in that it is based on a fundamental lack of individualization. Linked to mass
production, it directly involves reproducibility:
The object is not reluctant at being copied because the idea is not dispersed in
the various samples, but remains manifest and entire in each with its harmony
and its elegance.31
The technological beauty is the beauty of the idea. Some pages later, Bachelard
wrote that, the freedom allowed to the technician by the latitude of the mechan-
ical looseness being a false freedom, “in the end the engineer is not an artist
choosing and signing a work full of personality, he’s a geometer.”32 This may
appear as a contradiction, the engineer being deprived of an artistic value that
Bachelard seemed ready to grant to the industrial object. The explanation for
this contradiction may lie in a certain disjunction between aesthetic experience
and conception of art, a disjunction for which the emergence of technology in
fields related – culturally or conceptually – to art holds some responsibility. Ba-
chelard’s obvious sensitivity to the aesthetic qualities of the industrial object isn’t
that common at the time: one of the frequent criticisms made of mechanization,
that can be found in Bergson for instance, is the anxiety of standardization,
everyone wearing the same hat.33 In the debates of the period, the disruptions
involved by technical reproducibility are not considered only in the case of the
work of art, but affect all things – and perhaps beings.
In 1931, Bachelard reintroduced technique in his work. In his essay “Noumène
et microphysique” “appeared for the first time it seems the notion of ‘phenom-
enotechnique’ which will become, from 1934 onwards, a fundamental category
in Bachelard’s epistemology,”34 as Georges Canguilhem wrote. For it is unthink-
able, according to Bachelard, to trust an immediate given of which science could
do a simple “phenomenography”: it must on the contrary be opposed “a phe-
nomenotechnique by which phenomena are not found, but invented, but con-
structed from scratch.”35 This idea led Bachelard to confer a critical place to
instruments, apparatuses and experimental procedures, considering them as
crystals of theory and of history.
Besides, Bachelard composed in 1933 an article on problems involving day-
dreaming and visual perception: “Le monde comme caprice et miniature” [The
World as Whim and Miniature]. The photographic apparatus was invoked as a
model for the description of the eye, rather traditionally even if Bachelard trans-
formed the classical implications. He also described “the advantage of the experi-
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ence with consecutive images,” a perception protocol which allows to “decom-
pose in time the excitation-sensation complex.”36
At the same time, in 1932, Abel Rey, Bachelard’s dissertation supervisor,
founded in the Sorbonne the important Institute for the History of Sciences and
Techniques, that would remain crucial for the history of the French tradition of
epistemology and for the historiography of techniques. After Rey, Bachelard be-
came the president of the institution in 1940, then Canguilhem in 1955.
The question of technique was also central for this other founding figure of
20th-century French thought, who was a major influence on Michel Foucault.
Canguilhem’s first two scientific papers were explicitly discussing this theme:
“Descartes and Technique,” his contribution to the important 1937 Descartes
conference, and “Technical Activity and Creation” in 1938. Those two lectures
promoted the “creative originality of technique,”37 implying that we should con-
sider technique within “a theory of creation, i.e., basically an aesthetics.”38
“Technical Thought”: A Cinematic Conceptual Framework
Technique reappeared again in the philosophy of science in those early 1930s
along an almost opposite perspective. The work of Julien Pacotte, La Pensée techni-
que [Technical Thought], published in 1931,39 was largely informed by quantum
mechanics, but – as opposed to Bachelard’s positions – the book aimed at advo-
cating pragmatism, and the focusing on technique appears as a means to “pre-
serve physics from losing itself in the realm of abstraction by keeping it close to
its object: the world of perception and action.”40 Pacotte argued that physics
should be considered as a “general technique,” this science being essentially ex-
perimental, and as a consequence technical since according to Pacotte “the two
notions ‘experimental’ and ‘technical’ can hardly be differentiated other than by
the theoretical purpose of the former.”41
But the heart of Pacotte’s work lay in another suggestion. It was centered on “a
fundamental technical concept” that he drew from “the many and diverse techni-
cal operations of which it is the principle”: that of “technical transformation.” From
this newly defined concept, he presented “the idea of a general science of trans-
formation”:
The definition is abstract by its very generality; but its practical importance is
emphasized by the great number of techniques whose purpose corresponds
precisely to the concept thus defined: let’s mention, among others, kinematic
measures, intensive measures, recording, optical magnifying, photography,
the cinematograph, the phonograph, the telegraph, the telephone, phototele-
graphy, television.42
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These apparatuses resurfaced many times throughout the book, along with sev-
eral others: optical phonography, the lantern, slow and fast motion cinematogra-
phy, the telegraphic strip, engraving, the chronograph, etc. These machineries
taken as a whole constituted the epistemological model for Pacotte’s conception
of technique and, as a consequence, of science, as can be seen through the net-
work of key notions on which the entire work is based: reproduction, optical
mediation, transmission, recording, trace, inscription, etc. “Technical thought”
was thus thoroughly shaped within a post-Mareysian or cinematic conceptual
framework. It is because the privileged objects defining technique itself were for
him those visual and sound apparatuses, that he can conceive the whole of tech-
nique as transformation. Pacotte’s book is largely forgotten today, in spite of
being mentioned several times by Canguilhem in “Machine et Organisme”
(1946); but it strikingly reveals how the conception of technique of the early
1930s – or, to adopt the dominant terminology of today, of technology – has
been radically reoriented by visual and sound technical apparatuses.
The second half of the 1930s was marked, as for technological matters, by
some sort of acme: the International Exhibition held in Paris in 1937, entitled
“Les Arts et les techniques dans la vie moderne.” The cinema was central in the
event, due to the Photo-Ciné-Phono pavilion but also to the use of the apparatus
in almost all of the sections.43 This exhibition was a sign of the continued pres-
ence of these questions in the field of art since the first avant-gardes, and of their
diffusion in all areas of life. Its organization had several repercussions, as for
instance the setting up in 1936 in the Conservatoire national des arts et métiers –
one of the most important places for technical learning in France – of a course in
electroacoustics, television and cinema called “Telephonovision.”44
The event was prolonged from May to August 1938 by the publication of four
successive special issues of the important journal Europe under the general title
“L’homme, la technique et la nature” [Man, Technique and Nature]. The first
issue was opened by Georges Friedmann, the last was closed by Lucien Febvre;
contributors included Marc Bloch, Le Corbusier, Fernand Léger, Léon Moussinac
(with an article on “Theatrical Technique”), Pierre Abraham, Darius Milhaud,
André Spire and, H.G. Wells, among many others. Strangely, the cinema was
totally absent from these issues, appearing only in a series of short critics by
Léon Werth, situated outside of the thematic collection.
Between France and Germany: Benjamin and Around
This study should be completed by an analysis of what happened during the
same period in other countries, for instance in Germany. The German specific
intellectual tradition also gave to the technological questions an important devel-
opment at the time, but on a quite different basis. The contribution of the Bau-
haus, whose motto from 1923 onwards was “Kunst und Technik – eine neue
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Einheit” [Art and Technique – A New Unity] certainly plays a significant role. On
a parallel level, the theme finds many echoes within philosophy and art history.
The very beginning of the 1930s saw the publication of two key essays, very dif-
ferent in content and approach, but whose influence would remain crucial for
later developments. One was Oswald Spengler’s book Der Mensch und die Technik.
Beitrag zu einer Philosophie des Lebens (1931),45 and the other was Ernst Cassirer’s
article “Form und Technik” (translated in English as “Form and Technology”46).
In the latter, technique was defined as “the form of an acting,” thus belonging to
Cassirer’s category of “symbolic form.” It is important for us to recall that the
essay was published in the 1930 book Kunst und Technik, edited by Leo Kesten-
berg,47 whose sections examine successively “Music and Technique,” “Word and
Technique,” “The Radio,” “The Film,” “The Sound Film,” and “The Record.”
This division and the cultural landscape it defines regarding the problem of “Art
and Technique” in 1930 are of course rich of implications for our subject. The
very fact that film and sound film should be, in this context, considered in two
different sections is already significant. The filmmaker Walter Ruttmann contri-
buted to the first section a text entitled “Technik und Film.”
These problems found a singularly complex development in Erwin Panofsky’s
work. The 1927 seminal essay “Die Perspektive als symbolische Form” was in
fact actually a historical epistemology of a painting technique, even though the
term “technique” did only rarely appear. But for Panofsky, that “quite specific,
indeed specifically modern, sense of space or if you will, sense of the world” was
justified and constructed by constant reference to the photographic technique –
or, to adopt again the dominant vocabulary of our time, technology – the “habi-
tuation […] to linear perspectival construction” being today “further reinforced
by looking at photographs.”48 The distinctively cinematic problems did not ap-
pear in the text, except through the evocation of the “imaginary space” produced
according to El Lissitzky “by mechanically motivated bodies, by this very move-
ment.”49 That hypothesis did not sound very convincing to the art historian. But
questions of a close nature returned throughout his work, whether in “Original
und Faksimilereproduktion,” published in 1930,50 or of course in the text “On
the Movies,” whose first version came up as a lecture in 1936.51
Today, all those complex, heterogeneous and proliferating interrogations are
often considered through the sole contribution of Walter Benjamin, “Das Kunst-
werk im Zeitalter seiner technischen Reproduzierbarkeit.” Composed in several
versions between 1935 and 1938, the essay was published at the time only in the
French version resulting from a collaboration between Benjamin and Pierre Klos-
sowski, under the title “L’Œuvre d’art à l’époque de sa reproduction mécanisée”
[The Work of Art in the Age of Its Mechanized Reproduction].52 This French title
sounds of course closer to the English translation generally adopted [The Work
of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction], in that it transposes the semantic
field of the technical into that of the mechanical, a move whose importance can only
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be perceived when considered within its original framework of conception and
diffusion: the 1930s debates on technique/technology (and film). In fact, all the
text would benefit from a rereading in the light of the discursive production of
the time. This archaeological reconsideration of the “Work of Art” essay – to
which this article here partly aims at initiating – seems necessary in order to
perceive what actually constitutes the most crucial points of Benjamin’s contribu-
tion.
For an Epistemology of “Digital Cinema”
The 1930s are the years of the emergence and construction of technique/technol-
ogy as an object in all the branches of knowledge, provoking a complex – and
sometimes rather strange – circulation of themes, motifs, interrogations and
worries. Beyond the problem of “mechanization,” technique appears as funda-
mentally collective, essentially general, non-individualized and thus constituting
a threat to the individual – a problem to which Gilbert Simondon would later
return, from a different perspective. By its essence and its products, it implies an
aesthetics, but a singular one.
The cinema seems to play a major role in the cultural construction of the very
essence of the technical. But in return, the concepts that the cinema uses for its
own definition, even on an aesthetic level – montage, for instance – are themselves
emanations of this wide circulation of discourses on technique and the machine.
A certain number of questions traditionally related with the cinema, as for exam-
ple the aesthetic implications of technical/mechanical reproducibility, have to be
replaced in the wider scientific and cultural context of technology, considered as
a specific epistemological domain, as it is in this domain that they are first con-
structed. In this field, the cinema appears at the heart of a network which goes
beyond a strict “intermediality” to include visual and sound apparatuses not
dedicated to entertainment or art, but also machines in a wider sense, industrial
mass-produced objects, and perhaps even ready-to-wear clothes…
The 1930s show the elaboration of a fundamental, complex, multi-faceted re-
lation between the two concepts of cinema and technology, cinema being character-
ized through technology, and technology through the cinema both as a technical
apparatus, a machine, and as a cultural event, a media. What we would like to
have shown here is how the construction of the two concepts has been contem-
porary and interdependent. This has implications for today’s situation. The cru-
cial, ontological interrogations that have taken over film studies and connected
branches of knowledge with the shift to digital machines and technology, seem
to us only partly explained by the actual importance of the changes involved,
whether practical, theoretical or aesthetic. Those interrogations arise more deep-
ly from the fact that digital techniques – machineries and processes, apparatuses
and workflows – are perceived as belonging to a slightly different conceptual
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structure than mechanics. They imply a shift in the concept of technology, which is
quite perceptible in general culture. Given the way that our concept of cinema has
been constructed, this shift builds a new conceptual environment around the no-
tion of cinema, a new epistemological network that involves a reconstruction of
the concept itself, even though the notion may seem unchanged. Understanding
“digital cinema” has more to do with historical epistemology than with ontology.
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Technē and Poiēsis: On Heidegger and
Film Theory
Robert Sinnerbrink
But will not saying both yes and no this way to technical devices make our
relation to technology ambivalent and insecure? On the contrary! Our relation
to technology will become wonderfully simple and relaxed. We let technical
devices enter our daily life, and at the same time leave them outside, that is,
let them alone, as things which are nothing absolute but remain dependent
upon something higher. I would call this comportment toward technology
which expresses “yes” and at the same time “no,” by an old word, releasement
toward things [Gelassenheit zu den Dingen].1
Heidegger’s challenge to the philosophy of subjectivity and his re-thinking of the
“question of Being” have transformed modern thought. A number of movements
in 20th-century philosophy, such as existential phenomenology, hermeneutics,
deconstruction, and French poststructuralism, all owe a debt to Heidegger’s
work.2 Yet Heidegger does not seem, at first glance, a philosopher with much to
offer contemporary film theory. Heidegger’s few explicit remarks on the subject
make it clear that he considered cinema (and photography) to be forms of image-
making that signify the “end of art” in modernity.3 As Heidegger asserts, for
example, at the end of his essay “The Turning”: “we do not yet hear [the call of
Being], we whose hearing and seeing are perishing through radio and film under
the rule of technology.”4 In On the Way to Language, we read that cinema cannot
reveal an authentic sense of world since it is “captured and imprisoned […] with-
in the objectness of photography,” a fact that reflects the forgetting of Being
typical of the “Europeanization” of humankind and the world.5 And in Heideg-
ger’s Discourse on Thinking [Gelassenheit], we are told that the “uprootedness” of
post-war Europeans is being exacerbated by the ubiquity of the mass media, lead-
ing to a generalized condition of “homelessness,” an existential “worldlessness”:
Hourly and daily they are chained to radio and television. Week after week the
movies carry them off into uncommon, but often merely common, realms of
the imagination, and give the illusion of a world that is no world.6
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This rather unpromising start has not deterred some philosophers and theorists
from finding in Heidegger an ally for philosophical thinking in relation to film.7
In his 1979 foreword to The World Viewed, for example, Stanley Cavell remarks on
the difficulties presented by the relationship between Heidegger and film.8 He
refers explicitly to Terrence Malick’s Days of Heaven (1978), a film whose
images are not only beautiful but acknowledge the self-referential character of
moving images, the way they manifest the play of presence and absence that is
inherent in our experience of the world viewed.9 As Cavell remarks, Days of
Heaven displays a metaphysical vision of the world, but “one feels that one has
never quite seen the scene of human existence – call it the arena between earth
(or days) and heaven – quite realized this way on film before.”10 This raises a
difficulty for the philosophically minded viewer of film. To ask film theorists to
think about Heidegger, as Cavell observes, is to ask them to endorse an “em-
battled” perspective in Anglophone intellectual culture, one “whose application
to film is difficult to prove.”11 On the other hand, to ask academic philosophers
to think about film through Heidegger is to ask them to grant film “the status of
a subject that invites and rewards philosophical speculation, on a par with the
great arts,” a concept that is itself brought into question by film, as Walter Ben-
jamin observed long ago.12 Yet it is undeniable, for Cavell, that the films of Ter-
rence Malick – scholar of phenomenology and translator of Heidegger – have a
beauty and radiance that suggest something like a realization of Heidegger’s
thinking of the relationship between Being and beings, the radiant self-showing
of things in luminous appearance.13
Cavell was not alone in identifying Malick as a filmmaker whose work could be
described as “Heideggerian,” even though what a “Heideggerian cinema” might
be remains an open question.14 Heidegger has even inspired a Chris Marker-style
documentary-essay film, The Ister (David Barison and Daniel Ross, 2004),
based on his 1938 lecture course on Hölderlin’s poem of the same name.15 None-
theless, Heidegger is known as one of the great critics of the modern age, which
he famously called the age of the world-picture or world-image [die Zeit des Welt-
bildes], when all of reality is increasingly rendered as an ontologically degraded
representational resource on standby for use and consumption.16 Given Heideg-
ger’s evident skepticism concerning photography (and by implication, cinema),
what is the significance of his thought for contemporary film/media theory and
philosophy of cinema? There are two approaches I shall develop here in response
to this question: Heidegger’s influential response to the “question of technics” in
modernity and its implications for audiovisual media; and the idea of a Heideg-
gerian poetics, of modern art as having the poetic power to disclose new horizons




The only passage where Heidegger explicitly discusses a particular film is re-
markably suggestive. In “A Dialogue on Language between a Japanese and an
Inquirer,” two interlocutors, the Inquirer and his Japanese guest, converse on
the relationship between Western rationality and its dominance over the East
Asian sense of art and world.17 They are concerned, in particular, to explore the
meaning of the Japanese term iki, which turns out to have a much broader and
deeper meaning than the Enlightenment concept of “aesthetic experience.” In
the course of their discussion, the Inquirer warns against the tendency to follow
Western conceptual thought, for all its technological achievements, because this
will blind us to the increasing “Europeanization of man and the earth [which]
attacks at the source everything of an essential nature.”18 As an example of this
all-consuming Westernization, the Japanese guest suggests, surprisingly, Akiro
Kurosawa’s Rashomon (1950). The inquirer is perplexed, for he found Rasho-
mon utterly enchanting, above all its subdued gestures: “I believed that I was
experiencing the enchantment of the Japanese world, the enchantment that car-
ries us away into the mysterious.”19
Fig. 1: Rashomon (1950): “The enchantment of the Japanese world.”
Count Kuki explains that the film was overly realistic, particularly in the battle
scenes, which makes it far removed from the tradition of Japanese art and drama.
He hastens to add that it is not the realism of metaphysics but a realism pertain-
ing to the ontology of the cinematic image. As Kuki observes, it is not so much
the film’s dramatic or cinematic aspects but that the Japanese world is filmed at
all, “captured and imprisoned at all within the objectness of photography,” that
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makes Rashomon an example of Western techno-rationalization.20 Regardless
of the film’s undoubted aesthetic qualities, Kuki explains to the Inquirer that
“the mere fact that our world is set forth in the frame of a film forces that world
into the sphere of what you call of objectness.”21 And this “objectification” of the
world through photography and film, moreover, is “already a consequence of the
ever wider outreach of Europeanization.”22 The Inquirer (a stand-in for Heideg-
ger, one presumes) thus begins to understand Count Kuki’s concerns:23 far from
presenting the “enchantment of the Japanese world,” Kurosawa’s Rashomon
shows us the incompatibility between this Eastern sense of world, still replete
with a sense of Being, and the Westernized, “technical-aesthetic product of the
film industry” that suffers from a nihilistic loss of Being.24 In short, cinematic
art intensifies, rather than reverses, the “objectification” of beings that is symp-
tomatic of the Western forgetting of Being. The conclusion drawn from this brief
episode in the dialogue is stark: movies are symptomatic of our Western nihilis-
tic desire to “objectify” reality, to reduce the world, in its richness and mystery, to
representational images, to an aesthetic “resource” for our manipulation and
consumption.
While intriguing, this passage is hardly a promising start for thinking about
the relationship between Heidegger and cinema. Indeed, it suggests that cinema
is nothing but a pernicious manifestation of the technological “enframing” of
the world (what Heidegger calls the “essence” of modern technics as the reduc-
tion of reality to a stockpile of available resources).25 It is also a curious discus-
sion of Kurosawa’s work, given the latter’s explicitly hybrid character, fusing
Japanese with Western literary traditions (Shakespeare, for example), and its re-
vitalization of the Western action genre by combining it with martial aspects of
Japanese drama.26 Its importance, however, lies in the way that Heidegger under-
lines the metaphysical importance of the image in modernity, which is defined by
the reduction of the world to what can be represented directly, objectified by
technical means, and thus to what corresponds with the cognitive interests of
the human subject. Both of these ideas have profound implications for thinking
about the cinema.
Heidegger and the “Question of Being”
To explore Heidegger’s significance for film theory, however, we must begin,
albeit briefly, with Heidegger’s fundamental question. Heidegger’s entire body
of work is an extended meditation on this question: what is the meaning or sense
of Being [Sein] as distinct from beings or entities [das Seiende]? Traditionally, in
the history of philosophy, this question concerning Being took the form of an
inquiry into the Being of beings or entities as such and as a whole;27 a decision
that, according to Heidegger, has had profound effects on the subsequent history
of metaphysics from Plato to Nietzsche.28 In Being and Time, Heidegger points out
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that the various “prejudices” concerning the meaning of Being – that Being is the
most “universal” concept, that it is an indefinable concept, and that it is self-
evident – indicate that the question of Being not only lacks a coherent answer
but remains problematic and obscure.29 On the other hand, something like
“Being” is always already understood in our everyday language and in our practi-
cal comportments toward the beings or entities we encounter in the world. This
obscurity of the concept of “Being,” along with our everyday pre-understanding
of it, points to a fundamental difficulty in our philosophical understanding.
Hence the need for an explicit repetition of the inquiry into the meaning of
Being, unfolded through a preparatory interpretation of the Being of that entity
which we ourselves are – what Heidegger calls “Da-sein.”30
We are familiar with useful beings in our everyday comportment toward items
of equipment in our environment. We also have a “preontological” understand-
ing of Being in the sense of grasping the familiar beings that show up in our
shared being-in-the-world. But do we understand or have an intuition of the
“clearing,” “horizon,” or “lighting of Being” [Lichtung des Seins] through which
beings show up as intelligible at all? We might gloss this clearing or lighting as
the event of presencing or of originary world-disclosure. An experience of the clear-
ing of Being, for Heidegger, is precisely what we have lost in modernity, an
epoch defined, since Descartes, Kant and Nietzsche, by the metaphysics of hu-
man subjectivity. Being, however, cannot be reduced to what is present or repre-
sentable for a human subject. Being is not something that we grasp only thanks
to the thought, language, or action of human beings. Rather, the thought, lan-
guage, and action of human beings show up as meaningful only within the clear-
ing of Being. We must not think of temporal “projection” and understanding in
terms of a “representational positing,” otherwise we are taking these, in accor-
dance with modern metaphysics, to be the achievements of self-grounding sub-
jectivity.31 Indeed, if we take as our guide the manner in which Being is intelligi-
ble for us, we end up “subjectifying” Being: mistaking the limits of human
meaning-making for the limits of Being as such. Heidegger thus proposes that
we investigate the way of Being of that entity which we ourselves are: self-inter-
preting, finite, historical beings for whom our own existence is an issue. Dasein’s
way of Being, namely existence [Existenz], turns out to be complex. Being and Time
thus goes on to interpret the fundamental “structures of existence” in terms of
three interconnected ontological levels: pragmatic being-in-the-world, existential
care, and “ecstatic” (phenomenological-existential) temporality.
In his later thought, Heidegger observed that the quasi-transcendental project
of Being and Time, indebted to the phenomenology of Husserl, was a necessary
starting point for inquiring into the question of Being but still remained em-
bedded within the modern metaphysics of subjectivity. The existential analytic of
Dasein, which Heidegger also called “fundamental ontology,” failed to make the
transition to a genuinely post-metaphysical mode of inquiry into the truth of
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Being. It fails to make clear Heidegger’s famous “turning” [Kehre] to “this other
thinking that abandons subjectivity,” since it remains framed within, and de-
scribed through, the language of the “metaphysics of the subject.”32 This “turn-
ing” toward the question of the truth of Being – the meaning of Being indepen-
dently of beings – is what Heidegger undertakes during the 1930s and after
WWII, when he turns away from more traditional philosophical discourse, em-
braces a “poetic” manner of thinking, and poses “the question concerning tech-
nology” as the fundamental challenge facing the modern age. As we shall see,
cinema, as the technological art par excellence, presents important challenges for
Heidegger’s account of modernity, technology, and art.
The Question of Technology
In the essay “The Question Concerning Technology,” Heidegger attempts to
think through the essence of technology in order to “prepare a free relationship
to it.”33 The ethical dimension of this project is clear: through developing a
thoughtful relationship with the essence of technology, we might experience the
possibility of a freer relationship with the technological world. Such a relation-
ship will open up our human existence to the essence of technology, which now
dominates our experience of reality (nature, culture, and history). It would mean
that we were no longer “enslaved” to technology, and thus more able to find a
way of inhabiting the technological world that no longer does violence to our
own nature (which is to “dwell” as thinking beings) or to Nature as such. The
motivation and aim of Heidegger’s questioning of technology is therefore ethical,
in that it aims to clarify how we should best live in a free and fitting manner
within our technologically disclosed world.
Heidegger begins by pointing out that the essence of technology, meaning that
which enables technology in the ordinary sense to hold sway, is not itself any-
thing technological. When we think of technology we might think of machines,
technical apparatuses, modern science, cybernetics, computers, the Internet, and
so on. In short, the technical amplification of human power to control our natur-
al and cultural environments and possibly to enhance human life (though tech-
nology harbors both productive and destructive potentials). While these phenom-
ena are certainly relevant, they do not really capture the essence of technology.
They do not tell us how technology is the way in which Being is disclosed in
modernity. Indeed, Heidegger is at pains to insist that there is nothing to be
gained by rejecting technology (as though that were possible) or denouncing it
“as the work of the devil.”34 The point is to understand our current relationship
of enslavement and misunderstanding in order to better prepare for the possibil-
ity of a free relationship to technology. Heidegger is therefore not engaged in any
“neo-Luddism”35 or nostalgia for a pre-modern age, despite his penchant for
Black Forest mountain huts and solitary forest paths. What matters is to think
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through the essence of technology so as to no longer experience it in a “meta-
physical,” that is, a totalizing and instrumentally ordered way.
An obvious definition would be to say that technology is the product of human
activity, the application of knowledge to provide a “technical means to a human
end.”36 This instrumental definition is certainly correct; yet Heidegger argues
that it does not capture what is truly essential about modern technology. To
grasp this we must attempt to uncover the deeper phenomenological dimension
of poiēsis or “bringing-forth” that underlies our inherited understanding of caus-
ality and instrumentality (the producing of technical means to achieve a desired
end). We must endeavor to understand poiēsis in its originary meaning, which
neither refers merely to “handicraft manufacture,” nor just to “artistic and poeti-
cal bringing into appearance and concrete imagery.”37 Rather, poiēsis or bringing-
forth includes the understanding of Nature as physis: as self-blossoming emer-
gence, the “arising of something from out of itself.”38 This bringing-forth of
something into appearance means bringing it out of unconcealment and into the
realm of what is manifest to perception and available for practical use. In other
words, poetic bringing-forth reveals beings in the light of truth or aletheia, where
truth is understood in a Greek sense as a revealing or an unconcealing rather
than as correspondence between propositions and states of affairs.
Modern technology must be understood, then, in terms of revealing, that is, as
a way in which beings are made manifest for practical manipulation and theore-
tical contemplation. But we need to clarify the difference between modern tech-
nology and other forms of technology. What kind of revealing is at play in mod-
ern technology? How does it make beings manifest for theoretical knowledge
and practical use? Modern technology does not reveal in the mode of poetic
bringing-forth, revealing something and allowing it to reveal itself as it is (a self-
generated process in the case of natural phenomena; an assisted process in the
case of cultural artifacts). On the contrary, modern technology reveals beings in
the mode of an excessive or violent challenging-forth: “The revealing that rules in
modern technology is a challenging [Herausfordern], which puts to nature the un-
reasonable demand that it supply energy which can be extracted and stored as
such.”39 Modern technics refers to our way of inhabiting the world and using
our environment as revealed, mediated, and propelled by technology.
One might respond that surely all technology, even the most rudimentary,
functions in this manner. There are surely some forms of technology – so-called
“primitive” technologies, or ecologically sustainable technologies – that do not
function by means of a “violent” challenging-forth. Such ecological forms of
technology certainly use environmental energy resources, but they do not forcibly
extract it and store it into as an available but exhaustible resource. In fact it is not
the extraction and storage of energy resources that is the problem. Rather, it is
the reduction of Nature to nothing but a stockpile of potential resources that Hei-
degger regards as characterizing the violence of modern technology.40 Modern
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technology forcibly and exclusively transforms all natural beings into potential re-
sources: “Air is now set upon to yield nitrogen, the earth to yield ore, ore to yield
uranium, for example; uranium is set upon to yield atomic energy, which can be
unleashed either for destructive of for peaceful purposes.”41 To which we might
add that language is set upon to yield informational resources, genetic material is
set upon to yield biological resources, chemical and biological entities to yield
industrial, medical, and military resources, human energy, action, and ingenuity
are harnessed for economic purposes, and so on.
An important aspect of this inappropriate challenging-forth in modern tech-
nology is that it is always geared toward expediting, that is, unlocking and exposing,
the latent energies in nature in the service of maximizing efficiency: “i.e., toward
driving on to maximum yield at the minimum expense.”42 But this process is not
only discernible in the technological approach to Nature; it is also present in the
challenging-forth of energies in our social, cultural, and political environments.
Here we could mention the production of energy resources and commodities for
technical use and market consumption, the endless circulation of investment,
stocks, and information within the networks of global capital, but also the ma-
nipulation of so-called “human resources” available for deployment within social
institutions, commercial enterprises, and economic processes.
Modern technology must therefore be understood as a way of revealing that
has the character of a setting-upon both nature and culture; one that functions
by the excessive challenging-forth of energies to be extracted and stored. The
technological mode of challenging-forth is a dynamic process of unlocking,
transforming, storing, and networking energies in an endless cycle of production
and consumption whose aim is self-perpetuation and immanent expansion (for
example, the global economy). This endless cycle of technological production
and consumption involves constant regulating and securing, the “chief characteris-
tics” of the technological mode of revealing the world.43 The kind of truth re-
vealed in this way Heidegger calls Bestand or “standing-reserve”; that is, modern
technology reveals beings in the world exclusively in the mode of resources avail-
able for use. “Everywhere everything is ordered to stand by, to be immediately on
hand, indeed to stand there just so that it may be on call for a further order-
ing.”44 Bestand designates the technological mode of revealing the world through
the violent challenging forth of its energies, transforming reality into a perma-
nently ordered and available stock of resources.
A jet airliner standing on the runway, to use Heidegger’s example, is no longer
just an object but a technical resource ordered “to insure the possibility of trans-
portation.”45 As a whole and in each of its (technical and human) parts – crew
and passengers, pilots and air traffic controllers, computer navigation systems,
jet engines, engineering staff, ground crew, security, and so on – the airliner is
revealed as a resource permanently “on call for duty, i.e. ready for takeoff.”46
Heidegger’s claim that we no longer inhabit a world of subjects confronting ob-
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jects “standing” over against us is attested by the contemporary trend toward de-
objectified, networked resources. The computer is an information interface, the
mobile telephone a “personalized” communication resource on permanent
standby; we too become communication resources permanently “on call” within
social, electronic, and economic networks.
What is the role of human beings within the technological disclosure of reality
as a stockpile of resources? Are we responsible for this technological ordering
and stockpiling? Or do human beings themselves belong to the standing re-
sources ordered and available for use? Heidegger’s point is that technology is
not simply a human invention; rather, it orders human beings within its systemic
process of revealing, producing, and managing resources. Indeed, the social and
economic consumption of “human resources” is now routinely accepted as an
unalterable fact of modern life. This linguistic usage is evidence of a real trans-
formation occurring in our self-understanding as much as in the technological
ordering of the modern world. The epoch of modern technology is not simply
the handiwork of human beings; rather human beings are themselves part of the
general technical process of revealing and transforming reality into a totality of
stockpiled resources. This process is how Being presents itself or manifests his-
torically in modernity, which is not simply a matter of human action, although it
requires human action in order to take place.
Heidegger thus arrives at his provisional answer to the question concerning
the essence of technology. This violent challenging that gathers up human
beings in order to reveal actuality as available resources is what he calls en-framing
or Ge-stell. What does this mean? Gestell is an ordinary German word (meaning
frame, apparatus, skeleton or framework) which is used to designate the essence
of modern technology: the gathering of human beings along with other beings
into the forced revealing of actuality as a totality of available resources.47 Heideg-
ger’s “definition” of Gestell reads as follows:
Enframing means the gathering together of the setting-upon that sets upon
man, i.e., challenges him forth, to reveal the actual, in the mode of ordering,
as standing-reserve.48
Let us unpack this obscure remark a little further. The essence of modern tech-
nology refers to the systemic process by which human beings are integrated into
the violent transformation of nature (and culture) into productive resources avail-
able for use. Human beings, however, are not solely responsible for this techno-
logical transformation of the world. Rather, we are “challenged forth,” through
technological enframing, to contribute to the revealing of entities, via scientific
and technical means, as a stockpile of potential resources. Modern technics as
enframing, in short, amounts to the “resourcification” of reality (to coin an ugly
term): the reduction of beings as a whole to a totality of resources. As Heidegger
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remarks in his Discourse on Thinking: “Nature becomes a gigantic gasoline station,
an energy source for modern technology and industry.”49
Heidegger’s term enframing or Ge-stell, however, is ambiguous: it not only
evokes the sense of setting up and setting upon; it also evokes the sense of pro-
ducing [her-stellen] and presenting [dar-stellen]. En-framing thus points to two
kinds of revealing: 1) the violent challenging-forth characteristic of modern tech-
nics, and 2) the artistic or creative bringing-forth of poetic making. If we remem-
ber that the Greek term technē refers to craft, skill, and know-how, the point
becomes clearer. Technological enframing refers to the “violent” challenging-
forth characteristic of modern technology, which threatens to reduce all beings,
including human beings, to available resources. Poetic making, by contrast, re-
fers to the gentler, creative mode of bringing-forth manifest in art, craft, practi-
cal skills, and “ecological” forms of technology that do not violate the integrity of
beings but rather enable them to presence in different ways. This essence of
technology, Heidegger argues, must therefore be understood as fundamentally am-
biguous. The “danger” in technological en-framing, however, is that the “violent”
mode of challenging forth will become all pervasive. The danger lies in the capa-
city of modern technology to obliterate all other forms of revealing, above all the poe-
tic bringing-forth characteristic of art and non-violent forms of technology.
This danger manifests itself more concretely in two related ways: by the disap-
pearance of free-standing objects, now construed as resources for use; and by the self-
interpretation of human beings who come to experience each other merely as exploi-
table resources. This twofold danger Heidegger articulates as follows:
As soon as what is unconcealed no longer concerns man even as object, but
exclusively as standing-reserve, and man in the midst of objectlessness is
nothing but the orderer of standing-reserve, then he comes to the very brink
of a precipitous fall; that is, he comes to the point where he himself will have
to be taken as standing-reserve.50
Part of the danger of modern technology is that we seem blissfully unaware of
this threat to our nature as dwelling or thinking beings. Instead, this threat is
neutralized by the self-assertion of human power and the belief in technological
progress. In this way, as Heidegger presciently observes, “the illusion comes to
prevail that everything man encounters exists only insofar as it is his con-
struct.”51 The danger posed by technological en-framing thus amounts to a two-
fold threat: a threat to other ways of revealing the world, notably to poetic bring-
ing-forth as accomplished by art; and a threat to our “human essence” as
dwellers within the clearing of Being (beings with an ethical responsibility to-
ward those entities we contribute to revealing and using for our own purposes).
Far from glibly celebrating the “post-human” condition, Heidegger underlines
the danger inherent in the metaphysical-technological misinterpretation of hu-
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man beings, and of all other beings, as manipulable resources. This ambiguity of
modern technology is not simply a matter of human decision, nor can it be era-
dicated by the application of technical reasoning, rational planning, or utilitarian
calculation. It remains an historical “destiny,” a sending or destining [Geschick]
that defines our historical experience of modernity; it is the way that Being re-
veals itself through the ambiguous processes of technological en-framing.
Art as “Saving Power”
What positive potentials are there within modern technology? How might we
develop a “freer” more ethical relationship with it? Heidegger cites in response
the poet Hölderlin’s now famous lines: “But where danger is, grows/The saving
power also.”52 This “saving power” indicates the possibility that technological
enframing might harbor the possibility of a different way of revealing truth; a
non-instrumentalist, no longer “metaphysical” experience of “poetic reveal-
ing.”53 “Poetic” is taken here not in the sense of a romantic nostalgia, but in the
sense of a bringing forth that allows things to appear in their truth, to show
themselves in radiant appearance: a poiēsis paradigmatically found in the work of
art. To clarify this thought, Heidegger emphasizes the “originary” character of
the Greek artwork as a way of revealing truth, of setting truth to work in an
ontological sense (revealing the truth of a being through the work, and expe-
riencing the work as an expression of truth).54 Such ontological revelation of truth
through art, Heidegger maintains, occurred in ancient Greece, “when the bring-
ing-forth of the true into the beautiful was called technē,” when art “illuminated
the presence [Gegenwart] of the gods and the dialogue of divine and human des-
tining.”55 Archaic art, which was poetic art, set truth to work in the dynamic con-
flict between world and earth (roughly speaking, culture and nature).56 Art man-
ifested or revealed Being by bringing forth and presenting beings through
sculpture, drama, poetry, and architecture (the temple). Taken in its broadest
sense, art in its archaic form “therefore belonged within poiesis.”57 Within the
ambiguous condition of technological modernity, Heidegger intimates, the sav-
ing power can be found in the way the poietic work of art can still reveal the truth
of beings: disclosing aesthetically their distinctive ways of Being as what we
come to experience through the work.
The problem is that Heidegger appears at times to exclude the modern work of
art – including cinema and photography as the technological art forms par excel-
lence – from any such poetic revealing of truth. Indeed, he explicitly contrasts the
degraded character of the modern artwork with the authentic poiēsis or bringing-
forth of the (auratic) artwork that is capable of setting truth to work.58 For the
Greek world, unlike in modernity, art is still enchanted: “The arts were not de-
rived from the artistic. Artworks were not enjoyed aesthetically. Art was not a
sector of cultural activity.”59 In contrast with modern art, or the aesthetic prod-
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ucts of the culture industry, the authentic archaic artwork was a technē in the
service of poiēsis. Heidegger’s emphasis on poiēsis thus suggests that only a return
to auratic art, to an archaic mode of poetic revealing, will be capable of “fostering
the saving power” in modernity.
Heidegger’s recourse here to a pre-modern conception of art, however, indicates
a tension in his thinking on modern technology. As Walter Benjamin points out,
technological artworks no longer possess an aura – a singular presence and un-
iqueness – due to radical changes in the historical, cultural, and social meaning
of art wrought by the advent of technical reproducibility.60 According to Benja-
min, technically reproducible, post-auratic artworks liberate art from the rigidity
of tradition, dissolve the claims of originality, unique presence, and take on an
ambiguous political function.61 The technological art forms par excellence, namely
photography and cinema, shatter both the modern aesthetic conception of ex-
pressive art and the archaic conception of the sacredness of the artwork as cultic
object. Yet for Heidegger it is this auratic conception of the artwork, represented
by the cultic work (poem, temple, tragedy), that might “expressly foster the
growth of the saving power, may awaken and found anew our vision of, and trust
in, that which grants.”62 Heidegger’s thinking in regard to film, from this point
of view, remains overly restrictive. Only auratic works of art, Heidegger seems to
suggest, harbor the “saving power” that could keep open other ways of revealing
the truth of beings. Can a Heideggerian way of thinking about cinema help foster
the “saving power” in modernity?
Cinema as Poiēsis
In conclusion I would like to explore some ways of thinking about cinema that
Heidegger’s thinking on technology makes possible. Despite his critique of
photography and cinema, there are insights in Heidegger’s thinking that allow
us to understand cinema as poiēsis, as a medium of “poetic revealing.”63 As Hei-
degger goes on to observe, technological en-framing opens up the possibility of
new ways of revealing the world. Modern technology, understood as enframing,
harbors the possibility of a creative “bringing-forth,” a poetic revealing of truth,
even a new way of experiencing the “event of Being” (the latter is what Heidegger
calls das Ereignis: the appropriative event of world-disclosure that relates human
beings, beings, and Being in historically distinctive ways).64 The essential point
to note is the fundamental ambiguity of modern technology: since it is not possi-
ble that all of reality will be reduced to a totality of resources, “precisely the es-
sence of technology must harbor in itself the growth of the saving power.”65 The
question concerning technology thus turns out to be a question concerning truth:
a question of “the constellation in which revealing and concealing,” that is, “the
essential unfolding of truth,” happens as an event.66 This means that we must
look to technological enframing, examining the ways in which modern technol-
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ogy reveals the world, in order to find new ways in which truth might happen,
different ways we might experience the “worlding of the world.” What appears,
from one perspective, as the “danger” posed by modern technics also opens up,
from another, the possibility of new ways of being and thinking: “the essential
unfolding of technology harbors in itself what we least suspect, the possible rise
of the saving power.”67
Cinema is the technological art form par excellence; one that participates in the
very ambiguity of modern technology, its danger and its saving power. It is not
simply an instrument of representational objectification, or a means of reducing
art to an aesthetic resource designed to elicit sensation. Rather, it has the capa-
city to construct and reveal worlds, virtual and fictional, that can disclose differ-
ent aspects of our own being-in-the-world. Cinema is a technological medium of
poetic revelation with the capacity to reveal the truth of beings, even our own
experience of world-disclosure (the “worlding of the world”). This is an insight
that many other theorists have intimated, albeit from different theoretical per-
spectives. Whether through the “mummification” of time and consciousness
(Bazin), the “redemption of physical reality” (Kracauer), or uncovering the “opti-
cal unconscious” (Benjamin); whether as a series of “automatic world projec-
tions” that both express and undo skepticism (Cavell), or as the presentation of
perception, affect, and thought through assemblages of movement- and time-
images (Deleuze, phenomenology); cinema can be also understood, following
Heidegger’s account of the essence of technology, as a technological medium
capable of the poetic revealing of truth, a creative bringing-forth, the disclosure
of virtual worlds by audiovisual means.
In other words, we can think of cinema, adapting Heidegger, as a medium of
poiēsis: a medium of the “poetic revealing” of beings, worlds, and different as-
pects of existence. By “cinematic poiēsis” I mean a revealing or bringing-forth of
complex virtual worlds; the technologically mediated projection and disclosure of
a world through audiovisual images. Cinematic poiēsis articulates film’s “truth-
disclosing” power to present time, capture movement, express meaning, or re-
veal aspects of our experience of world that might otherwise remain obscured or
marginalized. This “Heideggerian” conception of cinema can supplement the
more traditional representational and narrative focus on film as presenting ob-
jects instrumentally within the action-directed schemas of psychologically moti-
vated subjects. One need only compare, for example, a film like Malick’s The
Thin Red Line (1998) with Spielberg’s Saving Private Ryan (1998) to see
the contrast I am proposing here. Many of Malick’s films perform this kind of
cinematic revealing of world, staging the poetic difference between saying and
showing, between the horizons of the world revealed through mood and the par-
ticular finite existence of individuals acting within these world horizons. The
Thin Red Line, for example, enacts a cinematic poiēsis, revealing different
ways in which we can relate to our own mortality, the “happening of Being” or
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radiance of Nature. Malick’s The New World (2005) projects a cultural and
historical clash of worlds, exploring the (Western) desire for conquest and dom-
ination, the ambivalent power of romantic love, and the need to acknowledge a
deeper (spiritual) unity with nature. Through images of non-human nature,
which both frame and interrupt the clash between Old and New Worlds, The
New World discloses cinematically and poetically the sublimity of nature un-
derstood as elemental earth, that which underlies and supports any historical and
cultural form of human community.
The Tree of Life (2011) also engages in “poetic revealing,” capturing an
aesthetically transfigured reality – attentive to contingency, nature, and mood –
through radiant images of place and duration. As a number of critics have noted,
Malick’s films express a cinematographic fascination with light, what one might
call his films’ Neo-platonic equation between light and life. Such “theophanic”
cinematography is a way of using the technology of cinema to express the inti-
mate relationship between human beings, nature, and the complexity of everyday
experience. We might call this the luminous “realism” of Malick’s cinema; its
Bazinian power to capture an aesthetically transfigured reality – attentive to con-
tingency, nature, and mood – through radiant images of place and duration. Al-
most every outdoor shot in The Tree of Life , for example, displays the setting
or rising sun, in the background yet shining brilliantly through trees, radiating
across faces, a poetic disclosure of the everyday world: images that express the
ontological, or better, the ontopoetical power of beauty to reveal the truth of
beings, to manifest the beauty of “all things shining.” This poetic revealing in
Malick’s work is enacted not only at the level of narrative content, visual style,
and musical expression. It involves the very capacity of cinema to reawaken dif-
ferent kinds of attunement or mood through sound and image, revealing other-
wise concealed aspects – visual, aural, affective, and temporal – of our shared
cultural and historical being-in-the-world. In this sense, Malick’s films enact a
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Fig. 2: Revealing worlds: Malick’s The New World (2005).
poetic revealing that shows the capacity of cinema to reveal truth and disclose
new worlds; a technē that, in Heidegger’s words, expresses a “revealing that
brings forth into the splendor of radiant appearance,” a poetic “bringing-forth
of the true into the beautiful”68 – or cinema as poiēsis.
A “Heideggerian” approach to cinema can embrace many ways of being, from
phenomenological depictions of different modes of existence, a questioning of
the dangers and promises of modern technology, to exploring poetic ways of
disclosing new worlds.69 All of these approaches, moreover, presuppose that we
have considered the ontological question of the nature of the cinematic image
and its capacity to provoke thought; a question that Heidegger’s challenge to
modern philosophy and confrontation with technology helps us to appreciate,
experience, and think anew. At the same time, and in keeping with Heidegger’s
account of the ambivalence of modern technology, it is important to temper Hei-
degger’s critique of the representational capacity of cinema and to acknowledge
the interplay between representation and poetic dimensions of cinematic world-
projection. A cinematic world has, on the one hand, a representational aspect of
identifiable objects, places, characters, actions; on the other, it has a poetic or
expressive aspect that is revealed in mood, affective attunement, sensuous aes-
thetic engagement, and our experience of temporality. Heidegger’s critique of
modern technology can help us acknowledge this often neglected dimension of
cinematic poiēsis as an important supplement to representationalist theories of
cinematic experience. From this point of view, cinema is the technological art
form that most intimately reveals the ambiguity of modern technology as both a
danger to our nature as thinking beings and as a “saving power” that might point
to new ways of inhabiting the technological world. It can help us experience and
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Fig. 3: Cinema as poiēsis: Malick’s The Tree of Life (2011).
cultivate an attitude of detached engagement: a releasement [Gelassenheit] toward
things or a “letting be” of beings, a shift in sensibility and attitude that might
open up a more “free” relationship with the technologically mediated worlds in
which we live. Despite Heidegger’s warnings about the “danger” posed by audio-
visual media, we can think with Heidegger (and against Heidegger) by exploring
the “mystery” of cinema:70 how it can be a poetic medium of projecting and
revealing worlds, a radiant bloom in the desert of technology.
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Stiegler’s Post-Phenomenological
Account of Mediated Experience
Patrick Crogan
[C]inema is a new experience of life that begins in 1895. These dates, 1877
[the invention of phonography] and 1895, constitute two immense turns in
the organological history of the power(s) to dream.1
Introduction
Bernard Stiegler’s analysis of cinema represents an important contribution to
attempts to rethink film at the current juncture of the “end of cinema” and the
emergence of the “post-cinematic” digital milieu. This is not, however, its pri-
mary purpose or disciplinary context. Within the ambit of its larger concerns,
Stiegler’s Technics and Time series develops a substantial critical renovation of phe-
nomenological approaches to experience by addressing the mediation and trans-
mission of experience through techniques and artifacts. In this regard I will ex-
amine Stiegler’s notion of the “industrial temporal object” – primarily
instantiated for him by cinema as pre-eminent media form of the last century. In
order to understand the significance of this new theorization of cinema in the
context of Stiegler’s wider project, I will first give an overview of his account of
the role played by technics in general, and mnemotechnical forms in particular,
in the dynamics of human life as a form of “technical life.”
Cinema is also a principal progenitor of the analog, analogico-digital and digi-
tal audiovisual media forms that have emerged in recent decades. This “post-
cinematic” period might best be described as lying between the epoch of analog
media (photography, phonography, radio, cinema, broadcast television) and the
epoch of the digital systems of recording, representation, communication, simu-
lation and so forth, an epoch which is only commencing to unfold.2 I term this
period the “digital transition,” a term which should be read as retaining the
question, “transition to what?,” while also citing the pervasive, default – if am-
bivalent – sense of the inexorable “progress” of the digital revolution toward a
global, “realtime,” “immaterial” technocultural future. In this period the sense of
“disorientation” arising from the mismatched speeds of technical, political-eco-
nomic and cultural change increases. For Stiegler, while “disorientation” is ori-
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ginary for the human, it is allayed by cultural political “meta-stabilizations” of
the interface between the developmental rhythms of technics and sociocultural
ways of life. Just how to achieve such a meta-stabilization, and what its character
could or should be are in question in the digital transition – for there is nothing
inevitable about the outcome of the current processes of technocultural change
in their unprecedented global reach and accelerated implementation. Stiegler’s
account of cinema is less about what is to become of cinema (or indeed of film
studies in the transformation of its object of study) and more a central part of his
philosophical project of responding to both the accentuated experience of “dis-
orientation” felt in the digital transition and to the critical and cultural potentials
it harbors.3 Its value to film theory is nonetheless twofold: it represents, as Tom
Gunning has recognized, an important reconsideration of cinema as a technocul-
tural form that has transformed human life’s potentials and possibilities on a
global scale; secondly, Stiegler’s post-phenomenological characterization of cin-
ematic experience offers crucial insights into how the post-cinematic digital me-
dia are transforming the conditions of the production of experience today.4
The Organological Perspective on the Human as “Technical Life”
Elaborated across the second and third volumes of the Technics and Time series,
Stiegler revises Husserl’s influential phenomenology of internal time conscious-
ness with a decisive post-phenomenological complication of how the “temporal
objects” of consciousness are constituted. The role of exterior forms of record-
ing, synthesizing and communicating experience – what Stiegler calls mnemo-
technics – is crucial in this revision of Husserl’s phenomenology. Mnemotech-
nics are not only memory aids or supports, they are forms of memory that are
constitutive of human experience in an intrinsic and essential way. This instanti-
ates one of the major tenets of Stiegler’s philosophy of technology – that the hu-
man cannot be properly conceived of without thinking of it as a “technical” form
of life, one whose development rests not only on genetic but cultural memory.
The human’s ethnocultural becoming rather than species becoming is consti-
tuted in and through the combination of the human biological organism with
the “organized but inorganic matter” of the tool or “organon.”5 Understood in
this way, the tool is not only an instrument in the hand of the user of tools and
invented for his/her purposes, but an organic supplement that has already played
its part in framing the user’s experience of life’s purposes and possibilities. The
“what invents the who, just as much as it is invented by it” argues Stiegler, com-
plicating Heidegger’s fundamental distinction between two kinds of being –
those of which one can ask “who?” or “what?” kind of questions.6
“Ephiphylogenesis” is the name Stiegler gives to this new kind of becoming of
the living in Technics and Time 1, describing it as an ongoing dynamic between the
“organic organized” individual and its environment, mediated by the “organon.”7
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Beyond the circumstances of its particular use or invention, the vital significance
of the non-living organon is its ability to function as exterior record of a context
and manner of usage, and of the gestures and processes involved in its produc-
tion. Techniques and artifactuality in general are the material substrate of the
transmission of ways of living, including ways of reliving, remembering, revising
reinventing and even revolting against those ways.
It is on the basis of this memorious capacity of technics in general and the role
it plays in ethnocultural individuation that dedicated “mnemotechnical” forms
developed, forms whose function was to exteriorize experience, make it commu-
nicable, collective, recoverable and transmissible. Language, a medium whose
conventionality enables the expression of interiority in a form that others can
understand, is both key instance and agent of this emergence of mnemotechnics.
The uncanny “technicity” that characterizes human life is perhaps nowhere more
keenly felt by many than in human language – both utterly internal, intimate and
“ownmost” (as Heidegger would say), the very means of crystallizing one’s sense
of self, and yet also an acquired competence, rule-bound, arbitrary, constantly
changing under the impetus of a continuous, collective evolution.
The advent of figural and symbolic graphic inscription marks another decisive
emergence in the becoming of human “technical life” by inaugurating a long
history of what Stiegler terms the “grammatization” of the mnemotechnical ar-
ticulation of experience. Initiated (so far as we know) with cave art, the oldest
known examples of which are dated around 30,000 years ago, grammatization
“refers to the process by which the mental temporal flows experienced by the
psychic individual are recorded, reproduced, discretized and spatialized.”8 In
cave art the experience of encounters with predatory environmental competitors,
of hunting and fighting, of sexual difference and the fecundity of women are
recorded and hence made available for re-living or, more precisely, for re-tem-
poralizing, in shared verbal and gestural rituals of remembrance. These record-
ings are reproducible, in successive iterations and elaborations of the cave in-
scriptions, and in their translation to other sites for the collective exteriorization
of ethnographic experience across a territory.9 As artifactual, these recordings
are concretized as material, spatial forms, like the tools and the jewelry and other
adornments (including, most likely, bodily inscriptions) that predate them, and
the fixed and mobile supporting “media” that emerge in the long history of
grammatization’s elaboration, from cave art all the way down to the book, the
gramophone record, the film, the cassette, and the disk. “Discretized”: an experi-
ential continuum is rendered through a process involving a technique of tool use,
which can itself be further exteriorized in successive developments of production
technics and technologies. This rendering of “mental temporal flows” operates
by a division of the flow into separate elements that are assembled together in
the spatialized, grammatized form. Various lines compose the image of the run-
ning horse, evoking its movement through space. Separate compositional ele-
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ments appear in several cave art sites; some are interpreted by evolutionary
anthropologists as “female symbols” (abstracted figurations of the vagina – al-
ready generalized here as “the vagina,” symbolizing “woman” in general), or
whose significance remains less certain, but are clearly a discrete and repeated
element.10
Writing, whose ideographic beginnings are composed in Leroi-Gourhan’s
view both by this abstracting, symbolic pole of the earliest cave graphics and the
more analog, representational markings, composes its recordings of interiority
out of discrete elements and develops modes of sequencing their “reading” to re-
produce an articulation of what their author(s) deemed necessary or worthy of
recording.11 Writing and imaging then, interrelated from their initial emergence
in rupestral graphics, begin their co-implicated trajectories of the differentiation
of this “new empathic possibility” of the grammatization of shared experience.12
With the development of phoneticized and linearized scripts in the Middle East –
associated by Leroi-Gourhan with the rise of agricultural society and the emer-
gence of new labor divisions, hierarchical social structures and trading econo-
mies in permanent settlements – a new phase of literate, orthographic mnemo-
technical grammatization commences.13 The “religions of the book,” but also
the cultures, economies, arts and sciences, politics and philosophies, not to
mention histories “of the book,” are possible on the basis of this phonetic,
orthographic artifactuality.14
Over the last century or so, the unprecedented power of orthographic analog
image and sound technologies – phonography, photography, radio, cinema, tele-
vision – technoscientifically and industrially produced and disseminated globally
– shifted the predominantly literary grammatizing conditions of the West’s tech-
nocultural transformation of ethnocultural becoming. Today the “digital transi-
tion” affects the conditions in which all mnemotechnical media, figural and sym-
bolic, analog and digital, make experience communicable, memorable, and
culturally valuable.15
Cave art is a matrix and point of departure for the era of grammatized “mne-
motechnicity,” by which term I mean to evoke the co-constitutive dynamic be-
tween psychic and collective, cultural becoming animating and mediated by mne-
motechnical forms. According to Stiegler’s account of the historical and
technically composed conditions of human being-as-becoming it is necessary to
distinguish the changing epochs of mnemotechnical mediation, for example
from ideographic to phonetic scripts, from hand-copied manuscripts to the
printing press, and from the graphic traditions to the industrial forms of me-
chanical reproduction of exterior phenomena. In “An Organology of Dreams,”
however, Stiegler draws inspiration from the extraordinary graphics discovered
on the walls in the Chauvet cave in 1994 when he characterizes the general con-
dition of human experience since grammatization as “archi-cinema.”16 This is in
part a citing and updating of his mentor, Jacques Derrida’s “archi-writing” (and
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“archi-trace”), terms which in Derrida’s Of Grammatology referred to the irreduc-
ible relation between “living” speech and the non-living writing artifact as extrin-
sic, codified, technical form of communication and expression (what Stiegler will
call “grammatized” communication). Stiegler acknowledges as definitive Derri-
da’s account of the intrinsic role of the technical “supplement” in our very con-
ception of what is integral, and essential to the human as conscious, living pre-
sent.
As an “updating” of this central Derridean notion of archi-writing, Stiegler
also points toward his more situated, engaged revision of Derrida’s “archi-” for-
mulation toward a more historical and strategic one. On the one hand “archi-
cinema” broadens the parameters of Derrida’s concerns with the philosophical
implications of the written technical supplement in going back to the graphic
markings of rupestral art as key moment of historical emergence of this new
“empathic possibility” of grammatization. On the other hand, it situates the the-
oretical task of coming to grips with the “technical supplement” as one that is
both more historical in character and more specifically addressed to and emerg-
ing from the contemporary conditions in which it emerges as an increasingly
urgent task.17 For Stiegler the cinema was the pre-eminent media form of the
20th century’s consolidation and intensification of industrial modernization. In
its rapidly achieved conventional stabilization by the late 1920s as commercial
sound cinema it combined the potentials of the photographic and phonographic
analog recording technologies in a mnemotechnical form of unprecedented
power and reach. I will examine Stiegler’s analysis of this power of the cinematic
“experience” below. The digital audiovisual media draw on this power in various
post-cinematic manifestations and consequently it is crucial for Stiegler’s critical
account of the nature and stakes of the digital transition to analyze the specificity
of the cinematic form.
Citing Marc Azéma’s La préhistoire du cinéma, Stiegler states that the extraordi-
nary Chauvet cave art is in a way “the origin of cinema, insofar as it brought with
it the discretization and proto-reproduction of movement, of which that cinema
that appeared in industrial form in 1895 would be the mechanical culmina-
tion.”18 On the cave’s walls were inscribed forms exteriorizing the psychic pro-
cessing of experience, images produced from the imagination’s reworking of
perceptions recalled by the “desiring and dreaming beings that we are.”19 These
images adopted and transformed the exteriorized forms that, as mnemotechnical
cultural artifacts, had already conditioned those perceptions and the psychic
mechanisms producing and integrating them. This is why Stiegler will propose
at the outset of “An Organology of Dreams” that “the dream is the primordial
form of this archi-cinema, and this is why an organization of dreams is possi-
ble.”20 As an expression of a desire (Freud), the dream is for Stiegler always also
a negotiation of the psychic process with the collective cultural conditions of its
identity and individuation, conditions experienced in and through exterior mne-
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motechnics. Dreams are “organized” in part through the agency of the culture’s
organons, through which they are concretized as “transductive” forms mediating
the reciprocal dynamics of individual and collective identity. Stiegler’s “organo-
logical analysis” of human (as) becoming insists on the essential part played by
an “organo-genesis in which consists the transformation of psychic and social
organizations that result from the transformation of technical and technological
organs.”21 Constituted in an irreducible relation of inside and outside, experience
is in the epoch of grammatization an “archi-cinematic” montage and projection
both of what individuals perceive and accumulate in living their lives and what is
shared through cultural artifacts.
Stiegler approaches cinema, then, from this perspective. Cinema was the last
century’s most significant concretization of an industrialized mnemotechnical
“organo-genesis” affecting the human capacity to dream (to desire) on an unpre-
cedented scale. In Technics and Time 3 its specific articulation of interior with ex-
terior is assessed by drawing on the resources of Husserl’s classic phenomenolo-
gical account of consciousness. Stiegler considers the implications of the
predominant industrial mobilization of film’s power to wed the flow of con-
sciousness to its unrolling in a process that concretizes in a particular way the
archi-cinematic dynamics of the “beings in time” that we are. It is to this analysis
that I now turn.
The Cinematic Industrial Temporal Object
Stiegler’s account of cinema as “industrial temporal object” draws on and revises
Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology of the temporal object of consciousness. It is
essential to understand Stiegler’s post-phenomenological supplementing of
Husserl’s analysis of experience to grasp the implications and stakes of his ana-
lysis (and indeed diagnosis) of industrial audiovisual culture. Stiegler’ cultural
politics turns on his insistence on the importance of the co-constitutive dynamic
between psyche and exteriority analyzed in the previous section. Cinema is im-
portant because of the transformative effect it had via its conjugation of the inter-
iority of mind, desire, perception, memory and anticipation (or “protention” in
Husserl’s terms) with “the movies” as industrial product, economic commodity,
cultural institution and political and promotional organon. Stiegler’s account of
cinema, then, is an account of the cinema as mnemotechnical organon connecting
and configuring interiority and exteriority. Husserl’s analysis of the phenomen-
ology of the “internal consciousness of time” is significant in Stiegler’s view for
having provided the means to discern how the flow of the present moments of
perception are combined together in such a way as to form coherent temporal
phenomena. These are available for recall and reflection in the ongoing synthe-
sizing dynamic through which consciousness develops and reformulates its cri-
teria for evaluating phenomenality. Husserl distinguishes between two kinds of
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“retention” operating in consciousness, the first enabling the second. “Primary
retention” is what strings together the separate moments of perception into an
extended present capable of constituting a coherent “temporal object” or phe-
nomenon. It retains the impressional contents of past moments in the percep-
tion of a phenomenon such as a melody (Husserl’s primary example) or a film
which has become an object of conscious attention, retaining these long enough
for the temporal object to be constituted as a single phenomenon.22 “Secondary
retention” on the other hand is the faculty of recollection as it is normally under-
stood whereby such phenomena can be remembered and re-processed, reviewed
and reflected upon by the imagination in the ongoing becoming of an individual
consciousness’s development. Stiegler supplements these with a third, exterior
form of retention that he argues conditions the operations of the first two and,
furthermore, demonstrates their composition in consciousness in contrast to
Husserl’s assertion of their opposition. “Tertiary retention,” available to con-
sciousness in the form of technical and mnemotechnical artifactuality, is the sub-
strate of the interior retentional processes of consciousness and conditions its
experience of and in time.
By adding this retentional “supplement,” Stiegler both adopts and refigures
Husserl’s analysis of the workings of primary and secondary retention. This is
why his account of cinema (and, indeed, consciousness) as developments in a
far longer history of “archi-cinematic” mnemotechnicity is decisively “post-phe-
nomenological.”23 Having posed insightfully the nature of experience as com-
prised of different retentional modes of perception and recollection, and of ex-
perience fashioned in the “living present” of consciousness and feeding the
continuous revision of its underlying synthesis, Husserl was unable in Stiegler’s
view to develop the full implications of his account.24 Limited by his efforts to
ground phenomenology in a rigorous conceptualization of the phenomenon as
separate and free from the subjective colorings of any particular perceiving con-
sciousness, Husserl maintained an absolute distinction between primary and sec-
ondary retention. Perception was not influenced by the imagination, by what
consciousness had already perceived and remembered. Primary retention formed
temporal objects that passed into consciousness’s store of experiences, but a
semi-permeable membrane prevented the revisions and remembering of past ex-
perience influencing the living present in its ongoing constitution of phenom-
ena. These were constituted on the basis of the general “eidetic” conditions of
the deep structure of the manifestation of phenomena to intentional conscious-
ness, the discovery and interpretation of which was the purview and goal of phe-
nomenological inquiry.25
For Stiegler perception and imagination and their primary and secondary re-
tentional processes are certainly different, but they cannot be opposed to each
other. This becomes evident as the relationship between retention and protention
in both kinds of retention is considered. For Husserl, the flow of time is phe-
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nomenally experienced in a Janus-faced present that retains the preceding mo-
ments and anticipates the next on the basis of the preceding. In the hearing of a
melody each new note sounds as the continuation of the sequence begun by the
first note and retained in the elaboration of the “large now” of primary retention.
As continuation of the melody, each new note is heard on the basis of its fulfill-
ment of or divergence from what was anticipated of it. This anticipation is the
protentional horizon that is the structural, eidetic complement of retention in the
internal consciousness of time.
Primary retention modifies the present now by reducing it in some way as it
passes into the “just-past,” and this modification is itself continuous. Its reduc-
tion of the presently heard note enables that sound to both make way so that the
new note can become present – a reduction that enables it to pass – and to be
retained as part of that ensuing present (reduction to the just-past). This passing
away to be retained as just-past is a dynamic process, however, and the proten-
tional horizon of primary retention is key to this dynamism.26 What is retained in
each new note of the melody, or in each new shot of a film, is the modified
previous note or shot. This just-past carries forth and undergoes a further modi-
fication of what it had retained of the note or shot before it, on the basis of the
changing protentional projections of what the ensuing note or shot would be in
response to what it turned out to be, and so on into the past of the retained just-
past moments in the continuously modifying “comet trail” of the temporal ob-
ject.27 Retention, as inherently protentional, is a dynamic in which “each later
retention is not only continual modification that has arisen from primary impres-
sion [the first moment of the temporal object], each is also continual modifica-
tion of all earlier continuous modifications of that same initial point.”28
Continual modification of continuous modifications – here, Stiegler argues,
Husserl approaches the true complexity of primary retention as a spiraling dy-
namic out of which perception forms phenomena in time. The present now
modifies what is retained of the just past “on the fly” (as one says today), but
this occurs as a function of the protentions which have anticipated it. A note
sounds that causes a refiguring of the pattern of the melody, or the sense of its
mood, as it unfolds. A shot shows us something that causes us to re-evaluate in
an instant what has been happening in the film’s narrative or sequence of images
and sounds, or how we are to understand a character or a montage of images.
Past and present are in a relationship of folded, iterative co-constitutivity,
mediated by the protentional projections of retention toward an anticipated fu-
ture that the present realizes differentially.29
How then, could the temporal object start with a pure, “primary impression”
unaffected by the protentional horizon of consciousness as ongoing, memorious
continuity? Inasmuch as retention is always protentional, the secondary retention
which enables consciousness to develop on the basis of its processing of experi-
ence cannot be definitively excluded, as Husserl would have it, from perception’s
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constitution of phenomena. This is in a nutshell Stiegler’s critique of Husserl’s
account of internal time consciousness. Secondary retention has always condi-
tioned primary retention from before it begins, and the spiraling flow of con-
sciousness of a temporal object takes its place within a larger “vortex” of memor-
ious consciousness.30 Moreover – and this explains Stiegler’s supplementing of
Husserl’s retentional modes – this is itself a spiraling within the cultural, collec-
tive vortex of tertiary retentions and protentions. The melody can only begin with
a “primary impression” if it is recognized as music, based on the protentions of a
consciousness that has heard music before and can distinguish it from other
sounds.31 What is and is not music is a question that must be posed in cultural
and historical terms.32
“The ear is originarily musical,” says Stiegler in summarizing his response to
Husserl in Technics and Time 2.33 And Technics and Time 3’s account of cinema and
“cinematic consciousness” could be similarly resumed as “the eye is originarily
cinematic” – although it would be more apt to say the eye and the ear inasmuch
as the synchronized sound film of standard commercial cinema is an audiovisual
temporal object. The “unprecedented” power of the cinematic mnemotechnics
resides, for Stiegler in its capacity to produce a compelling experience fashioned
in what he variously characterizes as a conjoining or coinciding of the temporal
flows of artifact and perceiver.34 The cinematic flux generated by the projecting
apparatus for “re-temporalizing” the industrially produced recordings captured
on film (and later on tape, floppy, optical disk and so forth) entrains the primary
retentional process of perceiving consciousness. Or, rather, entrains the flow of
many consciousnesses: cinema realized an unprecedented power to captivate
mass and globally extended audiences on an unprecedented industrial scale of
production, distribution and exhibition. Like Jonathan Beller, in the wake of the
Kulturkritik of Horkheimer and Adorno, and after the ideological apparatus theory
of Althusserian-influenced film studies – both of which his work represents a
critical response to – Stiegler emphasizes the centrality of “Hollywood” to the
spread and intensification of global industrial capitalism in the 20th century.35
The eye and the ear are “originarily cinematic,” that is, “archi-cinematic,”
which means technically, technoculturally enabled. Through his post-phenomen-
ology Stiegler is able to identify how cinema could map itself to the temporal
flow of consciousness like a musical (or theatrical) performance but also be in-
dustrially produced and reproducible. Its montage of shots fabricate the unrol-
ling of its projected flow and condition expectations of what temporal object it
will become – and all this as subject to industrial design, specification, and stan-
dardization.36 The archi-cinema of consciousness reaches a new stage of its
mnemotechnical, organological “evolution.” In the globalizing, American cen-
tury, archi-cinema becomes a cinematic montage and projection of perception
and memories that are both individual and retained from the experiences of
others that remain active thanks to the mnemotechnical organon. Hollywood be-
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comes the “capital” of 20th century consumerism through its capacity to standar-
dize and globally distribute dreams, fantasies and desires.37 Stiegler says that a
“film is a kind of dream had in common, a daytime dream, via the industrial
production of tertiary retentions which are themselves industrial.”38 It functions,
as Godard says of Hollywood (citing André Bazin in Contempt, but in error), like
the realization of a “world that conforms to our desires.”39
Cinema’s capacity to compel conviction is identified by Stiegler as the power to
fabricate a convincing mnemotechnical fictioning of reality, a reality which is
never phenomenally “pure” and which is always mediated by tertiary memory
supports. Film presented the possibility of the photographic and mechanical cap-
ture of the spatial and temporal dimensions of exterior appearance. This is un-
doubtedly central to its early success and its rapid expansion into a major indus-
trial media form in the early 20th century. Stiegler characterizes the specificity of
cinematic technics as emerging from the conjunction of their spatial and tempor-
al recording and playback systems. The cinema’s extraordinary power emerges
as the quickly understood expectation that it is able to generate two “co-inci-
dences”:
1. The photographic coincidence of past reality, of past and reality. This is the
“real effect” of the capture of a past space-time in front of the photographic
apparatus identified by Roland Barthes in Camera Lucida and André Bazin be-
fore him in “The Ontology of the Photographic Image.”40 In a similar vein,
accounts of the indexicality of the cinematographic sign have stressed this
sense of the capture by the camera of what was there before it at the moment
of exposure. This temporal dimension of photographic capture is the decisive
feature of what analog cinema “essentially” was for D.N. Rodowick; less a
representational record of an actual space than a recording of a past time,
gone forever but preserved by and in the apparatus.41
2. The coincidence of the “flux” of the film’s unrolling in time with the flux of
the spectator’s consciousness. This is the result of the mechanical production
of the illusion of movement from the capture of still images, a process of
recording duration comparable in effect, if not in procedure, to the phono-
gram’s recording of sound – itself later to be wedded to the cinematographic
through synchronized “sound-on-film” technology in the re-tooling of main-
stream cinema in the late 1920s.
The cinema produces a compelling “illusion” of reality that unfolds in the lived
time of the spectator’s conscious attention before it. The spectator lives the cin-
ema’s fictioning of experience. Lived experience is co-generated in the composed
fluxes of the film and its viewing. Stiegler’s focus on this composition of experi-
ence and fiction, of the fictioning of experience in the cinema, re-frames some
thorny issues concerning the realism of film (and indeed of the post-cinematic
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forms noted above). In the classic accounts of the ideological effect of the cin-
ematic apparatus and of its illusionistic realism, for example, the claims for the
effect of the cinema on the psyche of the spectator turned on an uneasy relation
between, on the one hand, an account of the imaginary mastery generated by the
“apparatus” of the cinema in its placing of the spectator as the invisible focal
point of an orchestrated sequence of views and, on the other hand, a convention-
ally established narrative realism of character, plots, and verisimilar representa-
tional norms.42 From this perspective, a phenomenological account of cinematic
experience was hopelessly naïve, or cynically complicit with the ideological work-
ings of the dominant social order dedicated to reproducing itself. The spectator
could only be rehabilitated by a theoretical and/or aesthetic destruction of the
double trap of apparatus and its false projections, much like the slave in Plato’s
cave who had to be freed and made to exit the cave of shadowy projections. His
or her life down there in the cinematic illusion was false, a kind of mental trap
made of artificial copies of true existence positioned cleverly vis-à-vis the
duped.43
From Stiegler’s perspective, however, access to a space of unmediated, illu-
sion-free experience is the illusion; all experience is mediated, that is, fabricated,
and passes into, through and from techniques and technics. Cinematic represen-
tation has been more or less globally adopted as a compelling experiential me-
dium. Its extraordinary global success in the last century represents a major shift
in the mode of fictioning experience from what was for two millennia a predomi-
nantly literary and graphic (as distinct from photographic) technoculture. Its
“apparatus” demands careful analysis as a powerful means of fictioning experi-
ence, but it is not a secret system for locking the human psychic apparatus into
an illusory experience of reality, just as the commercial “culture industry” more
generally does not possess – counter to what Horkheimer and Adorno proposed
– a decryption key for all the Kantian schemas operative in the syntheses of hu-
man imagination, memory and experience.44
So while it is important, indeed vital, to pay attention to what is fictioned in
mainstream cinema for its capacity to influence understandings, values, and in
general people’s orientations to living, it is also critical to keep in view the fact
that all experience is composed with and through kinds of fiction. This is why
cinema is so powerful; it animates fictioning in a new and compelling way
through its enrolling of the spectator in its unrolling. This is both its potential
and its threat, continued and in some ways multiplied in the wedding of this
capacity to other technics in the emerging digital industrial temporal objects.
Cinema edits experience and this is at the center of what Stiegler will call its
“pharmacological” character as both poison and cultural cure or therapeutics. In
the capitalist industrial era Hollywood has served the reifying purposes Horkhei-
mer and Adorno identified, “synchronizing” consciousnesses on a massive scale
in order to coordinate consumption with the needs of the industrial system in
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general by providing means to condition the experiences that become the sec-
ondary retentions – and consequently, the protentional horizons – of the
many.45 But cinema and its maturing digital mnemotechnical descendants also
hold in potential “positive pharmacological possibilities” via their amazing capa-
city to thread together consciousnesses in collective experience.46 Indeed, as is
widely recognized, the digital transition represents the potential for an equally
unprecedented, global empowerment of citizens as media producers with the
potential to completely overturn the predominant model of the concentration of
mnemotechnical production in corporate interests.
This is why Stiegler argues for the need to “make movies” and to “get behind
the camera.”47 Developing what one calls a “working knowledge” of the produc-
tion of experience is a central critical task today, inasmuch as it is a prerequisite
to realizing the potential of the digital transition’s remodeling of established
broadcast media production and reception regimes.48 It is not only that getting
“behind the camera” represents an effective way to unmask the synchronizing
techniques of mainstream cinema (and the industrial experiential media that
have succeeded it) – a rationale which best characterizes the project of the “poli-
tical modernist” experimental film maker/theorists of the 1960s and 1970s.49
Drawing inspiration from Abbas Kiarostami’s enigmatic Close Up (1990) and
its significance for the film-loving Iranian society in and for which it was made,
in “Faire du cinéma” Stiegler appeals to the critical value and necessity of work-
ing with as well as on – and not against – the technics for fabricating such com-
pelling experiences. This is the pathway to a better understanding of the nature
and necessity of “our” grammatized cinematic consciousness. It is in this way
that a better adoption of post-cinema’s systemic, industrial mediation of experi-
ence can be opened up in and as a way to dream up a credible future. If as I said
earlier grammatization marked another decisive emergence in the becoming of
human “technical life,” I would conclude by pointing out that for Stiegler there is
nothing inevitable about the course of this becoming, nothing that guarantees
that this technical life will continue to answer to the characterization of “hu-
man.” On the contrary; it is increasingly apparent today that the interminable
historical project of realizing a human being must be actively negotiated and
pursued through a critical and cultural political inflection of technoscientific de-
velopments that share no essential biological determinations or tendential vec-
tors with such a projection of the human. This makes the adoption of each shift
of mnemotechnical forms an increasingly urgent political question about the
course of the overdetermined but nonetheless open history of human becoming.
“Archi-cinema” – which today is on the threshold of an epoch that might moti-
vate a renaming of our mnemotechnicity to something like “archi-programming”





When we look at the current state of media studies, we might well think that it
may be better not to ask the question What are media? but rather What isn’t a me-
dium? Indeed the situation seems to be such that media studies is determined by a
rather large number of concepts of media that are, however, equally wide, in part
even unlimited. Media studies, that is, is determined by concepts of media that to
a worrisome degree have moved away from the everyday understanding of the
medium as a means of communication. This diagnosis is by no means restricted
to an isolated current. On the contrary, the inflationary employment of the con-
cept “media,” remarkably, can be observed in media theories that understand
themselves as competing positions. The technically oriented approach of Mar-
shall McLuhan can document as well as the system-theoretical approach of Nik-
las Luhmann and the concept of media in phenomenological theories how work
is done – if not in the same way, then to the same extent – with an underdeter-
mined concept of media. Just a short look at the main theses of these approaches
can show this.
In McLuhan’s work media – like all other “technics” – have the status of a
means. Media are tools that improve human action and cognition. Just as the
hammer is an artificial improvement and expansion of the human body, the
McLuhan tradition holds, other media are as well. While mechanical technics
relocate the bodily functions of the human being to the exterior, electronic media
exterritorialize the central nervous system and the sense organs. Media simulate
or amplify, implement or replace bodily and organic capacities. This understand-
ing of media leads McLuhan – and his many followers – to count not only every
tool but even every form of energy as part of the meaning of the concept “media.”
We may sharpen McLuhan’s concept of media in the following formulation: the
concepts “medium” and “tool” are synonymous.
Niklas Luhmann’s system-theoretical concept of media, in particular, deliber-
ately presents itself as an alternative to this technically oriented approach. Luh-
mann, following Fritz Heider, determines the medium as a possibility for real
forms. Media are an open plurality of possible connections. This means that
Luhmann and his followers use the concept “medium” with the meaning “op-
portunity for existence,” “disposition,” or simply “possibility.” Every undeter-
mined possibility that allows for the manifestation of determined forms is a me-
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dium. The medium is the opportunity to convert a form into something. That is,
completely different from McLuhan’s conception, a medium for Luhmann does
not itself do anything and is therefore not a part of any message either. Media
themselves cannot be present and graspable at all, for they are always only a
possibility determinable by concrete forms. We may sharpen Luhmann’s concept
of media in the following formulation: the concepts “medium” and “possibility”
become synonymous, and the extension of the concept of media is correspond-
ingly wide; art, society, and the human capacity for perception are all media.
Phenomenological media theories present themselves as yet another alterna-
tive – this time both to the technologically oriented and to the system-theoretical
approach. This can be observed particularly clearly in Boris Groys’s Unter Verdacht:
Eine Phänomenologie der Medien [Under Suspicion: A Phenomenology of Media].1
What is particular about phenomenological media theories is that they define
media exclusively via their presence with the user of media. For all the differences
between phenomenological media theories, one observation is always the focus
of interest – the transparency of media or the self-denial of the medium. A me-
dium, accordingly, is a means that functions only when it steps back. To fulfill
their function, media must remain unthematized. Put differently, media display
something without displaying themselves. In this respect they are comparable to
a transparent windowpane that allows for a look without itself being seen and
through which we only look as long as we do not pay attention to it. Media,
from this point of view, do all the more justice to their task the more they neu-
tralize themselves in their employment as media. A well-known description of
this medial transparency in Maurice Merleau-Ponty goes as follows:
Now, one of the effects of language is to efface itself to the extent that its
expression comes across. […] When someone – an author or a friend – suc-
ceeds in expressing himself, the signs are immediately forgotten; all that re-
mains is the meaning. The perfection of languages lies in its capacity to pass
unnoticed.
But therein lies the virtue of language: it is language which propels us toward
the things its signifies. In the way it works, language hides itself from us. Its
triumph is to efface itself.2
The consequence of this phenomenological approach is clear. All means that
remain unthematized during their employment are addressed as media. Accord-
ingly, signs are media the same way every tool is. Not only is every glove a me-
dium; even one’s own body [Körper] is explicitly described by Merleau-Ponty as a
medium, since it is invisible in the course of perception and action.3 We have to
go even further: there is much to suggest that in the phenomenological tradition
the body [Leib] is not just an example of a medium but the silent archetype of all
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media. This, at least, is the conclusion reached by Christian Bernes: “The Body is
the Paradigm of Mediality” [Der Leib ist das Paradigma der Medialität].4
To sum up: Even a short look at prominent positions within contemporary
media theory shows that the concept of media in each case can hardly be said to
correspond to the experience of media, if not in the same way then to the same
extent. In all three theoretical approaches the concept of media retains only the
most distant connection to the prominent everyday understanding of media as a
means of communication. Media theories analyze their own “home-made me-
dia,” for the phenomena analyzed as media have been identified as such only by
the respective theories. We are dealing with media theories of things that without
these theories would not be media, such as energy, perception, or the body. In all
three cases the concept loses significantly in intension and gains alarmingly in
extension.
This progressive de-limitation of the concept of media has by no means gone
unnoticed. On the contrary, we might get the impression that in this respect
there is a kind of reversal in media studies, especially in the last few years. At
least we can observe that the number of critics of concepts of media that are too
wide is on the rise. Exemplary of this trend is Matthias Vogel, with his widely
noticed study Medien der Vernunft [Media of Reason], in which he emphatically
warns that in the pre-eminent media theories, which “are more prone to dama-
ging the reputation of the concept of media in the long run,” the “highest point
in the process of dedifferentiation” is attained, the point, that is, at which “the
concept of media is threatened by substantial erosion.”5
Georg Christoph Tholen is even more radical in his study Die Zäsur der Medien
[The Caesura of Media]. He does not even regard the media theories presented
above as theoretical contributions but merely cites them as historical examples
for the “de-limitation of the figural and authentic meaning” of the concept of
media. The classics of media theory, for Tholen, come with a “sprawling meta-
phorics in the[ir] conceptual attempts at determining the mediality of media.”6
In short, what is missing are the differences that make a difference. If with
McLuhan every tool, with Luhmann every possibility, and with the phenomenol-
ogists every transparency is addressed as medium, there must arise a call for the
determination of criteria with which it becomes possible to distinguish the
screwdriver from the television set, art from the telephone, and a windowpane
from a book. That is why Matthias Vogel is correct in his demands: “An alterna-
tive to the turn away from the looming equivocation of media and tools and the
devaluation of the concept of media can only come into view if we distinguish the
goals to whose actualization media contribute from those that can be achieved
with the aid of tools or their means.”7 This, precisely, seems to be the challenge
of a media theory that works systematically: the search for a differentia specifica to
keep the concept of media from deteriorating into a mere synonym of other con-
cepts. Remarkably, the labor on this question is relevant beyond the concrete
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problem itself. For as long as media theories work with concepts of media ac-
cording to which almost anything can be described as a medium, they will be
regarded by other disciplines as worrisome academic jacks of all trades, which
surely is not conducive to the process of its institutionalization in the academy. If
this danger is to be continued by a fruitful perspective, there is no way around
advocating a concept of media that has more sense and less meaning, more in-
tention and less extension. And this, precisely, can only be achieved by strictly
ensuring that necessary characteristics of media are not treated as sufficient
ones.
When we stand on the floor wearing socks and shoes, we usually do not sense
our socks and shoes but the floor. We perceive mediately whether we stand or
walk on carpet, grass, or concrete. The shoes and socks are not perfectly nonpre-
sent, for it is very well possible to distinguish whether we walk barefoot or in
shoes. But this belongs to transparency: it always includes opacity as well. What
is decisive, exclusively, is that the shoes and the socks are not themselves thema-
tized but that they let the ground below and its properties such as bumps be
perceived. And now the crucial question poses itself: how do the socks fare with
the media theorist? Only two possible answers are conceivable.
First, the socks and shoes, too, are accepted as media, for after all it is by
means of them that a thing that is not directly touched is perceived; they are a
transparent extension of the body. Formally speaking, the argument is that trans-
parency is a sufficient phenomenological property of media, which is why all
transparent means, that is all tools that are not thematized in their employment,
are media.
Second, shoes and socks do indeed have a phenomenal property that media
have as well, but this property is not sufficient for media, only necessary. The
definition of media via transparency raises a necessary property to the level of a
sufficient property. Yet the sufficient property is a completely different one. The
same argument can be used for McLuhan and Luhmann. Media are tools but not
every tool is a medium, or media offers possibilities but not every possibility is a
medium.
If we follow this second path we are concerned with the search for a differentia
specifica, a sufficient criterion by means of which media can be distinguished
from other phenomena that have the same necessary properties. What is remark-
able is that what offers itself for this delimitation by means of a sufficient char-
acteristic is a distinction that belongs to the great classical ideas of Husserl’s
phenomenology. The suggestion is that media are those tools that make it possi-
ble to separate genesis from validity. Media, accordingly, are tools or means that
are transparent during their employment; but they are also specific tools that are
capable of something that other tools cannot achieve, namely a separation of
genesis and validity. This suggestion of a definition takes recourse to a genuinely
phenomenological idea, albeit an idea that until now has hardly been noticed in
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phenomenological media theory. This is not surprising insofar as the distinction
of genesis and validity was developed by Edmund Husserl at the end of the 19th
century without any reference whatsoever to media theoretical questions. The
separation of genesis and validity that Husserl develops in the first volume of his
Logische Untersuchungen [Logical Investigations] of 1900, following to a large extent
similar reflections by Gottlob Frege, is seen as the central argument against psy-
chologism and historism.
Humans are capable of producing something that has no physical properties
by means of techniques of production that can be described physically – this is
the claim of the separation of genesis and validity. The concept of genesis is used
generally for all physical processes. Every process of production or emergence is
– in somewhat emphatic terminology, to be sure – addressed as “genesis.” Put
tautologically, this means that genesis is the genetic process that generates
something. These processes take place in space and time; they are empirical facts
and can accordingly be studied with the means of different empirical sciences.
Thus, for example, it can always be determined when such a process of emer-
gence begins and when it ends, where it takes place and under which conditions
it unfolds. An empirical process is always a process that can be changed and also
be destroyed, that is to say aborted – and this is not the case for validities. We can
speak of a validity when something seems to exist that has no physical proper-
ties. Indeed, it is easiest to determine validity negatively, by saying what it is not:
it is something that is not physically graspable yet to which humans can none-
theless refer. We sense this nonphysicality of validities in particular when we take
notice of time. If something is unchangeable and does not become older, then it
cannot be an empirical thing. What is in the world also ages with the world. In
considering time, Husserl describes the decisive difference between empirical
processes and validities. Validities are “untouched by the contingency, temporal-
ity and transience of our mental acts.”8 His example is a mathematical calcula-
tion. If we take the proposition 2 x 2 = 4, then we have on the one hand an
empirical speech, a materialized process in space and time, a physically describ-
able phenomenon. Yet on the other hand we also have the validity of this propo-
sition, which is not dependent on who formulates this proposition when and
how: “Acts of counting arise and pass away and cannot be meaningfully men-
tioned in the same breath as numbers.”9 What Husserl means is a difference
that is as simple as it is important: if the proposition 2 x 2 = 4 is printed in a
book, this material sentence will age, yellow; it can be erased, or the book can be
destroyed. But what is meant by the proposition is not touched by these changes
in time; the content of the proposition does not grow older, which is why Hus-
serl writes, “In this sphere there can be no talk of individual facts. Of what is
temporally definite.”10 Hence a property is present that cannot be thought physi-
cally: everything that has a physical existence must grow older. Yet validities are
removed from the ravages of time because they are not physically existent. What
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is not in time cannot be changed by physical force. Husserl writes, therefore, “My
act of judging that 2 x 2 = 4 is no doubt causally determined, but this is not true
of the truth 2 x 2 = 4.”11
Husserl’s example has one great disadvantage: it suggests that truth and valid-
ity are identical. Yet this precisely is not the case. What this is about is just that
different people at different times can mean the same thing by the proposition
2 x 2 = 4. Validity is a precondition equally for truth and for falsity. For even
someone who wants to claim that the proposition 2 x 2 = 4 is by no means always
true finds him- or herself in opposition to whoever thinks, like Husserl, that the
proposition 2 x 2 = 4 is always true only if both mean the same thing by their
different propositions and thus are of a different opinion about the same thing.
Only if we are of different opinions about the same thing are we of different
opinions – and this, precisely, is what validity is: the existence of something that
is the same for several people at different times.
In light of the classic distinction of genesis and validity the question imposes
itself: how is this possible? How can something that does not have any physical
properties be generated with physical tools? The question seems unanswerable
because in the end it asks how thinking and rationality are possible. Yet even if
we cannot explain how something is possible, we can sometimes describe what
is necessary for it, in this case: media. Media are necessary for the separation of
genesis and validity – other tools are incapable of this, which is why the follow-
ing definition imposes itself: media are precisely those tools with which this se-
paration can miraculously be accomplished and which constitute at the same
time the mediation between both moments. “Separation” here does not mean
that one could, so to speak, really isolate validity and cut it off from the hardware
and put it aside like a thing. “Separation” means that media always consist of a
genesis aspect and a validity aspect and that this conceptual distinction is neces-
sary and possible in their case alone. Husserl’s example already shows this: only
somebody who employs a conceptual language as a medium is capable of think-
ing by means of the proposition 2 x 2 = 4 something that can also be thought by
other people at other times by means of this medium. Human beings can think
things and relations that do not grow older, that cannot be influenced by physical
processes, only with the help of the medium language. In short, only by means of
media can different human beings at different times think and mean not only
something equivalent but also the very same thing [nicht nur das gleiche, sondern
dasselbe].12 We may even determine the somewhat antiquated concept “validity”
as follows: validity is artificial self-sameness [Selbigkeit] and media are the means
for the production of artificial self-sameness.
In many books, in many locations, the self-same novel can be read – it is pre-
cisely this self-same novel that affects so many people so differently, that is at
different times interpreted and understood so differently. Hardly anyone would
seriously want to claim that only those have read the same novel who really held
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the self-same copy in their hands. Everybody who has read Thomas Mann’s The
Magic Mountain has not read a merely equivalent, but the very same novel. Husserl
writes about his example, the proposition 2 x 2 = 4, that this judgment “is the
same whoever passes it.”13 Following this formulation we could say that the nov-
el The Magic Mountain is always the very same novel, no matter who prints it. The
movie The Matrix is always the very same movie, no matter when and where it
is watched. A home page is always the very same home page, no matter with
which computer and on what screen it may be generated. In this way the funda-
mental capacity of media becomes determinable: media allow for the production,
in different places and at different times, not only of an equivalent but also of the
very same thing. And because everybody can at different times and in different
places read the very same novel, make the very same judgment, and see the very
same image, it can no longer be said that what, thanks to media, comes about as
validity is a private affair. Medial validity exists only in the communal form: “The
number five is not my own.”14 Of course there are private psychological acts of
thinking with which someone at a specific moment thinks the number five but
because of the employment of a medium – namely conceptual language – the
very same thing that this person thinks in this moment can also be thought by
another person at another moment. There is of course the private copy of Mann’s
The Magic Mountain, that is, the unique kind of genesis of the novel that sits on a
bookshelf in someone’s home. Yet the content of the book can no more be pri-
vate property then the number five – for the content does not exist as a physical
something but as a validity. The parallel to Husserl, therefore, is the following:
just as writing is a medium by means of which many people can read the very
same novel, so language is a medium by means of which many people can think
the very same number.
These reflections show us what is meant by such widespread concepts as “sto-
rage media” and “distribution media.” If media as a whole are the means by
which human beings can perceive and think something that has no physical
properties, then this validity is stored in storage media and distributed in distri-
bution media. It is quite inapt to call every means of storage and every means of
transportation a medium. Storage media, to be more precise, are media for the
storage of validities, and distribution media are media for the distribution of
validities, for the simple reason that what a storage medium stores is something
special: something that does not grow older. The grain of wheat that is stored in
a granary is subject to the laws of physics. No refrigerator, no matter how good,
will ever be a storage medium because no matter how well it preserves the food
stored within, it will not suspend the laws of physics. That is why storage media
are not optimized refrigerators. A symphony that is stored in a score or on a CD
no longer changes. In this sense distribution media do not allow for the distribu-
tion of just anything but for the distribution of self-sameness. Many people in
many places can nonetheless see the very same TV program. No transport com-
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pany has this capacity. The very same thing can be present in different places and
at different times only through media.
It seems to be a genuinely phenomenological concern to pursue the idea that
media produce and allow for something whose specific qualities can be de-
scribed; media can be recognized by the phenomenological properties of their
products. The particularity of this approach becomes clear when we compare it
to the definition proposed by Lorenz Engell and Joseph Vogl in the preface to
their ambitious collection Kursbuch Medienkultur: Die massgeblichen Theorien von
Brecht bis Baudrillard [A Guide to Media Culture: The Authoritative Theories from
Brecht to Baudrillard], which reads: “Media make legible, audible, visible, percei-
vable, yet all of this with the tendency to erase themselves and their constructive
participation in these sensibilities and thus to become as if imperceptible, anaes-
thetic.”15 To be sure, hardly anyone would want to contradict the claim that me-
dia make legible, audible, and visible. Yet when we reduce media to this capacity,
we implicitly claim that what is made legible, audible, or visible by media is not
distinct from what is legible, audible, or visible without media. The use of media,
so to speak, would have no effect on what is made visible with them. Yet it is
here, precisely, that a phenomenological description can pick up: what is made
visible by media is of a fundamentally different kind than what is visible without
a medium. We can tell that what was made visible by a medium was made visible
that way: media make visible, audible, legible something that does not exist phy-
sically. That is why we are not dealing with a medial process when something
physically existing is made visible. When the light is turned on in the basement,
it makes the things stored there visible – but the light is not a medium; it only
lets things become visible that behave according to the laws of physics. The same
is true for mirrors. In the case of media it is exactly the other way around: they
exclusively make things visible that would not be capable of being visible without
media because they are nonphysical things. This does not in the least mean that
media are remarkable and relevant only with respect to this specific capacity of
theirs. On the contrary, very often it would be a distorting reduction to concen-
trate, in medial processes, only on the validity and not on the materiality of the
medium employed. In quite a few aesthetic contexts it even is the materiality of
the media employed that is of pre-eminent significance. Nonetheless, no materi-
al property explains why something is a medium. Only certain materials and
technologies are addressed as media, namely those with which self-sameness
can be produced. This difference can be depicted particularly well in the case of
images.
The visibility of the image is, medially conditioned, a kind of visibility that is
fundamentally different from that of a real thing. For the image object visible on
an image carrier is distinct both from the material that makes visible and, as the
case may be, from the denotatum symbolized by the image object. The image
object is visible, but it has properties that a real visible thing cannot have, which
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is why we hardly confuse an image object with a real thing: it does not grow
older; it cannot have light shed on it; it cannot move; it cannot trigger any physi-
cal effects; and it cannot be looked at from the side. That is why two moviegoers,
even though one may be sitting all the way to the left and the other all the way to
the right in the movie theater, still see the very same film, even if they do not look
at the screen from the same direction. (This, by the way, is not true for theater;
there, it may very well be the case that not everything on the stage can be seen
from every place in the audience.) What is seen in an image are autonomous
things that are perfectly taken out of physical reality, things that are not part of
the world. It is as if Hans Jonas wanted to hint at the characteristics of validity
when he writes in his essay “Homo pictor and the Differentia of Man” that the
world visible in the image is “removed from the causal commerce of things.”16 In
short, the image object has no physical existence but is nothing other than the
visible validity of an image. This certainly surprising consequence indeed seems
inevitable. What Husserl calls image object is only a form of appearance of visi-
ble validity specific to the medium of the image. This interpretation and, in parti-
cular, the formulation “visible validity” seem unusual only as long as the prob-
lematic of validity is discussed in reference to problems of mathematics and
proportional truth alone. Yet in Husserl himself we do not find this limitation.
In a small, somewhat hidden short remark that he makes in a supplement to the
fifth of the Logical Investigations he explicitly clarifies that image objects are per-
ceived validities: “The painting is only an image for an image-constituting con-
sciousness, that is a consciousness that by means of its imaginative apperception
endows a primary object that appears to it perceptually with the ‘validity’ or
‘meaning’ of an image in the first place.”17 This makes it clear that validity in the
case of the image is an object that is perceived and that is no longer subject to the
laws of physics, and that media are the tools that must be employed for the se-
paration of genesis and validity. Media make legible, audible, and visible – but
something special becomes legible, audible, and visible through them; namely
intersubjective self-sameness, that is, validity. That is why we can say that media
are precisely those tools that make it possible that not just something equivalent
but also the very same thing can be seen, heard, and thought at different times, in
different places, by different people – and this likely is the reason why media can
hardly be overestimated in their anthropological significance.
If humans had no media, they would be a mere piece of the world – like jelly-
fish, they would stand in a relation of identity to their environment, if in that case
we can even speak of environment. Humans are part of the world – but precisely
not just that, since by means of media they participate in realities that do not
behave like the world of physical things. If humans had no media, they could
only see what is present; they could only see what they could also hear, smell
and touch. Only because there are media are humans capable of seeing, hearing
and thinking the very same content at two different points in time. Nature does
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not know of the self-same, only of the equivalent. The camera is a visibility isola-
tion machine: it separates visibility from the present physical substance of a
thing. Yet what is not physically there, like an image object, has no physics; it is
fantastically nonphysical. That is why images can display matters of fact that are
physically impossible. Precisely this, the ability to think and perceive physical
impossibilities, is possible only with media; they are the only means humans
have to disempower physics. That is why without media no human existence
that is more than the presence of stuff can emerge. Because there are media, hu-
mans live not only in physical nature but also in a culture, and they therefore owe
their human existence to the employment of media. Thus results a perspective
for work on media that is as phenomenological as it is anthropological: media
liberate humans from the ubiquitously present dictates of the physical world.











At least since Karl Marx, cultural critics have claimed that perception has a his-
tory, and, since media involve perception, critics of industrial modernity have
applied and elaborated this idea in their theories of modern popular culture,
which is why this tradition of thought is also known as the “modernity thesis.”1
The “first generation modernity theorists,” as Ben Singer has usefully called
them,2 e.g., Georg Simmel and Walter Benjamin, claimed that the sensory over-
load of the modern metropolis changed man’s sensorium profoundly, and that
this in turn created the desire for modern forms of art and entertainment.
Whereas some of the “second generation modernity theorists,” such as Wolf-
gang Schivelbusch, have continued to draw upon these ideas, others, such as
Jonathan Crary, conceive media as forms of perception and interpret these as
well as historical theories of perception as reflections of capitalist ideology (i.e.,
they address the impact on the viewer less directly). Such theories are still influ-
ential today, but they have increasingly been challenged by scholars who, draw-
ing upon cognitive and evolutionary psychology, argue that perception is biologi-
cally determined and hence largely unchanging. Early cinema has played a major
role in this debate, because the modernity thesis attributes a special importance
to vision,3 because cinema is a typical example of a modern, commercial mass
medium, and because the historical emergence of this medium marks a “turn” or
even an “upheaval” in popular culture that is comparable to our current “digital
revolution.”4 Hence the most prominent protagonists of the debate, such as Tom
Gunning and David Bordwell, can be found in film studies.5
Noël Carroll and also Frank Kessler believe that this debate is mostly due to
differences in the definition of “perception” (the content vs. the process of per-
ception, sensory perception vs. apperception, etc.).6 This may be true in part, but
at least the “first-generation modernity theorists” really did make statements
about physiological change. For example, Simmel claimed that the sensory acuity
of modern man had decreased,7 and that people had developed a protective or-
gan to guard against the sensory overload of the modern metropolis.8 Later,
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Wolfgang Schivelbusch drew upon Walter Benjamin’s appropriation of Sigmund
Freud’s concept of the “stimulus shield” as if it were entirely plausible.9 The
stimulus shield is a rather questionable notion, variously described as an inor-
ganic region of the brain and as a psychic function of the ego. Psychoanalysts
have usually preferred the latter description, because there is no empirical evi-
dence for the former.10 Perhaps not all of the “second-generation modernity the-
orists” take such physiological claims literally anymore, but if so, they have rarely
said so explicitly. Hence media theories should be continually updated with psy-
chological research, and this is a process that scholars who draw upon current
psychology, such as Ben Singer, have begun.
However, even the way that media theories are formulated often makes such
updating difficult, if not impossible. For example, Edward S. Reed has commen-
ted on Donald M. Lowe’s book History of Bourgeois Perception:
Lowe’s discussion of the role played by cinema in changing people’s perceiv-
ing is completely undercut by his muddling of the objects and processes of
seeing. He is unsure whether camera and editing techniques actually produce
an objective visual display of a certain sort, or are merely stages in the forma-
tion of subjective impressions. [...] Thus Lowe can make such an absurd
claim as the camera eye is “mobile, unlike the human eye” (p. 130). It is one
of the basic facts of primate seeing that it is an act of looking around, accom-
plished by a moving binocular system inside a mobile head above a mobile
body. Lowe complains that still and motion photography have taught us to
“see the world in fragmentation and dislocation” (p. 135). If anything, what
we have learned is to see events portrayed in pictures and film despite the
selective fragmentation of photographic and cinematographic technique. Like
many students of visual art, Lowe consistently – but without explanation or
justification – confuses the world that is seen with both the seer (and her
subjective processes) and the medium allowing the indirect perception of the
world.11
If the example of the “mobile eye” is relatively simple and hence easy to dismiss,
there are many other tenets of the modernity thesis that are much more complex.
The basic problem of approaches like Lowe’s is that even though they make
strong claims about the relevance and effects of media, they argue on such an
abstract level that they practically eliminate the perceiving subject. Without a
concept of viewers as real human beings (rather than spectators as “textual posi-
tions”), we cannot make a connection with psychology at all, because even
though psychologists are also aware that their theories are only constructs, they
are theories about human beings rather than cameras (which do not really per-
ceive, but only record).12
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A further consequence of this line of argument is that, as Carroll points out in
the case of Jonathan Crary, there is a tendency toward taking contemporary the-
ories of perception for the perception of contemporaries.13 One might say that
discourse analysis often takes the notion of ideology as “worldview” too literally.
For example, in response to remarks by Paul Feyerabend about the historical sig-
nificance of the telescope, Gernot Böhme insists that it has not only changed
knowledge, but perception.14 With this he does not just mean that the telescope
has shown us more things than we are able to see without it, but that we do not
see a “Man in the Moon” any longer. I must admit that I still see a shape that
reminds me of a face, even though I know that it is formed by craters of rock and
dust, and I suspect that I am not alone. As for anecdotal evidence, one might
think of one of the most popular films of early cinema, Georges Méliès’s La
Voyage dans la Lune (1903), as well as the recent discovery of a “face” on
Mars. The phenomenon of seeing objects in random visual patterns is known as
pareidolia. A psychological explanation for this specific instance is that recogniz-
ing faces is important for us as a species, and the basic pattern is therefore im-
printed in our brains at a very early age.15 Knowledge does not override this per-
ceptual impression – which, however, does not make the telescope and the
“insights” that it has provided any less important. The “history of vision” thesis
tends to overlook that knowledge and perception can often be at odds.
That said, perception, and especially the perception of historical individuals, is
very difficult to study. Historical discourses predominantly represent the experi-
ences of the cultural elite rather than those of ordinary people. Furthermore,
much of what goes on in perception is subconscious and hence not articulable
in the first place,16 a fundamental epistemological problem that Zenon Pylyshyn
has called the “cognitive impenetrability of perception.”17 Consequently, either
we follow Ludwig Wittgenstein’s dictum that, “Whereof one cannot speak, there-
of one must be silent,”18 or we argue on the basis of what is most plausible with
the help of current psychological research. However, the range of aspects that
one can study is potentially limitless, so I can only discuss a few examples here.
Instead of structuring my discussion of the “history of vision”-debate according
to its chronological development or the positions of individual theorists, I will
present the central arguments according to the perceptual aspects of film viewing
to which they relate.
The Perceptual Environment of Early Cinema: Overstimulation as
the Modern Condition
The current consensus in the social sciences is that media effects, even those on
cognition (e.g., opinions), are relatively small, mostly due to “selective expo-
sure,” i.e., people tend to select media and content in accord with their beliefs,
tastes, skills and dispositions, and then process what they see and hear on the
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basis of their established cognitive schemata (which only change if they are re-
peatedly confronted with highly contradictory information).19 Furthermore, the
media industry itself tends to be conservative: There is certainly interest in selling
new products, but it is more economical to adapt them to audiences as they are
rather than try to change them profoundly. Indications of this are the high failure
rates of new products in the media industry as well as the tendency to turn to
successful formulas again and again.20 That is, if there is any deeper, perceptual
change, it is neither likely to be quick nor brought about by media directly, but by
culture at large. The “first generation modernity theorists” actually argued as
much, but nevertheless, they tended to overestimate the effects that even culture
as a whole has on perception (and they also judged them too negatively).
Simmel and many other cultural critics around 1900 claimed that the sensory
overload of the modern metropolis induced people to seek out highly stimulating
leisure activities (which is not unlike complaints today that people are percep-
tually overwhelmed by an environment of digital media). Several years later, Wal-
ter Benjamin still held a similar view, but perhaps one could say that he gave the
argument a somewhat more sympathetic twist:
The film is the art form that is in keeping with the increased threat to his life
which modern man has to face. Man’s need to expose himself to shock effects
is his adjustment to the dangers threatening him. The film corresponds to
profound changes in the apperceptive apparatus – changes that are experi-
enced on an individual scale by the man in the street in big-city traffic, on a
historical scale by every present-day citizen.21
In his discussion of this hypothesis, Singer employs the concept of “neuroplasti-
city.”22 However, in a wide sense, any learning involves neurological changes,
whereas in a narrow sense, processes such as neurogenesis are limited (to critical
phases, to certain brain areas and functions, etc.).23 Hence, it is not that physio-
logical change is not possible at all, but drawing on this concept only shifts the
problem to a biological level, it does not in itself answer the question how much
psychological change is possible or has actually occurred over time. This ques-
tion cannot be answered in general; rather, specific hypotheses have to be exam-
ined in detail.
Torben Grodal, a proponent of evolutionary psychology in film studies, dis-
misses Singer’s arguments rather harshly:
Ben Singer […] follows up on Benjamin and other modernity theoreticians by
seeing a link between modern psyches, stress-creating films, and stressful en-
vironments, as if stress was a kind of modern pleasure-evoking drug condi-
tion, although the physiological arousal system that supports active coping
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and provides dopaminergic pleasure by moderate activation will cause brain
damage in humans and animals by prolonged activation […].24
Even though I agree that Singer ultimately fails to support the psychological
claims of the modernity thesis, this summary is not quite accurate. Firstly, con-
trary to the modernity theorists, Singer points out that increased arousal can be
either pleasant or unpleasant, i.e., eustress rather than stress (but he does not
make very much of this point). Secondly, he refers to research that shows how
an “enriched environment,” which one might regard the modern metropolis to
be, enhances sensory acuity and cognitive skills. This may well be true, but it is
actually a contradiction to the typical claims of the modernity theorists (see e.g.,
Simmel’s remark that the acuity of the senses has decreased).25 Finally, Singer
refers to research that shows that prolonged stress causes nervous exhaustion,
which is certainly true, but he does not provide any evidence for the central claim
that this induces individuals to turn to highly stimulating leisure activities
(which, contra Grodal, they might do despite negative “side effects”). In fact,
there is a study that clearly contradicts this claim: In a series of experiments
Laurent Brondel and Michel Cabanac have shown that people experienced vari-
ous environments (with low, medium and high levels of audiovisual stimuli, in-
cluding films shown on a television set) differently depending on their state of
arousal; in particular, a low-stimulus environment (a bare room with dim light-
ing) was rated negatively when subjects were rested, but positively when they
were tired.26
The Perceptual Basis of Film Viewing
Motion Perception
Famously, Henri Bergson called the modern concept of time as a sequence of
static images – as it was employed, for example, in astronomy – the “cinemato-
graphic method.”27 However, in contrast to the time series photography of Ead-
weard Muybridge and Étienne-Jules Marey, the inventors of film were not inter-
ested in breaking down movement that was too fast for the naked eye to see into
static images, but rather wanted to create a realistic representation of motion.
This was achieved in several variants around 1895, even though the contemporary
theories of motion perception were incomplete and even mistaken in some
points.28 As so often, technology was not the product of theory, but practical
experiment. As Harro Segeberg put it:
[T]he term “emergence” […] is taken to imply that in media history, not only
manifest technological and economic conditions need consideration, but also
cultural configurations, which consist of autonomous, irreducible elements
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(e.g., epistemes and aesthetics). Such elements cannot be derived or intercon-
nected on the principle of strict causality, which is precisely why they are
“creative,” but they develop in complex co-evolution, rather than being merely
contingent.29
We still do not know how motion perception works exactly, but it is possible to
correct a few errors that one occasionally still finds today in descriptions of film
technology.30 Firstly, the perception of motion in film viewing is not based on
the “aftereffect.”31 This is a perceptual effect that is experienced after fixating on
one object for a while and then fixating on another object that is complementary
in certain characteristics, so that it will produce a specific visual illusion (e.g.,
looking at a green square for a time and then at a white surface will create the
illusion of a red square appearing, or fixating on a moving pattern of lines will
create the illusion that a corresponding static pattern moves in the opposite di-
rection). Such a situation is the exception rather than the rule (i.e., it hardly ex-
ists in nature), and not the one that film creates. Secondly, the “stroboscope
effect” is not sufficient. The continuous motion of the filmstrip is not only inter-
rupted by the alternation of light and darkness, but also by short stops. The stops
are necessary, because otherwise only a blur would be perceived rather than the
objects represented by the images. The rotating shutter that intermittently inter-
rupts the light may show each image twice or even three times and thus reduce
flickering. (Incidentally, there was no standard speed before sound film, and a
flicker-free image was achieved long before synchronous sound.) The basic per-
ceptual effect that is created in film viewing is called a phi effect, an illusion of
motion that arises when similar static objects are shown in close spatial proxi-
mity and temporal succession. Depending on the arrangement of the objects,
different phi effects can be created, some looking quite “unnatural.”32 For exam-
ple, contrary to common belief, the wagon-wheel effect, i.e., the impression of
wheels turning backwards, does not arise only in films, but may also happen
when looking out of the window of a moving vehicle at the wheels of another
moving vehicle.33
We still do not know whether our visual apparatus only samples images,
which are then combined into an impression of movement in the brain (as Berg-
son assumed). Even if this is the case, then this sampling is much more complex
than that of a film camera (due to the constant voluntary and involuntary move-
ments of the eyes, the fact that only the center of the retina has receptors for
sharp color vision, etc.).34 Interestingly, people with a rare perceptual defect
who are unable to recognize static objects in reality are able to do so when watch-
ing television.35 It seems that the light changes of the television screen are not
consciously perceived, but sufficient to excite motor neurons. Furthermore, mov-
ing images of objects cause higher arousal than static images of the same ob-
jects.36 Hence, artificially created moving pictures seem to stimulate some sub-
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conscious nervous excitement already with their technological features, similar
to what Benjamin claimed, but it is hardly on the level of “shock” (and, as the
research mentioned above suggests, prolonged exposure is more likely to cause
fatigue rather than desire for more stimulation).
Spatial Perception
Film creates an impression of space in a similar way as central perspective does
in painting, which had been discovered centuries earlier. This discovery was also
made long before it was completely understood. Even though the practical dis-
covery and the theoretical understanding required learning, the similarity to the
perception of space in reality is good enough, so that seeing such a painting
“correctly” does not require learning. There are at least two significant differ-
ences between central perspective and natural human vision: 1) Natural human
vision is binocular, whereas central perspective, as the name says, only has one
focal point; 2) Natural human vision is subject to “constancy scaling,” which
means that with increasing distance the size of objects decreases less than pro-
portionally. This is a specific instance of the more general principle of “object
constancy,” which makes it possible to identify objects as the same under chang-
ing conditions (e.g., lighting).37 Hence, central perspective is not a perfect repre-
sentation of natural vision, but this does not necessarily mean that the differ-
ences reflect a particular “worldview,” as has often been claimed.38 For example,
contrary to common belief, René Descartes was aware of the phenomenon of
constancy scaling, so central perspective was not “the measure of all things” for
his philosophy.39
Richard Nisbett has found that Asians and Europeans tend to perceive pictures
differently: Europeans concentrate on objects, whereas Asians are more aware of
the context.40 If this is due to individualist vs. collectivist socialization, then this
might explain why the preference for central perspective emerged along with the
rise of individualism in Western countries. However, calling this a “change in
perception” implies inevitability: When Europeans are instructed to pay more
attention to the context, they are able to do so, as Asians are when they are asked
to pay more attention to the details of objects. Significantly, the central perspec-
tive was known in Asia before the influence of Western culture,41 whereas con-
versely, European modernism was later inspired by Asian art. Hence a “mode of
representation” on the side of the artist and a “mode of perception” on the side
of the viewer might be more appropriate terms. When psychologists attempted to
explain the individual styles of modern artists with perceptual defects,42 art his-
torians expressed reservations, and understandably so, due to the potential of
individual creativity that may deliberately diverge from everyday perception. One
should grant the corresponding degree of freedom to viewers, because audiences
often reject representations that they do not like, and tastes differ considerably.
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The mode of representation that became less common, i.e., depicting figures
according to their social importance rather than their physical distance from the
viewer (Bedeutungsperspektive), may also have a socio-psychological interpretation:
We actually do tend to estimate people that we regard as important as taller than
they actually are.43 However, this is probably better conceived as cognitive judg-
ment rather than perception, because it is not an optical illusion: We may be
surprised when we actually meet a celebrity in real life to see that he or she is
much shorter than we expected, but as soon as we have this opportunity to com-
pare, we do perceive their actual height. Historical sources show that Western
artists were also aware of the fact that the perceived size of objects decreases
with distance long before the central perspective was commonly employed.
Hence, even though it cannot be proven, it is plausible to assume that the viewers
of medieval paintings did not perceive them as “realistic,” but understood them
as conventional, symbolic representations – just as they are likely to have recog-
nized the sky as blue, even though in religious paintings it was often depicted in
gold. Collapsing all of these complex processes into the single concept of “per-
ception” tends to imply that media lock viewers into “ideological apparatuses”
from which there is no escape.
Technological Features of Images: Analog vs. Digital
As important as the technological characteristics of images may be in many re-
gards (production time and cost, reproducibility, etc.), their influence on percep-
tion is often overstated.44 For example, the camera obscura may well have been a
revolutionary device for the production of paintings, but not even art historians
are certain whether or not Jan Vermeer used it for his paintings.45 If the material
structure of an image is invisible to the eye, then as far as perception is con-
cerned it makes little difference whether it consists of brush strokes, halftone
grids or pixels (or only insofar as this structure produces unique, visible effects).
What we perceive in each case on a higher (cognitive) level are the depicted ob-
jects, and on a lower (sensory) level light emitted from matter (i.e., in the case of
digitally created images from a computer screen or a paper printout). Further-
more, in a manner of speaking, the human eye has always converted “analog”
images to “digital” ones: The receptors of the retina encode the continuous sti-
mulus of light into discrete impulses from a very large, but limited number of
neurons. This causes a great loss of information, but has the advantage of faster
processing.
The Future of the History of Perception
Carroll asks the question why the “history of vision”-debate exists, but does not
answer it (he defers it to a later text, but as far as I know he has not returned to
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the question),46 so I would like to suggest an answer here. In addition to the
practical difficulty of researching perception, the humanities are often extremely
critical of the social sciences as such,47 whereas conversely, the social sciences
have almost completely lost interest in historical topics. Most scholars who have
applied psychology to historical questions, regarding both their training as well
as their institutional affiliation, are based in the humanities, not the social
sciences. I do not think that the paradigms that currently dominate psychology,
such as cognitivism and evolutionary psychology, are fundamentally opposed to
the idea of historical change or unable to conceptualize it in principle. In fact,
even evolutionary psychology is currently developing a new interest in environ-
mental influences.48 These trends do not seem to be concrete enough yet to be
readily applicable to media, but if culture has more influence than has previously
been thought, especially in the long term, how else could this be researched than
by looking at cultural history? Comparison of cultures in different stages of “de-
velopment” might come to mind as an alternative, but due to many confounding
factors, this is only an approximation. So far, however, the social sciences, and
psychology in particular, have hardly contributed to the study of history them-
selves. I believe that there are two reasons for this: Firstly, the social sciences are
more interested in practical applications than the humanities. Secondly, many
social scientists believe that only the direct study of people with their established
methods (questionnaires, experiments, etc.) is properly “empirical.” Conse-
quently, historical questions may not be forthcoming from the social sciences,
but I do believe that psychology is useful – and even necessary – for trying to
answer the historical questions that the humanities pose. Furthermore, many
more theories and studies exist in psychology than have so far been applied to
media history.
In the course of my article, I have focused mainly on refuting common hypoth-
eses about perceptual change rather than contributing new ones. Reed has
summed up:
Perception has a history because what people typically are aware of changes,
because the information on which awareness is based changes (especially be-
cause media – methods of displaying information – change) and because how
people go about perceiving changes.49
I believe that even most of this is better conceived as “representation” on the one
hand and “cognition” (or behavior) on the other, rather than “perception.” Even
though there is certainly a “gray area” between the “higher” and “lower” aspects
of perception, and this “territory” is precisely where culture and biology meet,50
which, among other things, creates potential for change, the term “perception”
seems to produce confusion and exaggeration all too easily. Consequently, I pre-
fer to be careful with it. New hypotheses and knowledge about perceptual change
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may well emerge in the future, but we should not content ourselves any longer
with employing perception as a pseudo-psychological metaphor. Furthermore, I
do not think that change is the only question for which psychology is of interest:
Whether we are studying contemporary or historical audiences, understanding
the basic psychological processes of media reception is important, whether they
change or not.
In 2004, motivated by the finding that the understanding of media-related be-
havior is still frustratingly inadequate, John L. Sherry called for a “paradigm
shift” in communication studies. Sherry believes that media studies are still
more or less explicitly influenced by theories of human behavior that have long
since lost their dominance in the social sciences at large, because they do not
adequately account for biological factors (such as behaviorism). Instead, Sherry
envisions a “neuroscience paradigm,” a systemic model of behavior that would
investigate the interaction of biology and culture:
Such a perspective attempts to account for the contribution of biology (e.g.,
sex, temperament, hormones, physical appearance, etc.) and of the social en-
vironment (e.g., parents, peers, culture, etc.). The neuroscience paradigm as-
sumes that (a) all human behavior is rooted in neurophysiological processing,
(b) one’s neurophysiological makeup is genetically determined, but (c) is
plastic across the life span (including in utero) and is therefore susceptible to
environmental influence. [...] The concept of embeddedness states that hu-
mans exist within a context made up of multiple levels of being (inner biologi-
cal, individual psychological, dyadic, social network, community, societal,
cultural, outer ecological, and historical). […] The system is also character-
ized by dynamic interaction in which influence occurs across levels of being
with variables at different levels having more or less influence at different
times. Hence, the individual has the potential for plasticity or change across
the life span. [...] Importantly, this perspective stresses that the person is the
producer of his or her own development. As such, individuals have the poten-
tial to interpret stimuli in ways that are consistent with their needs, drives,
and desires. Therefore, people actively shape their environment.51
As Sherry’s remarks show, a paradigm that is informed by biological psychology
does not necessarily entail that culture is regarded as unimportant or that histori-
cal change cannot be accounted for in principle. Sherry’s “neuroscience para-
digm” is a theoretical framework rather than a unified theory of behavior, to
which approaches from different disciplines, including the humanities, could
contribute with various subjects and methods. The “history of vision”-debate has
been a step in this direction, and this is why I hope that it will continue.
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Will the 3D Revolution Happen? A Brief
Perspective on the Long History of
Stereoscopy (with special thanks to
Eisenstein and Bazin)
Ian Christie
James Cameron’s Avatar inaugurated a new phase of commercial 3D cinema at
the end of 2009 – and also precipitated the final stage in the full conversion of
cinema to digital. Many cinema operators who had been skeptical or hostile to
digital projection were persuaded that their outlay would at least be repaid by the
attraction of digital 3D, however short-lived this fashion might prove, and so the
tipping point was reached in digital conversion.1 Yet Avatar and its immediate
successors were not only commercially successful on a scale that dwarfed all pre-
vious 3D releases, but also provoked an even greater hostility toward the format
than its earlier manifestation had in 1952-1954. The canonical version of this is
Roger Ebert’s 2010 article entitled “Why I Hate 3-D (and You Should Too),”
which was followed by many similar and equally extreme expressions of animos-
ity.2 Ebert’s main assertion was that the process “adds nothing essential to the
moviegoing experience.” Among other reasons he gave for “hating” 3D were:
“for some, it is an annoying distraction […] for others, it creates nausea and
headaches”; adding for good measure that “it is unsuitable for grown-up films
of any seriousness” and “limits the freedom of directors to make films as they
choose.”3
Most of Ebert’s assertions are obviously polemical or subjective. In addition to
box-office results, there is in fact considerable evidence that many have found 3D
does “add” to their moviegoing experience. A survey commissioned by the UK
Film Council and British Film Institute in 2011 recorded Avatar as the third
most frequently cited film that “affected” a balanced sample of UK respondents,
with many commenting on its spectacular visual effects and on how 3D intensi-
fied their emotional engagement.4 And empirical research comparing viewers’
experience of the film seen in 2D and 3D found that the latter created great
“presence” or immersion overall.5 Subsequently, two non-mainstream films,
Cave of Forgotten Dreams (Werner Herzog, 2010) and Pina (Wim Wen-
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ders, 2011) enjoyed wide success and acclaim in the art house sector which had
hitherto been hostile to 3D. But such evidence seems unlikely to persuade those
who have felt affronted or “conned” (according to Mark Kermode6) by 3D since
its return in 2009, regarding it as, in Thomas Elsaesser’s colorful summary, “an
aberration, a travesty, and an abomination.”7 What I wish to focus on here is the
recurrent argument, already voiced in the 1940s, that 3D “adds nothing” to nor-
mal cinema experience; or that if it does “add something,” this is either gratui-
tous or distracting.
Cinema history, of course, records similar responses to earlier additions to
cinema’s prevailing regime. The introduction of synchronized sound and of
photographic color (as distinct from applied coloring) were resisted by many at
the end of the 1920s, largely on the grounds that these intruded into a medium
which was felt to be already mature. An editorial in the avant-garde journal Close
Up in 1928 spoke of the “future of pure cinema” as “safe in Soviet filmmakers’
hands,” faced with the “excrescent and reactionary strivings of talking and talk-
ing color films.”8
Even earlier, the very invention of moving pictures or “animated photography”
had been deplored as “unnecessary.” An art critic writing in 1896 was clear that
the Cinematograph had no artistic value, but might prosper “statistically,” by
mechanically reproducing what was placed before it as “slabs of life.”9 However,
there can be no doubt that during the 1930s, “an explicit and pure style of silent
film” was felt by some to be under threat from synchronized sound, color and
even stereoscopy, even though it is unclear how widely and coherently this view
was held.10 What is less widely understood today, by cultural critics and within
the industry, is that a similar sense of crisis reappeared at the end of the 1940s,
after sound and color had been assimilated, and that the new threats to “film as
art” were seen to be changing screen format and the first demonstrations of
Polaroid 3D, as well as the looming challenge of television.
Many of the complaints against 3D that have surfaced since 2010 were first
heard between 1946 and 1954, accompanied by denunciations of the widescreen
format that became established with Cinemascope in 1953. But there were also
trenchant arguments voiced in support of these new formats, which remain little
known; and two of the most intriguing were by André Bazin and Sergei Eisen-
stein, neither of whom have traditionally been seen as engaged in the 3D debate.
Total Cinema
Several generations of film students are familiar with Bazin’s seminal text “The
Myth of Total Cinema,” possibly one of the most widely quoted and anthologized
of all writings about the origins of cinema. This was in fact a review of the first
volume of Georges Sadoul’s history of cinema, L’Invention du cinéma 1832-97,
which dealt more comprehensively than before with the pioneers of moving
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images. From this, Bazin concluded that the 19th-century inventors saw “in their
imaginations […] the cinema as a total and complete representation of reality
[...] the reconstruction of a perfect illusion of the exterior world in sound, color
and relief.”11 Probably few of the many who have read this have noticed the inclu-
sion of “relief,” since Hugh Gray’s non-translation of “relief” does not immedi-
ately evoke stereoscopy in English.12 However Bazin continues in the same vein,
crediting a French historian P. Potoniée with the view “that it was not the discov-
ery of photography but of stereoscopy, which came onto the market just slightly
before the first attempts at animated photography in 1851, that opened the eyes
of researchers.”13 And he adds, “there was not a single inventor who did not try
to combine sound and stereoscopy [relief] with animation of the image.”14
Bazin would write two short articles about stereoscopy in the 1950s, immedi-
ately before and after the brief period when 3D films were being widely seen and
discussed, as part of the industry’s response to what was perceived as the threat
of television. The first, published in 1952, offered a brisk survey of stereoscopic
theory and processes as a prelude to welcoming Norman McLaren’s animations
in “artificial 3D,” which Bazin reported being “as difficult to describe to anyone
who has not seen some of this prodigious film artisan’s ‘flat’ animations,” but
best described as “abstract painting in motion and 3D.”15 For Bazin, 3D film may
be “a trivial scientific curiosity,” but he predicted it would probably make “a leap
as great as that from L’entrée du train (Lumière, 1896) to the train engine
sequence in La Bête humaine (Renoir, 1938).”16 Bazin insisted that the de-
monstrations at the Festival of Britain in London “already proved that 3D affords
the same interpretations, with an operation as orchestrated and utterly artistic as
‘flat’ cinema,” and invited his readers to “quickly take this new and decisive step
towards total cinema.”17 The echo of his review six years earlier is unmistakable:
realizing projectable 3D marked an important step toward making that “myth” of
the previous century’s obsessives and visionaries a reality.
Eisenstein and Stereo in Depth
Sometime in late 1947 or early 1948, Sergei Eisenstein wrote a long essay on
“stereo-cinema,” which has been claimed as his last completed text.18 Having
first appeared in English in 1949, this was included in the third collection of
Eisenstein’s writings in English, Notes of a Film Director, in 1970.19 For unknown
reasons, the essay exists in two versions, with the English version omitting a
long central section of some 20 pages, presenting in effect the beginning and
end of Eisenstein’s passionate advocacy of stereoscopy.
The most immediate reason for the essay was that the Soviet film industry had
just produced its first stereo feature film, Aleksandr Andrievsky’s Robinson
Crusoe which was released in November 1947, with Crusoe played by Eisen-
stein’s former pupil, Pavel Kadochnikov (who had played Vladimir in Ivan the
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Terrible Part 2 [1958], which, however, was then banned, and would not be
seen until the late 1950s).20 One phrase indicates that Eisenstein had seen Ro-
binson Crusoe: he talks about Robinson’s raft trying to slip past the tangled
lianas as “one of the best stereoscopic shots,” before going on to use it as the
basis of a rhetorical flourish: “the day is near when, instead of rafts, we shall see
galleys, frigates, cruisers, battleships and dreadnoughts arriving in stereoscopic
film ports.”21 What Eisenstein does not mention is that the film was presented in
a pioneering “autostereoscopic” format, using a specially constructed screen
which did not require viewers to wear glasses.22
Anticipating the optimism of Bazin, Eisenstein asserts that “it is as naïve to
doubt that stereoscopic film is the tomorrow of the cinema, as it is to doubt that
tomorrow will come.”23 Linked to this confident claim is a political argument:
“the bourgeois West treats the problem of stereoscopy either with indifference or
scorn, but the inventors and researchers in the Land of Soviets, its government
and its leading officials, pay a great deal of attention to it.”24 Eisenstein takes as
his target the French scriptwriter and sometime editor Louis Chavance, who had
written skeptically about stereoscopy in July 1946.25 The quotations Eisenstein
cites amount to asking – as many have done once again – who needs it? What
will it add to drama or comedy, even if it has some application to filming sculp-
ture? Eisenstein brands Chavance “conservative” and “obscurantist,” hence a ty-
pical proponent of Western ideology. We Soviets, he continues, are different; and
the essay ends with a paean of praise for “the glorious and triumphant tomorrow
[…] and those who have joined us in leading mankind towards a bright future!”26
The tone of this polemic is similar to that of a number of articles written in
1947, including the notorious “Purveyors of Spiritual Poison,” in which Eisen-
stein attacked a number of recent American films as examples of “the skill, in-
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Fig. 1: The Ivanov autostereo system screen in Russia from 1941.
ventiveness and technical mastery of American cinema used in the service of
darkness and oppression,” singling out Griffith’s The Birth of a Nation
(1915) as an “ultra-reactionary” film that “celebrated the formation of the Ku
Klux Klan, a fascist organization.”27 There were many contextual reasons for
this harshly critical stance. After the Central Committee’s banning of Ivan Part
2, Eisenstein had published a ritual self-criticism, but was still hoping to be al-
lowed to “correct” the film. More generally, since 1946 Stalin and Zhdanov had
emphasized the need to politicize all areas of life, with a special emphasis on
ending cultural and scientific deference to the West.
But even if these factors influenced the framing of the essay, and its professed
scorn for Western “backwardness,” the main aim of the full-length text is to out-
line an historical poetics of stereoscopy.28 After his opening declaration on the
“inevitability” of stereoscopic cinema, linked to the triumph of Robinson Cru-
soe, Eisenstein proposes an argument not unlike that of his essay on Disney and
animation, based on what would today be termed evolutionary biology.29 Forms
of art, he claims, stem from what is deepest in human nature, and their survival
is governed by the same law of natural selection that prevail in other spheres of
life. An example of non-survival that he offers – which reflects the prevailing
hegemony of Socialist Realism at this time – is “so-called ‘pure’ abstract art,”
“which could exist for a short period as a reflection of the doomed social class
than engendered it.” Eisenstein’s counter-example is “a no less abstract form of
art that has existed unchanged for centuries – the circus.” Circus, he claims,
deals in “feats of dexterity, strength, self-possession, purposefulness – all in
keeping with man’s inborn striving for the fullest development of these abil-
ities.” Likewise sport “provides us with the most perfect forms of exercising our
natural faculties, not only as spectators but as active participants.”30
From this standpoint, the test for 3D being a valid art form with a future must
be that “it answers some inner urge, some requirement of human nature,” and
there should be a history of striving to satisfy this urge “through different stages
of social development and artistic means.”31 But before exploring this history,
Eisenstein offers a brief phenomenology of the stereo-cinema illusion, noting
three main effects. First, there is representation which stays within the experi-
ence of conventional cinema, “like a flat high-relief suspended on the surface of
the screen”; secondly, the representation “recedes deep into the screen, drawing
the spectator into unknown depths”; and thirdly, the representation “‘falls’ out
of the screen into the auditorium” – an effect which can be “overwhelming.”
Although these mark a new stage in creating and manipulating the illusion of
volume for the spectator, Eisenstein argues that on close examination stereo-cin-
ema is only developing tendencies which were already inherent in cinema at the
time of its birth, bringing these to a more perfect expression. A similar realiza-
tion followed the introduction of synchronized sound and color: these were im-
provements on what had been present but inhibited in silent and monochrome
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cinema. So, stereo-cinema favors “foreground composition,” placing objects
near the camera to accentuate depth – a style which Eisenstein traces back
through his own films, from the famous image at the end of Ivan Part 1
(1944), with the Tsar in close-up profile and a column of his subjects snaking
away into the distance,32 through many compositions in the unrealized Que
Viva Mexico! (1932), including the Day of the Dead and a woman’s face in
close-up along the diagonal of a pyramid, and further back in Old and New
(1929) and even in Strike (1925). A similar tendency can be found in the Holly-
wood tradition that runs from Erich von Stroheim, through his former assistant
William Wyler’s Jezebel (1938) and The Little Foxes (1941) – in which Eisen-
stein describes the use of the wide-angle 28mm lens as “almost abusive” – up to
Citizen Kane (Welles, 1941), which takes this technique “to the level of trick-
ery and the absurd.” Earlier, such compositions were also frequent in the work of
Degas and Toulouse-Lautrec, Eisenstein observes, testifying to the influence of
Japanese models on these artists, and feeding his own precocious attraction to
this technique.
He admits that the most evocative examples of this tendency are still found in
“flat cinema,” which is explained by the necessity of using the “least expressive”
50mm lens when shooting in stereo. But despite such current limitations,
it is stereo-cinema that gives us the real sensation of the two main spatial
tendencies in contemporary cinema: that of “sucking” the spectator towards
what was formerly the surface of the screen, and of “discharging” over him
what hitherto remained flattened on the mirror of its surface.33
Why should these new expressive possibilities of stereo-cinema exercise such a
powerful appeal for the spectator? Eisenstein’s answer is that, if “ordinary” cin-
ema is the offspring of Edison and Lumière, stereo-cinema is also the great-
grandson of theater, of which it represents the latest and most socially developed
form.
What follows (and was omitted entirely in the English versions) is a lengthy
excursus on the history of theater, which Eisenstein divides into three main
phases. In the first “primitive” stage, reaching back into prehistory but also sur-
viving until recently in the collective rituals of Bali and Siam (Thailand), there is
no distinction between performer and spectator: all participate.34 The second
phase in all its varied forms is characterized by an “organic union” between ac-
tion and audience, where the performance seems to penetrate a mass of specta-
tors. In such forms, he suggests, there is immediately a “nostalgia” to unite the
dissociated roles of performer and audience, by seating arrangements which
bring at least some audience members close to the performance area, or enable
the performers to mingle with spectators. This nostalgia is not just a feature of
the modern era, Eisenstein insists, but is present throughout the long history of
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theater as we know it. His examples range across the history of carnival, court
masques and baroque theater (citing engravings by Baltazarini and Callot), the
move to arena-style auditoria in the later 19th century (as in Wagner’s Bayreuth
Festspielhaus), the Japanese Kabuki theater, with its hanamichi runway linking
stage and auditorium, up to performance in the round in the 20th century, and
finally to the Russian and early Soviet avant-garde theater, from Eisenstein’s for-
mer mentor Vsevolod Meyerhold, the great Symbolist producer turned Construc-
tivist, to his own work at the Proletkult, with his 1921 productions of The Mexican
and Léna, both seeking to engage the audience in avant-garde ways and challenge
theatrical convention.
Even in conventional theater, Eisenstein finds revealing examples of this desire
to create a connection, often by verbal means, as in long speeches clearly ad-
dressed to the audience rather than other characters, and he cites an anecdote
from the Moscow Art Theatre – described as the last defender of the “fourth
wall” – where the great actor Ivan Moskvin regularly played the governor in Go-
gol’s Dead Souls, and once shouted at the audience: “What are you laughing at?
It’s yourselves.” In this same passage, he recalls a conversation with Pirandello in
Berlin, when the playwright spoke of wanting to write a film script in which
characters would argue with the projectionist – and this prompts a recollection
of the anarchic comedy Hellzapoppin (Potter, 1941) where this does indeed
happen. But what cinema also offers – making it effectively the third phase in
the history of theatrical representation – is the ability to “make illusion almost
tangible,” through its use of elements of reality “transformed by the creative will
of the artist.”35
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Fig. 2: Jacques Callot, engraving, The Combat at the Barrier (1627), recording an
entertainment for the Duke of Lorraine in Nancy, with the audience surrounding
the performance and participating in it.
The “simple technique” of cinema has long been able, “by means of lens and
microphone,” to make us “invisible observers of the most secret actions taking
place within four walls.”36 But, Eisenstein insists, “the cinema as art” wants to
go further, beyond the interior monologue (which he had identified in the early
1930s as one of the major opportunities granted by sound), to “penetrate into the
inner processes of thought and feeling.” In contrast to the preceding condensed
history of theater, which drew on a lifetime of theatergoing and research, Eisen-
stein’s account of the growing tendency to “subjectivize” cinema was clearly in-
fluenced by his recent viewing and access to Western cinema literature.37 In rapid
succession, he cites the “I” of the narration in Hitchcock’s Rebecca (1940), the
psychoanalytic basis of Secrets of a Soul (Pabst, 1926), Spellbound (Hitch-
cock, 1946) and Lady in the Dark (Leisen, 1943), the dream sequences of The
Lost Weekend (Wilder, 1945) and Dream Girl (Leisen, 1945/48),38 and the
first-person camera in Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde (Mamoulian, 1931), Lady in
the Lake (Montgomery, 1947) and A Matter of Life and Death (Powell,
Pressburger, 1946). All of these serve, in different ways, to align the viewer with
the central character’s perception, and clearly fascinated Eisenstein, even if he
feels obliged to denounce them as examples of a “pathological introspection to-
wards which Western ‘creators’ have turned, breaking with the healthy realism
that would not serve reaction.”39 However, like the increasingly frequent
breaches in theater’s “fourth wall,” they demonstrate an immersive ambition,
reaching toward that “aspiration” which Eisenstein detected in earlier phases of
culture.
For Eisenstein, Aldous Huxley’s satirical vision of the future in Brave New
World, with movies replaced by “coloured and stereoscopic feelies,” offering a
new level of erotic stimulation to their viewers, amounts to an ironic diagnosis
of the fate of bourgeois culture, aided by its science.40 His defense of stereo-
cinema in Soviet hands insists that it is democratic, uniting performers and audi-
ence; and thus embodies “progress,” in socioeconomic as well as aesthetic
terms, just as synchronized sound and color did, confirming cinema as the third
phase of theater – recapturing that primordial unity of performer and audience.
So those who attack it, like Chavance, can be dismissed as bourgeois defenders
of an elite form of cinema and theater.
The confrontational rhetoric of the early Cold War may make Eisenstein’s ad-
vocacy of 3D seem naïve, or merely propagandist, but it also fits well with his
major conviction that cinema constituted the latest phase of social ritual leading
toward the “art-work of the future.” Just as the history of theater reveals a strug-
gle to overcome the early schism between performers and audience, cinema initi-
ally entrenched this breach during its first half-century, but was now on the brink
of solving the problem. To ask “what does stereo add” would be to miss the
point, according to Eisenstein, since it obviously enhances the immersive realism
of cinema-theater. In an extraordinary finale, the essay ends by listing recent
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technological developments which have extended human capacities (infra-red
glasses, radar, computers), arguing that these all require “absolutely new arts,
unknown forms and dimensions, going beyond the palliatives that traditional
theatre, culture and cinema are revealed to have been.”41 Hailing the advent of “a
new dynamic stereoculture,” he insists that there is nothing to fear in the coming
of this new era of art. Instead, echoing Wagner’s call for a new kind of artwork,
we should,
prepare our consciousness for the coming of new themes which, multiplied
by the potentialities of new techniques, will demand a new aesthetics for suc-
cessfully realising these new themes in the novel, breath-taking works of the
future.42
Stereo Installations and the Battle of the Formats
Although it is the short-lived Hollywood 3D wave of 1952-1954 – which included
Bwana Devil (Oboler, 1952), It Came from Outer Space (Arnold, 1953),
House of Wax (De Toth, 1953), and Dial M for Murder (Hitchcock, 1954)
– that has loomed large in accounts of the history of 3D, it was in fact stereo-
scopic installations as part of exhibitions or as stand-alone attractions that con-
vinced many of its potential. The launch of Robinson Crusoe had followed
the earlier establishment of a permanent Stereokino in Moscow, which showed
an 80-minute program of three films in Ivanov’s “autostereoscopic format.” After
visiting this, Ivor Montagu, a producer, critic, co-founder of the Film Society in
London and friend of Eisenstein, wrote:
When all film is stereoscopic and we have forgotten that we ever accepted the
convention of the flat-image as real, it seems unlikely that we shall remark on
the stereoscopic film’s appearance of reality, any more than we remark at pre-
sent on the conventional flatness of the two-dimensional film.43
Such installations were in vogue in the post-war world, and at the UK’s 1951
Festival of Britain, the Telecinema (the forerunner of the British Film Institute’s
Southbank cinema complex) displayed two technological marvels, large-screen
television and stereoscopic films, which the future theorist and filmmaker Peter
Wollen recalled as a vivid childhood memory:
When I was thirteen years old, I went to the Festival of Britain, a kind of
World’s Fair which was held in London to celebrate the Hundredth Anniver-
sary of the Great Exhibition of Victorian times […]. The Telekinema was the
first theatre specially built to project television onto a large screen – as you sat
waiting for the films to come, you watched the rest of the audience as they
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were televised entering the theatre.44[…] The main programme consisted of
specially made films for which you had to put on polarizing glasses, with one
lens red and the other green. There were two animation films in the pro-
gramme, made by Norman McLaren, and a demonstration film of the London
Zoo. For me, the great moment was when the giraffes stretched their necks
out from the screen and high over the audience, as though you could stretch
up and touch them.45
Fig. 3: Norman McLaren’s “artificial” 3D film Around and Around, using an
oscilloscope image, was seen by large and enthusiastic audiences in London and
Paris in 1951-52.
Bazin was similarly inspired when he wrote about 3D in 1952, after the 3D films
from the festival of Paris were shown in Paris, and he refers to the theoretical
work that lay behind this program by Raymond Spottiswoode.46 Having analyzed
the geometry of the stereoscopic illusion, involving the axis of convergence of the
two camera lenses and the focal plane of the image, he announced that Spotti-
swoode had paved the way for variation in apparent depth, so that “the film-
maker now has as much creative control over the third dimension as his various
lenses give him over framing and visual style.”47 For Bazin, this brought 3D into
the same creative sphere as the deep focus staging he admired in Welles and
Wyler, which depended on the use of the short focal-length lens (Bazin was al-
ready writing with enthusiasm about deep focus in Wyler and Welles at exactly
the same time as Eisenstein, although his more familiar texts date from the
1950s; and he would not have known of the cameraman Gregg Toland’s involve-
ment with a pioneer 3D camera system in the 1930s).48
However, what excited Bazin’s admiration most was the “artificial 3D” created
by McLaren “using only one standard camera and calculating the precise separa-
tion and axis of convergence for each part of the image.”49 Instead of the sepa-
rated planes and dioramic effect of early 3D, Bazin found in McLaren’s “poetic
sensibility” evidence that modern 3D “lends itself to the same range of interpre-
tation and concerted use for artistic purposes as ‘flat’ cinema.” Evoking Fernand
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Léger’s transposition of his painting practice into black-and-white photography
in Ballet mécanique (1924), Bazin suggested that “today stereoscopy in color
would give him a means that is purely painterly and unimaginable outside stereo-
scopic cinema […] to create moving forms in space.”50
Bazin’s initial argument in favor of 3D cinema is thus substantially different
from Eisenstein’s, which rested on the re-creation of a revitalized shared space
between viewer and percept. Bazin is attracted by the potential, glimpsed in
McLaren’s Now Is the Time (1951), for a fundamentally new plastic experience,
unconnected with enhanced “realism.” However, three years later, Bazin wrote
again on the subject in the same journal, in an article entitled “The 3D Revolu-
tion Did Not Happen.”51 New technical processes were launched under the ban-
ner of stereoscopy [relief], he writes, “and perhaps a true stereo cinema would
have constituted a real revolution, comparable to that of sound.” What happened
instead, eclipsing the short-lived promotion of 3D, was the launch of Cinema-
scope in 1953, which prompted Bazin to observe that
no-one today, even if watching a film in cinemascope, imagines this is cinema
in three dimensions. As for the only commercial process that truly offered the
impression of depth, that based on anaglyphs and perfected with Polaroid
glasses, its failure was so rapidly clear that the films made in this process
were more often seen in flat versions.52
1953 had marked the apogee of 3D’s first commercial presentation, with the re-
sult that even films made in the format were largely seen “flat,” like Hitchcock’s
Dial M for Murder. By 1956, 3D was already a distant memory, and one
tainted by “failure.” The Bazin who had foreseen great potential in McLaren’s
short films was now pragmatically weighing the commercial success of Cinema-
scope (“already installed in 32,000 cinemas”) against its artistic significance. His
conclusion was that all the new techniques – which included Cinerama and Vis-
taVision, as well as Cinemascope – had some negative consequences for the qual-
ity of projected image, often blurred or cropped – but on balance could be con-
sidered “rather positive without being revolutionary.” The most positive result
was that
in place of the old screen with immutable proportions, [there are now] three
or four different formats to break old habits and stimulate the formal imagi-
nation of filmmakers, leading them to re-think anew their mise en scene (cf
Lola Montes). Equally, the attention aroused by all this commotion can only
help to attract the curiosity of spectators.53
Since Bazin is often miscast as an aesthetic conservative, it is refreshing to find
him reporting from the midst of the “battle of formats” of the early 1950s in such
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a pragmatic tone. A footnote to the 1956 article even suggests that “the famous,
sacrosanct [principle of] framing may not be as important as is it considered to
be by the aestheticians of cinema.”54 Amid widely differing standards of presen-
tation, with many cinemas poorly converted for widescreen formats, Bazin pro-
poses the “practical conclusion that an informed and well-organized spectator
must not only choose their films carefully but also the cinemas they patronize.”55
Expanding the Screen
The “failure” of 3D in 1952-1954 continues to be cited as a reason why we should
be suspicious of its return in digital form; and this failure is often assumed to be
the result of audience rejection. However, as long ago as 1980, Peter Wollen con-
cluded that “exhibitors […] defeated 3D,” having “consistently resisted conver-
sion costs.”56 Cinemascope, he added, “was able to make headway because it
involved minimal adaptation of the projector, under the economic pressure of
competition from TV (and also to eliminate 3D).”57 Looking back at the enthusiasm
displayed by both Eisenstein and Bazin after their first encounter with 3D, it is
striking that both invoke histories of anticipation – Bazin reaching back to the
pre-cinema era of optical inventions, and Eisenstein to the long history of dra-
matic performance – to justify their sense that this would “complete” the cin-
ematic illusion, together with stereophonic sound.58 Neither assumed that it
would merely “add something” to existing cinema, even if this represented its
initial novelty value, but rather that it could usher in new possibilities, and poten-
tially a new art form.
The two main progenitors of moving pictures, Thomas Edison and Louis Lu-
mière, both believed that their inventions were incomplete without stereoscopy.
According to the pioneer film historian Terry Ramsaye, Edison included “the
stereoscopic picture idea” in what was described as “an obscure and abandoned
patent application” from 1891, three years before the Kinetoscope made its public
debut.59 In practice, however, combining the phonograph with moving pictures
fully occupied his attention. The Lumières registered a patent for an Octagonal
Disk Stereo Device in 1900, at a time when many others also patented devices for
stereo projection, but none apparently with any success. However Lumière per-
severed, and in 1936 published an article on “Stereoscopy on the Screen,” with a
drawing of a projection system, followed by a patent for a special colored screen
in 1938.60 Yet the 3D films that Lumière had shot were not seen in 3D until 2010,
when the installation of digital projection that Avatar and its successors pro-
moted made screenings possible.61
There are indeed parallel “long histories” involved, and as Bazin’s 1955 article
makes clear, it would be misleading to focus on 3D in isolation, even during its
brief 1950s heyday. We need to consider instead two broad issues, which have
been intermittently intertwined, yet are distinct: the place of 3D in cinema and
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the place of cinema in stereoscopic practice. Since the mid-1990s centenary cele-
brations, traditional “birth of cinema” narratives have increasingly been super-
seded by multi-dimensional histories of the technologies that coalesced to be-
come “cinema” from around 1912 until the first decade of the 21st century.
Despite recurrent efforts to isolate a particular phase of this history as cinema
“proper,” and to defend it against vulgar “additions” (sound, color, 3D, variable
screen-shape, video, digital imaging, live performance transmission), the social
practice of cinema has vigorously modified and re-invented itself for over a cen-
tury. Nearly twenty years before his stereo-cinema essay, Eisenstein had argued
that cinema should forsake its slavish attachment to the horizontal rectangular
screen, “based on deductions from traditions in the art forms of painting and
stage practice,” and instead experiment with a variable “dynamic square.”62 The
occasion was a debate then under way in Hollywood about the desirability of a
widescreen format known as “grandeur film,” and Eisenstein’s arguments drew
on a range of sources as eclectic as in his 1948 essay, including references to the
physiology of perception, claiming that the human eye could accommodate verti-
cal scanning as easily as horizontal, and to the impact of the still-new synchro-
nized sound.63 “Acoustics help optics!” proclaimed Eisenstein, on the threshold
of the sound era, claiming that this offered a chance to rethink all the parameters
of cinema, and anticipating the call for stereophonic sound he would also make
in 1948.64
Eisenstein may have been one of the most outspoken and theoretically minded
of major directors, but there were others arguing for radical change in cinema’s
presentational format. Michael Powell, for instance, shot Oh, Rosalinda!! in
Cinemascope in 1955, although later lamenting the poor quality of lenses then
available, and in the following year he would film The Battle of the River
Plate in VistaVision, relishing its greatly increased frame size and hence immer-
sive potential.65 Looking back at these experiences of “early adoption,” he re-
ferred to having “always been against projecting [the image] in the cinema with
a black surround,” instead of having using photo-electric cells to create a “sym-
pathetic surround for color films, so that the overall tone on the screen wouldn’t
suffer.”66
Besides questioning the dominance of standardized formats, it is equally im-
portant to remember that “film” – in the physical sense of a transparent image-
strip of whatever gauge and composition – despite being long at the center of
this ensemble, has never been confined to cinema(s), having also been part of
domestic, “non-theatrical” practices. From the point of view of stereoscopy, film-
strip technology was arguably the major obstacle to its widespread adoption,
since it required either precise synchronization of two projectors, or a reduced
size of side-by-side image on the same filmstrip. Digital projection has vastly
simplified this process, making possible Avatar and its successors.
will the 3d revolution happen? 127
The fact that almost all aspects of moving-image practice now use digital tech-
nology has not, however, eliminated use of the terms “film” and “cinema” (or
their equivalents in other languages). Whether we will continue to call this “mul-
tiple and multiform” ensemble cinema is both a lexicological and an aesthetic or
philosophical question.67 But within it, 3D is perhaps best understood as some-
thing like a comet, returning at periodic intervals to light up the sky of cinema
with a spectacular display, before retreating into darkness. The 1952-1953 peri-
helion has been vastly exceeded in magnitude by the post-2010 return of digital
3D, although this now seems to be waning, in both creative and commercial
terms.
Two New Visual Cultures: Depth before Movement
A second issue, however, is that of “stereoscopic culture,” most of which lies
outside cinema, and whose history is more continuous, and certainly much long-
er and fuller, than recent polemics would have it. The term dates from 1838 when
Charles Wheatcroft gave a paper on binocular vision at the Royal Society, and
demonstrated a mirror device that he called a stereoscope, “to indicate its prop-
erty of representing solid figures.”68 Wheatcroft used hand-drawn images, but
after Daguerre’s and Fox Talbot’s demonstrations of fixing a photographic image
in 1839-1840, photography offered an obvious way to produce matched images
reliably; and in 1849 David Brewster constructed a lenticular, or lens-based,
stereoscope, which was soon mass-produced by the French instrument maker
Jules Duboscq.
Fig. 4: Brewster’s lens-based stereoscope and the simplified Holmes version.
Versions of these would dominate the home-3D market for the second half of the
19th century.
Between the 1850s and the early 20th century, the stereoscope became a ubiqui-
tous domestic appliance, arguably the first modern communications device in a
series that would eventually include the telephone, radio and television. The
128 ian christie
London Stereoscopic Company, founded in 1854, aimed to have “a stereoscope
in every home,” and after the American polymath Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr.,
launched his elegantly simplified model in 1861, a variety of types proliferated.69
In a famous article from 1859, Holmes envisioned the device’s development:
The consequence of this will soon be such an enormous collection of forms
that they will have to be classified and arranged in vast libraries, as books are
now. The time will come when a man who wishes to see any object, natural or
artificial, will go to the Imperial, National, or City Stereographic Library and
call for its skin or form, as he would for a book at any common library.70
Holmes’s prediction was fulfilled to the extent that the London Stereoscopic
Company’s catalogue offered 100,000 views by the early 1860s and Underwood
and Underwood in New York were selling 10 million per year by 1900. The stereo-
scope rapidly became what we can recognize as a prototype for many subsequent
media systems, such as picture postcards and cigarette cards, and more techno-
logical media, such as the magic lantern and the phonograph, in which a pri-
vately owned device gives access to a repertoire of pre-recorded items. Much that
was later expected of film was indeed already anticipated in the industrialization
of stereoscopy. And as Potonniée, Sadoul and others would suggest, the wide
popularity of the stereoscope has as plausible a claim to having inspired the drive
toward “animated photography” as any simple desire for moving pictures.
There was also a social or communal dimension of stereoscopy, often forgot-
ten in Anglo-American accounts. Projecting stereo images by magic lantern
proved difficult, despite many attempted solutions between the 1850s and 1890s,
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Fig. 5: The Great London Exposition of 1862 received over six million visitors, and
images from it published by the London Stereoscopic Company helped
consolidate their early dominance of the stereo market.
and the term “Stereopticon” commonly used for a twin-lens or biunial lantern in
the United States has often been mistakenly thought to imply successful stereo
projection.71 However, after a display at the 1855 Paris Exposition, stereoscopes
began to be arranged in circular structures, so that a number of viewers could see
a succession of views that were changed automatically.72 Having seen this dis-
play, Brewster envisaged “sixty views of Rome placed on the side of a revolving
polygon with a stereoscope before each of its faces, [so that] a score of persons
might […] see more of Rome, and see it better, than if they had visited it in
person.”73 This public deployment of stereoscopes was developed on a commer-
cial scale by several entrepreneurs, one touring a cylindrical structure with a
clockwork mechanism to advance fifty glass stereographs, and another creating
a network of 250 permanent “Kaiser-Panorama” establishments, mainly in Ger-
many and Central Europe, which offered a 30-minute travelogue to twenty-five
patrons, backed up by an elaborate distribution system to refresh the program.
The quality provided by these systems was considerably higher than that of
printed stereocards viewed at home, and a number survived well into the 20th
century – joined in the 1890s by Kinetoscope and later Mutoscope parlors in the
first phase of moving image exhibition.74
Looking back from our present vantage point, it is clear that the relative posi-
tions of cinema and stereoscopy changed during the early decades of the last
century. While one emerged from music halls and fairgrounds to became a
shared, predominantly social and commercially driven experience with seemingly
universal appeal (although home cinema continued the traditions of 19th-century
domestic entertainment), stereoscopic entertainment apparently lost ground and
became “old fashioned.” No doubt the popularity of Eastman’s box cameras con-
tributed to a shift in photography toward “personalization,” rather than forms
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Fig. 6: August Fuhrmann’s “Kaiserpanorama” allowed multiple spectators to
view stereo images simultaneously, with the slides being changed automatically.
requiring more complex procedures. Equally, the proliferation of cheap colored
picture postcards may have eroded stereoscopy’s former preeminence in topogra-
phy and travel.
Entertainment and leisure applications may have led the way in stereoscopy
during the 19th century, but with Röntgen’s discovery of X-rays in 1895, new
vistas in medical imaging appeared. A patent for making stereoscopic X-ray
images was filed in the same year, and medical applications of stereoscopy have
since proliferated.75 The unprecedented scale of carnage in the First World War
created an urgent need “to localize the projectiles inside a soldier’s body,” and
this was initially achieved by means of tomography, or “slice radiography,”
“showing cross-sections through body parts at regular intervals,” before compu-
ter-aided scanning (CAT), introduced in 1972, led to magnetic-resonance ima-
ging (MRI), which today offers “two- or three-dimensional images of great qual-
ity.”76 Other medical applications of 3D include teaching, pre-surgical planning,
and imaging for public engagement. The other main field which quickly adopted
and developed stereoscopy was warfare, with gun-sighting an early application,
followed by aerial reconnaissance, bomb and missile aiming, and today an ex-
panding field of “military training, visualization and remote observation applica-
tions,” according to the website of a major supplier of such systems.77
One 3D innovator who benefitted from military interest in his work was the
pioneer of polarization lenses, Edwin Land. Land contributed to a strong 3D
presence at the 1939 New York World’s Fair, where for “ten magic minutes” over
one and a half million visitors saw a stop-motion animated film featuring the
assembly of a Chrysler car, using Land’s polarized filter system.78 The 3D film
proved so popular that another was made, in color, for the 1940 Fair; and as
already noted, the Festival of Britain would provide a UK platform to demonstrate
advances in 3D cinema at the Telekinema, where some half million spectators
queued to fill every seat during the 22 weeks of the 3D programs.79 More perma-
nent 3D installations would become a feature of IMAX theaters, then mainly in
museums, from 1985 onwards, and Disney entertainment parks, where a spe-
cially produced 3D science-fiction short, Captain EO, directed by Francis Cop-
pola, made its debut in 1986.80 The group viewing experience of projected 3D
had become part of the revival of the fairground-com-expo begun by Disney in
1955, where it would exemplify the futuristic “Tomorrowland” theme that was an
intrinsic part of Walt Disney’s vision.
Meanwhile, the re-birth of “domestic” 3D also began at the 1939 World’s Fair,
where visitors could sample the earliest model of what would become the View-
Master, a sleekly modern handheld 3D viewer that used Eastman’s vivid new Ko-
dachrome emulsion stock to present “reels” (actually discs) mainly of spectacular
scenery. This phase of the modernization of 3D continued in 1947, when the
Stereo-Realist Camera was launched for the US amateur market, using what
would become the standard photographic format of 35mm reversal film, and
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attracting a new generation of amateur 3D enthusiasts who were soon served by a
growing number of manufacturers.81 In 1952 Bolex introduced a 3D 16mm movie
kit, also aimed at the amateur market and no doubt linked the rising tide of
interest in commercial cinema at that time.82 Interest in 3D has persisted among
amateur photography and film communities, and has continued into the digital
era, with Pentax cameras offering a simple 3D system from 2002 and enthusiasts
using two camcorders to create “DIY” 3D. A new digital 3D camera by Fuji, ap-
propriately appeared in 2009, the year that ended with Avatar – as if once again
symbolizing the potential reunion of the domestic and the spectacular branches
of stereoscopy. Meanwhile, many television receivers have been marketed as “3D
ready,” in anticipation of the growth of 3D television transmissions beyond the
limited currently offer available.83 And “live 3D,” as seen at recent music festival
performances, seems to be emerging as a new form.84
The Revolution Postponed – or Defeated?
At the time of writing, it is received opinion that the “3D boom” in cinema which
began in 2010 has waned;85 and confident predictions by the major electronics
companies, led by Sony, that 3D television and gaming consoles were about to
conquer the domestic market have become noticeably muted. For skeptics and
vocal opponents, this merely confirms its novelty status, and the hollowness of
aesthetic claims. More dispassionate observers might argue that until “autoster-
eo” systems are available, not requiring glasses, 3D will remain a minority choice
within mainstream entertainment and communications. Nearly twenty years ago,
Brian Winston’s study Technologies of Seeing, which offered a theorization of tech-
nological change in visual media, concluded with a short chapter entitled “The
Case of the Third Dimension.”86 The previous chapter had analyzed in detail how
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Fig. 7: 3D at the 1939 New York World’s Fair, with a Chrysler advertising film
shown in Polaroid 3D and the launch of the View-Master home viewer, re-
kindling enthusiasm for “personal stereo.”
the promise of HDTV had been frustrated over many decades because there was
insufficient incentive – and some entrenched disincentives – to carry through this
long-awaited improvement on “normal” television. Winston’s explanatory model
posits two forces at work in all major technological paradigm change: “super-
vening social necessity” and its antithesis “the ‘law’ of suppression of radical
potential.”87 His survey shows that without pressure from the former, both tech-
nological problems and vested interests can and will frustrate what are clearly
possible, and attractive, developments. “Given our fundamental addiction to re-
alism,” he writes, echoing Bazin, “there is no underlying reason why a true three-
dimensional motion picture system should not achieve a cultural fit and be dif-
fused.”88 He accepts that wearing glasses remains an obstacle, but notes that
progress with holography, which seems to offer a solution to this, has been
slow, lacking the incentive of any felt “social necessity.”
Given the fevered rate of contemporary technological research, driven by the
immense profitability of systems that achieve wide diffusion, “autostereo” sys-
tems do indeed exist, both in niche markets and at the prototype stage for wider
consumer use. There are also holographic systems for medical use, offering “nat-
ural 3D perception [for] multiple viewers.”89 And Hewlett-Packard’s “diffractive
optics” research promises 3D displays on mobile phone screens within the fore-
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Fig. 8: Special camera filming for Wim Wenders’s dance film Pina (2010), the
first major art-house success in 3D.
seeable future – on which a scientific commentator on this technology (who has
worked on prototype laboratory autostereo), commented: “All that remains is the
more nebulous question of whether human beings want or need 3D displays.”90
More nebulous – or more fundamental than the technological solutions now be-
coming available, and the commercial judgment of those able to “suppress” (in
Winston’s term) or accelerate them?
The only likely reason for wide acceptance of 3D entertainment, as distinct
from such applied fields as medicine and military logistics, is aesthetic: that
which pleases or satisfies our sensory judgment. Less than four years into the
era of mass-market digital 3D cinema, the most positive aesthetic responses to
the experience have probably come from audiences for Avatar, Pina, Toy
Story 3 (Unkrich, 2010) and Hugo (Scorsese, 2011) and ahandful of smaller-
scale successes, such as Streetdance 3D (Giwa, Pasquini, 2010). Despite the
range of new technical-cum-aesthetic problems that now face filmmakers, it is
the widely shared and distinct aesthetic appeal of these pioneering films that has
built momentum, amid so many mediocre and crass 3D releases.91 The most
obvious lesson from cinema history is that both recorded sound and color took
years to be assimilated into the working practices of filmmakers around the
world – the handful of canonic successes that are known today hardly represent
what was typical in early sound and color production – so it is unreasonable to
expect more than a minority of early 3D films to be aesthetically successful.
But there are perhaps other lessons, or at least hypotheses, from history. The
hostility expressed by some of cinema’s taste-makers toward sound and color
(cf. Close Up, cited earlier), and later widescreen, stemmed from a desire to de-
fend what was seen as cinema’s hard-won status as “art”; to distance it from the
taint of the fairground or amusement park, from novelty or “mere sensation.”
Something similar is clearly apparent in the demand “what does it add?” or
“who needs it?” And underlying this are deep-seated aesthetic positions, involv-
ing attitudes toward realism, novelty and “world-building.”92 The history of pic-
torial and plastic art offers many examples of long-standing prejudices against
“colored” rather than monochrome media, most obviously in classical statuary,
but also in photography; and against genres such as bas relief sculpture, blurring
the distinction between three-dimensional sculpture and “flat” image-making,
and more generally against such “deceptive” or illusionistic pictorial forms as
trompe l’oeil mural and ceiling painting and panoramas, compared with framed
pictures. 3D, at least in the early phase of its latest incarnation, challenges the
aesthetics of distance and composure, insisting on engagement and potentially
immersion. It reasserts the bodily kinesthetic dimension of the cinematic illu-
sion, which film connoisseurship has largely suppressed. Already a sense of
3D’s lost history is becoming apparent, not only in the Lumière films from the
1930s, but in two archival discoveries from the 1950s now made viewable as
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never before on Blu-ray: the Cinerama feature How the West Was Won
(1952), which includes what has been described as John Ford’s “masterpiece”
The Civil War,93 and Laurence Olivier’s VistaVision Richard III (1955).94
These processes were rivals to two-strip 3D in their day, and their restoration
allows us to experience something of their original immersive ambitions by
means of a large screen and high definition. The return of Hitchcock’s Dial M
for Murder, now showable in digital 3D, also reveals this as the first master-
piece of stereoscopic “chamber cinema”: controlled, astute and ironic in its play
with the new dimensionality on offer.
Many of the recent arguments against 3D cinema – apart from legitimate accu-
sations of studios and exhibitors profiteering, and the low ambition of many
films rushed out in the format – seem flimsy, and easily challenged from one’s
own and others’ experience. For those who emphatically do not share Eisen-
stein’s sense of a vast new arena opening up, or of living through what the Polish
filmmaker Jerzy Hoffman has called “the third revolution in cinema,”95 this may
be aesthetic preference, or prejudice masquerading as sturdy common sense.
However, the future of stereoscopy, alongside other forms of enhanced audiovi-
sual experience such as holography, Virtual Reality and High Dynamic Range
imaging, will not be decided finally in the cinema, where only a fraction of total
film viewings now take place.96 We live irreversibly in a multi-platform world
where, as Elsaesser has rightly observed, 3D “is changing our sense of temporal
and spatial orientation and our embodied relation to data-rich simulated envir-
onments.”97 In this sense, its cinema career marks a highly visible “return of the
stereoscopic repressed,” while a range of other immersive and interactive devices
carry us forward into a highly diversified new era of mediation.98 But 3D digital
cinema also offers us, even if only on rare occasions, a unique contemporary
experience of the technological sublime.
I am grateful to Grant Weidenfeld for generously giving me access to his transla-
tions and to the Bazin Archive at Yale University for the Bazin texts discussed
above (http://bazin.commons.yale.edu/index.php). Thanks are also due to Mar-
gaux Guillemard and Ondrej Novak for timely help with references and docu-
mentation.





Media are inseparable from technology.1 Yet each medium – or what is culturally
identified as such – provokes new ideas about not just what technology actually is
but also about what technology’s relevance is for all the different media. Televi-
sion research, in this context, presents an interesting case. On the one hand,
technology in the narrower (or, maybe, banal) sense – the hardware, the electri-
cal principals, and so on – has not been granted much attention.2 On the other
hand, research on television actually does offer interesting provocations to exist-
ing definitions of technology in film and media studies. This is especially ob-
vious with respect to television’s latest transformations, which undermine any
clear technical definition of the medium since they comprise both program sche-
dules and individual access through DVD or streaming outlets, as well as both
traditional, living-room TV sets and mobile phone applications. To focus on only
these developments, however, would simply lead to affirming a banal idea of
technology’s influence: technological innovations change and challenge the
identity of the medium. In contrast, I want to start by focusing on the seemingly
more simple television landscape between the 1960s and 1990s, and on “classic”
television research. Television research’s most relevant contribution to the ques-
tion of technology in media development, I want to argue, is mainly due to tele-
vision’s domestic character. The day-to-day use of highly complex machinery in
ever changing connection with other domestic technologies poses quite different
questions than the more public use of technology in cinema and the mobile al-
ways-connectedness of digital media. What is at stake here is the intricate rela-
tionship between technology as technical system, as material object, as social
practice, and as techniques of the body.
In the first part of this chapter, I will show how television research’s focus on
the medium’s domestic setting (supported by television research’s excessive op-
position to technological determinism) in the 1970s and 1980s helped develop a
complex and extended, yet often implicit concept of technology; this is also visi-
ble in television research’s take on the digital in the 1990s, which is very different
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from the film and new media studies debates of the issue. In the second part, I
want to suggest certain conceptual tools – dispositif, technologies of governing,
genealogy – to give these often under-theorized and under-debated insights a
clearer shape (which also somewhat allays the conceptually limiting fear of tech-
nological determinism).
Three main insights will be at the core of my argumentation: 1) television
urges us to think of media as unstable constellations of technologies including
practices and discourses that are no less technological than hardware and soft-
ware; 2) this technological constellation is characterized by constant transforma-
tion, connecting a medium to cultural struggles and strategies of (self-)govern-
ing; 3) taking these inspirations from (“traditional”) television/television
research seriously brings up questions and concepts that are helpful in analyzing
the complexities and transformations of current (post-television) media culture.
Who’s Afraid of Technological Determinism?
The makers and cultural commentators of early television were eagerly looking
for its well-defined specificities that would offer criteria to adapt or translate old-
er media and their forms to the requirements, the potential, and what today is
called the affordances of the new medium. More often than not, they looked at
the realm of technological features – transmission, liveness, image size – to find
solid guidelines for their still developing practices. In this way, debates on televi-
sion repeated a characteristic gesture familiar from early uses of other technolo-
gies and, more generally, artistic practices: the exploration of a new medium’s
technological characteristic and potential is supposed to deliver inklings of the
forms most appropriate to the medium; it should make clear the difference from
older media and showcase the full potential (and possibly dangers) of the new
one. In a somewhat circular process, the forms developed with respect to these
definitions might point out, even invent, new aspects of the medium never
thought of before.3
However, each definition of the medium’s core features is at the very least only
a selective “reading” of it, if not an authoritarian one guided by (more or less
veiled) commercial and political agendas. Only recently Evgeny Morozov poign-
antly criticized the widespread idea that “the Internet” – with reference to its
technical features – possesses an “inherent nature, a logic, a teleology,”4 which
then is used to naturalize (or as one should say to technologize) evolving new con-
cepts of the social, of privacy, of copyright, and the like.
In television research it was mainly Marshall McLuhan’s groundbreaking Un-
derstanding Media: The Extensions of Man5 that was criticized for such a determinist
view of technology. It was this book which most explicitly brought forward the
argument that media transform experience and perception in a fundamental
manner and that therefore an investigation of media’s technological characteris-
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tics is of major importance to understanding their social impact. While McLu-
han’s arguments were shaped by his involvement in researching the educational
use of television,6 his book only became a household name in television research
because of repetitive refusal.7
First in Raymond Williams’s Television: Technology and Cultural Form (1974)8 and
subsequently in dozens of introductory books (and surely endless university
courses), McLuhan has been accused of technological determinism and of ideo-
logical abstraction or formalism.9 However, the accusation is not entirely appro-
priate. McLuhan, on the one hand, is quite explicit about media/technologies
having a completely different impact on different environments (radio, for exam-
ple, had very different consequences in Europe than in North America). On the
other hand, his work is characterized by a complex and ambivalent notion of
media (which in his definition includes traffic and spectacles, light and electri-
city), as he closely connects their historical development to the human senses
and their (im)balance. The accusation of technological determinism insinuates
that he reduces all media (and their impact) to technical, material hardware –
which he does not.
Maybe even more problematic is the fact that the reproach of technological
determinism – according to John Durham Peters – “blocks the path of inquiry.”10
While Morozov’s above quoted warning has to be taken seriously, the often knee-
jerk opposition to technical arguments is in denial of the always already technical
being of humans and society: the fact, for instance, that the techniques of the
body and cognitive processes developed in close interrelation with material tech-
nologies. Too often in media studies, the human or social appropriation of tech-
nologies is simply opposed to the technical characteristics of a medium.
The constraining effect of the stereotypical opposition between the “techno-
determinist” McLuhan and Williams as the preferred alternative is that there is
actually almost no theoretical debate on television’s technological characteristics.
This blind spot is amplified by the fact that the more technologically oriented
fields of media studies – including so-called German media theory – did not
show much interest in television. The fifteen pages on television in Friedrich
Kittler’s Optical Media open fewer new perspectives on the cultural impact (or the
“technical a priori”) of the medium than his texts on the phonograph, film, or
the computer.11
The surprisingly productive aspect of this prevalent fear of technodeterminism
in television research lies in its sometimes explicit but more often implicit re-
conceptualizations of the relationship between media and technologies – on
which I will focus in the first part of this chapter. Williams’s already mentioned
Television: Technology and Cultural Form is surely the most important reference point
for this endeavor. In criticizing both technological determinism and what he
calls “symptomatic” explanations of technological change, he suggests introdu-
cing the idea of “intention” into the analysis of technology. This term, in its basic
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sociological understanding, is intended to help see how some of the multiple
aspects of a technology are realized because some institutions (e.g., the military)
not only have more power but also much more clearly formulated objectives for a
technological trajectory than broader civilian technology uses.
Looking through this lens of intention also means that a medium becomes
successful – and becomes an institutionally specific technology – because it is
involved in broader cultural tensions. The mass medium of television, according
to Williams, bridges the gap between increasing mobility and exchange on the
one hand and a heightened relevance of the familial private sphere on the other;
television thus contributes to what he calls the “mobile privatization” of capital-
ist culture. Here at least, we can also see a similarity between Williams and
McLuhan, who can both be claimed as precursors of more recent ecological ap-
proaches to media in that they consider “not only the ‘content’ but the medium
and the cultural matrix within which the particular medium operates.”12 One of
the most decisive aspects of television’s “ecology,” though, is its domestic char-
acter, which raises more general questions about the consequences of the do-
mestication of technologies and the interrelation between media technologies
and other technologies involved in daily life.
Mobile Privatization and Domestic Technologies
Even early and highly critical approaches to television realized that the technolo-
gical characteristic of television is very much shaped by the medium’s domestic
setting. Already in 1953, Theodor W. Adorno tackled television’s cultural impact
with reference to the size and quality of the image – characteristics which are
also of major importance to McLuhan, who goes so far as to say that with im-
proved image quality it just would no longer be television.13 He could make this
statement because McLuhan did not deal with the domestic setting as a decisive
factor of the medium. The size of the image or “the physical dimensions of tele-
vision programs,” Adorno insists, “cannot be isolated from the specific context
of television, that of home viewing.”14
The domestic is not just the setting, in which television takes place, rather it
has to be conceived of as a particular field of intense intersections of different
technologies. From at least the 1970s onwards, what was at stake in television
research, was “the need to recognize how ‘television’ and ‘the home’ have gradu-
ally redefined one another.”15 The domestic modulates both the mediation char-
acteristic to television – its broadcasting mode, the spatially indifferent one-way
communication from a center to an anonymous audience – and the character of
its mediated “content.”
Williams’s concept of “mobile privatization” but also his famous notion of
program as “flow” highlight not only the fact that television’s technology is
adapted, “domesticated” into a complex and dynamic setting which modulates
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and multiplies the possible effects of television, but also that the technology
itself is only constituted in this process. Television consists of many different
technological devices, and it is in the process of domestication that these devices
are interconnected with other technologies (telephone, refrigerator, and so on)
and practices, all of which, as Roger Silverstone made clear,
provide the basis for a domestic socio-technical system, systematic not neces-
sarily in terms of the formal and technical links between machines, but in
terms of the social relations that construct them and define their significance
and patterns of use.16
The concept of mobile privatization highlights the fact that television, more than
any other preceding media, mediates between the public and the private, the na-
tional and the familial; it is inextricably defined by spatial dynamics that are not
entirely defined by television itself. Broadcasting, while being a quite specific
technical characteristic of television (at least before the introduction of video and
pay-cable) is a too abstract notion to exclusively understand the space-structuring
effects of the medium.
In most Western countries, television acquired its dominant shape from
broadcasting and the process of domestication and (sub-)urbanization in a na-
tion-state. Political regulation, economic interests, and cultural frameworks all
equip television’s entire technological infrastructure and the products that are
transmitted with a national bias. Television reaches the people of a nation-state,
its program schedule synchronizes the daily patterns of life, and its news pro-
grams and spectacular events implicitly or explicitly address audiences as citizens
of a nation-state (notwithstanding also addressing them as consumers – for
mostly nationally available products).
Williams’s concept of flow on the other hand is very explicitly not only a char-
acteristic of the textual structure of television, but also a “characteristic experi-
ence” that results from the medium’s technological adaptation to the domestic
sphere: it can be switched off and on by the individual user – and as soon as it is
switched on (“at the flick of a switch” as Williams puts it17), something is already
going on. “This phenomenon, of planned flow, is then perhaps the defining
characteristic of broadcasting, simultaneously as a technology and as a cultural
form.”18
Stating that flow is a defining characteristic of television’s technology implies
that it indeed might be a feature of television that shapes its cultural function
independent of (or perhaps even more than) the selection and distribution of
“content” across the day-to-day programming (Williams, just as many others,
found it striking that people often do not talk about watching a particular pro-
gram but about “watching television” instead19). Furthermore, flow can also be
conceived of as a technology in itself, as it is strategically used as an instrument
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to intervene into the practices of the audience. Broadcasters dispose of a set of
techniques to ensure program flow: continuity announcers, teasers and many
more aim at “the grabbing of attention in the early moments; the reiterated
promise of exciting things to come, if we stay.”20
Questioning the relevance of some seemingly basic technical characteristics of
a medium, therefore, does not necessarily lead to an ignorant stance toward tech-
nology. Rather it forces to ask, how and in which contexts do practices and ma-
terialities get a technological shape: How do they become procedures with the
capability to structure behavior and with the promise of constant improvement
(and the threat of malfunction)?
Domestic Practices and Technologies of Gender
Television became a technology through its strategic, interventionist application
in the domestic sphere. On the one hand, television is both in its historical estab-
lishment and daily use deeply related to other domestic technologies – here in
the sense of machines or gadgets such as the refrigerator or washing machine. It
also has become “a key technology for the selling of other technologies.”21 On
the other hand (and partly because of that connection), television has become an
object of (and is connected with) domestic technologies in the broader sense of
structured practices, craftsmanship, and automatized strategies: a great deal of
research has shown how television became a tool of intervening in familial rela-
tionships – the nearly stereotypical examples being mothers watching sports pro-
grams just to spend time with her son or husband, or fathers switching on the
TV to avoid the necessity of talking.22
Even the basic feature of flow gets its technological efficiency from daily prac-
tices and thus becomes a different technology in different domestic settings or
for different people within this setting. Tania Modleski has shown how the flow
of daytime programs (soaps and commercials) “connects to the work of women
in the home”23 and in fact contributes to and modulates the fragmented and
distracted mode of working characteristic of household duties. In the same way
as Teresa De Lauretis used the term technologies to describe many different sets of
social relations that contribute to the differentiation of gender throughout all
practices of society,24 television could be conceived of as being technological not
because of (or with reference toward) its hardware, but because of its systematic
contribution to the re-organization of (gender) identities and social relations.
Public and private are no natural givens (on which technology has an impact),
but a relationship defined by earlier mediation technologies and by the technolo-
gies of gender. The difference between public and private is always already a
gendered difference, defining unequal distribution of (in)visibility for men and
women. Domestic technologies therefore mean something different to men or
women while at the same time intervening in the relationship between them.
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In television research, the transformation of television’s spatial and temporal
dynamics through video and satellite was similarly described as an overlapping
of the infrastructural scape of these technologies with the other “scapes” (fi-
nance, migration and so on)25 they were connected to. Whatever their technolo-
gical potential, video did not just become an individualistic medium withdrawn
from the public and satellite TV did not create a straightforward global and cul-
tural imperialist form of communication.26 Rather, they became technologies
(and part of television’s technological constellation) because they enabled and
provoked strategic practices, and because they opened up additional cultural
practices (e.g., migration) for intervention and improvement.
The research on “traditional” television – television before the transition to the
post-network of the 1990s or the matrix television of the late 2000s27 – already
had to extend the notion of technology to get a grasp on the situated (domestic),
dispersed (fridge, car, remote control), and ever-changing (satellite, video) exis-
tence of television.
Television became a key example of the “inconspicuous presence of the tech-
nical” in everyday life:28 technology is everywhere, unavoidable, and often not
even explicitly identified as technology. This implies that technology, in televi-
sion research, is at least a twofold and highly ambivalent concept: on the one
hand, technology intervenes in everyday life as an abstract and incomprehensible
system, objectifying and rationalizing practices. On the other hand, domestic
technologies also figure as instruments that only get their technological shape
from the patterned practices connecting the different elements and re-organizing
the relation between public and private, male and female, work and leisure. The
constant transformation so characteristic of television also has to be understood
as a result of the interrelation between technical innovations and strategic prac-
tices.
Why Digitization Did Not Matter
The ambivalent place and extended notion of technology in television research
became especially clear in the (lack of) debate on the digital in the 1990s. In film
studies (but also with regard to photography, video art, and other media forms),
the upcoming digital technology provoked substantial questioning of the original
technology’s role in the medium’s identity: computer-based, calculated images
were considered to be completely different from the photo-chemical and there-
fore “indexical” image that (notwithstanding animation) defined (the “essence”
of) film and photography. Even if one did not opt for an ontological definition of
the digital and its difference from the filmic image, the digital at least became the
central metaphor in rethinking the multiple technical identities of cinema, even
suggesting scholars “to rethink the idea of historical change itself.”29
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In television research, the computer and digital technology, in the 1990s, were
occasionally discussed as complete opposites of television that might eventually
replace it in the future: we would become users instead of audiences, individual
choice would rule over mass consumption, and so on. And surely the digital
became productive as a prism that allowed for a closer look at several allegedly
characteristic features of television, begging the question: Does the broadcasting
mode of television – its powerful combination of centripetal and centrifugal cul-
tural dynamics30 – depend on its technical setup, or is it a cultural form that will
be continued (if in a different manner) under digital conditions?31
Nevertheless, the digital (as a question of technology) remained marginal.
This can partly be ascribed to technological reasons: the television image’s grid
of pixels always already did have a certain digital aspect (even if the color and
brightness of the distinct pixels were not digitally determined but defined by
continuously, analog changes). Furthermore, digital technology was successively
introduced both to television production and to domestic television sets long
before the switch to digital transmission “completed” the digitization of televi-
sion.
The aesthetics of the television image (and its addressing of the viewer) had
already been changed very fundamentally before this completion and only partly
because of the introduction of digital technologies – television industry (at least
in the US) pre-mediated its digitization through a bundle of strategies. John
Caldwell very comprehensively analyzed how the dominant zero-degree style of
most television coverage, starting from the 1980s, was replaced by a broad palette
of distinctive looks (or “stylizations” as he prefers to call it) that partly imitated
the production values of Hollywood films and partly displayed a videographic
“hypermediality.”32
The televisual image was reinvented as a tool to give programs and networks
an identity, to break the continuity of program flows, to attract certain audiences
and to become discussed in its visual qualities. This was made possible by differ-
ent technical innovations, such as non-linear editing, motion control, and digital
graphics, yet it was also based on new economic strategies (addressing target
audiences), on an exchange of workforce and technology between film and tele-
vision, and especially on an intensified theorization of the image in the produc-
tion process. Caldwell explicitly pleads for an interventionist notion of technol-
ogy, pointing out that political and industrial forces constantly evaluate and
regulate the use and the qualities of certain technologies.33
Televisual technology though, in this account, comprises a much larger (and
more ambivalent) terrain than just the machines used for image production;
rather, television’s technological impact becomes truly obvious in the strategic
aims and effects of the stylization, one example being the “industrial reconfi-
guration of the audience, in the name of cultural diversification,” which “helped
spawn the need for cultural- and ethnic-specific styles and looks.”34
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This then also allows putting aspects of the digital beyond the visual quality of
the image into perspective which became relevant in the 2000s. The landscape of
content distribution and audience practices may have changed through those
technological innovations that make television programs accessible on/through
quite different machines and gadgets (through telephone cable and a game con-
sole, on a mobile screen, and so on), but this transition to the digital is strategi-
cally regulated (made possible but also constrained) by techniques of program-
ming and of audience creation that are taken from “traditional” television and
gradually adapted to this new landscape:
Successful multimedia development, therefore, means being able to track,
monitor, and predict – or at least respond quickly to – multidirectional user
flows and migrations. As a result, digital programmers must develop new
units of temporal-user management.35
Innovative aesthetics and technologies (gadgets or online tools, for instance) of-
ten figure as strategic entities, organizing the connection and combination of
different industrial players and the adaptation and reformulation of techniques
(in terms of strategies of intervention). What they are capable of doing “techno-
logically” might not be as important as what they achieve as symbols of innova-
tion, progress, and “the next big thing.”
There are of course aspects and layers of digital technology that might not
sufficiently be taken into account by such an approach: the power of algorithms
and protocols, questions of digital methods and big data.36 Television research,
however, clearly shows that each approach of technology that locates the techno-
logical in one well-defined principle (the structure of one piece of hardware or
the rules that make up a piece of software, for instance) tends to miss the many
technologies that make up a medium. Strategies of scheduling and classifica-
tions of audiences are no less technological than hardware/software (or the re-
mote control for that matter) – they offer tools for managing a particular field
and enable constant and systematic improvement. Each new medium’s technolo-
gical characteristics include (and are partly defined by) these kinds of discursive
and practical layers.
Both the production process and the domestic reception of television therefore
consist of heterogeneous bundles of gadgets and practices that only in their in-
terrelation become technologies. They become machineries that define a field of
intervention, of improvement, and of agency. In the second part of this chapter, I




For a long time, the focus on the relationship between (ideologically structured)
texts and their (sub-culturally, domestically structured) reception dominated dis-
cussions in television research. The research’s perspective on technology was
shaped by this paradigm, countering the much-feared technological determinism
by insisting on the varied and socially embedded “actual” adaptation of technol-
ogy. However, as I hope to have shown, a sensitivity to both the domestic setting
of television and to television industry’s articulation of the digital provoked an
extended notion of technology – a notion which undermines any clear dichotomy
between technology on one side and humans/practices on the other. The prac-
tices of consumers and producers are technological – not least because they are
formed in connection with gadgets, infrastructures, and buttons to push; the
gadgets and buttons become technological by their embedding in already tech-
nologized contexts and patterned practices.
These insights, however, are somehow buried at the margins of television re-
search due to its ambivalent attitude toward technology and its focus on ques-
tions of representation and reception. To more consistently take inspirations
from television to the more general debate on technology and to overcome the
still looming dichotomy of technology vs. social adaptation, I want to give televi-
sion studies’ often implicit extended concept of technology some more explicit
theoretical leverage.
Considering the close relation between practices and gadgets/infrastructures
in the above descriptions, one might take advantage of actor-network theory’s
insight that both society and the technological systems lending durability to so-
ciety consist of networks that include human and non-human elements (or “ac-
tants” as this theory would have it). In short, object relations and social relations
are inseparable.37 These networks are always fragile, as each new actant that en-
ters or leaves the network changes the entire configuration. Television, that is,
becomes a different medium when used with a remote control; it also becomes a
different medium when it is watched in a post-traditional family setting. How-
ever, the relation between the remote control or the post-traditional family and
(the other elements of) television is not a given, but something that always will
have to be renegotiated or “translated.”38
The concept I want to focus on, however, is the one of apparatus/dispositif.
Much more explicit than actor-network, this deals with questions of power,
which have been at the center of the bigger part of television research; further-
more, the concept addresses how constant transformation – so characteristic of
television – contributes to its technological aspects.39
While there are some approaches which have taken advantage of this concept
to understand the technologies of television,40 any prior use of the term dispositif
(or rather “apparatus,” the often-used English translation for the French term) in
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film theory of the 1970s very much confined its applicability to television. The
term aimed to explain the ideological effects of the medium film/cinema (and
not of single films) by taking into account the entire configuration that allegedly
defines the cinema experience: the camera with its unavoidable central perspec-
tive, the movie theater immobilizing the spectators in a dark room with the pro-
jector in their back, and the distant screen with its dreamlike images edited into a
continuous flow of actions and reactions.41
While technology, here, is conceived of as a complex constellation, the cin-
ematic dispositif receives its ideological efficiency from the stability of this over-
all constellation transfixing the human body. In Jean-Louis Baudry’s seminal
text, Plato’s cave is the decisive point of reference;42 in subsequent media studies
research, the panopticon – Bentham’s model for a prison as analyzed by Michel
Foucault – partly replaced the cave metaphor. Both models highlight an asym-
metric visibility and the effects of a materially, architecturally fixed topology – a
machinery of power and subjectivity that does not need human intervention to
keep on working.
On the one hand, television can productively be contrasted to the cinematic
dispositif point by point: it is mostly watched in a lighted room; viewers remain
mobile and might be distracted; and the texts of television being much more
fragmented, mixing documentary and fictional, or live and recorded images.
Such a comparison leads to the conclusion that the experience of television is
much less defined by a concentrated gaze than by distracted glancing and there-
fore also less defined by processes of identification than by empathy or casual
judgments.43
This comparison also questions the viability of the apparatus/dispositif ap-
proach for television research as it highlights the flexibility and heterogeneity of
television. The discussion on domestic technologies, however, is eventually
much closer to Foucault’s definition of the dispositif than the use of the concepts
apparatus/dispositif in cinema studies ever was: he describes it as “a thoroughly
heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural
forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements,
philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions – in short, the said as much
as the unsaid.”44 A more thorough consideration of this definition of the dispo-
sitif could actually have helped overcome some of the binaries structuring the
debates on television – especially reception research’s fruitless oppositions be-
tween textual structures and “actual” use, or between “active” and “passive” re-
ception.
Foucault’s deployment concept in his The History of Sexuality made clear that
not one stable setup (of the confessional box, for example) forms a dispositif
but a changing set of tools, institutions and individual self-guidance, which all
can be considered “technological” and thus on the same level as machines, infra-
structures, and discourses.45 The dispositif is not identified as one visible or co-
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herent entity (contrary to what often comes to mind when we speak of “panopti-
con” or of “television”) but as an ensemble that receives its coherence from the
effects it produces. Television might thus be analyzed as being or establishing a
dispositif, but it also has to be analyzed as an element of a larger, more abstract
dispositif (what Deleuze calls a “diagram”) – e.g., mobile privatization.46 That a
dispositif is never perfectly congruent with one medium makes it such an inter-
esting concept for the analysis of media technologies, as it opens up the question
of which kinds of technologies are taken up and transformed by the unstable
constellation we call television.47 The concept forces television research to get a
better grip on how practices and materialities become technologies in a certain,
conjunctural constellation.
These questions did eventually get more explicit in television research when,
starting in the late 1990s, Foucault’s later work on governmentality was taken up.
In this context, finally, a more explicit discussion on technology unfolds.
Television’s Constant Transition: Technologies of Governing
With the concept of governmentality, the historical development of technologies
of governing is brought into focus. Compared to the notion of the dispositif,
both institutional frameworks (especially the actions of a government or a state)
and individual practices are much more explicitly taken into account as opera-
tional elements of power technologies. Furthermore, the indirect and situation-
based effects of technologies are articulated much clearer, which makes an appli-
cation of the concept to television especially pertinent: contrary to film (and the
panopticon for that matter) television’s basic fact of transmission necessarily se-
parates the viewers not only from the site of image production, but also from the
“co-presence of subjects contained within a field of the gaze”48 – any direct con-
trol of the viewer is thus barred. The entire regime of mobile privatization is less
based on the panopticon’s “visible display of force,” but rather on “the values of
individualism and hedonistic pleasure, as well as desires for social recognition
and dreams of community.”49 This might also be the reason why governmental-
ity studies (in contrast to the apparatus/dispositif concept) was earlier and more
intensively taken up in television than in film studies.50
Governing, in Foucault’s sense, encompasses all manner of strategies aiming
to structure the behavior of both people and things; these strategies, however, do
not restrict or dictate, but rather take the inner dynamics of the governed entities
into account and thus create a milieu that structures the field of possible behav-
ior.51 Technologies of governing are the constellations of techniques, institu-
tions, and procedures that make it possible to gain knowledge about the entities
in question and to establish “rational” modes of intervention, which rather enact
a “governing at a distance” or a “conduct of conduct” than direct physical disci-
pline.52 Part of this complex are so-called technologies of the self, meaning a
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complex of discourses, tools, and practices that allow (and incite) individuals to
systematically modify their own behavior.
To call this technological is more than just a metaphorical way of speaking.
Technology here means that a specific rationality is established that defines a
field of intervention and structures possible, alternative strategies of interven-
tion. It also underlines that technology is not only defined by its capacity to inter-
vene into such a field to structure or to improve behavior, but also by the very
possibility to change, to improve the technology itself. The “improvability” of
technology does not consist in linear progress, but rather in the constant reac-
tion to conjunctural-defined problems, so-called “problematizations.”
In television studies, this perspective was taken up in many ways. Most promi-
nently, technologies of governing have been identified in the genre of reality TV,
which not only displays examples of self-improvement, but also acts very much
as “life intervention”53 and thereby contributes to a broader reinvention of
government in which former public institutions are privatized or delegated to
self-responsibility. Commercial television, often in close cooperation with exper-
tise from the corporate and business sectors, proliferates “the everyday techni-
ques through which individuals and populations are expected to reflect upon,
work on and organize their lives and themselves as an implicit condition of their
citizenship.”54
Seen from a broader perspective, the entire institutional and technological de-
velopment of television is very much shaped – and in a sense “technologized” –
by the question of governing. Dependent on the different kinds of television re-
gimes (e.g., state controlled or commercial), this question was formulated in
different ways. However, from its inception, television in most countries was
conceived of as a medium that could reach the entire population and thus could
possibly contribute to improving the people’s conduct, be it as citizens or consu-
mers. The placement of the medium in the domestic setting made it into a tech-
nology of governing that was feared and desired even more. In ways that are not
that different from sexuality as analyzed by Foucault, television guarantees access
to the family’s private behavior and through that affects the entire population.
For the case of US television, Anna McCarthy has shown how from the very
beginning, TV stations and sponsors were busy trying to find out as much as
they could about their audience, classifying its different groups and producing
knowledge about their tastes and reactions. Television thus allowed some peo-
ple/institutions to define themselves as “elite” and thus entitled (and obligated)
to “guide” the population.55 This guidance, however, is not plainly given by in-
herent technological features of television; rather, the desire to govern through
television incites constant transformations of the program schedule, of content,
of policy regulation, and of paratexts advising the audience how to appropriately
use the medium to society’s – and their own – advantage. Television is “techno-
logized” by equipping it (or some of its heterogeneous elements) with interven-
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tionist potential and with rationales for transformation and improvement. In this
process, the medium is simultaneously considered to be a problem (for family
life, for education, for citizenship) and an instrument to deal with these prob-
lems.56 Through the endeavors to govern, television is established as a topology
of things and people – a milieu – that allows for a systematic reflection on, and
intervention in, the behavior of populations, (target) groups, and identities which
are themselves co-constituted through these procedures of knowledge produc-
tion.
Often (as in the film theoretical discussion of the dispositif) technology is dis-
cussed in terms of its rigidity, a matter of materially or procedurally determining
what can be done and what cannot. It might actually be one of the most impor-
tant gains from studying television as a technology of governing to question this
idea: It is not the stable (technological) constellation that characterizes televi-
sion’s power effects, but the constant transformation that point to and identify
certain audiences and behaviors in need of transformation. The improvability of
“content,” of image quality and of individual access to television contribute to
television’s character as technology of governing just as much as the improvabil-
ity of children’s knowledge about commercials and parents knowledge about the
appropriate “content” for their children.
With its constantly new formats and schedules, however, with the continuous
connection to quite fundamental technological add-ons (cable, satellite, video,
DVD, and so on), television was a forerunner to the permanent state of transition
we find ourselves in in present-day gadget – and update – culture. But how to
analyze technology if it is obviously less defined by setting binding standards
than by constantly introducing new ones? Here, the concept of technologies of
governing allows us to describe the transformation patterns themselves as tech-
nological processes: the technological, then, does not lie in the distinct constel-
lations before and after the transformation – as if television before the VCR
would have been a different dispositif from television after the VCR. Rather, the
technological can be located in the multiple rationalities structuring the process
of transition: the incitement toward more individuality, the effort to get more
“control” over domestic life,57 the problem of how to adapt techniques of the
body to the techniques of remote controls, and so on. Television’s governing
potential, thus, is based on many different, alternative strategic interventions in
individual and social, domestic and national issues.
Beyond Archaeology: Genealogy of the Televisual
Finally, this constant transformation of television and its domestic setting in-
spires a certain re-adjustment of the historical approaches to technology. In place
of the archaeology-inspired cinema and digital media histories, television re-
search tends toward a more genealogical approach. Again, this methodological
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debate remains implicit in most television history writing (and the opposition
between archaeology and genealogy is far from clear58), but we might gain from
a more explicit profiling of its alternative approaches.
The concept of archaeology became important in film studies and in media
studies, especially in German media theory, in a number of ways. Getting in-
spiration from various backgrounds (in their overview, Huhtamo and Parikka
mention Walter Benjamin, Siegfried Giedion, McLuhan, and others59), the most
explicit reference point is Foucault’s archaeological method, which aims at an
alternative history, one not looking for origins and developments but for histori-
cal ruptures and “conditions of existence.”60
Instead of focusing on the genius of inventors, a linear dynamic of progress,
and a successive enfolding of the ontology of a medium, an archaeological ap-
proach would ask: What are the historical formations (the structures of historical
knowledge and practices) that make a particular invention possible and useful,
and that define its historical ontology? But it would then also ask: How did a
technological constellation contribute to the historically specific rules that guide
the production of knowledge and subjectivity? The second question, quite clearly,
goes far beyond the history of a single medium and Bernhard Siegert, more gen-
erally, warned that any appropriation of “archaeology” to write an alternative
history of media rehistoricizes and belittles the term.61
The first question, however, is more closely adaptable to the history of a single
medium and it provokes a constant re-conceptualization of its coherence and
identity. Thomas Elsaesser, for instance, argued for such an archaeologically in-
spired film history that would switch back and forth between the present and the
past. Recent developments (digital 3D, digital projection and distribution, and so
on), which are too easily conceived of as challenges to the identity of cinema, can
better be used to re-discover already forgotten sideways and seemingly obscure
aspects of the medium’s history; archaeological findings (abandoned technolo-
gies, formal aberrations, etc.) can thus force us to include aspects in film history
which have long been excluded by the dominance of the narrative feature film.62
In contrast, historical television research, which got a boost in the early 1990s,
can be described as being genealogical, since it focuses less on synchronic for-
mations than on a diachronic series of struggles that develop around technolo-
gies while at the same time transforming them. The notion of power, which is
here to be understood not as the power of one specific technology, but as a ma-
trix of power which rests on, produces, and transforms technology, is very pre-
sent in these genealogies of television. They aim to tell a history of the present in
which the well established and naturalized building blocks of television – think
“audience,” “household,” “information/entertainment” – are analyzed in their
contingent, heterogeneous, and contested pre-conditions. Where an archaeologi-
cal approach mainly aims to enable new perspectives, the genealogical approach
150 markus stauff
aims for a critical assessment of the turning points which gave technologies a
certain shape and excluded possible alternatives.
The production of the domestic sphere (a precondition for television as we
know it) involved a redistribution of public and private and of male and female
spaces – as it was connected to programs of suburbanization, cheap mortgages,
and the establishment of the nuclear family.63 The audience, a concept now con-
sidered a key element of television, just as new media seem to have replaced it
with the “user,” is not a given of television either; genealogical research has fo-
cused on the constant struggle to produce and quantify audiences,64 to address
and educate them.65
As noted, the research I refer to here does not necessarily describe itself as
genealogical. I am using this label firstly to mark a certain distinction from the
more prominent approach (or, better, different approaches) of media archaeol-
ogy and its interest in surprising findings and moments of rupture. Secondly, the
label allows me to point out the broad and partly ambivalent role that technology
has in historical research on television as a medium in transition. Television
technology, even in its more narrow meaning, has constantly changed. In the
1960s, at least in the US, the VCR was being discussed as a means for improving
the medium of television – however, this was heavily contested, as this improve-
ment could either consist in selling or renting out high-culture on tape with the
intent to replace the dominant TV fare or in offering more individualized access
to the regular TV programs.66 As in most other struggles defining television’s
transition, the shape and use of machines may have been what was at stake in
these debates, but they also transformed television – and its different technologi-
cal developments – into technical metaphors for the entire society:
[T]elevision continues to be a central medium not just for entertainment or
information, but also for speculations about the present state of gender roles,
family life, race relations, international conflict, and the general prospects for
art in media culture.67
The genealogical view of technology avoids any clear-cut distinction between the
discourses on technology and the technologies themselves (contrary to Kittler’s
explicit claim that discourse is no longer an appropriate level of media analy-
sis68); it shows that the medium of television is in permanent crisis and it is this
crisis that makes it technologically, metaphorically, and culturally into a power-
ful medium. While archaeological research aims at showing that, from hind-
sight, a technology could also be seen in a different perspective, genealogical
research shows that technologies always already were seen, used, and defined
from different perspectives: they exist and function because of the competing
concepts and strategies.
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For the present, the genealogical approach furthermore allows us to avoid a
similarly clear-cut distinction between television and other (digital, new, social)
media. If the digital image was considered a turning point in film history, the
mobility of digital media could be conceived of as a similar challenge to televi-
sion; after all, the domestic medium, however heterogeneous it might have been,
was organized around the television set placed in one, or several, rooms of the
static domestic space. Yet more recent research has shown that questions of,
first, portability and, later, mobility already accompanied some of television’s
historical transformations – and different forms of mobile technologies have
since re-defined the “essence” of television.69 This also allows us to discuss
which material technologies (machines, gadgets), discursive technologies
(promises, classifications), and practical technologies (body practices, social re-
lationships) that define the field of mobile media are taken up from the context
of television, and which are abandoned, re-invented, or re-mediatized. Televi-
sion’s genealogy thus provides insight into technologies and the power relations
making them possible, which might be overlooked by only focusing on the spe-
cificities of the new digital, social media.
Conclusion: Toward Post-Televisual Technologies
When in May 2013 Microsoft presented its new video game console, the Xbox
One, this – once again – was presented as a conspicuously hybrid or convergent
piece of technology: it not only includes a Blu-ray disc drive and supports the
presumably next-generation flatscreen’s 4K resolution, it also offers recording
functionality (if only for recording game play), and can partly function as televi-
sion set-top box offering an electronic program guide for navigating television
shows. It therefore figures as yet another example of digital media’s fantasy of
unification, the promise to bring formerly separated media functions together in
one coherent interface70 (and with only one remote control) – while in fact only
contributing to the ongoing multiplication of standards, gadgets, points of ac-
cess, modes of use, and so on. For some it also proves that television, after being
declared dead more than once, is persistent and will become an economically
and technically important node of digital culture. Technologically, however, it is
ever more uncertain just what television is and where/how one can identify it.
As already stated at the beginning of this chapter, a closer look at the domestic
incarnation of television delivers conceptual tools that also allow to get a better
grip on the most recent transformations of television. The extended notion of
technology and its theoretical sharpening through the concepts of dispositif,
governmentality, and genealogy does surely not ignore the dramatic conse-
quences of digital and social media. However, instead of taking the technological
features of the digital (and its impact on television) for granted, this extended
notion locates the technological aspect of media in the constantly transforming
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connections between its heterogeneous elements. This ensemble of gadgets, in-
frastructures, discourses and practices becomes technology through enabling
strategic interventions, improvability and knowledge production.
Television never was anything but a constellation of heterogeneous technolo-
gies and respective problematizations that structured the application and trans-
formation of these technologies that react to and intervene in contested cultural
fields. Neither the problematizations, nor the multiple technologies characteriz-
ing a certain moment of television necessarily have a common trajectory. Some of
them survive and come to new life in a re-organized media constellation. The
question is less whether television will die or persist, but which televisual tech-
nologies (and problematizations) are taken up by what comes next and will thus
still shape media culture. Lisa Parks summarized this very well:
A convergent approach to television involves keeping the meanings of the
technology dynamic and malleable, open to being mobilized and used in dif-
ferent directions, across languages and disciplines, and in unpredictable
ways. It also involves rewriting our critical terms and keeping them useful as
television combines with and is altered by new technologies.71
Additionally, television’s constant transition suggests that any technology (and
this is even more true of a medium combining quite a number of technologies)
gets at least part of its cultural impact not from what it is and what it does (re-
liably, repetitive, hidden from the surface), but from how it changes and can be
changed.
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Postmodern Hi-fi vs. Post-Cool Lo-fi:
An Epistemological War
Laurent Jullier
For every narrative cinema challenge there are at least two solutions: one involv-
ing costly techniques, and one involving only a single camera. If a contemporary
director reads in a synopsis “then our main character is fighting in Austerlitz,
among troops of 200,000 men,” she or he can hire armies of 3D compositors
and match move artists to design the battle, or find a narrative or visual idea to
avoid the screening of the whole battlefield. Let us imagine an ideal situation and
take for granted that the choice is not a matter of money but a matter of art, and
call the first solution “hi-fi” and the second one “lo-fi.” One already knows “fi”
stands for fidelity, but which kind of fidelity? A cartographic fidelity, i.e., a bird-
view of the event. Scores of digital designers will authorize large establishing
shots of the battlefield, as if we are birds flying over the madness going on below
– see the Star Wars or the Lord of the Rings film series. The hi-fi choice
then means an exocentric type of encoding environment data. It allows a kind of
disembodied experience in order to embrace the wholeness of a scene. All details
must be calculated, since the hi-fi choice has to “impartially” show the world “as
it is,” not as it is seen.1 High resolution domestic displays, 48 FPS shooting and
3D glasses, among other technological inventions, run for the same team. On the
other hand, the lo-fi choice will probably mean an egocentric type of encoding
environment data,2 where we will be thrown at the heart of the battle, briefly
seeing three or four other fighters. Smoke, blasts and run-and-gun style3 will
forbid any clear gaze on what happens, while fast cutting and numerous close-
up shots will provide disconnected samples of the event.
Now we have our two competitors: on the left, hi-fi exocentric computer-gen-
erated imagery; on the right, lo-fi egocentric hand-held cameras, both having the
same purpose: describing a scene with the most possible accuracy. As suggested
by the title of this chapter, this is an epistemological war which gives rise to the
question: “How can I know, as a spectator of a fictional narrative, what a Napo-
leonian battle was like?” Answering this question, i.e., trying to provide some
reliable (or at least believable) knowledge, even if the spectator only intends to
have fun watching a good movie, supposes at least two antagonistic technologi-
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cal means. The aim of this essay is to establish the extent to which these means
differ when considering the kind of effects they produce on the spectator.
Hi-fi: From Keplerian Replicas to Vasarian Substitutes
First of all, the dichotomy “hi-fi vs. lo-fi” reflects a culturally biased terminologi-
cal pick, coming from the northwestern European tradition. During the 17th cen-
tury, according to Svetlana Alpers, there were two different ways for a painted
image to describe the world: the cartographic eye of the Dutch masters, who
provide lens-like Keplerian images as replicas of the world, and the narrativist,
self-interpretative way of the Italian masters, who provide window-like Vasarian
images as substitutes for the world.4 Then, for many reasons, the dichotomy “hi-
fi vs. lo-fi” appointed the cartographic fidelity of the birdview as a touchstone to
the former, while implying that the hand-held shaky camera provided so-called
low-fidelity shots, which reflected the wedging of our senses and provided a
knowledge which was located to a single point. Now imagine the touchstone no
longer entails the disembodied mapping of the event but the embodied feeling to
live this event. No human being can fly as an eagle over the battlefield, scanning
and storing visual data as a machine, but computer-generated imagery (CGI) sure
can make you feel you can. In this new linguistic setup, the computer-generated
imagery should be called lo-fi, and the run-and-gun style hi-fi, since it manages
to put us onto the battlefield, assuming fear and distress prevent our reason to
manage any rational data treatment. Then, the hierarchy associating hi-fi with
computer-generated imagery does not value “realism” but “photorealism.” A cal-
culated scene does not “objectively” inscribe itself on the screen: to deserve such
a reputation and give all the scientific guarantees of optical truthfulness, it
should rather consist in raw data, i.e., columns of numbers and measures. In-
stead of these numbers which probably could give one a good idea of what “the
world as if nobody was here to watch it”5 is like; what spectators see on the
screen looks exactly like a photograph or a shot of the scene, including the distor-
tions and errors usually induced by an average camera. It is easy to understand
this “irrational” preference (irrational from a scientific point of view) when com-
paring the first and the third installments of the Toy Story franchise.
The main proof of the exocentric quality of a computer-generated visual scene
is the freedom for the artist to choose the point of view after the modelization is
achieved by the machine. Here we have the opportunity to bridge the gap be-
tween painting and sculpture: imagine Leonardo storing all the visual data con-
cerning Mona Lisa, including her back and her legs, then deciding at the last
minute: “Let’s capture her with a simple classical medium close-up, and store
the complete data, in case the audience asks for a sequel.” To fight the methodi-
cal calculating side of this attitude toward representation, directors make exten-
sive use of hypnotic and vertiginous crane moves, mainly track-in shots
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associated with wide-angle lenses, allowing to do what the human body cannot
(such as soaring or flying). These fluid movements “enroll” the spectator in spite
of the fact the screen in front of him/her shows no strong epistemological
boundaries between diegesis-related pixels and production-related pixels.6 The
editing is in line with the use of this technique, providing numerous action-
match cuts without continuity – a characteristic trait of music video effects: the
movement of a figure in shot A will be completed by that of another figure in
shot B (classical cinema mostly refused this type of practice which, by underlin-
ing the plastic qualities of the figures onscreen, ran the risk of preventing the
spectator from seeing them as traces, which would have endangered the reality
effect so dear to classical cinema). Synaesthetic music video effects, which have a
direct influence on the body – based on binary metronome beat music, rich in
low frequencies and, if possible, broadcast very loudly – eventually bring some
help. Here the soundtrack has the upper hand on the visuals, imposing its law on
picture editing (whereas in classic cinema the very opposite happened – as in
circuses where the orchestra has to adapt to what was happening on stage, the
music had to conform to the picture).
In this aesthetic and technological frame of the music video effect, “commu-
nication” (as the conveying of descriptive information) is substituted by “com-
munion” (as harmony and attunement with the data).7 Audiovisual fluency rocks
and rolls us into a pleasant state of mind, even when the time comes to make
moral evaluations on what happens in the diegesis – “high fluency is associated
with positive affect and results in more favorable evaluations.”8 Maybe it even
equips us to cope with the representation of harsh events on the screen. “Tradi-
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Fig. 1. Left: Toy Story (John Lasseter, 1995). Behind Woody, all background
details are in sharp focus in the depth of field. Each white bar of the bed is clear-
cut, for example, even the ones far off. Right: Toy Story 3 (Lee Unkrich, 2010).
Behind Woody, this time, background details are blurred, due to the shallow
focus. In 1995 the address to the spectator was: “Hey, look at how we calculated
every single detail as is!”; fifteen years later, it became “Please concentrate on
what Woody has in mind (and remember that shallow focus suggests
psychological introspection, since a character appears oblivious to the world
around her/him”1).
tionally, psychologists studying evaluations viewed them as resulting from the
slow and careful consideration and integration of relevant stimulus attributes. In
contrast, recent psychological research suggests that evaluative judgments are
often formed without such considerations, for example, by consulting one’s ap-
parent affective response to the stimulus.”9 Therefore the role technology plays
in ethics, when considering CGI “cool” exocentric and fluent representations, is
to induce a Nietzschean or dandy moral point of view, centered on the aesthetic
apprehension of the spectacle. Compare for instance two versions of this tragi-
cally narrative episode: a young man fails to come back home in time to prevent
his aunt and uncle, who raised him since his infancy, being savagely murdered by
barbarians. This scenario takes place in The Searchers (John Ford, 1956) as
well as in Star Wars (George Lucas, 1977). In the former, neither the desperate
journey home nor the hideously wounded and burned corpses of the boy’s rela-
tives are shown, and Max Steiner uses dissonant chords to score the scene. In the
latter, we follow the boy driving his speeder (this machine glides over the
ground: perfect for fluency, not to mention Lucas is fond of wipes – transition
effects which give the editing work more fluency), then watch him discover the
bodies while the pleasurable chords of John Williams’s score accompany the
scene.
Lo-fi: Justifying the Alterations
On the so-called lo-fi side things are quite different. A reflexive device seems to
have been borrowed from literature: the false document. From Miguel de Cervan-
tes’s Don Quixote to Jean-Paul Sartre’s La Nausée, not to mention Robinson Crusoe or
Dracula, thousands of novels used it, usually asserting in their first pages that the
author “found” (instead of “wrote”) the very text we are about to read. The
Blair Witch Project (Eduardo Sánchez & Daniel Myrick, 1999) remains a
famous example of how a lo-fi movie can benefit from using the false document
device. What appears on the screen when the narrative begins is presented as “all
that remains” of the footage shot by three student filmmakers who disappeared
while filming a documentary in Maryland about a local legend known as “Blair
Witch.” As soon as we take this “truth” for granted, we indulge in the poor non-
broadcast quality of the images because that is all we have. We even welcome tech-
nical mistakes, since if (1) “to err is human” and if (2) a real human being is
supposed to have made these images, then (1+2) these images must display er-
rors. Indeed the capacity to be believed, “far from being undermined, is much
rather confirmed by the reader’s customary expectation that self-representation
always involves a measure of misrepresentation.”10 This kind of lo-fi apparatus
adds a second apparatus to the hi-fi one: we are not supposed to believe the
(unmediated) presented world, but rather the (mediated) presented world to be
part of a real world. Home-movie film look, mobile phone-recorded shots, single
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microphone poor sound, etc., are all the more true because in the real world we
are accustomed to link their presence to truth, from Rodney King’s beating to the
9/11 attacks. To bring back memories from his honeymoon, Shrek, the epon-
ymous character of Shrek 2 (Andrew Adamson, 2004), films the event with a
Super-8 camera, the very same tool with which Abraham Zapruder recorded the
assassination of JFK: how could we refuse, at least in the first place, to “believe”
the validity of the clumsy and scratched shots of him and Princess Fiona?
The lo-fi apparatus is not limited to the “false document” taped by a diegetized
operator. Numerous movies, especially when it comes down to action sequences,
allow the operator to become a visible and unblinking witness in order to express
her/his emotions by moving the camera in a non-broadcast way. Maybe the start-
ing point of such a habit was given by the universal success of a device that
turned into a cliché; the shaking of the camera caused by the T-rex when he
brushes past “us” in Steven Spielberg’s Jurassic Park (1993). Indeed he is sup-
posed to be so heavy the earth trembles – this lo-fi device can be seen as the
desire of the CGI crew to give some weight to their hi-fi but immaterial creation
(the T-rex weighs nothing, since he is made from 0 and 1s). Nowadays, neither
car chase nor fighting sequence comes without its lo-fi shaky shots, even if the
sequence is not presented as found footage or live broadcasting. This lo-fi device
can even be found in films that depict a time when the camera was not yet in-
vented. From Dances with Wolves’s buffalo-hunting Dutch-angle shots (Ke-
vin Kostner, 1990) to Robin Hood’s run-and-gun style fights (Ridley Scott,
2010), numerous examples can be found. But do not forget that these alterations
must be diegetically justified, except for when the audience is looking for a
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Fig. 2: [REC] (Jaume Balagueró & Paco Plaza, 2007) displays the same kind of
apparatus as in Blair Witch. Television reporter Ángela and her cameraman
Pablo are following firemen and policemen in Barcelona, until everybody is
locked up in a deadly building full of infected demonic creatures. Left: Ángela
asks Pablo to “tape everything”; meanwhile, her face, blurred due to the motion
induced by the shaky cam, looks like some Francis Bacon painting. But we
understand this technical failure as a proof of humanness. Right: The diegetized
operator interferes with the main action, “testifying” to the validity of his images:
“Get out of the way!” yells the fireman to him, i.e., to us.
modernist Brechtian movie. For instance, spectators who only went to see Ra-
chel Getting Married in 2008 because it had been directed by Jonathan
Demme, and expected the same mainstream narrative and forms as his well-
known success Silence of the Lambs (1991) offered, were definitely thrown
off balance by the use of its lo-fi apparatus, which they failed to link to either the
operator or the characters in the film. In this respect, casting a glance over a
single page of IMDb user reviews of this film will be clarifying:
A great performance by Anne Hathaway and a good story gets lost inside a
horribly shot and edited film. Way too many “why did they do this” questions,
way too many overly long scenes, and quite possibly the worst use of hand
held camera technology in recent memory. (Rachel Gets Married, Audience Gets
Headache, 11 Oct. 2008, by Ira Sez from the United States)
When I was an engineer and again as a programmer, we had a saying, “Just
because you can do something doesn’t mean you have to do it.” Last week I
saw W. and had the same comment about it. The hand held, shaky, up your
actor’s nose close-ups all distract from what could be an interesting story.
How I miss the carefully plotted camera work of people like Gregg Toland
(The Grapes of Wrath and had the same comment about it. The hand
held, shaky, up your actor’s nose close-ups all distract from what could be an
interesting story. How I miss the carefully plotted camera work of people like
Gregg Toland (The Grapes of Wrath and Citizen Kane). (An Old Cur-
mudgeon’s View, 25 Oct. 2008, by Al Weiss from the United States)
Ten minutes into watching this movie I was thinking: how much longer will
this last? This film sort of reminded me of the time my neighbor brought their
daughter’s wedding video over and, to my wife’s embarrassment, I fast for-
warded thru the ceremony, in front of them. (Calling a Spade a Spade, 30 Nov.
2008, by mrblimp from the United States)11
These IMDb reviewers convey their inability to enter the diegetic world in spite of
a true desire to be absorbed. They were unable to worry or to feel happy for
characters – which obviously for them is the common way of “using” film narra-
tives – because the lo-fi apparatus puts some inappropriate distance between the
two sides. Only an audience well-versed in the Verfremdungseffekt could feel com-
fortable with it.
From Absorption to Experience
Aside from these communication problems – these IMDb reviewers of Rachel
Getting Married should ideally have been warned or should have been look-
postmodern hi-fi vs. post-cool lo-fi: an epistemological war 159
ing for further information about the film’s style – the intermedial import of the
lo-fi apparatus into the mainstream style nonetheless is a hit. For the sake of
argument, let us put the extensive use of the shaky camera as part of what one
could call the post-cool style, since it is a testament to the desire to believe again as
opposed to keeping an ironic “dandy” gaze on what is shown on the screen,12
while the extensive use of CGI remains as part of the original postmodern style.
The table below summarizes a few characteristics of these styles by basically
comparing it to both the Hollywood Golden Age “classical” style and the Euro-
pean “modern” cinema of the 1960s. Of course these four categories are just
convenient labels used nowadays to signify the collective presence of formal fig-
ures, the seeds of which were already mostly present in films dating back to the
early years of cinema.13
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* “Caméra-épaule,” used by documentarists, Free Cinema and Nouvelle Vague operators, is
technically the ancestor of the run-and-gun style but should not be confused with the shaky cam
as we actually know it. The visual culture of the 1950s is not the one of the 2010s, and a shaky
shot does not always mean the same thing.
Post-cool egocentric cinema goes together well with fictional autobiography,
which, like “false document” movies, is “the deliberate artificial simulation of a
discourse that refers to the past of a real speaker,”14 and displays “feigned reality
statements.”15 Does that mean that postmodern exocentric cinema excludes any
subjectivity in order to warm up to its representations? Not at all. We already
noted how, from Jurassic Park to Toy Story 3, directors allow imperfections
to voluntarily waste the “objectivity” of their computerized worlds, and how
these imperfections are not only tolerated but valued by the audience when they
can be linked to humanity on both sides of the screen (the fear of the operator to
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be wounded, the feelings of the character made “readable” by some technical
alteration, etc.). But a lot more CGI effects can be related to this thawing.
What Happens, What I Saw, What I Remember
See for examples two recently released features teeming with CGI: Life of Pi
(Ang Lee, 2012) and The Great Gatsby (Baz Luhrmann, 2013). In the former,
a sad and tragic story is seen as a fairytale by a boy and narrated as such. All that
we see onscreen is untrue considering the “real” world, but true considering Pi’s
heart and mind. In the latter, another sad and tragic story is seen as an epic by a
writer who narrates the story. All we see on the screen (and what we hear on the
soundtrack) is untrue considering the “real” world, but true considering Nick
Carraway’s heart and mind. Neither Pi nor Gatsby are true cases of “autobiogra-
phical pacts”:16 Pi is half himself, half Ang Lee and his crew; and Nick Carraway
is even more so the offspring of several instances – he stands for both Fitzgerald
(since he is writing a novel called The Great Gatsby) and Luhrmann’s alter egos.
But the point is not to find “who speaks.” It is to see the world through some-
body else’s eyes. When a writer recalls a memory, she or he distorts it, and “these
encodings and re-encodings of experience necessarily become increasingly sub-
jective. Memoir, then is less about relating the past than editing it.”17 The task of
CGI, in both Pi and Gatsby is to display this “editing” work. In both cases, every
pixel, every composition, every bigger-than-life match move effect is not in-
tended to deliver the cold exocentric calculation of a world, but to permit our
journey into the character’s imagination and sensibility. This mark is not hit by
imperfections, this time, but is hit by overstatement: to use a common psycholo-
gical dichotomy, CGI does not display bottom-up perception of the world, but
top-down cognition. For instance, Fitzgerald writes in his novel:
A breeze blew through the room, blew curtains in at one end and out the
other like pale flags, twisting them up toward the frosted wedding cake of the
ceiling – and then rippled over the wine-colored rug, making a shadow on it
as wind does on the sea. The only completely stationary object in the room
was an enormous couch on which two young women were buoyed up as
though upon an anchored balloon. They were both in white and their dresses
were rippling and fluttering as if they had just been blown back in after a
short flight around the house. I must have stood for a few moments listening
to the whip and snap of the curtains and the groan of a picture on the wall.18
In order to visualize this description of Nick’s environment, from the “frosted
wedding cake of the ceiling” to the impression the girls give of having made “a
short flight around the house,” Luhrmann and his CGI crew spare no costs: ceil-
ings as high as in a cathedral, never-ending curtains moving in slow motion are
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“stroking” us when we watch with our 3D glasses on, not to mention smooth
waves of low-frequency sounds. No place on earth has such ceilings, curtains,
and sofas, and certainly not Tom Buchanan’s house – but we do not see Tom
Buchanan’s house, we see it re-encoded by the memories of a Yale graduate and
World War I veteran from the Midwest named Nick Carraway. In this respect, we
could say we also (through the intervention of totally unnatural CGI effects) are
astonished by Tom Buchanan’s house as it appeared in the summer of 1922 – In
fact, it was Hemingway who wrote:
All good books [for us: all good movies] are alike in that they are truer than if
they had really happened and after you are finished reading one you will feel
that all that happened to you and afterwards it all belongs to you; the good
and the bad, the ecstasy, the remorse and sorrow, the people and the places
and how the weather was.19
But of course, the audience is made of “perverse spectators,”20 and as was the
case for Rachel Getting Married, such a commitment does not automati-
cally happen. A modernist audience, for example, considering getting absorbed
in the diegesis is a regressive childish pleasure, would resist the audiovisual ex-
cesses or feel uncomfortable with it. That explains, in France, why the daily
newspaper Le Monde – which remains one of the cornerstones of the orthodox
modernist cinephilia21 – regularly despises this kind of movie. Unsurprisingly,
they declared Gatsby a poor movie, full of “these dreadful digital track-ins
which transform any narrative situation into a videogame trial [...].”22 Another
danger, in terms of harmony between audience and aesthetic features, lies in the
ageing of technology. When Jack Clayton directed his own adaptation of The
Great Gatsby, in 1974, he could not of course use CGI, but he resorted to the
then up-to-date technology, mainly zoom-in associated with telephoto lenses.
This device was supposed to give a representation of Nick Carraway’s gaze, since
Nick (I am here referring to the same scene) is astonished by Tom Buchanan’s
house but at the same time feels far from the ethical way of life it accommodates
(to see something through a telephoto lens means to be able to study details
without being physically close). But nowadays – think of Quentin Tarantino and
other postmodern directors who quote such devices just for fun – a zoom-in
associated with telephoto lenses “means” above all else the beginning of the
1970s era. It lost its evocative power in aid of becoming an outmoded signal in
the history of film style. And one day the 3D CGI and hip-hop music of Luhr-
mann’s Gatsby will suffer the same fate.
However, CGI and other large-scale cinematic technological displays keep an
ultimate card up their sleeves. It is the ability, on both sides of the screen, to take
pride in a job well done. The photorealistic precision of an average blockbuster, as
suggested by the hundreds of names lined-up under the heading of “CGI effects,”
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is achieved by several months of hard labor and armies of experts. Most specta-
tors, even if they are not convinced by the story or by the aesthetic biases of the
movie, at the end acknowledge it was “technically well done.” A sociological in-
quiry, in this respect, showed a few years ago why numerous French communist
steel workers of the 1950s were overly fond of Hollywood Golden Age movies: the
ideology displayed by these movies was of course not their cup of tea, but they did
not care about ideology. The point was: they saw jobs well done, i.e., jobs done
(mainly by actors and actresses) with as much dignity and sense of responsibility
as they themselves put into their factory work.23 And when on the screen the RMS
Titanic sinks or when Manhattan is destroyed by alien invaders, the amount of
work is undeniable. Behind the amount of work, at last, lies the fascination for
larger-than-life spectacles, in which John Dewey, building the basis of a pragma-
tist aesthetic, saw the roots of the human tendency to be moved by artworks:
In order to understand the esthetic in its ultimate and approved forms, one
must begin with it in the raw; in the events and scenes that hold the attentive
eye and ear of a man; arousing his interest and affording him enjoyment as he
looks and listens: the sights that hold the crowd – the fire-engine rushing by;
the machines excavating enormous holes in the earth; the human-fly climbing
the steeple-side; the men perched high in the air on girders, throwing and
catching red-hot bolts.24
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Fig. 3: Two cases of remediation. Left: In Toy Story 3, the hi-fi apparatus
appropriates the lo-fi one. The aspect ratio falls from 1:1,66 to 1:1,33, leaving two
vertical black stripes; the REC signal and the four white frame marks are clearly
visible, complete with the battery signal; the entire image is blurred because the
autofocus system takes a long time to move on; the upper horizontal part of the
image is deformed due to the tape’s wow and flutter. All these “deficient”
characteristics are feigned by a technically perfect high-tech system. Right: In
Cloverfield (Matt Reeves, 2008), the lo-fi apparatus appropriates the hi-fi
one. The hideous alien comes from CGI disembodied hi-fi representations of
reality, while the little pale stains between him and us signaling “reality” is
mediated by a simple handy cam whose lens is dirty because it fell on the grass a
few seconds before.
Nobody would deny CGI the power to represent convincing fire engines or “en-
ormous holes in the earth” (see the caving in of a football field in The Dark
Knight Rises, Christopher Nolan, 2012).
Cinema as a Situation
To finish, one must not overstate the opposition between CGI hi-fi scenes and
shaky camera lo-fi scenes, since nowadays they come mixed. Every side finally
understood how useful the weapons of the other side could be, and appropria-
tions go both ways.
As a result, and all problems of ethical ambition and artistic achievement
aside, experiencing movies probably is now more “vivid” than ever, thanks to the
combination of hi-fi and lo-fi devices. Let us have a final example and compare
two cinematic solutions to a single aesthetic and narrative problem: how to scare
a spectator by showing him how vulnerable he would be if he were in danger to
be trampled by a stampede of unleashed war horses.
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Fig. 4. Left: Stagecoach (John Ford, 1939). The fixed camera on the ground is
level, and the aim is to increase our fear about the plight of one of the main
characters who (voluntarily or not) falls out of the coach – he or she will
irremediably get trampled. Right: Seventy years later, in a mainstream Disney
cartoon (Tangled, Byron Howard and Nathan Greno, 2010), the staging is
both close to and far from its ancestor. The camera is not level anymore – it is a
Dutch-angle shot – and it uses a wide angle “lens” (quotation marks since this is
CGI, which means no real camera nor real lenses were used). The feelings that
are evoked changed too: in this little medieval fairytale town, there is an operator
trying his best to tape what suddenly happens. He has no time to level his
camera. We understand how astonishing the event is – Flynn escaped death and
he ran away! – because this shot is not technically perfect. The mediation
produces a direct effect on us more than the narrative episode itself, especially as
a Jurassic Park-style shaking effect has been added at the very moment the
horse reaches the ground with its front hoofs.
In this chapter, we have seen that the CGI hi-fi apparatus and lo-fi shots are
engaged in a war whose trophy is truth. Which one is telling it? The hi-fi side,
claiming CGI is apt to model the “real” world? or the lo-fi side, claiming that
high-tech devices build post-human cold calculations of a world that never ex-
isted and will never exist, while lo-fi includes the observer in the observation in
order to improve the sharing of the experience? In such an epistemological di-
chotomy, technology appears itself as a condition which permits or forbids the
access to a useful knowledge of the world. But it is a (bad) formalist way to think.
As we have seen too, not only hi-fi and lo-fi technologies are more and more
intermingled in each new release, but we have to think of cinema as a situation,
and not as a technologically built text, in order to understand how some truth
can be found in it. To sum up, a situation is a collective agreement between
individuals about the different ways to appropriately react and adapt to a given
socially situated interaction, as interactionist sociologists, from W.I. Thomas to
Erving Goffman, stated. As soon as 1933, Herbert Blumer – himself an interac-
tionist sociologist – already asserted,
[M]ovies do not come merely as a film that is thrown on a screen; their wit-
nessing is an experience which is undergone in a very complex setting, [as
they] serve as a source for considerable imitation. Forms of beautification,
mannerisms, poses, ways of courtship, and ways of love-making, especially,
are copied.25
What was acknowledged two years later in the academic anthropological field by
Marcel Mauss and his conference paper “The Techniques of the Body,” in which
he underlined the fact that cinema is a kinesthetic form of imagery ever since he
saw girls walking in a particular manner both in Paris and in New York – a man-
ner they had seen in the movies and imitated.26
Once one considers cinema as a sociohistorical succession of situations, it
becomes difficult to assign a particular technology to a particular effect.27 The
way we read technological effects varies through time and depends on cinephile
communities – everybody knows a given aesthetic device, which moves us to
tears, can appear as unbearably kitsch to the spectator seated next to us in the
theater; and the other way round. Nevertheless this variability does not keep both
filmmakers and spectators from studying preferences for the so-called lo-fi or hi-
fi ways of making images, and the categories of arguments they may use to justify
these preferences.







Marey’s Gun: Apparatuses of Capture
and the Operational Image
Pasi Väliaho
We often approach the histories and theories of moving image media in terms of
the art and technology of projection. While the understanding of cinema as con-
tinuing the tradition of optical shows and magic theaters no doubt discloses an
important aspect of the medium, it simultaneously occludes one decisive line of
development: the alternative conception of “cinema” as the mechanical record-
ing and automation of movement that can be highlighted in the context of the
late-19th-century life sciences, in particular. It was in this context that precine-
matic devices such as chronophotographic apparatuses – epitomized by the
“photographic gun” (fusil photographique) that the French physiologist Étienne-
Jules Marey made in 1882 – were developed to scrutinize the living in terms of its
dynamic expressions. A range of different kinds of machines was designed to
capture and reproduce what was seen to be the essence of life: movement.
The following explores this alternative trajectory of cinema to articulate the
medium as a specific kind of apparatus of knowing and reproducing the living.
Focusing on Marey’s photographic gun, the aim is to think of media technolo-
gies in terms of technologies of government, and in this particular case, in terms
of the biopolitical capture of life into fields of knowledge, intervention and con-
trol, the notion of “biopolitical” referring here, following Michel Foucault, to
strategies and mechanisms, developed since the 18th century, that come to har-
ness the creative forces of living beings (from physical activity to mental disposi-
tions) into a machinery of profitability.1 This capture, as we will see, is not a
question of spectacles, but rather, of functional, even secretive “operational
images,” which over the course of the past 150 years have gradually become an
intrinsic feature of our lives.
Photographic Gun
Everywhere he lived, Marey surrounded himself with animals and machines: re-
cording instruments, photographic apparatuses, cages, and aquariums filled
with fish, pigeons, lizards, and so on. “Everywhere, in every corner, life,” as the
photographer Nadar noted about his visit to Marey’s office and living quarters in
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Paris in 1864.2 Or, life coupled with technological mediators, one should add, to
acknowledge the extent to which, for Marey, life as an object of study could not
be epistemologically separated from various kinds of scientific apparatuses,
which the physiologist envisioned as “indispensable intermediaries between
mind and matter” necessary to overcome “the insufficiency of our senses.”3
Among the myriad of fauna, birds were of particular interest for Marey
throughout his career. The physiologist, who also very much acted as an engi-
neer, anticipating modernity’s key technological developments, from the cinema
to the airplane, was keen to unravel the secrets of aerial locomotion. The aim was
to imitate and reproduce the flight of winged creatures so that us humans, too,
would to be able to “travel through air” in the very near future.4 In this regard,
the patterns of movement that birds’ wings perform in interaction with air,
which evade the slow thresholds of human perception, presented an epistemic
puzzle that needed to be solved by technical means. In the 1860s, Marey had
already started to develop and perfect his recording instruments based on the
“graphic method,” that is, the measurement of physiological processes such as
the heartbeat, breathing, muscle activity, etc. by using graphs to depict change
over time.5 To get accurate data about the movement of wings, Marey would wire
an individual bird with his recording machines: electrical tracings signaled the
speed of the wing movements and myographic tracings indicated the contraction
and relaxation of the pectoral muscles. Marey also constructed mechanical bird
models to test and synthesize the information so gathered by the instruments.6
It was in the purpose of deciphering the mechanics of flight that Marey also
developed one of his first chronophotographic apparatuses, the photographic
gun, described in an article published in La Nature in 1882 (Fig. 1).7 The device, as
the physiologist acknowledges, drew on the idea of the “astronomical revolver,”
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Fig. 1: Marey’s photographic gun, La Nature, April 22, 1882.
which Marey’s colleague, the astronomer Jules Janssen had designed in 1874 to
record the transit of Venus across the sun: a combination of a photographic cam-
era and a telescope to capture sequential images of the passage of the planet.
Janssen had already noted, when musing on the possible uses of his invention,
“how interesting it would be to obtain a series of photographs reproducing the
various aspects of the wing during that action.”8 This was exactly the objective
behind Marey’s image-shooting machine. Further inspiration came from Ead-
weard Muybridge’s studies with instantaneous photography, starting with the
study of the trot of Occident, Leland Stanford’s horse, in the early 1870s. How-
ever, the equipment Muybridge was using was heavy and unsuitably clumsy to
capture the rapid movements of birds and insects.
Trying to overcome this shortcoming, Marey designed a device that was about
the size of a hunting rifle, portable and free to aim from any angle. The photo-
graphic lens was located in the barrel, while the bottom end of the barrel housed
a magazine containing a cylindrical glass plate alongside two disks with shutters.
Pulling the trigger made a clocked mechanism of the three disks move inside the
magazine and record pictures sequentially. The model described in La Nature took
12 images per second with the exposure time of 1/720th of a second.
One of the first subjects of Marey’s experiments with his gun was an anon-
ymous gull flying supposedly somewhere on the coast near Posilipo (Naples),
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Fig. 2: Flight of gull, chronophotograph by Marey, La Nature, April 22, 1882.
Italy, where the villa in which Marey spent the winters and developed his appara-
tus was located (Fig. 2). Here, the study of the large-scale movements of celestial
bodies as carried out by Janssen was turned into the capture of the swoops and
dives of winged creatures capable of mastering the aerial ocean. The pictures
Marey was able to make were nonetheless (as he affirms) somewhat lacking in
detailed information, and the interval was not short enough to come up with a
desired reconstruction and analysis of the mechanics of motion by means of ani-
mation devices such as the phenakistiscope. But the potential advantages of the
instrument seemed obvious, especially when it came to extending the reach of
knowledge of how different species of birds fly in various environmental condi-
tions, in calm winds or alternatively when pulled by gusts.
Cinematic Apparatus
Of course, in the final analysis, the photographic gun could be aimed not only at
animals with wings, but at any living being, covering in principle the whole
realm of zoe in its crosshairs. Furthermore, the gun initiated the construction of
several more elaborate chronophotographic apparatuses, which Marey worked
on during the 1880s and 1890s, charting movement on either a single or several
plates and covering a wide range of phenomena from the physiology of flight to
the gestural economy of manual labor and even to the invisible motion of air
currents.9
In this sense, there is one word that perhaps best describes the functioning of
Marey’s chronophotographic method: capture. Or, more precisely, the capture of
life in its (potentially) moving image. The apparatuses sought to record traces of
the living on the silver-gelatin or other type of emulsion in the purpose of the
analysis and simulation of motion as well as measuring the forces that determine
movement10 – a kind of “motion capture.” Life was in Marey’s eyes equated with
movement. “Motion,” the physiologist wrote, “is the most apparent of the char-
acteristics of life; it manifests itself in all the functions; it is even the essence of
several of them.”11 Hence, instead of killing the objects it was targeted at, the
photographic gun was to affirm animate life in all its positivity, dynamics, and
complexity, which is something arguably different from the phenomenology of
traditional photography: not ghosts of the living (as Roland Barthes would have
it),12 but the living itself.
In this respect, the chronophotographic machines that Marey designed and
built were much more than mere instruments. It is not only by verbal association
that the idea of capturing life resonates with Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s
notion of the apparatus of capture [appareil de capture]. This, bluntly put, points out
the different and changing mechanisms by which the activity of living beings
becomes abstracted, homogenized, and channeled for capital accumulation.13
“Capture” is, for Deleuze and Guattari, a process of bringing together bodies,
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things, and persons into specific arrangements or assemblages in order to profit
from their productivity. In its many forms, the accumulation of capital implies, in
one way or another, the apprehension, according to a certain model of intellig-
ibility, efficiency, and functionality, of living beings into circuits of production
and consumption that impose upon them a framework of standardized and stra-
tified ways of being, doing, and making sense.
Marey’s gun does indeed come across as an apparatus of capture in this parti-
cular sense, geared as it was toward the extraction of forces of the living in the
purpose of manipulating and (re)directing them. The gun functioned above all as
an epistemic “grid,” or better, a technē in the sense of practical knowledge and
action, that filtered the world in perception through the parameters of quantifi-
cation, homogenization, and standardization. Rather than being considered
aesthetically pleasing, for instance, any kind of movement – running, throwing,
flying, walking, jumping, crawling, and so forth, intentional or not – was to be
disassembled into and scrutinized in terms of minute spatio-temporal coordi-
nates. Critical here is the way Marey’s work resonated with the epistemic dy-
namics of industrial capitalism and the systematic mechanical control and opti-
mization of life’s productive forces exemplified by Taylorism, among other
things.14
What becomes evident in Marey’s gun is that, generally speaking, technical
devices never simply are what they first seem. In capitalism’s indifference to (ca-
tegorical) difference, and embrace of repetition (under the guise of the constantly
new), guns easily become cameras, and vice versa, with the result that inferring
the purpose and function of technologies from their apparent uses would simply
be a mistake. Any gadget becomes operative and meaningful – acquires agency, if
you will – only as part of larger systems of power, knowledge, and action. It is
these systems that Michel Foucault called dispositifs, often translated into English
as apparatus. In an interview from 1977, he defined the apparatus quite loosely as
a network or “ensemble” that in a given historical moment becomes established
between such heterogeneous elements as discourses, institutions, architectural
forms, laws, scientific formulas, philosophical and moral propositions, adminis-
trative statements as well as technologies.15 Foucault stressed that “the apparatus
itself is the system of relations that can be established between the elements.
Secondly, what I am trying to identify [...] is precisely the nature of the connec-
tion that can exist between these heterogeneous elements.”16 What, according to
Foucault, makes the apparatus distinctive as a network of such heterogeneous
and even discordant elements is that it has a “dominant strategic function” in
relations of power. An apparatus, Foucault outlined, implements a certain kind
of manipulation of forces of life so as to channel them in a desired direction, to
block them, or to stabilize and utilize them at a given moment.
Recently, Giorgio Agamben has developed Foucault’s apparatus concept by
shaping its definition to apply to “literally anything that has in some way the
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capacity to capture, orient, determine, intercept, model, control, or secure the
gestures, behaviors, opinions, or discourses of living beings.”17 Here, the appa-
ratus’s meaning as a technique and logic of power becomes evident. Indeed,
Agamben has emphasized the etymological connection that Foucault’s notion of
dispositif (deriving from Latin dispositio) has with the word oikonomia especially in
the sense of “divine economy,” which the word acquired in Christian theological
conceptualizations of the divine rule on the earth. Without going into details of
Agamben’s analysis, dispositif and oikonomia both find their semantic core in the
notion of government, that is to say, sets of practices, measures, institutions, and
bodies of knowledge employed in organizing and controlling the movements,
behaviors, and actions of humans and other living beings. Government is not
primarily concerned with the sovereign juridical rule of a territory; nor is it pri-
marily concerned with the discipline of bodies and persons. Rather, it is a mode
of power that pertains to conducting the movements of active, productive indi-
viduals, and their relationships with each other as well as with their material
environment.
Agamben even proposes a general ontological partitioning of beings into two
groups: on the one hand, living beings, and on the other, apparatuses into which
living beings are captured and which seek to govern and guide individuals. Fol-
lowing this line of thinking, Marey’s photographic gun belongs to the latter on-
tological category concerning the self-replicating mechanisms of power to which
life becomes exposed. The gun presents a “cinematic” mode of government in
the sense that it seeks to capture, manage, and regulate the movements and en-
ergies of the living. It is a biopolitical apparatus of capture in that it, quite sim-
ply, contributes to exposing, optimizing, and controlling the forces of life.
Operational Image
The apparatus concept as conceived above prompts us to think of technical de-
vices in terms of governmentality (the administration and management of the
activities of living beings), and as becoming operative and meaningful when em-
bedded within larger social, institutional, epistemic, aesthetic, and political ar-
rangements. From this angle, Marey’s photographic gun appears as a biopolitical
technology that renders life amenable to government as well as capital accumula-
tion within a particular visual – and indeed cinematic – economy of movement.
Interestingly, the gun thus compels us to approach the genealogy of cinema
from an angle that is quite different from the “apparatus theoretical” conceptua-
lizations of the 1970s and 1980s, of the ideological-psychic mechanisms involved
in film spectatorship. Jean-Louis Baudry famously articulated cinema as a disposi-
tif, referring to film as a technology that generates a particular kind of viewing
position with specific psychic effects, as well as to institutionalized film forms
that keep on reproducing this type of spectatorial arrangement.18 Fashionable as
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it might nowadays be to debunk such generalizations as essentialist (or some-
thing similar), let us just note how Baudry’s cinematic apparatus is fundamen-
tally based on the notion of projection and seeks to conceptualize the particular
kind of psychic capture and government that the movie machine as a projector of
light and shadow, as an optical spectacle, is able to implement. However, Mar-
ey’s gun shifts the attention from projection to recording, and from the realm of
the phenomenological to what lurks beyond the immediate reach of the senses.
Government here concerns, not the contents of our dream-like hallucinations,
but the modulation of life processes by bringing them into the field of knowl-
edge and intervention.
Marey’s gun should perhaps, then, be seen as an early indicator of what “cin-
ema” – understood broadly as a visual economy of movement – is becoming in
today’s networks of power. It fashioned a mode of vision that outlines and auto-
mates intensities and tendencies of movement, aiming at spatialization and cal-
culation; a vision that traces, scans, reorganizes, and abstracts rather than re-
sembles or represents; a vision that turns our lives into statistical “data.”19
Accordingly, one could regard the photographic gun as a precursor for what Har-
un Farocki has termed “operational images,” that is to say, functional images
that increasingly define and determine the sphere of everyday life today, from
automated CCTV and missiles to computer simulations and industrial robotics.20
In terms of its circles of production and consumption, this imagery does not
conform to what is traditionally, either in terms of education, art, politics or en-
tertainment, expected from the “image.” Rather than meant to be something to
be gazed upon and serving the purpose of instruction, aesthetic pleasure, enjoy-
ment, or even propaganda, it is defined by its functionality. Farocki characterizes
operational images as ones that are part of a process, rather than portraying a
process. They contribute to the execution of a technical, industrial, military, or
some other kind of operation, for instance, calculating and predicting the aver-
age paths of consumers, or pattern recognition in machine vision used in assem-
bly lines or in so-called smart bombs.
The photographic gun can be considered part of this trajectory of the develop-
ment of visual technologies of government – especially those of pattern recogni-
tion and motion capture, which concern the calculation of patterns of movement
for the purposes of surveillance, for instance. Of course, if captured by today’s
vision machines, the flight of the anonymous gull would not simply remain a
series of more or less distinctive traces on the silver-gelatin emulsion. Its trajec-
tory could be predicted by computer vision; the movements of the bird’s wings
could be simulated by algorithms; a robotic weapons system could both shoot a
video of the gull or shoot it down, making no distinction between a camera and a
gun. But the general logic that pierces through both Marey’s invention and these
contemporary technologies is one of taking charge of living beings by means of
images that seek to turn gestures and expressions into quantifiable and calcul-
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able data – a logic one could describe, in a word, as biopolitical. The photo-
graphic gun from 1882 exposed living beings to measurement and control. In
doing so, it foreshadowed our contemporary world of biopolitical screens.
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Re-editing as Psychotechnique:
Montage and Mediality in Early Soviet
Cinema
Malte Hagener
According to traditional historiography, Soviet cinema comes into existence in
the mid-1920s when the triumvirate of Sergei Eisenstein, Vsevolod Pudovkin,
and Alexander Dovshenko suddenly and seemingly out of nowhere bursts onto
the scene. Classical film histories might offer a few lines on Tsarist cinema, but
they contain little, if anything at all, on the years 1919 to 1924 because – as would
be the standard argument propagated by Henri Langlois – the chaotic situation
following the revolution, the lack of resources and the general turmoil, did not
allow for any systematic film production. In effect, there was hardly a film pro-
duction to speak of, therefore there was no need to write about the period. In the
past 20 years, this has changed markedly, especially in the wake of the 1989
Pordenone retrospective “Silent Witnesses” and its 1996 sequel “In the Land of
the Soviets, 1918-1924.”1 Another decisive shift has been the recent “discovery” of
the early films of Dziga Vertov, who was virtually unknown in the West2 until his
extended tour promoting The Man with the Movie Camera (Celovek s
Kinoapparatom) in 1929.3 Vertov already complicates the canonical story of
Soviet cinema because his materialist practice offers a different kind of cinema
from the narratively driven, rhetorically laden revolutionary films of the 1925-
1930 period.4
Yet again, it would be misleading to play off Vertov against Eisenstein (or other
filmmakers from this period) because their theory and practice, albeit in different
ways, did put the materiality and mediality of film at center stage. If considered
in this perspective, Eisenstein’s voluminous thinking can be summarized as a
series of ideas on psychotechnics and biomechanics related to how film technol-
ogy and mental activity intersect: the attraction (the collision of two shots) acts as
a stimulus on the psyche triggering specific responses, thus intellectual montage
can be seen as an external simulation and visualization of thinking and imagistic
discourse, while pathos and ecstasy function as a transport into a pure state of
sensation and feeling. Lev Kuleshov was interested in how the coupling of shots
was forged into an imaginary spatial and temporal unity by the spectator, while
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Vertov championed the interval as the force prying open the imaginary space
between shots. All reactions of the spectators resulted from the careful crafting
of filmic material, the selection and arrangement of shots, which could be, at
least this was the hope at the time, measured, planned, and triggered. In this
sense, the Soviet cinema of the 1920s was not – as is often claimed – primarily
interested in rhetorical devices and storytelling techniques in the service of poli-
tics, but rather in the capabilities and opportunities that the medium could offer.
I want to focus on one specific example here – the re-montage of existing materi-
al – because it shows how a specific historical situation gave rise to specific tech-
niques and a specific employment of the medium’s possibilities. Implicit in this
discussion is an attempt to rethink the nexus of style and technology as a com-
plex negotiation in which neither side dominates the other, thus avoiding any
kind of determinism.
The Practice of Re-Montage
What characterized the Soviet cinema in its first years of existence was dearth –
the lack of material and resources after the war and revolution had two immedi-
ate consequences: on the one hand it resulted in a scarcity of (feature) film pro-
duction, while on the other hand, paradoxically, it led to an extraordinary out-
burst of creativity. In the first years after the revolution, the young Soviet Union
produced very few feature films, but concentrated instead on two forms of film-
making, treated marginally in most film histories: re-montage and non-fiction.
Two of the most famous filmmakers who took up film immediately after the
revolution (and before the triumvirate Eisenstein, Pudovkin, Dovshenko rose to
prominence) could be seen as embodiments of these two larger trends: Lev Kule-
shov, known for his montage experiments, most famously the formulation of the
proverbial “Kuleshov effect”; and Dziga Vertov, known for the category-bursting
non-fiction production of the early years of Soviet cinema. Without wanting to
personify these larger trends and while trying to undermine the overriding auteur
theory still prevalent in film history, the oeuvre of these two celebrated directors
can be productively mapped onto a genealogy of re-editing and non-fiction. I will
deal here with the re-editing of existing films while non-fiction would require a
different kind of reflection.5
In the early 1920s, most films exhibited in the Soviet Union were foreign pro-
ductions, mostly German and American, or films that originated in the Tsarist
period. Yet, these films were often shown in altered versions since the film com-
mittee already had, in early 1919, founded a section for the re-montage of foreign
films (and of films produced before the revolution), a practice dating back to
1918 and that remained common during the whole existence of the Soviet
Union.6 A good many filmmakers sharpened their eyes and scissors while practi-
cing these transformations, among them Lev Kuleshov, Sergei Eisenstein, and
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Esfir Shub. The practice of re-montage consisted first of all of the cutting and
removal of excessively violent or overtly sexual scenes. Obviously, this common
way of censorship was not specific to the Soviet situation alone. More impor-
tantly though, far-reaching changes were made when films were converted ideo-
logically: whole sequences were pieced together in different ways, titles were
changed, and shots were removed to give a film a different political thrust. A
classic example of this “bolshevikation” of Western films is the transformation
of Dr. Mabuse, der Spieler (Fritz Lang, 1921/1922) into Gilded Putrefac-
tion (Eisenstein/Shub, 1924).7 Apparently, Eisenstein took time off from the
editing on his debut Strike (Stachka, 1925) in order to work on Lang’s film,
which demonstrates that this was not just an assignment done grudgingly, but
an integral part of developing a different way of making films. There was a spe-
cial value involved in working with existing material (instead of shooting one’s
own); there was something to be learned from the rearrangement of shots and
the modularity of film. The Soviet montage school is unthinkable without this
practice of creating new meaning by cutting, repositioning, or exchanging shots.
The technique was widespread, as practically all foreign films were re-edited.
As Yuri Tsivian reports, these specialists and cinephiles avant la lettre developed
an extraordinary pride and confidence in their work:
They were connoisseurs: no one in the film industry (or outside it) knew
Western cinema better than the re-editors; they were experts: few filmmakers
compared to them in mastering the technique of editing [...]; they were arro-
gant: they believed they could improve Griffith! And despite being badgered
by film critics, they were proud of their profession!8
The reversal of hierarchies so typical of the Soviet culture in the 1920s related to
the theory of re-montage on a number of levels. One can point out, for instance,
the inversion of the traditional evaluation of the arts, most famously encapsu-
lated in Lenin’s legendary claim for film as “the most important of the arts.”
Additionally, the eccentricity and the carnivalesque in FEKS (factory of the ec-
centric actor);9 the significance of the circus, highly valued by Eisenstein; the
prominent feature of the music hall in work by the Futurists;10 and the notion of
“ostranenie” (making strange) by the Russian formalists,11 are all indicators of
this reversal of hierarchy. Here, the inversion of center and periphery adheres to a
practice of breaking down traditional barriers and evaluations, of toppling tradi-
tional value judgments, of rearranging existing elements. Undermining and
transforming the narrative, making a film state something unintended as in the
re-montage is akin to this reversal of established hierarchies.
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From Collage to Montage: Modernism
In retrospect, the Soviet cinema of the 1920s is often subsumed under a single
term: montage. It is hard to disagree with this claim, as the collection of hetero-
geneous fragments, the juxtaposition of different parts, and the sudden clash of
diverse pieces indeed became an important and central aspect of the films that
came to represent the Soviet production as a whole in the West. While it is im-
portant to remember that the 1920s also saw a popular cinema of genre films and
an interest in film stars,12 the focus of this chapter will remain on the more high-
brow art aligned with the avant-garde. In fact, montage in a wider sense is not
specific to the cinema and it was widespread in avant-garde art practice of the
1920s.13 The concept itself can be found in various guises across different
modernist art forms: from collage in visual arts (Cubism and Surrealism, Han-
nah Höch), to the integration of everyday material in literature (Tristan Tzara,
James Joyce, John Dos Passos, Alfred Döblin), all the way to the usage of existing
phrases in sound art (Charles Ives, Walter Ruttmann’s Weekend). In Russia,
montage was prefigured in pre-revolutionary art, especially in Futurism and con-
structivism, and then taken up via theater, as can be seen in Sergei Eisenstein’s
short film, Glumov’s Diary (1923), which was made for a theater production.
This opens up a wide horizon for understanding the practice of re-editing, or
re-montage. In formal terms, re-montage was related to collage because the crea-
tive act consisted of cutting up, isolating elements, destroying an old context and
creating a new one, when re-combining the pre-existing parts in a different
whole. Re-montage could also be related to the Dadaesque technique of blowing
up an ordered bourgeois universe and creating non-sense (or anti-sense); the
title Gilded Putrefaction could have easily been thought up for a Zürich
Dada soirée or for a meeting of the Parisian surrealists. Moreover, an element of
abstraction can be found in this strategy as the narrative – which traditionally
takes center stage – recedes into the background and fresh meaning is created
from existing material in a new assembly. It is on these three levels – collage
technique, destroying existing order, and abstraction from a predominance of
narrative – that the Soviet cinema aligned itself with avant-garde preoccupations
in a more general way. In fact, the practice of reverse engineering (i.e., taking
something apart in order to understand its functioning) is typical of a constructi-
vist ethos: isolating elements, examining how energy is generated through a par-
ticular sequence by focusing on the contrast and alternation of parts, and putting
the elements together again. The modular approach, constructing a whole from a
limited number of existing entities, proved to be crucial for montage, as the film-
makers saw themselves as engineers working on the hearts and minds of the
people.
This new practice was fundamentally born from the capabilities of the me-
dium, as Jay Leyda in his pioneering study on the compilation of film has argued:
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“The basic technical contribution of Kuleshov [...] was the discovery that there
were, inherent in a single piece of unedited film two strengths: its own, and the
strength of its relation to other pieces of film.”14 The new practice also called for
a different organization of labor which followed a specific model: the collective
or the reliance on a small and stable group. One can think here of the FEKS
collective, of Eisenstein and his assistants (they called themselves “the iron
five”), of Kuleshov’s workshop, of Dziga Vertov’s Cinema-Eye group, of the Pro-
letkult collective and many more.15 Working in collectives had two direct effects:
on the one hand, this was meant to work against the diagnosis of alienation from
work that orthodox Marxism saw in Fordist factories, where tasks were divided
into minimal units assigned to different workers; on the other hand, producing
in small groups of highly skilled specialists is reminiscent of engineering teams
in research departments. The Soviets were fascinated by modern industrial pro-
duction in which labor was divided according to abstract models of flow and
efficiency. Similar models were developed by Frederick Taylor, whose ideas influ-
enced Vsevolod Meyerhold’s notion of biomechanics (which in turn can be found
in Eisenstein’s thinking). In fact, the Soviet montage cinema arguably occupies
the confluence of scientific management and Pavlovian behaviorism, since it can
be mapped on the human body and psyche.16
In the desire for renewal and restructuring, these examples are not only novel
models for organizing labor processes that address the individual as a specific
bundle of physiological and psychological reactions, but these activities also
gave rise to the study and teaching of the medium. Tellingly and crucially, the
collective was not only a work collective compatible with communist society, but
it moreover led to a dissemination of knowledge and abilities that were in tradi-
tional film cultures (like in Hollywood or Weimar Germany) heavily policed by
specialists’ associations. The pedagogical impetus of the avant-garde has tradi-
tionally been neglected, yet education is a crucial element in any attempt at re-
structuring the power relations in the cinema.
Practical Research and Theoretical Practice: Studying the Cinema
The idea of technē, prevalent in 1920s Russia, is one in which formal and aes-
thetic elements cannot be distinguished from technical or practical questions.
Therefore, technē does not distinguish between art, science, and technology, be-
tween theory and practice; instead, it connects skill with reflection. The early
experiments of Soviet film were as much practical research as they were theoreti-
cal practice. In this sense, the Soviet filmmakers behaved like engineers faced
with the daunting task of making a new machine from the recombination of old
parts. At the same time, this process was seen as a learning experience which
could be reflected upon and appropriated in the next films to be made. Hence,
many of the early montage experiments took place in an environment of teaching
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and learning – in fact, (professional) filmmaking was not yet separated from
teaching and other didactic work. This merging of art and learning can be seen
for instance in Meyerhold’s theater experiments which brought Eisenstein to the
cinema, in the workshops of Kuleshov and FEKS, or in the work of Georgii and
Sergei Vasiliev, later famous filmmakers in their own right remembered mainly
for the socialist-realist classic Chapaev (1934). The Vasilievs put together an
educational film from existing material, The ABC of Film Editing (Azbuka
Kinomontazha, 1926) that illustrated the practice of re-editing. While the film
was used in class at the Film Institute in Moscow, there was also a book pub-
lished under the same title in 1930. Just like the avant-garde wanted to overcome
the barriers separating life and art, Soviet film culture aimed at an approach to
the medium that took the basic characteristics of the medium as its starting
point.
It is worth dwelling in a bit more detail on the workshop of Kuleshov and the
“films without films” which were staged in this context, as this practice illus-
trates how the medium film could be abstracted from its technical and material
basis. This was the preferred method of teaching in the early years of the VGIK,
the Russian State University of Cinematography, which had been in existence
since 1919, first as an acting school which was successively transformed into the
first film school anywhere in the world. The “films without films” were per-
formed on flexible stages with swift scene changes in order to master formal
aspects of montage in a different medium. Of course, lack of cameras, film ma-
terial, and other necessary equipment played a part in the reversion to theater,
but implicated in this practice was also an abstraction and generalization which
had a didactic effect for learning the principles and processes not in a passive
and abstract way, but concretely using a case study. When considering Kule-
shov’s workshop it becomes clearer how mastering technique is bound up with
an investigation into the basic functioning of a medium:
From 1922 through 1926 […], the workshop held classes off campus. Class
members were permitted to study with Kuleshov alone and were excused
from attending courses taught by other teachers. The group’s autonomy en-
couraged a sense of collective learning and cohesiveness within the class. In-
dividual students with special skills – boxing, acrobatics, set design – led
classes within their areas of expertise. Exams and grades were never adminis-
tered; instead, particular achievements were recognized by tokens ranging
from ribbons to flowers, and these were issued on the basis of a student vote.
In lieu of reading assignments, the group collectively attended movies at Mos-
cow theaters, studying and discussing the only texts they deemed worthy –
film.17
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In formalist circles, such as the journal Lef, the debate on re-editing peaked
around 1926 when the Soviet cinema was taking another direction – from large-
scale experiments toward narrative-driven films aimed at achieving a specific po-
litical effect. Writers at Lef took issue with Dziga Vertov for shooting new materi-
al, but also for the way he used documentary material, thus destroying it for
future use. As Mikhail Yampolski has argued:
Films were born from the film archives as from the earth, in order to return
again to them. The eternal document absorbed the transient film. […] In so
far as the material was understood as raw material for permanent re-combina-
tion, the film archivebecame an endless and inexhaustible source for the fu-
ture film-maker.18
Not coincidentally, the mid-1920s was the time when the achievements of the
Soviet cinema became first visible to an international audience in films such as
Eisenstein’s Battleship Potemkin (Bronenosez Potemkin, 1925), Pudov-
kin’s Mother (Matj, 1926) or Kuleshov’s By the Law (Po Zakonu, 1926).
One had to discard at least of the more radical part of this (apparently) un-
controllable practice which was nevertheless a necessary step in developing the
specific techniques of meaning-making through montage.19
Yet again, Soviet filmmakers had no monopoly on this kind of practice. Films
created through the practice of montage and re-contextualization of existing foo-
tage could be found at the same time in avant-garde circles across Europe: Bal-
let mécanique (Dudley Murphy/Fernand Léger, 1923) uses pre-existing foo-
tage; Inflation (Hans Richter, 1927) is comprised almost entirely of stock
shots; as is the satire Histoire du soldat inconnu (Henri Storck, 1932).20
At the same time, similar techniques were also not uncommon in more main-
stream circles: under the auspices of the German film studio Ufa, popular com-
pilation films were made by Oskar Kalbus, e.g., on Henny Porten (Henny Por-
ten. Leben und Laufbahn einer Filmkünstlerin, 1928), and
Prometheus also heavily re-edited Soviet films for re-distribution in the West.21
Arguably though, the Soviet experiments were the most radical and the most far-
reaching, as they combined psychological and physiological elements with artis-
tic and cultural considerations.
Conclusion
It is always difficult to establish direct links of cause and effect, but it is hard to
deny that the widespread practice of re-editing – corroborated by the lack of ma-
terial after the revolution – played a crucial part in establishing montage as the
key technique of filmmaking. It could be argued that these experiments gave
many of the filmmakers that rose to prominence in the 1920s the chance to de-
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velop skills and techniques that they would later integrate into more standar-
dized and predictable forms in the service of the revolutionary cause. The ques-
tion that was implicitly asked in the different experiments was whether meaning
was inherent in a shot or whether it was the sequence in which it was edited that
fixed its meaning in a certain way. Therefore, the nexus between the collision of
shots as experienced in the spectator’s psyche and mind was seen as the gravita-
tional core of filmmaking, rather than the indexical nature of the image or the
phenomenon of images in movement.
The 1920s in the Soviet Union saw a broad reception, discussion, and applica-
tion of psychological theories in politics and economy, but also in the arts and
culture, all the way from Taylor’s scientific management to Rorschach’s and Pav-
lov’s psychological experiments. In this respect, montage was seen as a specific
psychotechnique meant to directly work on and stimulate the body and mind of
the spectator. The cinema as a modern machine was likened to the mind, which
was conceived as a similarly modern machine whose functioning, it was believed,
could be decoded by science. Montage was seen as the key to understanding the
functioning of the mind and the effects of combining specific shots could be
ascertained in exact terms. It was through exploring these relations that theory
and practice, creating and learning came together up until the mid-1920s when
the changed context of film production cut short some of the more radical ex-
periments. In the meantime, these attempts were instrumental in bringing about
the astonishing output of the Soviet cinema between 1925 and 1932.
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Technophobia and Italian Film Theory
in the Interwar Period
Francesco Pitassio
Cinema would not change in any way its character, if specialized miniaturists
painted the whole film in miniature, instead of it being photographed. […]
Image origins are indifferent to film art, since film “matter” lies only in in-
ternal relations between image series creating a unity, and so forth.
– Eugenio Giovannetti, 1933
Somehow, Italian theorists of the interwar period, who were very suspicious of
technology and of theoretical discourses concerning cinema technologies in par-
ticular, often explicitly disassociated themselves from technology. They were in
some respect technophobic, meaning that they feared “the effects of technological
developments on society.”1 In some ways, the attitude of Italian theorists toward
technology is somewhat surprising as it stands in sharp contrast to Italy’s own
cultural heritage handed down by the Futurists, who, from the 1910s on, cele-
brated technology in art; it also stands in sharp contrast to the interest in cin-
ema’s technological newness within early European film theory (certainly in the
1920s) at large. To name but two particularly prominent theoretical debates of
the period: the reflections on the power of the photographic image within French
theorizing on so-called photogénie2 by Delluc, Dulac, Epstein, and others; and the
predominant role of scientific thinking on the (envisioned) effects of cinema
technologies by Eisenstein, Pudovkin, Kuleshov, and others within the Soviet de-
bate on the cinema.3 Notably, many of the terms belonging to a transnational
theoretical debate made their way into Italian discussion, which was coming into
its own between the 1920s and the 1930s.4
Italian Theorizing in the Interwar Period
Italian film theory followed two main trends. On the one hand, it sought an
aesthetic acknowledgment for cinema and related critical and theoretical dis-
courses; in order to accomplish this task, Italian film theory needed to set some
boundaries for the discussion by detaching it from practical and professional
needs and placing it within the realm of philosophical speculation. To reach this
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ultimate goal, film theory demanded to borrow philosophical conceptual tools,5
forged by the prominent national philosophers of the time. On the other hand,
film theory started to define and examine cinema within a media system as an
apparatus belonging to modern life.6 Following these two trends, a good deal of
research has been done in Italy in previous decades.7 In addition to previous
research, my aim is to provide a description of the ways institutional, philosophi-
cal, and political frames determined film theory in its relation to technology and
in its social action. This influence was not exclusively limited to highbrow, aca-
demic discussion. Even among intellectuals familiar with the European debate
and film production, idealism affected many terms of the discussion. For in-
stance, this was also the case with Enzo Ferrieri (1890-1969). Ferrieri was an
active intellectual who played an instrumental role in the then recently created
state radio broadcasting system. He was also a leading organizer of cultural jour-
nals and film clubs. Nonetheless, by examining his private archive, which con-
tain the texts of his film lectures and correspondence, the influence of idealistic
philosophical ideas on Ferrieri emerges rather clearly. I would consider this ex-
ample as quite telling of a widespread condition of the national cultural debate.
Finally, recent historical research, as developed mostly in Italy and in the Uni-
ted States, focused on modernization processes taking place during the Fascist
era, and more specifically during the 1930s.8 It is certainly not my purpose to
deny or challenge these assumptions, which I share for the greater part, specifi-
cally concerning production and reception processes. Nonetheless, I would like
to partially reconsider these general assumptions by tracing the lineage of theo-
retical reflection and its idealistic sources, since idealism was quite at odds with
modernization. By choosing such a line of inquiry, it is my intention to add some
features to Italian film culture identity, which might partly explain the outburst
of Italian film humanism in the post-war era as the underdevelopment of a high-
tech industry, even though a huge industrial context was surrounding film pro-
duction and the film market.
Idealist Legacies and the Attitude toward Technology and Science
The theoretical discussion of the technological apparatus of the cinema (l’appareil
de base) was frequently dominated by accepted philosophical frameworks. This
was not very conducive, as Collins and Pinch already indicated.9 One might say
that to Italian film theory the technological base of cinema was a black box. As
Bruno Latour explains: “The word black box is used by cyberneticians whenever a
piece of machinery or a set of commands is too complex. In its place they draw a
little box about which they need to know nothing but its input and output.”10
Cinema was mostly discussed in terms of its (aesthetic) effects, barely taking
into account its machinery – a word that was disdained itself.
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Nevertheless, Italian film theory and the very few remaining traces of technol-
ogy should be pondered for several reasons, if only because technological pro-
gress does not happen as a separated, one-way development, but as a multi-fa-
ceted process, where material components, scientific speculation, economic and
industrial factors, and social needs continuously overlap. To quote Rick Altman,
What is utmost needed is instead a theoretical approach that, although fully
recognizing cinema’s material and commercial nature, could also consider
how film art responded in different ways to specific and relevant social func-
tions as needs related to self-representation. […] In fact, a full understanding
of cinema’s material and industrial basis implies considering both the exist-
ing technological multiple differences (cinematic or not) and their artistic,
financial and social ends.11
Therefore, I will pay attention to these theoretical discourses because they were
part of the collective knowledge concerning cinema and its technology. From
this standpoint, dismissing the technology of cinema comprised a major part in
this knowledge-building process, leading to peculiar outcomes. As a matter of
fact, any scientific discourse in social as in semiotic terms implies a system of
presuppositions,12 i.e., its co-text.13 I consider Italian film theory and its neglect
of technology as a co-text for technological discourses in Italy, or for the lack of
their full development in the interwar period.
Early-20th-century Italian philosophy, and specifically Italian idealism, played
a significant role within this field in two different ways. On the one hand, two of
the utmost influential philosophers, Benedetto Croce and Giovanni Gentile,
openly rejected scientific knowledge as partial or false. For instance, Benedetto
Croce examined and dismissed scientific concepts as pseudo-concepts, be they
empirical (as those elaborated in natural sciences) or abstract (as those produced
by mathematics). Pseudo-concepts, he argued, lack the duplicitous quality of real
concepts that philosophical knowledge produces: universality and concrete-
ness.14 Giovanni Gentile in this respect was quite close to his elder colleague,
for he, too, saw science as a particular (and limited) sort of knowledge. Both
philosophers placed the humanities, i.e., philosophy and art (and history, in
Croce’s case), at the top of the knowledge processes: philosophy and art unified
the spirit as a non-empirical knowledge. This antiscientific attitude originated in
a reaction to positivism and the rise of new scientific methods, endangering the
legacy of Western European thinking. By taking such a clear stance in early-20th-
century national and European culture, Italian idealism determined a specific
“knowledge” apparatus, producing elements of knowledge, in the sense of Fou-
cault, as something that must conform to the rules and constraints belonging to
a certain type of scientific discourse in a certain epoch.15 Italian idealistic philo-
sophy, I would argue, is a hegemonic scientific discourse, validating what is to be
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admitted and acknowledged. The main reasons for my standpoint are twofold:
firstly, philosophical concepts stemming from Croce’s and Gentile’s works are
blatantly present in Italian film theory; secondly, and most significantly, the in-
stitutional influence exerted by both philosophers, through cultural institutions
and governmental processes, led to an overall reform of school teaching. Giovan-
ni Gentile was a prominent intellectual during the Fascist era; furthermore, he
was also Minister of Education in 1922, realizing the school reform that Benedet-
to Croce fostered. As philosopher Pietro Rossi describes,
The main polemic target upon which Croce and Gentile agreed was positivist
culture, mostly the Italian one. But the battle against positivism also implied
refusing scientific culture, or more specifically, refusing a culture in which
science played a relevant role. […] From the very start of the century Gentile
was mostly engaged in transforming the Italian school system by declaring
the role classical culture was to have in spiritual education, to which school
itself must tend, and its supremacy on scientific culture. […] The school re-
form was actually not so much “Fascist” – as the regime presented it – as it
was inspired by idealistic principles.16
The school reform was among the main actions the new political regime im-
posed on the nation, and contributed in establishing a set of cultural and knowl-
edge values that would endure in the following decades.17 Among these values
were the hegemony of classical culture and the humanities, and the pedagogical
role assigned to the state. Fascist cultural politics also appointed intellectuals as
mediators between highbrow and popular culture (for instance, cinema), and as
educators.18 In order to instruct the future ruling class, intellectuals ratified and
disseminated the main cultural trends implied in the school reform and idealistic
culture overall. This is why a new cultural institution, established in 1935 and
devoted to the training of film industry personnel such as the people studying at
Centro Sperimentale di Cinematografia (National Film Academy), imposed com-
mon topics for all students: universal humanities such as history of literature, art
history, music history, and film history and film aesthetics, these latter two based
on the previously established humanities model.19 Thus, even in professional
training technology was conditioned by the humanities, although the national
film school and related publishing did contribute to the dissemination of techno-
logical knowledge through a series of handbooks.20 In fact, Italian film theory
and critical discourse built a hierarchy of knowledge, placing humanities at the
very top, and science and technology underneath, as a necessary evil. To resume
a wide range of positions, let us consider Gentile’s authoritative statement,
which he made in the preface to Cinematografo (an influential book in the field of
film theory by Luigi Chiarini, who was soon to become the head of Centro Sper-
imentale di Cinematografia):
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In creation, the universe as an antecedent disappears or, if you prefer, is trans-
figured: it becomes the artist’s world, infinite. Technique dies down, art begins.
[…] The problem is solved by overcoming or annihilating technique; i.e., in represen-
tation, as the audience does not see any more the mechanism producing it;
and the man that the audience sees before its eyes, is alive, not on the screen,
but in the world.21
As this brief passage shows, man and life (as perceived of by humanism, and
allegedly classical culture) prevail over technology, which is canceled out and
merged in mere art. Technophobia in Italian film theory defines in paradigmatic
terms a certain state of interwar Italian culture – in its relation to scientific
knowledge and its application – a certain institutional order, and a set of actions
spanning two decades.
The Sound of Theory
Regarding the interval of technophobia in Italian film theory between the 1920s
and the 1930s two main areas of interest were constitutive: theoretical discourse
itself (as explained above); and the transition to sound. Rick Altman already ex-
plained how much a specific epistemology – a crisis historiography as he called it –
may help to understand the way a medium is shaped.22 It seems to me that the
Italian transition to sound may help to understand the contemporary attitude to-
ward technology: 1) the shift draws observers to look at cinema from a historical
perspective, forcing them to associate it to different states of being;23 2) this
incites commentators to ask questions about the medium’s technological nature
and invites them to include technology itself as a medium’s component; and 3)
by significantly changing the apparatus’s basic technology, the transition to
sound in itself enhances cinema’s material and technological basis.
The Italian transition to sound certainly created a very prolific and intense pe-
riod both in terms of theoretical discourse and production. In the early 1930s,
experimentation with sound technology in film production flourished, producing
very peculiar films such as Resurrectio (Alessandro Blasetti, 1931), La can-
zone dell’amore (Gennaro Righelli, 1930), or Acciaio (Walter Ruttmann,
1933). Furthermore, technologically recorded and reproduced sound was at the
heart of many reflexive films throughout the 1930s, ranging from transnational
comedies, such as La telefonista (Nunzio Malasomma, 1932), to interna-
tional style productions such as La signora di tutti (Max Ophuls, 1934).
Nevertheless, these films seldom drew much theoretical attention, and in parti-
cular popular comedies were largely neglected, if not overtly despised. Most of
the time, theoretical speculation did not directly refer to current national film
production, and certainly not at the end of the 1920s, when there was hardly a
relevant national film production to speak of. The wide and quite abstract debate
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on the rebirth (Rinascita) of the national film industry after the bleak crisis of the
mid-1920s merged with theoretical speculation.24 Because of this connection,
discourses on technology were very often related to a national issue. For in-
stance, technology became a matter of national primacy in what concerned scien-
tific inventions. To name but one example, in a rarely considered technological
treatise popularizing film technology, its author opposes technological Italian
imagination to a one-dimensional commercial Anglo-Saxon pragmatism:
If we cannot be fierce enough merchants in the fight, we would do well to
remember that we are Latin: recognizing our infinite genius might be a good
idea. Let’s draw our competitors into the arena of technique and fight them
here, where we also have our weapons and know how to handle them. Let’s
fight here, where brains are more valuable than dollars. […] In the name of
technique we will be able […] to win the battle for national film.25
In line with this, Fascism financially and politically supported the 40th anniver-
sary of the cinema, and helped to display technology as an outcome of Latin
genius.26 Furthermore, Italian scientific culture seemed reactive to the needs of
technological innovation, as a census of patents for color or sound technologies
reveals.27 At the same time, this kind of culture did not get much support,
neither in theoretical debate, nor in industrial development policies from the
silent era on. As Silvio Alovisio remarks, technology played a marginal role in
film discourses, as industrial policies aimed at projecting and producing technol-
ogy were sporadic.28 Only rarely did critical and theoretical discourses articulate
national issues with regards to industrial research and development: practically,
critical reflection did not fully take into account the need for an articulate indus-
trial basis in order to build a national cinema. If they did, they focused on the
Hollywood film industry, referring to it with mixed feelings of admiration and
despise. For instance, when commenting on The Singing Fool (Lloyd Bacon,
1928), refined intellectual Alberto Cecchi criticized the way technical innovation
affected the overall structure by turning film sequences from figuration to repre-
sentation, from paintings into scenes.29 On a more positive note, Cecchi also
acknowledged the Hollywood film industry’s unique achievements, based on the
interconnection of industry, technology, and promotion.30 In Cecchi’s seminal
view, this combination led to Hollywood’s tendency to naturalize representa-
tions, narratives, and ethical values.31 What was at stake was modernity itself,
and the social processes that media unleashed. The effects of the cinema were
felt everywhere. A quite peculiar intellectual in that era, Eugenio Giovannetti,32
noted:
Airplane, automobile, radio, television, cinema, gramophone work altogether
in creating and gaining a cosmopolite audience, with an aesthetic and moral
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unity beyond any national boundary. […] As an effect of mechanical arts, the
world is turning into a unitary, limitless artistic democracy.33
The effect of technology, eventually feared by the traditional and established cul-
tural organizations, was a loss of inherited privileges. Within this context, Gio-
vannetti’s enthusiasm about media induced transformations was largely ignored
by his contemporaries.
The advent of sound raised a series of issues concerning technology and its
power over aesthetic determination. Italian film theory, as a legacy of philosophi-
cal idealism, wanted to see artworks transfigure reality into a renewed form, fol-
lowing the artist’s intuition and concept. This (idealist) position was well known
and widespread at the time. As Luigi Chiarini observed in the mid-1930s, “cin-
ematic reality, as pictorial or sculptural ones, is not reality, exactly reproduced,
but artistic reality, i.e., transfiguration. […] Every art transfigures in relation to
its technique and, therefore, to its expressive means.”34 The most limited this
technological capacity remained, the better it was for the expression, as Rudolf
Arnheim’s influential remarks on sound and cinema outlined.35 What was at
stake was expressive pureness planned by an artist, which sound technology
might endanger by adding to representation raw expressive materials. In Italy,
Luigi Pirandello was among the first to stigmatize sound cinema, since it
dragged the attention of the audience away from representation to technology.36
But at the heart of the issue is the confrontation between material and ideal ele-
ments, and the dismissal of the former, as artist and filmmaker Anton Giulio
Bragaglia explained:
The trouble with sound cinema is the gross spontaneity pertaining to crude
sound reproduction of either music or dialogue. […] The required transmuta-
tion and transfiguration of sound images, comparable to visual ones, is lack-
ing here.37
Sound technologies led some theoretical accounts to couple sound to stereo-
scopic technologies. Both technologies were acknowledged for the ways in which
they could enhance the resemblance to the real in some ways.38 Nonetheless,
theoretical speculation looked with suspicion at this resemblance, rejecting a key
feature of cinematic technology: mechanical reproduction.
Reproduction and Animation
Emerging within European theoretical debate in the first half of the 20th century,
mechanical reproduction has often served as a rhetorical feature to assess and
point out cinema’s difference from previous expressive forms, and its belonging
to a wider range of media. Furthermore, mechanically produced images often
technophobia and italian film theory in the interwar period 191
serve as a visualization apparatus in scientific discourse, as Françoise Bastide terms
it, meaning that an apparatus’s main task is making available to sight what is
otherwise concealed.39 Mechanical reproduction as the technology underlying
cinematic representation is a crucial topic to be examined in many theoretical
accounts. Nevertheless, Italian film theory systematically overlooked or reduced
this fundamental element of cinematic representation. The technological and the
mechanical were considered to be sinful qualities that prevented the medium’s
sanctification as an art in its own right. Italian film theory underestimated the
power of photographic reproduction and omitted it from its discursive strategies
to the point that most film theory volumes lack illustrations altogether.40 Photo-
graphic illustration, however, dominated the popular film press. The dismissal of
the mechanical did not exclusively concern institutional discourses, such as those
that took place between the covers of highbrow journals or volumes on aes-
thetics. Informal discussions on cinema, such as those that took place within
film club activity related to the journal Il Convegno, also regarded cinematic ma-
chinery as a negligible feature. The fact is much more striking if we take into
account that the film clubs were screening avant-garde films as well as feature
films on a regular basis; films that did not shy away from the technology issue,
such as At 3:25 (Paris qui dort, René Clair, 1925), Freedom for Us (A
nous la liberté, René Clair, 1931), or Ballet mécanique (Fernand Léger,
1924). At the start of the 1930s, Enzo Ferrieri declared in an unpublished lecture:
By creating a cinematic rhythm, the director sets himself free from the ma-
chine’s burden and enters the spiritual realm. Somehow, by being perfectly
aware of the machine’s value, instead of being subject to his tool, the director
dominates it to the extent that he profits from all its possibilities, in order to
achieve spiritual architectures of unprecedented beauty.41
The films screened in Ferrieri’s circle as well as those he referenced consisted of
world-famous examples of recent and current film art: French and German
avant-garde filmmakers, Georg Wilhelm Pabst, Erich von Stroheim, Rouben Ma-
moulian, and others. These film choices seem at odds with Ferrieri’s idealistic
philosophical ideas about film, which provides a clue about the key issue here:
the aim was less to enhance and evaluate technology’s unprecedented functions
in artworks, and much more to dismiss and conceal its role in order to stress
cinema’s resemblance to the established arts and to include it in their system,
within a shared set of values. Such a stance is quite surprising, if we consider
that during previous decades the national cultural arena saw the outburst of Fu-
turism and its appraisal of technology, machinery, and new forms of vision. Ex-
tensive and in-depth research has been done on the topic of the Futurists and
their appreciation of technology, which goes beyond the scope of this chapter
and will not be addressed here.42 However, despite this apparent recognition of
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technology that took place prior to the technophobic period under discussion, it
seems that Futurism did not truly influence the Italian theoretical debate regard-
ing cinema as it was carried out in cultural journals and treatises; whereas its
assumptions were much more influential in other forms of art such as painting
and music. Nevertheless, the indirect influence of the Futurists can be traced in
film practice, specifically during the sound era. For instance, in terms of motifs,
a film such as What Scoundrels Men Are! (Gli uomini, che mascalzo-
ni!, Mario Camerini, 1932) celebrates movement and the machine: when Bruno’s
car speeds, it de-figures the landscape and thus emphasizes movement and the
machine simultaneously. Similar influence can also be traced through poetic
practices, such as sound composing: in O la borsa o la vita (Carlo Ludovico
Bragaglia, 1932) recurring urban noises, as in the opening stock market se-
quence, foregrounds the technology of sound. Additionally, when film theory in
Italy was defined as a discursive field, Futurism was partly institutionalized. If
some references to past avant-garde filmmaking survived, this often happened in
alternative film practices, such as architecture documentaries or subsidiary
films,43 Cineguf (Fascist university associations) film production, and alternative
newsreels (for instance, Settimana Cines).44 Finally, Futurism itself was often
interested in cinema’s representational novelty, i.e., its aesthetic and linguistic
peculiarity and modernity, however its technological specificity was not neces-
sarily discussed in-depth. In this respect, the discussion on special effects or on
slow and fast motion was fully inherited in late 1920s and early 1930s reflec-
tion.45 In this regard, a cynical but interesting note can be found in Ferrieri’s
remarks, as he discusses the machine in Futurism as a strategy to preserve old
mythical structures underneath the surface:
Considering the “machine” as the only modern source of inspiration, creating
the “speed myth,” should be nothing but a need to grasp new spiritual con-
tents to replace and banish the old ones.46
As with every cultural inheritance traces remain; however, instead of being cele-
brated as in Futurism, technology was dreaded and molded into a form accept-
able to idealistic philosophy. As was the case with mechanical reproduction,
technology was seen as an obstacle to the full rise of the film artist, i.e., the film
director. The professional role envisioned for the film artist within the con-
straints of idealistic philosophy and based on the unity of the subject, played a
crucial role in Italian theoretical debate.47 Alberto Consiglio explicitly advocated
cinema as an individual art form, and therefore an art in its own right.48 In order
to consider cinema an art according to idealistic philosophy, theoretical debate
needed to dismiss technology, specifically the expressive means of technology,
and claim an individual creator as a savior. Commentators suggesting that cin-
ema should be considered among the figurative arts49 were attacked, although
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they stayed within the realm of idealistic philosophy: true art does not need any
expressive specification.50
Photography as a topic was introduced to the debate, but it was barely consid-
ered a scientific means to analyze and describe reality beyond the capacities of
the human eye. Photography, so closely associated with cinema did enter into the
Italian debate51 via the French notion of photogénie.52 Moreover, Béla Balázs’s
writings, translated into Italian from the early 1930s on, had already spread
among contemporary Italian intellectuals. Photography, was understood as a
creative resource, a means to realize the artist’s intuition by overcoming reality
(and its reproduction). Furthermore, photography could grasp the ideals beyond
physical appearances. As Bragaglia declared, when describing his Futuristic
photographic experiences in the 1910s, known as photo-dynamism (fotodinamis-
mo):
We strived to make photo-dynamism less and less photographic, and to por-
tray more and more dematerialized – and, thus, more and more idealized –
moving figures. This is because reality appalls us as a result of its indifference
and materiality.53
Figuration is privileged over reproduction, as in classical culture and idealism. As
Bragaglia declares:
The more slowly [a gesture] is performed, the less deformed, the more unreal,
ideal, lyrical, as extracted from its personality and closer to [a universal] type it
will be, with the same deforming effect the Greeks sought for their beauty
types.54
Later on Bragaglia opposes photo-dynamism to cinematography (as understood
in Marey’s scientific research, to whom he expressly refers). One would be hard-
pressed to find a more clear-cut opposition between a classical culture, often
underlying Futuristic claims, and a scientific one. Figuration appears the best
solution available, in order to preserve a subjective creation over the scientific
apparatus. And animation fitted perfectly in this frame of thinking. Unsurpris-
ingly, it was praised by some Italian film theorists as the pure essence of cin-
ema.55 This appraisal concerned early Hollywood animation, such as Pat Sulli-
van’s Felix the Cat cartoons (starting in 1919), but also Europe’s first attempts at
animation, as in the case of Lotte Reininger’s films. As the film critic and future
successful screenplay writer Ettore Maria Margadonna wrote:
I dare to say that pure cinema, the purest, are “cartoon songs.” Their main
characteristic feature is easy to describe: “cartoon songs” are untranslatable
and non-reproducible, they are just cinema and nothing else.56
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Margadonna’s words indicate why non-mimetic cinematic models such as “car-
toon songs” played a relevant role in the theoretical reflection on the cinema:
they were symptomatic of the suspicions and dismissal of the technological basis
of film. Nevertheless, after WWII theoretical debate mostly concealed the expres-
sive potential of non-mimetic cinematic models and marginalized them as a sub-
sidiary or minor part in theoretical reflection.57 Nevertheless, Italian film theory
occasionally promoted animation as pure cinema because of its closeness to tra-
ditional, non-reproducible art forms, such as miniature, thus proving how much
one dreaded the social, cultural and hierarchical shifts film technology could
elicit if given free reign. It is by no chance, for instance, that Ferrieri promoted
The Adventures of Prince Ahmed (Die Abenteuer des Prinzen
Achmed, Lotte Reininger, 1926),58 a renowned German animation movie based
on hand-made silhouettes. The profile of these slim, enchanting figures was de-
cidedly more capable of resembling ephemeral ideals, or miniatures, than any
photographed bodily appearance could have been.
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Jean-Luc Godard’sHistoire(s) du
Cinéma: Cogito Ergo Video
Céline Scemama
Fig. 1: Chapter 1b, A Single Story, 1’45’’.1
On Technique, Thought and Beauty
When viewing Histoire(s) du Cinéma (1988-1998), one necessarily asks one-
self how, technically, Godard succeeded in bringing such a vast selection of
sounds and images into this impressive and infinitely beautiful work. One also
wonders from where the bits and pieces of images, phrases, and melodies were
taken, even as they vanish and are replaced by others – but this is another matter.
We cannot begin to consider the film’s poetics – a film about History, which, for
Godard, means a film about all stories – without taking into account how God-
ard, as a filmmaker, puts the techniques of cinema to the test.
Long before this highly atypical film, Godard had always attached great impor-
tance to film techniques. In À Bout de Souffle (1960), he used highly sensi-
tive film generally reserved for photographers and the making of documentary
films; in La Chinoise (1967), he already thought of using a video camera; he
used high-definition video for an unprecedented color treatment in Éloge de
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L’amour (2001), and is considering using stereoscopic 3D technology in his
next film (Adieu au Langage). In Histoire(s) du Cinéma, strangely en-
ough, the innovation does not lie in the adoption of any technological novelty
but in the way Godard uses methods and processes that are in fact very old –
which also lends the film a melancholy and tragic dimension.
What is important here, however, is not Godard’s relationship to any state-of-
the-art technology. According to him, he had thought of using a video camera on
La Chinoise, at a time when Sony had no interest in such cameras: “When La
Chinoise was being made, I’d seen a camera and a video recorder in Philips’s
window, and said to myself that the discussion in the room between the Maoists
could be filmed on video by them and they could then make their autocritiques, as
the fashion then was.”2
What matters is not so much whether his interest in new technologies put
Godard ahead of his time, as is the way in which he instantly thought of using
them to serve his outlook on the times; more than one year before the May 1968
events started in France, he had already made La Chinoise. The young revolu-
tionaries he depicts in this film “play at” revolution and, as Shakespeare and To
Be or Not to Be3 have taught us, there is no incompatibility between “playing”
and “doing.” Therefore, the kind of theatricality one observes in La Chinoise is
in fact the most vivid expression of a certain social reality as the artist saw it.
Godard was well aware that representation was an integral part of the revolution-
ary process, and his video camera project – whereby the characters would have
been shown filming one another – was meant to emphasize this essential fact.
In Histoire(s) du Cinéma, Godard uses old cinematographic techniques –
“a wonderful legacy of the past”4 – and thus experiments in an unprecedented
way of conceiving a prophetic work of History, a kind of funeral announcement.
For Godard, this means going back to the infancy of cinema as it lays dying. Iris-
ins, iris-outs, fast motion, slow motion, superimpositions, old-fashioned fade-
outs: Histoire(s) du Cinéma integrates all the outdated effects and cinemato-
graphic tricks that Epstein used to theorize and experiment with, and that Élie
Faure already regretted: “Superimpositions and slow motion effects, which
played a fundamental role in the development of our rhythmic and visual educa-
tion, have disappeared from most contemporary films.”5 Godard is neither con-
servative nor backward-looking; however, he has never refused a new technical
possibility and has always been infatuated by machines.6 In the manner of pio-
neers such as Méliès, Lumière, Griffith, and Vertov, he has always experimented
with the technical potentialities his art offered. “Technological inventions bring
the idea of a new art form. But once the idea exists, [...] it inspires technology in
turn, gives it a direction and a specific mission.”7 In this case, Godard entrusts
the art of film with a mission that has often been denied: to think – and, more
particularly, to think “all the stories.” And to think, for Godard, means to see...
and to see implies to hear. Consequently, such audiovisual thought cannot be
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dissociated from what is objectively – and hence technically – happening on
screen. Even though his transformation of the Cartesian phrase – “Cogito ergo
video”8 – is sometimes considered humorous, it is nevertheless a founding prin-
ciple, a discourse on method.
Are thought and beauty two separate entities? It seems not, as Godard uses
techniques to forge his audiovisual material into beauty and thought at the same
time: “Few pan shots – maybe one high-angle shot, but because a mother is cry-
ing over her murdered child”9 – a phrase that reminds us of Godard’s statement
from the sixties: “Tracking shots are a matter of morality.”10 What is beautiful is
not the represented thing itself, but a form’s accuracy with regard to its object –
which is why Godard repeats no less than eight times in the film: “neither an art
nor a technique: a mystery.”11
The thought and beauty present in a work of art essentially depend on the
employed techniques: technique is everything. On the other hand, technique is
nothing without the use one makes of it. An artist makes do and invents new
forms with whatever comes to hand: therefore, technique is nothing. Thought
and beauty, in a work of art, are the result of a coincidence between materials,
techniques and the various ways in which the artist uses them: a mystery, that is,
which this article does not pretend to solve but to explore – notably through the
analysis of certain film extracts.
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Fig. 2: Chapter 1a, All the Stories, 44’55’’.
Associated to Greenberg’s line in To Be or Not to Be,12 when quoting Shy-
lock in Shakespeare’s Merchant of Venice (act III, scene 1): “If you prick us, do we
not bleed? If you tickle us, do we not laugh? If you poison us, do we not die?”
Cogito Ergo Video
Godard’s version of Cartesian certitude – “Cogito ergo video”13 (Fig. 3) – means: “I
think, therefore I see.” Consequently, Godard thinks what he shows – that is,
what he sees. In other words, his thought never precedes what he sees: “Never
decide anything in advance,”14 Bresson writes. Godard’s thought exists only be-
cause his sight is focused in a very specific way, and inasmuch as “a mechanism
gives rise to the unknown, and not because one has found this unknown in ad-
vance.”15 Histoire(s) is entirely based on this principle. We can see Godard’s
thought take form on screen, as it were, from one shot to the next – although not
in the way we see and grasp objects that surround us, as ideas cannot be sepa-
rated from their mode of appearance: the combination of images, words and
sounds. This principle is very much in keeping with another Bressonian precept:
“Your film is not readymade. It makes itself as it goes along under your gaze.
Images and sounds in a state of waiting and reserve.”16 Godard follows Bresson’s
teachings and respects “the precept: find without seeking.”17 Once in contact
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Fig. 3: Chapter 1b, A Single Story, 0’14’’.
with the associated images, sounds and words, the screen, thus impacted, re-
veals the unexpected: “It is profitable that what you find should not be what you
were expecting. Intrigued, excited by the unexpected.”18 The whole difficulty –
“hoc opus, hic labor est” 19 – implied by this method is to “Provoke the unexpected.
Expect it.”20 To provoke and wait at the same time: a fine paradox, for the artist,
which ties in with the other great principle upon which Histoire(s) is based: “A
thought that forms a form that thinks”21 – “to provoke” being the equivalent of
“a thought that forms,” and “to wait,” of “a form that thinks.” This phrase is not
more rhetorical than Godard’s transformation of Cartesian certitude, as God-
ard’s thought does not exist independently from the images that appear edited
together on the screen – which amounts to saying it does not exist without the
syntax Godard uses to work with his material, a syntax which wholly depends on
the instruments of cinema and, in this particular case, of video.
Are video and cinema here considered as two separate art forms? Generally
speaking, they may be – and sometimes quite vigorously –, but Godard himself
implies no such thing. According to Youssef Ishaghpour, “[…] For cinema to
turn in on itself in this way, in this sort of reflection on itself and its History –
for that to be possible and for the result to become a Scripture, cinema squared so
to speak, a great work – it seems to me that the existence of video was neces-
sary.”22 And to that Godard answers: “Video seemed to me one of the avatars of
cinema […] I’d say there was no very big difference between video and cinema
and you could use one like the other. […] Video came from cinema, but you can’t
say now that IT23 comes from cinema.”24 However, Godard explains that what he
realizes in video could not be done through cinema. He also says that,
Histoire(s) was cinema. Technically it was textbook stuff, very simple
things. Of the forty possibilities in the list I used one or two, mostly overprint-
ing to help retain the original cinema image, while if I’d tried to do the same
thing with film I’d have to use reverse negative copies and that causes a loss of
quality; above all you can alter the image easily with video, while with film all
variation has to be preplanned. […] It was an act of painting. The overprints,
all that comes from cinema, they were tricks Méliès used.25
Godard’s answer is highly significant, especially in its paradoxical aspects. He
explains that Histoire(s) is at once cinema and an act of painting, and that
video is cinema, even though all that video enables could not be done with film.
Two points may be singled out: according to Godard, video is cinema’s daughter,
or one of its avatars, but the immediacy of the mixing and combination of images
is – as such – only possible with video. The potentialities of video are compared
to an “act of painting” because, in both cases, the artist works with his hands,
and, furthermore, the screen may be compared to the painter’s canvas receiving
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shapes and colors. Before the form itself begins to think, the artist must think
with his hands, whether in the art of film, video or painting.
The mind is only true when it manifests itself – and in the word “manifest,”
one hears the [French] word “main.” [...] It is time that thought becomes what
it truly is: dangerous for the thinker and capable of transforming reality.
“Where I create is where I am true,” Rilke wrote.[…] It is said that some
think, others act. But man’s true condition is to think with his hands. […] I
shall not denigrate the tools we have, but I do wish they were functional – […]
if it is generally true that the danger does not lie in the tools we use but in the
weakness of our own hands.26
Thinking with One’s Hands (Fig. 4)
Video enables Godard to make a film in a more visible and immediate way: the
editing, fast and slow motions, superimpositions, fade-outs, and so forth, are
directly made on a set of screens and in a sound control room. It is Godard’s
hands that think and try out new rhythms and associations, and with his eyes
and ears that he apprehends the outcome of this “form that thinks” in its turn:
“It is manual work,” Godard says. This clearly appears in the film, notably in the
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Fig. 4: Chapter 4a, The Control of the Universe, 7’19’’.
passages using reverse, fast or slow motion effects: when Capitaine de Boïel-
dieu,27 in slow motion, miraculously rises from the ground after having been
shot, for instance, or when a young woman28 runs toward a door in fast motion
and does the same movement in reverse and in slow motion.29 The latter shot is
caught between two shots showing edit benches, which further emphasizes the
manipulative process at work. In the film as a whole, Godard shows 31 times the
image of a spinning film reel on an edit bench – a film in the process of being
edited –, thereby using video to show the potentialities of celluloid film and de-
monstrate the essential manual dimension of cinema. The most significant shots
in that respect are those that show Eisenstein manipulating film30 – an icon of
cinematic thought at work (Fig. 5).
This enables Godard to try out the effects an image, a sound, a word, a title
and a bit of dialogue produce when they are brought together. From an infinite
number of possible compositions, Godard chooses only one, leaving the fabrica-
tion process partly apparent in the completed work. This is particularly obvious
when the word “error” appears on the screen:31 at one point, when alluding to
the founder of Universal Studios, Godard first mentions Erich Pommer, but in
the next shot, a written phrase appears: “Error – Carl Laemmle” (Fig. 6). He also
says:32 “and Tyrone Power in a romance set in the South Seas – never mind the
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Fig. 5: Chapter 3b, A New Wave, 5’26’’. Eisenstein cutting film and Anna
Karina:1 “Beauty. Montage my beautiful care.”
story, so long as it is entitled Birds of Paradise.”33 And then, “error” appears on
screen again, followed by “Virginia Mayo.” And Virginia Mayo herself appears.
This happens three other times in the film: Godard leaves the traces of this trial
and error, because they show the way he proceeds and how his thought pro-
gresses on screen. However, among all the possible solutions and compositions
he tried out, he kept only those that appear in the film – highly complex compo-
sitions on which are based both an individual thought and a specific art form.
For instance,34 the expression “dream factory”35 – which reflects the duality of
cinema itself – has a double meaning in this context: the factory one has been
dreaming of, a beautiful factory, and, on the other hand, an industrial machine
designed for the mass production of dreams. “SUDDENLY”: the Russian title
card from Battleship Potemkin (1925) creates an interruption similar to the
inversion of power represented in Eisenstein’s film. The battleship retaliates by
shooting at the palace. Eisenstein’s three stone lions – one asleep, one sitting,
one rising to its feet – symbolize, in three shots, the uprising of the people with-
in a very short period of time, hence mirroring the revolutionary process. Within
a few seconds, the people have taken power. But immediately afterwards, Godard
says “the Gulag Archipelago” and thereby announces what will follow: the death
of Lenin, and the collapse of a dream. “Communism has worn itself out dream-
ing such factories,” Godard says a little later. Schubert’s Unfinished Symphony – as
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Fig. 6: Chapter 3a, The Small Change of the Absolute, 6’53’’.
unfinished as the communist ideal itself – accompanies the images of Dziga
Vertov’s Kino Pravda until the roll of the timpani announcing Lenin’s death.
Superimposed on Lenin’s inert face – and while the Unfinished Symphony still re-
sounds – there appears, in a very quick alternation, the image of women’s faces
evoking the decadence of a corrupt civilization. Those women – one of whom
smokes a fat cigar and occupies a central position – appear as scavengers feast-
ing on Lenin’s body. It is most unlikely that the simple juxtaposition of these two
images would have sufficed to produce such a powerful effect, but the flickering
superimposition gives the impression of a successful attack on Lenin’s body
launched by the women of The New Babylon (1929, Fig. 7).
Neither an Art nor a Technique: A Mystery
Even though none of all this would be possible without the use of technique,
Godard nevertheless rejects the primacy of technique in the foundations of art
and thought: “I mean that cinema has never been an art, and even less so a
technique. Technicians might tell you this isn’t true, but one must bear in mind
that the 19th century, which invented all techniques, also invented stupidity.”36
Techniques do not really matter, video is cinema, and “the camera has never
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Fig. 7: Chapter 1a, All the Stories, 15’37’’. Lenin and a shot of The New
Babylon.1
fundamentally changed: the Panavision Platinum is less sophisticated than the
Debrie 7…”37 In fact, nothing is ever predetermined by the artist, that “operator
of associations” – “A thought that forms a form that thinks” – but it is such
techniques and such gestures that produce the unexpected that appears on
screen: a mystery, that is, since whatever objectively appears onscreen neither
results from technique nor intention.
“Neither an art nor a technique,” says Godard. Of course, such a statement
must be put into context, as Godard is probably the last person on earth to not
consider cinema as an art form – and even Art itself, as it appears in Histoire
(s). However, by going back to the origins of cinema – the infancy of an art form
– he brings the mechanical characteristics of the cinematograph back to the fore-
ground. He also refers to the Lumière brothers’ prediction, which he explains as
follows: “An art without a future, a kind warning immediately uttered by the two
brothers [...] and then they were misunderstood: they spoke of an art without a
future – namely an art of the present, an art that gives, and receives before it
gives: say, the infancy of art.”38 An art – Godard calls it an art – that, because it
inherited from photography, becomes the most realistic of all art forms. The
infancy of art is the promise that art made to life, because cinema, by reprodu-
cing life, has a responsibility toward life, and resounds through it: here is an-
other aspect of the mystery.
Let us consider another example39 dealing with the potentialities of the cine-
matograph’s early techniques – the infancy of an art that promises to fulfill its
duty toward the life it is capable of reproducing, and, on the other hand, of an art
perverted by its desire to gain power over life itself. Such a thirst for power over
life is related to that which realizes itself in war. And such a desire to possess the
world is incarnated onscreen under the aspect of another: the desire to possess
the body of a woman. Both aspects are systematically interconnected in His-
toire(s) du Cinéma: every time a threat looms over a living thing, every time
humanity is offended, attacked, raped, despised, or worse, pornography fills the
screen and the bodies of women become objects of domination. The phrase
“Splendor and Misery of Cinema” appears on screen, thereby emphasizing the
two opposite aspects of cinema: Eadweard Muybridge’s galloping horse, and,
later on, Étienne-Jules Marey’s flying bird – “splendor,” the same sequence re-
peated over and over of a lion going round and round in a cage – splendor and
misery – a pornographic film from the nineteen-thirties (Fig. 8). Superimposed
on magic lantern animals, stags appear, along with the phrase “on cinema,” and
a song by Otis Redding is heard: I’ve Been Loving You Too Long – a sadly ironical
counterpoint to the “love stories” shown in pornographic films.
There are no exact words to describe what can be seen and heard on screen
while viewing Histoire(s) du Cinéma: the combination of many forms and
the modalities of their encounters. Maybe this is what Godard has always called
montage, one that has never existed yet, “like a plant that never really popped out
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of the ground […]. People at the time of silent movies felt it very strongly and
talked about it a lot. Nobody though really found it.”40 Cinema thus seems con-
demned to die without having done what it could and had to. Nevertheless, in the
dusk of the 20th century, Godard produced this monumental opus displaying, like
a fireworks display, the full power of film editing. Paradoxically, he uses the
techniques of video to discover cinema’s most lively mode of expression. How-
ever, video – which Godard considers as one of the avatars of cinema – is not
used to make a video film but to show – in a state of emergency, before it is too
late – in what consists the kind of cinema that fundamentally relies on editing –
that is, on associations. And this is a manual work above all else. The whole
“mystery” of Histoire(s) seems to rely on the strange balance struck between a
thought developed with one’s hands and that elaborated with the help of ma-
chines.
Translated by Maxime Shelledy
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Fig. 8: Chapter 1b, A Single Story, 28’54’’. A pornographic film from the thirties
and Rolla (Gervex, 1878).
Performativity/Expressivity: The Mobile
Micro Screen and Its Subject
Nanna Verhoeff and Heidi Rae Cooley
Informed by a tradition of cinema and visual culture studies on the one hand,
and science and technology studies and new materialism on the other, we mobi-
lize Peircean semiotics in order to theorize new media technologies and related
practices. Our question is, in what way performativity and subjectivity are central
to an understanding of technology. It is our contention that it is in performative
and expressive inscription that technologies have cultural, social and historical
embedding and meaning. In the following we will explore how the dispositif of
mobility, and the fluid spatio-temporality of emergence that we see as underpin-
ning a visual regime of navigation, require that we acknowledge that technolo-
gies, practices, and subjects are in a particularly dynamic relationship.
Mobile Subjectivity: Navigation and Findability
In hand and “on,” the mobile micro screen defines subjectivity in the digital and
mobile present. Not only is it a “window” through which we see, touch, and
navigate the world, but it is also a recording device by means of which we docu-
ment, “share,” and understand ourselves as present within our surroundings. Its
real-time touchscreen interface invites us to approach the world through layers
and streams of data. Concerns for location (i.e., where-ness) and destination
become central. And because our devices are nearly always on and connected –
cellular service, wi-fi, Bluetooth – our movements, even our gestures, register us
as locatable to innumerable others – human, technological, and institutional.
In order to grasp more fully the status of mobile subjectivity, it is crucial to
think in terms of performativity (as opposed to use) on the one hand, and ex-
pressivity (as opposed to self-expression) on the other. Specifically, our aim is to
bring together questions about navigation and findability, which we see as fun-
damental to the current moment in which a rapidly changing landscape of new
technologies of mobility opens onto equally dramatic shifts in the construction
and articulation of subjectivity. In this regard, the mobile micro screen functions
as a site for thinking about processes of inscription. Inscription, as Bruno Latour
has explained, refers to “all the types of transformations through which an entity
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becomes materialized into a sign, an archive, a document, a piece of paper, a
trace.”1 What is more, inscription defines how behaviors between human and
nonhuman actants stabilize over time and how, as a result, actions become rou-
tine and by extension also invisible. We grow accustomed to the ways in which
technologies shape our interactions and transactions; in the habit of regular use
and everyday practices, we forget what this might mean.2 In light of this mutual
inscription of mobile technologies and practices, we are specifically interested in
understanding the implications of mobile technologies for subjects who are con-
structed in the process of negotiating technological affordances, performative
agency, and the expressivity that making use of these technologies brings about.3
In what follows, we explore the navigational use of the mobile screen. The
possibility for the interaction in real-time across temporal registers in augmented
reality and navigation apps means that subjectivity is constituted in the act of
navigation. Technology affords and constrains how we relate to our surround-
ings, yet it is in the relation with her surroundings that the subject is positioned.
The mobile subject emerges within an ensemble of her physical location and the
mobile micro screen interface, her potentially ever-changing geographical loca-
tion (whether or not en route toward a specified destination), and the various
data that she accesses and disseminates along the way. The moment of this ar-
ticulation plays out through the performativity that is the expressivity of mobile
screen practices. We contend that the conditions of mobile subjectivity brought
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Fig. 1: Diagram of the mobile dispositif of navigation.
Augmented Reality: Navigation and the Index of Destination
Because individual agency is materialized through an articulation of the mobile
user being active and present “on-grid,” her physical interaction with the screen,
and the streams of data she produces (intentionally or not) in the process, we
posit that mobile screen practices always take place within a mobile dispositif.
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This Foucauldian concept has been taken up and developed in French film theory
by Jean-Louis Baudry and Christian Metz to provide a theoretical construct of
what is often translated in English as the cinematic apparatus, and helps us to
analyze the material and spatial specificity of the arrangement within which
screens operate and the subsequent construction of screenic subjectivity.4 Prefer-
ring the French term with the Latin root of dispositio, which emphasizes the
power of “position,” we use mobile dispositif in this context to refer to the spa-
tial, yet mobile arrangement comprised of technology, screen content or image,
and subject, according to which the process of “screening” takes place.
For our purpose here we take the navigational interface of augmented reality as
the mobile dispositif par-excellence in the digital present.5 Augmented reality, or
AR, refers to a digital mobile interface by means of which “data from the net-
work overlays our view of the real world.”6 Commercial smartphones and tablets
today boast AR functionality. In fact, as Jason Farman has argued, AR has be-
come a “key technology” for extending, or expanding, the meaning of a place
through site-specific data overlays that appear on screen in real-time.7 Not sur-
prisingly, many AR applications populate the smartphone’s real-time image with
commercial information, such as the locations of and reviews for local restau-
rants or stores. However, other uses for the technology exist. For example, a
number of applications present historical and archival information and imagery
so that one can experience – touch, even – the past, as it is plotted in the present.
Like a living avatar in a game, the mobile screen subject simultaneously navigates
on- and offline space. She moves through the city from screen “pop-up” to “pop-
up” in a manner much like a treasure hunt. While embedded in the software, the
activation of geo-located information on screen in AR requires the navigator to
move. AR interfaces show a little map on screen in the form of a compass-like
circular “radar” image or perspectivally oriented grid to indicate the various
points of interest (POI) around the user according to proximity. It is only when
in the vicinity of a POI, and turned in the right direction that the screen displays
the location-specific, geotagged content. This makes the image itself a destina-
tion, and navigation becomes a tracking of that information.
American Pragmatist Charles Sanders Peirce provides a perspective for inter-
preting how the mobile subject, with device in hand, “on,” and raised for viewing
information overlays on the AR interface is constituted in the process of mean-
ing-making. His theorization of indexicality supplements Latour’s notion of in-
scription and allows us to describe more precisely how mobile subjectivity man-
ifests in the digital present. Significantly, Peirce identifies two categories of
indexicality: a trace from the past and relational deixis in the present. This logic
of classification allows us to account for both the directional gesture that AR
invites, if not necessitates, as well as the digital traces that mobile connectivity
produces.8 The affordances of the mobile micro screen – portability, connectiv-
ity, location-awareness, and AR functionality, in particular – make it possible to
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interpret indexicality as producing a multi-layered temporality, one that includes
the future and possibility-oriented temporality of destination as a third category
of the index. This is because the device tracks where one has been in relation to
where one is going, at the same time it registers text-messaging, image-sharing,
and other social-networking practices, not to mention the various data prolifer-
ated by Internet searches and mobile application diagnostics.
Looking at the widely familiar apps that feature augmented reality and/or navi-
gation at this moment of writing, such as Layar or Wikitude, we see that when a
mobile phone user lifts her device and directs its screen-lens toward some object,
she enacts deixis: she points, and thereby, establishes a relational presence of
subject and object. The real-time image appearing on-screen frames a referent
that is only here and now – in the moment of the instance of framing. The user
and her display occupy – identify – the presence of each “now,” “here,” and
“there” in its passing. As film theorist Mary Ann Doane has indicated, deixis is
the “purest form” of Peircean indexicality. Proceeding in the manner of a point-
ing finger, or the “this” and “there” of language, deixis only exists, that is, it only
signifies, in the now of its happening. It “evaporate[s]” in the very moment of its
production.9 This is precisely the kind of indexicality at work in augmented real-
ity applications that overlay the real-time image with information by combining
the user’s gesture with GPS system-oriented data.10
We propose the moment of AR’s mobile screen gesture to be an index of des-
tination. Not an indexical trace of the past – some that-has-been, e.g., the photo-
graphic image – deixis only has a shifting referent in the present. Yet, in naviga-
tion this present is invested in the future of “going somewhere,” triggered by
markers that have been plotted and tagged with GPS coordinates within the spa-
tial field. This scripted trail, organized in and made operational by the program-
ming software and AR interface, harbors a future trace of the forward movement
of navigation. This necessitates a different thinking about the screen and its im-
age. Not committed to an end result or a fixed visual representation that might
serve as a verifiable document, the AR interface produces an index of emergence
– a temporally layered and dynamic product of, and tool for, negotiating place in
the present with respect to both the past and the future. AR establishes a set of
relations among the here-and-now of the present, the traces that indicate past
itineraries or movements through space (e.g., GPS coordinates), and the future,
or some destination, toward which a subject is moving in a haptic, performative
engagement with space and time. This navigation is in essence a performative
cartography, underpinned by a “techno-logic,” that simultaneously “gives birth
to both space and subject.”11
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“You Are Here”: Findability and the Indexical Trace of Expressivity
While the performative cartography that is practiced by means of the AR interface
is produced in the act of deictic gesture, it simultaneously produces indexical
traces.12 Beyond the oily residue of one’s fingers on the touchscreen surface,
GPS coordinates and GSM cell tower data track the participant. This is because
the moment of deixis coincides with and, in fact, requires the smartphone’s loca-
tion-awareness functionality. At each moment the device registers location-based
information. Our movements through a space are recorded and mapped so as to
enable site-specific information in the time of one’s movements. The resulting
artifacts, recorded as metadata, constitute an index-symbolic relation that docu-
ments a device’s “having-been” in a particular place at a time so-recorded.13 Not
unlike light “touching” the photographic medium, electromagnetic waves strike
a receiver and “stamp” a location into a file. We attribute to such metadata the
evidentiary properties we assign to the photograph. We believe that this informa-
tion “points back” to a time and place.
More than indexes in this conventional sense, these traces of where-ness are
likewise evidence of the expressivity of performativity of AR navigation.14 Expres-
sivity, here, does not mean self-expression. It does not refer to any self-aware,
autobiographical “I” who intends to document her movements. Rather we pro-
pose that mobility itself is expressive of subjectivity. When one pauses and for
how long, where one shifts direction and with what frequency: these instances
of change within the navigational context communicate moments of attraction or
attention that transpire in the immediacy of the moment before conscious deci-
sion factors in. In other words, the manner by which one inhabits the present
and the momentum of navigation are expressive of an articulation (i.e., assem-
blage) between a mobile subject and her device. In the case of augmented reality,
when deixis inspires interaction with and movement with respect to the touchsc-
reen, the mobile subject’s engagement expresses. The impulse to find the next
locative pause, the inclination to screen information overlays on a real-time im-
age, the desire to pinch and swipe the augments that appear onscreen all “speak”
through the pause, the gesture, and the resumption of mobility.
The “you are here” icon that specifies a mobile subject’s location underpins
the cartographic act of navigation, which unfolds in a sustained present that is
always positioned toward a future as a possible destination. And because AR’s
layering transpires according to a person’s location as registered by satellite and
wi-fi connectivity and GPS tracking, it confronts users with, while simultaneous-
ly allowing them to forget, the fact that their devices are both navigation devices
and tracking devices. As a consequence, “you are here” renders the mobile sub-
ject not simply locatable, and the map/screen navigable, but also calculable and
therefore findable. Here, we distinguish between locatability and findability,
wherein locatability involves specifying a stable and stationary position or loca-
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tion, while findability names the capacity to access and recombine data about
location.
As a logic that underpins governance, findability requires coordinated invest-
ments in both locatability and navigability such that shifting patterns of move-
ment and relation, for example, across people, objects, and information, can be
identified, followed, and interpreted, and, more importantly, anticipated. Navi-
gation, as a practice of moving through space in relation to site-specific layers of
data, produces patterns that can be quantified and used to predict other possible
movements. In this way, the mobile subject is always a site of relay, a point of
measure, assessment, comparison, and prediction. Because the mobile subject –
her navigation through both place and information – is tracked, “patterns of use”
always ensure that persons are findable within a population (of people and data)
as well as across a physical terrain.15 This is how navigation and its correlate
findability make governance possible. The affordances of the mobile micro
screen mean that the techniques of governance are always already implicit in
routine practices of mobility.16
In this regard, the triangulation of tracking, tracing, and monitoring as per-
tains to navigation matter. The tracking inherent to the project of findability in-
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Fig. 2: Connecting to the past in the present via the AR of Ghosts of the Horse-
shoe (December 4, 2012). Pictured: Dr. Susan Courtney and undergraduate AR
programmer Andrew Ball. Image: Heidi Rae Cooley.
vests in where-ness (Where is x at any given moment?). Relatedly, tracing, crucial
to navigational technologies of destination, concerns outlining trails of move-
ment (What is/was x’s itinerary?). And monitoring, an extension and intensifica-
tion of surveillance, insists on a continuous following (i.e., observation) of mo-
bile entities in the present (Where is x and what data is x proliferating in this and
all other – past and subsequent – moments?). While monitoring is not our main
concern in this article, it is relevant to mention, insofar as it is the ongoing con-
dition of monitoring that enables tracking and tracing. In the next section, we
consider two examples in which tracking and/or tracing figure prominently.
Tracking and Tracing: Between Where-ness and Destination
To conclude, we offer two case studies that exemplify both the twin logic of
navigation and findability and the distinction we discern between tracking
(searching: the analysis of “where-ness”– location specific and in the present)
and tracing (following: the analysis of movement in a trail history, whether it is
already the past, or transpires in present, or heads into a future). While the two
projects differ substantially in terms of their goals, both revolve around the prin-
ciple of digital navigation as performative deixis – a making visible in naviga-
tional movements through space – and the subsequent layering of past, present,
and future. Both raise the question of “where” and “when.” Both suggest a status
of the image which is emergent in the connection between past and present.
Moreover, they position an “I” that is the center of that deictic transaction. They
reflexively address How?, in our use of technology, we situate ourselves in rela-
tion to past, present, and future.
Our first example is a critical interactive called Ghosts of the Horseshoe currently
under development at the University of South Carolina.17 Ghosts intends to de-
monstrate how the deixical gesture as inspired by the AR interface might open
onto moments of empathic identification, or in Peircean terms, intellectual sym-
pathy. Featuring the “Historic Horseshoe,” the app draws participants into rela-
tion with history and historical figures by turning the mobile micro screen into a
“window” onto the past in order to bring to visibility the unacknowledged history
of slavery that made possible the physical site that many take for granted. As
participants traverse the grounds, the app tracks them. At designated locations,
it announces the “presence” of a datapoint or augment. In the case of AR func-
tionality, the overlays on the real-time image respond to gesture and touch in
order to “fill in the gaps” where institutional history falls short and a general
lack of awareness predominates. One might confront an historic photograph of
a building, whose degree of opacity varies with the swipe of a finger to reveal
how the physical structure before which one stands has been modified. One
might encounter the three-dimensional rendering of an architectural “skeleton”
of an outbuilding (i.e., slave quarters) that no longer stands. One might come
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across a textured brick augment, which upon touching, activates an audio
recording of the ambient sound of brick-making or the voice account of slave
life informed by archival records and performed by a professional slave inter-
preter.
Ghosts uses the affordances of locative screen technologies in order to trans-
form everyday mobility into an embodied experience that might facilitate a dee-
per empathy with a past that otherwise is regularly overlooked. For example, it is
not just that one imagines in the abstract the work of slaves forming, firing, and
carrying bricks and, subsequently, building a wall. Rather, one becomes capable
of comprehending in situ and through the “lens” of AR the daily labor done by
slaves to create the wall that stands physically before her today. In the process,
she relates to the built environment differently. She “sees” a division of labor
rather than just an old wall. Ghosts of the Horseshoe imagines that at the intersection
of a continuously refreshed real-time image, the here and now of a user’s deixical
relation to her surroundings, and the geo-coordinated ghostly encounter we
might find the condition of possibility for thinking differently about a physical
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Fig. 3: Detail of Meridians, GPS drawing by Jeremy Wood (2006).
Image: Jeremy Wood.
place and the work of history as these intersect in the present. The hope is that
such experience might encourage mobile subjects to take responsibility for a
legacy that is embedded in a seemingly ordinary landscape.
While this case works with and critically interrogates how we can be recon-
nected with a complex and layered past, we shift our focus to a work that seems
to reverse this directionality: one that uses navigation to inscribe the present with
a past whose traces reveal the technology for navigation to be one for recording
and writing.
An exemplary GPS artwork is Meridians by Jeremy Wood (2006) which shows
an aerial image of recorded traces of navigation by GPS superimposed on the
landscape, much like a palimpsestic drawing of movements within the land-
scape.18 The words that these movements compose are a phrase from Melville’s
Moby Dick: “It’s not down in any map; true places never are.” The traces of past
movements performed by the artist, walking with a GPS device, make up the
superimposed lines that shape the words layered on the aerial image. Paradoxi-
cally, the artwork emphasizes the ephemerality of movement, while the words
can only be expressed by making the emergent “happening” of physical move-
ment readable by the “drawing” of lines. Performativity and expressivity are con-
flated. For, the artwork makes clear, visual representation, indeed, “needs” the
indexicality of the trace as a residue of what was before a deictic present, slanted
toward the destination in the future. Tracing, then, is the recovery in the present
of the movement in the past toward the future – like a residue of navigation –
unlike tracking, which entails the search for presence at a specific time: the pin-
pointing of position. As such, tracking is about where-ness – albeit in the succes-
sive “points” within a trajectory; tracing is about the articulation of the trajectory
itself – the line that is established in the movement between the points. The
question the GPS drawing raises, then, is about the difference between move-
ment and writing, and stillness and “reading” in the close connection between
performativity and expressivity.
What makes these two cases comparable-yet-different is how both track-and-
trace the movements of the mobile subject. In both cases, meaning evolves
through a present that is future-oriented. The first opens onto a definitive albeit
polemical past – a history whose material remains constitute the present site of
traversal, or mobility. The second reveals that we leave trails all of the time be-
cause of the devices we have in hand. The first takes advantage of this but does
not explicitly comment on it, although the trails participants produce appear on
the historical map interface. Similar to Melville’s poetic observation that “it’s not
down in any map,” the maps of the campus do not “speak” the history that Ghosts
mobilizes. The lines that appear on the Ghosts’ map are perhaps less “signifi-
cant”– literally, they do not signify – than the lines in Meridians, but they do
suggest/invite possible destinations. Meridians, on the other hand, does not di-
rectly invoke the (traditional) map. Instead, it does invoke innovative mapping
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practices that are implicit in the association with the satellite-view layer that is so
significant for digital cartography (made widely known by the Google maps in-
terface) and that the tracking-by-GPS as tool signifies. What is communicated in
each instance, however, is substantially different because the first privileges
tracking and the second foregrounds tracing.
As social anthropologist Tim Ingold has suggested, a notion of space as being
a container for movement and “holding” our presence is a fallacy of the logic of
inversion. His “contention is that lives are led not inside places but through,
around, to and from them, from and to places elsewhere.”19 In a similar vein,
our argument in this essay has been that it is really in the connection “between
the dots,” within the flow of movement, in the performative act of navigation,
that mobile “presence” and subjectivity is created. The rather nostalgic phrase by
Melville, indeed suggests that the “map” or image could never harbor the subjec-
tive, lively presence of being and going. What is lost is the “true” place – of
history and change – that is emergent in practice. Mobile technologies are funda-
mentally embedded in that logic, a logic perhaps also expressed in Emerson’s
famous words, that life is a journey, not a destination. This perhaps somewhat
poetic philosophy, we hold, is underpinned by the fundamentally material semio-
tic logic of the mobile micro screen.





Rethinking the Materiality of Technical
Media: Friedrich Kittler, Enfant Terrible
with a Rejuvenating Effect on Parental
Discipline – A Dialogue
Geoffrey Winthrop-Young and Annie van den Oever
Friedrich Kittler, Professor of Aesthetics and Media History at Humboldt Univer-
sity, Berlin, who passed away in 2011, is generally considered to be the intellec-
tual father of the relatively new discipline of media archaeology. Most, if not all
of his work was written in an academic German one can safely label as complex,
dense, and highly idiosyncratic. Moreover, Kittler never hesitated to be provoca-
tive or thought-provoking. Unsurprisingly, he was controversial and often mis-
understood. In retrospect, however, most media scholars agree that Kittler is one
of the most important media theorists of the past thirty years.
A very early reader of Kittler’s work, the Vancouver-based Professor of German,
Geoffrey Winthrop-Young, having attended Kittler’s early career lectures in Ger-
many as a very young student, developed into an insider with expert knowledge
of Kittler’s texts, sources, shifts, affinities, and Kittler’s “supreme media-theore-
tical trinity,” Shannon, Heidegger, and Turing. He was among the first to intro-
duce Kittler’s work to the English-speaking world. His Kittler and the Media (2011)
provides a concise, yet sophisticated and slightly provocative overview of Kittler’s
works and is the ideal introduction to Kittler’s work, according to many. Addi-
tionally, he wrote Friedrich Kittler zur Einführung (2005) and numerous essays on
German media theory, media archaeology, so-called cultural techniques, and sys-
tems theory.1 He co-edited two collections of essays on Kittler and is the co-
translator (with Michael Wutz) of Kittler’s Gramophone, Film, Typewriter (1999). At
this point in time, he is working on Media, Systems, Spheres, a book on German
(media and systems) theory with special emphasis on Kittler and Niklas Luh-
mann (among others).
A dialogue with Geoffrey Winthrop-Young on Kittler and media archaeology
was initiated by me for the very reason that Kittler’s work had a profound impact
on the international community of film, media, communication, and cultural
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studies; a profound assessment of his impact on the fields of film and media
studies could not be missed in this book.2
As to the format of this dialogue: it will start with some introductory questions
regarding the context in which Kittler was working in an early phase of his career
and the ways in which Geoffrey Winthrop-Young became acquainted with him
and his work as a student in Germany in the early 1980s. Secondly, some provo-
cative and iconoclastic aspects of Kittler’s work will be explored. Thirdly, one of
Kittler’s crucial terms, “technische Medien” [technical media], will be analyzed (in
relation to Rudolph Arnheim); and the critique of “technodeterminism” regularly
being made against him will be addressed. Fourthly, his relation to, and rele-
vance for, the field of film studies will be assessed more elaborately. Lastly,
McLuhan’s impact on Kittler’s work (if any) will be discussed in more detail, as
part of a retrospective assessment of his work.
– Annie van den Oever
How It All Started
AvdO: So let me simply start with stating that reading Friedrich Kittler was for
very many years the exclusive privilege of a relatively small community of scho-
lars who happened to be able to read German. As all his readers know, reading
Kittler is one thing; understanding him within his context is a wholly different
chapter. As you wrote in the opening pages of your Kittler and the Media, one
simply must label Kittler German, though the term obviously needs some further
clarifications.3 It seems to me that you, being one of his earlier readers yourself,
must have felt that his work was badly in need of a proper introduction to the
English-speaking world, and then decided to write the book yourself – Kittler and
the Media – which indeed is extremely relevant and helpful for the wider commu-
nity of non-German-speaking readers who want to be introduced to Kittler’s
complexities and idiosyncrasies with sufficient knowledge of the context in
which his thinking developed. Now my question is: when did you start to read
him yourself and when did you pick up on him as a tremendously interesting
source for media studies?
GWY: I started reading him right after our first encounter in Freiburg in the early
1980s. Reading him was preferable to attending his seminars, which I soon
stopped doing.4 Though I must point out that I was 19 at the time: I doubt I fully
grasped what he was trying to say. Reading Kittler was often more a matter of
attitude than of analysis; his texts were a cool sound experience rather than a
source of critical insight. Also, I recall that I started reading him alongside the
new breed of science fiction which soon came to be known as cyberpunk – and to
this day this cross-reading shapes my view of Kittler. That said, I did sense back
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then that he was of singular importance to the future of literary studies. But it was
only later, when he had completed the intellectual and institutional move from
literature to media, that I began to realize how important he was for the latter.
AvdO: Reading Kittler was cool, as you said. Still is cool, I guess. His first circle
of readers were students and scholars. They were German mainly, if not, exclu-
sively. Kittler was German, born and raised in the former DDR. He wrote in Ger-
man. He taught in Germany, first in Freiburg and Bochum, later in Berlin, at
Humboldt University. You already met him in Freiburg, in an early phase of his
career, when he was in his late thirties. Could you tell us a bit more about this,
also about what you then understood as “his singular importance to the future of
literary studies” as you just labeled it.
GWY: Let’s focus on the second part of your second question and talk about
national matters of literature. Kittler started out at the University of Freiburg –
Heidegger’s lair – in 1963. He initially contemplated becoming either a philoso-
pher or a Romanist but ultimately opted for Germanistik, the study of German
language and literature (not to be confused with “German Studies”). But Germa-
nistik, once the uncontested keystone species in the German humanist habitat,
was turning into an anxious, unsettled discipline. Its insecurity was fuelled in
part by economic downturns that directly affected the job prospects of its numer-
ous graduates in the teaching profession. Germanistik, too, suffered its post-For-
dist awakening. On a larger scale, however, it was the inevitable result of the
demotion of literature as a medium for national self-understanding and collective
Bildung. Books and letters were losing ground; inevitably, their slippage affected
the disciplines that had grown up around them. Of course this is not a uniquely
German development, yet I think it is safe to say that it was felt more strongly in
Germany than in most other places because Germanistik had been so involved in
nurturing a national identity that only later took on concrete political shape. And
let’s be clear on this: No matter how unorthodox or zany Kittler’s analysis of
literary texts, his treatment of them as decisive moments of cultural inscription
does not stray far from their more established treatment as repositories of value
and sources of Bildung. Their truth content may evaporate, their hermeneutic illu-
sions may be exposed, but their efficacy and representativeness (and thus their
status as privileged objects of scholarly inspection) remain unchallenged.
AvdO: Would you say that in this particular phase Kittler was part of the crisis in
Germanistik being one of the most prominent disciplines in the humanities which
were looking for new approaches, new methods as well as new ways to legitimize
their academic activities and curriculum at that point in time? Moreover, would
you say that he not only was part of the crisis but also of its solution? In other
words, did he change the field in ways which were needed at that point in time?
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GWY: I like the way you phrase that: Kittler as part of both crisis and solution. He
certainly was prone to exaggerate a crisis in order to raise the profile of his solu-
tion. But no doubt there was a crisis, a crisis within Germanistik that incited
squabbles about the necessity to modernize the discipline. The debate was
further exacerbated by the delayed acceptance of the extent to which the disci-
pline had failed under the Nazis to uphold the values it claimed to convey. Enter
Kittler. He wasn’t overly concerned with values, politics, or disciplinary history.
In his student protest days the proletariat took a backseat to Pink Floyd. He had
little interest in any socio-emancipatory-oriented overhaul of the discipline. Yet
in hindsight it becomes apparent that he was engaged in a similar enterprise. He,
too, wanted to modernize the study of literature, but he advocated the archaeol-
ogy of its discursive and later media-technological layers and protocols. To me,
this was no less a bid for relevance than attempts to infuse the study of literature
with a more explicit socio-emancipatory agenda. Nobody will ever label Kittler a
Marxist (though he could on occasion express a faintly Althusserian approval of
the structuralist tendencies of the older, post-Parisian Marx), but his techno-Fou-
cauldian agenda struck me as an equally strident attack on the bourgeois blather
of academic routines. And it infused some of those who read and followed him
with no less of an anti-establishment feeling.
However, the great irony is that Kittler thereby gave the very discipline he at-
tacked and later abandoned a new lease on life. Before he left the house of books
and letters for that of numbers and codes, he shook it up. He broadened the
theoretical dimensions of literary studies by introducing so-called French theory;
his insistence that literary works must be studied alongside handbooks, dia-
grams, manuals, and programs extended the range of disciplinary objects; and
his technological bent prepared the gradual transformation of parts of German
literary studies into Kulturwissenschaften. No doubt all of this would have happened
without him, but he happened to have been there at the pivotal juncture, so give
the man his propers. As we know, academia and the real world operate differ-
ently. In real life, troublesome children make their parents age faster; in acade-
mia, an enfant terrible often has a rejuvenating effect on parental discipline.
AvdO: Would you say that Germanistik developed into Literaturwissenschaft which
was not only broader than Germanistik (and Philologie) but also different in that it
quickly developed a keen focus on theoretical and comparative issues – and then
helped to give birth to the newer field of Medienwissenschaft?
GWY: Yes, all that applies. And with regard to Kittler there is a peculiar irony.
While he contributed his share to the broadening of Germanistik, the discipline
also imported many of the North American approaches that fall under the blan-
ket heading of “cultural studies” – and which Kittler himself was quite averse to,
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and which at times did their share to delay or distort his North American recep-
tion.5
Kittler as Iconoclast
AvdO: I have been traveling and reading and rereading Kittler, as well as your
work on him and temporarily felt paralyzed by a fear to either sound smug or
too ironic when addressing one of the main topics – or worries – in a question
to you. Nevertheless. As to my worries: the topic of the war and media; his ob-
vious provocations; Kittler and women – his full-fledged misogyny, as many feel.
Of course you have already addressed them all in your last chapter of Kittler and
the Media, and elsewhere.
GWY: ... and while we’re ticking off the trouble spots, let’s add his views of the
achievements (or lack thereof) of certain cultures located to the east and south of
ancient Greece...
AvdO: With regard to the gender issue: would you say it has harmed the rele-
vance of his work as a media scholar with a keen interest in power relations to
have neglected this one point?
GWY: Yes, but the harm arises from analysis and attitude, not from neglect. The
gender issue is all over Discourse Networks and related texts. In fact, in this particu-
lar context neglect is a charge that should be directed at Kittler’s readers rather
than at him.
Let’s deal with one example: Discourse Networks describes the “Discourse Net-
work 1800” as composed of sexually closed data-processing circuits in which
women have been relegated to the outside positions. Women inspire men to
write texts for and about women that are professionally commented upon by
male critics and philosophers and then read by women who are thereby inspired
to be women who inspire men to write texts for and about women – and so it
goes round and round and round in feedback cycles until the advent of analog
media brings about an epochal rupture. But women do not write. They provide
input and receive the output, but with very few exceptions (and the only excep-
tion Kittler describes in detail, Bettina von Arnim, comes across as a slightly un-
hinged wild woman, which strikes me as yet another male fantasy) they are ex-
cluded from processing and transmission. It’s a very elegant construct brimming
with all the masculinist techno coolness and bravado that has become a trade-
mark of the Kittler effect. It effectively transforms cultural dynamics into a cyber-
netic circuit. Yet like all such constructs it entertains a somewhat tenuous rela-
tionship with historical reality. Did women really not produce literature? Kittler
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concedes that they did so “from time to time,” but if you take the trouble to
research matters or engage with the type of feminist scholarship Kittler tended
to avoid, you’ll soon learn that the number of women writing was much higher
than this cavalier concession indicates.6 However, for well over a century nobody
talked about them. Kittler too mistakes the ex post facto silencing of writing wo-
men for their de facto absence.
This not only a matter of lacking historical knowledge. The problem is also
that the quantitative discrepancy calls into question Kittler’s basic description.
If, as some of his truly brilliant analyses have it, language acquisition and textual
production were gendered to the point of extreme segregation, then how are we
to account for the many women who are writing like men? And by the way, what
is their social background? And that of the men who wrote? This “Discourse Net-
work 1800” is a very bourgeois affair, and the bourgeoisie is, of course, that part
of society that has perfected the skill of never naming itself to ensure that no
alternative to it can be named either. But do its practices deserve to mark a total
epoch? Kittler is not so much neglecting gender as class. That, however, appears
to be a common affliction these days.
And yet. Think about it. We have here, produced in the late 1970s and early
1980s in Germany – that is, before the arrival of Genderwissenschaften (an awkward
Anglo-German paste job necessary because the German language does not dis-
tinguish between sex and gender) a thorough analysis of the discursive construc-
tion of gender identity and performance that in many respects was so ahead of its
German times it was almost North American. For all its failings and masculinist
crankiness, it contained so much that could have been used for further discus-
sions. But just as it takes two to tango, it takes two to break off a dance. Yes,
regarding the gender issue Kittler often deserves to be taken out to the
woodshed, but the blame also falls on those of his readers who should have
known better than to ignore the potential of his arguments.
AvdO: On a more positive note, regarding his productivity and enduring rele-
vance for the humanities: it seems to me that Kittler was utterly important in
pushing literary studies into a new realm by addressing the communication me-
dia from a new and different perspective, assessing the materiality of the media,
analyzing media as technologies, studying them with a keen eye on the hardware,
thus pushing the field in the direction of a science of the media. Would you agree
with this?
GWY: Absolutely. To put it in alliterative shorthand, Kittler was instrumental for
the move from content to channel, materialism to materialities, hermeneutics to
hardware.
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AvdO: As to his study of the hardware, of the media technologies: would you say
that thanks to the Kittlerian enterprise perhaps, as you already seem to suggest
above, cultural studies should not be confused with German Kulturwissenschaft. In
a similar way, media studies should not be confused with the Kittlerian and Ger-
man brands of media sciences. There is a profound difference between these fields
and approaches, generally speaking. Kittler “technologizes and extends Foucault”
as you wrote.7 He gave Foucault’s epistemic regimes “a historical footing.”8
GWY: Let’s talk about Foucault. Or rather, Kittler’s Foucault – a rare creature
different from the flashier Foucaults bred and raised in North America. Not even
the English language has enough words to capture the many facets of Kittler’s
treatment of Foucault: veneration, continuation, revision, implementation, de-
construction, occupation, vindication, sublation, redemption. There’s admira-
tion bordering on worship – think of Kittler’s obituary of Foucault,9 in which he
describes how he used to await Foucault’s next book like the steps of an ap-
proaching lover, or how he froze in silence the only time he ever came across
Foucault in person. There’s respectful updating – there’s nothing wrong with
Foucault’s elegant dismantling of discursive epistemes, Kittler argues, but they
must be grounded in a similar dismantling of the materialities of communication
and they must be carried passed epochs when people no longer write. And
there’s a slightly smart-alecky, incipiently parricidal patronizing – he, Kittler,
knows what Foucault is really about, or what he really should have done.
To understand the latter it is important to keep in mind that when Kittler is
referencing Foucault, he primarily has in mind the Foucault of The Order of
Things.10 (When the older Kittler goes Greek, his references to the older Fou-
cault’s take on Greece are decidedly less flattering.) The impact of The Order of
Things on Kittler is not only due to the book’s indisputable qualities, it also has
to do with two crucial points that go beyond Foucault. As you know, Foucault
describes a sequence of discontinuous epistemes that forestalls the ongoing
presence of a central entity around which history evolves. It precludes continuity
and thus the emergence of a grand subject. This, of course, brings to mind Hei-
degger’s equally discontinuous Seinsgeschichte or history of being. Indeed, espe-
cially in his later publications Kittler indulged in ever more explicit claims that
Foucault was, as it were, the canniest laborer toiling in Heidegger’s vineyard.11
Second, every episteme has to be analyzed in terms of discursive protocols, or-
ders of speech, conditions for the validity of statements, and so on. This implies
among other things that whatever is factually said must be seen against its un-
said possible alternatives. And this – Kittler would now pile on his famous ad-
verbs – is simply, clearly, naturally, obviously, self-evidently a discourse-analyti-
cal redescription of one of the basic axioms of information theory. In short,
Foucault was great not only because he was Foucault but also because he was a
bit like Heidegger and Shannon.
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AvdO: And they were the other two gods in Kittler’s universe?
GWY: There were so many gods in Kittler’s pantheon, and sometimes even a
goddess or two... But just as in some strands of Hinduism Brahma, Vishnu, and
Shiva reign above the rest, Kittler’s supreme media-theoretical trinity is, argu-
ably, composed of Shannon, Heidegger, and Turing. And serious Medienwis-
senschaften should be located between and around those three.
Technē and Technodeterminism
AvdO: I think Kittler’s explanation of the crucial difference between technische
Medien or “technical media” such as photo-, phono-, and cinematographic me-
dia, and other communication media, such as language, is highly relevant. In his
words: language operates by way of a “symbolic grid” which requires that all data
“pass through the bottleneck of the signifier,”12 whereas technische Medien – the
analog technological media – process physical effects of the real.13
GWY: Yes, he frequently supports this with Arnheim’s famous quote which states
that with the arrival of new (analog) media “reproductions are not supposed to
resemble the object, but rather guarantee this resemblance by being, as it were, a
product of the object in question, that is, by being mechanically produced by
it.”14
AvdO: He cited Arnheim’s words to point at a crucial quality of the technologies
which mediate photographic images, moving images, and sound: mechanically
speaking, they produce an object with a resemblance to the object represented
within the limits of the technology used. By implication, the technical media
need to be understood in relation to art and aesthetic styles in a new and differ-
ent way. First of all, because the data need not pass through the bottleneck of the
signifier. And secondly, because the data contain the inevitable inscription of the
technical medium itself. In your shorthand: “Arts give way to media; aesthetical
styles are replaced by technical standards.”15 Would you say that these pivotal
insights regarding the differences between media and their implications have
been made sufficiently productive in the fields of art and media studies so far?
GWY: I am tempted to respond in the negative. It has nothing to do with ignor-
ance, that is, with not understanding the distinction. People are fully aware of the
difference between paintings and photos and, by extension, between (artistic)
styles and (technical) standards. I hope I am mistaken but I sometimes sense
that many theorists are afraid to foreground this distinction because they may
end up being charged with technodeterminism, which is a bit like being covered
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in cat poo. I hope I’m wrong. But in any case, like any precise insight this one
has a precise expiry date: namely, the subsequent arrival of digitally enabled si-
mulation, which makes possible the lifelike rendition of a non-existing tree in
ways that are indistinguishable from the reproduction of a real tree.
AvdO: As to technodeterminism, there seems to be something distinctly cyclical
about this, meaning that the impact of new “technical media” experienced by
many at the moment of introduction (say, television once broadcasting started,
or the computer) sets in motion a new cycle of interest in technology (e.g., McLu-
han; Kittler) with renewed complaints about technodeterminism. Would you
agree there is a cyclical aspect to this, a reoccurrence of certain phenomena both
on a technoperceptual as well as on a theoretical level?
GWY: I’m going off on a rant here because I feel very strongly about this. Kittler’s
texts – and the same applies to McLuhan, Harold Innis, and Vilém Flusser – are
like Caravaggio paintings. There is a stark, often perturbing distribution of light
and shadow. It is difficult enough to make sense of this chiaroscuro without
adding the damn technodeterminist bogeyman. Technodeterminism – to be pre-
cise: the accusation of technodeterminism – is one of the most pathetic yet unfor-
tunately also one the most handy devices in the vast arsenal of intellectual dis-
honesty. It is a gratuitous and more often than not misinformed mixture of
ideological moralizing (to be a technodeterminist is, somehow, a politico-moral
failing) and supercilious laziness (now that I have determined that X is technode-
terminist, I can happily disregard X and go back to sleep). When you hear the T
word, remove your gloves.
But back to your point: Historically speaking, technodeterminism is in part a
discursive transfer from the realm of economics to that of technology.16 Espe-
cially in the 1920s the arguments aimed at the alleged economic determinism of
Marx were redeployed against theories that appear to smack of technocratic en-
gineering, a change of target that both drives and feeds off a flattening of the
term technology. The logia is dropped, as it were, leaving a very mundane and
trivial view of technē as something big and ugly with lots of knobs, levers, and
blinking lights.
However, I like your idea that technodeterminism – be it euphoric or apocalyp-
tic – is also an undigested residue of the initial impact with a powerful new tech-
nology. What makes your point so pertinent to Kittler in particular is the fact that
it is central to the design of Gramophone, Film, Typewriter. People tend to overlook
that this reputedly arch-technodeterminist manifesto, which begins with the apo-
dictic pronouncement that “[m]edia determine our situation,” is heavily invested
in literature and the literary construction of media technology. As he states at the
outset, Kittler inserts and relays texts from the period of the initial encounter
with analog media, when even “obsolete media” like books exhibited a sensitivity
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for new technologies “and the terror of their novelty,” which we, having grown
accustomed to them, have lost.17 Of course Kittler quickly adds that these stories
cannot replace a history of technology. You are not going to gain a technical,
medium-specific understanding of phonography by reading Rilke’s “Primal
Sound” and its speculation on what sounds would emerge if you used a phono-
graph needle to “play” the coronal suture on a human skull. But we sense what is
going on underneath Kittler’s procedure. These early literary texts stake out the
epistemic and experiential domain of the theory to follow. The flight path He-
gel’s owl of Minerva follows at dusk was in part explored and plotted at dawn by
Apollo’s and Aphrodite’s twittering sparrows. We need a media theory that in
order to break the narcotic spell imposed on us by new media must be commen-
surate to the sense of fright and wonder we experienced when we first encoun-
tered them.
AvdO: Moreover, would you say that Kittler, an active participant in this cycle for
some time, chose to push the topic a little by fearlessly and purposefully provok-
ing his opponents as a fierce anti-humanist, a scholar in the humanities who,
contrary to most scholars in his field, passionately and polemically wished to
focus on technology, not humans, when addressing major questions of the huma-
nities regarding communication and representation?
GWY: No doubt about it. There is – especially in Kittler’s media-theoretical writ-
ings – not a single important concept that is not also a fighting word. In feisty
German: Kittlers Medientheorie ist eine Theorie der Kampfbegriffe [Kittler’s media theory
is a theory of fighting terms]. And the supreme fighting word is, of course, me-
dia. It is so difficult to determine what on earth Kittler means when he uses the
term because he has it operate in three different registers. First, it denotes a new
object of study – say, the typewriter. Second, it denotes a new approach to estab-
lished objects – the study of literature within a Remington discourse network of
mechanical text production. Third, it is a kind of constant accusation which re-
fers less to anything Kittler is saying than to everything others are not saying. It
polemically highlights what has been overlooked, suppressed, or concealed by
“soul,” “subject,” “man,” “spirit” (a.k.a. Geist) and all the other nebulous entities
at play in the humanities that Kittler loved to preface with his trademark term
sogenannt (“so-called”). Media occupy the center of the humanist blind spot.
Kittler and Film Studies
AvdO: Would you say that Kittler was a productive thinker also in the field of film
studies?
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GWY: I doubt it. Isn’t the film section the weakest part of Gramophone, Film, Type-
writer? Kittler himself thought so. Optical Media is almost an act of atonement.18
On a very basic level, Kittler struck me as a man of sound and temporal sequence,
not of sight and visual composition. “Hold on,” readers will say, “film is every bit
as much a temporal sequence as a phonographic recording; it is subject to the
same time-axis manipulation that is so central to Kittler’s approach to media.
Film, too, is an instantiation of machine time.” Agreed. But I think it’s advisable
when tackling the Kittler/film issue to recall Frank Hartmann’s diagnosis:19
There is a moment of almost Kantian distrust of images in Kittler, which may or
may not be part of his Lutheran heritage. Some passages in Optical Media read like
belated contributions to the 17th-century word-based Protestant campaign
against the image-based Catholic Counter-Reformation.
AvdO: Kittler as an iconophobiac, that would indeed make sense to me. For one,
it would help me to understand why I was so terribly disappointed by Kittler’s
(online) lecture on “The Relation of Art and Techne,” given at the European
Graduate School in 2005.20 I already knew the etymological connections between
the two words, art/technē, thank you. So could we proceed beyond that, please.
But Kittler did not. Not really. Though the connection between arts and technol-
ogy does still need some serious attention. For one, I take it that the genealogies
of art and technology are intertwined in many ways, moreover that it is sympto-
matic that, historically speaking, debates on the relation amongst poets, artists,
and cultural critics (Baudelaire and Benjamin were once among them) recur every
few decades, at the very least. These seem to indicate that new technologies – and
optical and visual technologies perhaps even more than the others – may affect
viewers in all sorts of interesting ways, creating a different perceptual or aes-
thetic experience which may have a sudden and strong impact on the imagina-
tion, particularly of those who are sensitive to the visual, to images. In other
words, should we not simply expect the art world to have responded to technolo-
gical and particularly optical inventions over the centuries? As the avant-garde
artists of the 20th century have shown repeatedly, experimenting with all sorts of
ways to transform perceptual experiences, if only temporarily, etc. In other
words: I had high expectations of the lecture. When I saw it, though, I was really
disappointed. It is cliché in part, unintelligent in part, repetitive and… the provo-
cative remark on Warhol makes Kittler suddenly sound like a petit bourgeois on
avant-garde paintings that “my kid could do better”…
GWY: … and there’s the swipe at Locke’s “incredibly dull essay on Human Under-
standing, the entry of commercialism into philosophy.” Trust Kittler – who none-
theless had an anglophile streak – to resurrect the good old continental view of
the English as a nation of shopkeepers whose contributions to philosophy
amount to glorified bookkeeping...
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AvdO: I always thought this was Kittler on an off day.
GWY: Annie, I am afraid there is a fundamental divide between Kittler and your-
self that no deliberation on my part is going to mediate. But you are voicing a
discontent many have expressed concerning this particular lecture (and related
pieces), so it’s worth trying to probe what Kittler is saying. Why he is so dismis-
sive of contemporary techno- and media-artistic endeavors? (Yet before we begin:
in fairness to him, he is squeezing material covering two thousand years of his-
tory into a 50-minute lecture delivered in his third or fourth language. It is no
coincidence that he now and then slips into French. Il parlait beaucoup mieux le
français que l’anglais.)
This is the big cinemascope narrative: Once upon a time under a bright
Aegean sky there was a notation system, the Greek vowel alphabet, which was
successively refunctionalized in such a way that it was able to encode linguistic,
mathematical, and musical data. This pristine unity fell apart, and the various
arts and media formats developed their own notation systems. Speaking dialecti-
cally, it is precisely this differentiation that allowed for their progressive mathe-
matization and technologization. At one point, and it first occurred inside Alan
Turing’s cranium, the ability to unite the various media formats was regained by
means of digital computation. Step 1: Unity. Step 2: Differentiation with atten-
dant specialization. Step 3: Unity on a higher level. E unibus pluram, e pluribus
unum. For all his disavowal of Hegelian teleology, Kittler is telling a story that
comes with strong Hegelian residues.
Now, it is this story that provides the algorithm for the distribution of praise
and disdain. Worthy of praise are those artists who – like Brunelleschi, Alberti,
or Vermeer in the realm of painting – are at the top of their game because they
push the mathematization and geometrization of their art. Worthy of praise are
those who – like Wagner and his projected Gesamtkunstwerk – push the reintegra-
tion of media formats. And worthy of praise are those who – like Pink Floyd in
“Brain Damage” – use the art form or media format they work in to stage and
reveal its current technological underpinning. Given this basis for evaluation,
Warhol does not qualify for any praise, on the contrary. From Kittler’s point of
view, Warhol is adopting a fancy artistic pose by simply sponging off a medial
effect with little understanding of its technological conditions. He is doing very
little with a lot of attitude. Nowadays any PC can do the same with far less fuss.
And computers – to return to the question of images – do not operate on the level
of images, they merely use them to stoop to inferior human operating levels.
AvdO: Indeed, though, you make me wonder all over again whether visual art in
fact was not a thing he understood, he could experience, could take in? Is there a
deeper lack of concern with visual art? Perhaps with optical technologies? And
also with film, with the cinema?
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GWY: It’s difficult to diagnose. My suspicion is that on top of the admitted in-
ability to discuss images on the same level as acoustic phenomena, there are two
other points. First, remember that Kittler did not invent German media studies.
He was not the first to seriously scrutinize non-literary media in an academic
setting. Kommunikationswissenschaften (communication studies), once known as
Zeitungswissenschaften (newspaper studies), had been around a long time. And
Filmwissenschaften (film studies) were already on the go when Kittler headed into
media. Indeed, there have been recent attempts to show that German media
studies started in and with film studies. Forget Kittler, forget the Frankfurt
School, forget communication studies, the real point of origin is said to have
been the arrival of the video recorder. Kittler, however, saw the bulk of film stud-
ies as nothing but literary studies applied to film. Sure, you could read Christian
Metz et al., add a layer of structuralist sophistication and rhapsodize about alter-
nating syntagmata, but for the main part films were treated as texts on celluloid.
The accessibility of the image invited elaboration of the content at the expense of
more medium-specific issues. This apparent hermeneutical appropriation, I be-
lieve, biased his perception of the medium itself. Whether that is a fair assess-
ment of the film studies he encountered is a very different question. Kittler was
prone to pontificate in rather one-sided ways on disciplines he disliked. Think of
his parochial dismissal of US-style cultural studies.
Second point: Lacan. As you know, Kittler related film to Lacan’s imaginary.
But the imaginary is a Lacanian register Kittler does not take kindly to. It is no
coincidence that he sometimes treats film as the technical implementation of
text-based reveries cooked up in the “Discourse Network 1800” – which we can-
not simply surrender to.21 To put it bluntly, in terms of Lacan’s tripartite division
Kittler’s media theory aims to send the imaginary out to pasture in order to se-
cure an undisturbed fruitful intercourse between the real and the symbolic. This
bias results in – I hesitate to call it laziness – but a certain reluctance to move
beyond the Lacanian playground when dealing with film, that is, the imaginary.
He is much better when discussing the real (phonography) and the symbolic
(typewriter).
AvdO: Kittler’s ideas of film studies and Metz’s theorizing in particular were
already so outrageous and outdated when he presented them back in the 1990s
that it would be unproductive and irrelevant indeed to respond to them in 2013;
instead, let me address some remarks on Kittler’s perception of film. You label
film studies as one of the disciplines Kittler disliked. That obviously would be in
line with his assumed lack of affinity with images and the imaginary. Interest-
ingly, connecting the two was exactly what Metz tried to do in Le Signifiant imagi-
naire [The Imaginary Signifier].22 Coming from phenomenology and structuralist
linguistics and having already explored the productivity of studying film in terms
of a language, a grammar, and a time-based art driven by narration in “La grande
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syntagmatique du film narratif” and other works, he then went on to explore how
the considerable impact of film images on the viewer’s imagination could best be
understood.23 In his apparatus theory, Metz basically explored the productivity of
framing the problem in terms of an apparatus (l’appareil de base), which could
produce and project film images that, under circumstances specific for the cin-
ema dispositif (and while concealing the apparatus, which was needed to create
these effects), were able to affect and often even captivate the viewer’s imagina-
tion for the duration of a movie. In other words, Metz addressed some funda-
mental questions triggered by the medium as he had come to understand it, as
an “apparatus,” and at the same time he explored the productivity of a new theo-
ry of the imaginary for the field of film studies. Now let us say neither images nor
the imaginary were Kittler’s cup of tea. He was not interested in these aspects of
the film medium (or in a dialogue with Metz). Obviously, this was bound to
affect his relevance for film studies in the long run. Perhaps we should go even
further and say that it affected his relevance for media studies overall, as images
and the visual and their impact on viewers form such a substantial part of media
history, of media’s impact on culture, certainly in the 20th and the 21st centuries.
Do you agree?
GWY: I do. But he wouldn’t. And the reason is related to a feature of the image
we have not yet addressed. Kittler’s reluctance to fully engage images and their
cultural impact is not only a matter of personal proclivity. It is not only a residue
of Lutheran or Kantian sola scriptura. Neither is it only a matter of discontent over
content-based film studies. It also has to do with the technical fact that in many
ways the image, which in your description comes across as an ontological entity,
is a surface and/or interface phenomenon. Computers do not communicate
images to each other but their digital encoding. In contrast to numbers, images
are, as it were, a kiddie language, a primitive vernacular adopted by computers
when they stoop to our operating levels. Kittler was so taken by the Dürers, Al-
bertis and Brunelleschis because their grids, veils, and diagrams were earlier
ways of generating images from projective geometry or other mathematically or-
iented cultural techniques. Mediated images are numbers in their Sunday best –
impressive, representative, seductive – but they do not reside on the operating
levels that media theory has to access.
This directly affects your question whether Kittler’s relevance as a media the-
orist is hampered by the fact that he did not adequately address images and their
visual and their impact on people and culture. Your question is based on the
premise that such impact studies are central to media theory, but that is not how
Kittler saw Medienwissenschaften. Regardless of the fact Kittler provided some in-
genious insights on how media inscribe people, he would insist that media theo-
ry’s principal concern is the historically informed study of the ways in which
changing media structures or discourse networks store, process, and transmit
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data. On a bad day in the early 1990s he would have added: Let sociologists worry
about human impact.
AvdO: When we go back to his 1999 Berlin lectures on optical media, we see that
Kittler typically approached cinema as a time-based medium.24 One of his central
questions was the impact of film on “the ancient monopoly of writing” and the
new ways in which authors (and certainly writers of fiction) were forced to com-
pete with film and cinema, which were to alter the status of books. Kittler was
interested in these “media wars.” He was interested in the analysis of power rela-
tions. In many ways, Foucault was his model, as you already explained. Like Fou-
cault, he was discourse-oriented. Moreover, he successfully inspired a focus on
the materiality of media. He helped to lay bare the epistemological structures
underpinning studies in the humanities. He helped to open up the field for me-
dia studies. How exactly do you assess Kittler’s attention for the materiality of the
medium with regard to this? I mean to say, the aura of the traditional discipline
of archaeology in many ways rests upon the aura of the objects, that is to say,
direct empirical contact with all these curious material leftovers of past centuries.
Contrary to fieldwork in archaeology as a traditional discipline, which takes a lot
of long hours of sweating under the Mediterranean sun on one’s knees, Kittler
seemed to shy away from field work for months on end, from empirical contact
with the objects, perceptual experiments, hands-on research. Nor did he often
resort to sharing his knowledge in a dialogue with, say, the Philips or Blaupunkt
engineers, who did perceptual experiments with optical devices for five decades.
You used the words reluctant if not lazy… A preference perhaps to fool around in
the discursive playgrounds he already knew? Trained as a philologist, he was a
man of books, he was effective with words. They did the job. In retrospect, we
may conclude that he successfully helped to construct media studies in the hu-
manities. This has changed the field. That critical project as such, as a discursive
enterprise, productive as it was, has come to an end. And now? Must we not leave
that playground and move on? Include the material objects, as archaeologists do,
to construct hypotheses, test theories, substantiate claims. Talk to engineers.
Study their experiments. Study the historical leftovers of the l’appareil de base in
the archive. Endure long hours under the hot sun?
GWY: But in fairness to Kittler, isn’t that like taking the speed of supersonic jet
planes as the norm for air travel and then dismissing old propeller biplanes for
not being fast enough? They were a heck of a lot faster than the hot-air balloons
they replaced. Go back to the 1980s and early 1990s, when institutionalized me-
dia theory was in its infancy. How many “media theorists” apart from him stud-
ied synthesizers, assembled their own switchboards, made an effort to master
mathematical information theory, and learned and even taught basic computer
programming? No doubt the engineering sections and software experts within
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today’s media studies (and the fact that they are now within this discipline is part
of the Kittler effect) can easily expose Kittler’s gaffes and reveal his textualist
bias, but in his day he was ahead of the curve. He had earned the right to ridicule
academics who pontificated about media technology but could not explain the
difference between a vacuum tube and a microprocessor – and boy, did he make
use of that right.
The irony is that what you recommend for the future of media studies (sensi-
bly, I think) is what others perceive to be one of the most lamentable aspects of
Kittler’s impact: the tendency to indulge in mind-numbingly tedious artifactual-
ism, in which (let’s run alliterative amok) the analysis of algorithms, the diagno-
sis of diagrams, the exegesis of electronics, the probing of programs, the scru-
tiny of switchboards, is seen in itself as an inspired act of real media-theoretical
critique with God knows what kinds of ramifications. I think he sensed the dan-
ger of the increasingly self-enclosed tech-focused sterility he had helped create.
The whole late-career shift to love, the Greeks and the protean glory of the multi-
functional vowel alphabet, the attempt to show by close reading of the gospels
that Jesus was crucified because he was the Linus Torvalds of his age, the philo-
logical meticulousness employed to reveal Saint Paul as the Great Apostle of
Pneumatic Vowels, not to mention the close reading of the Odyssey’s Siren song
as a Homeric discourse on discourse channel conditions – isn’t all this also a
return to a textual critique designed to counterbalance some of the effects of his
earlier work? Kittler’s oeuvre, like Foucault’s, is continuous by reacting against
itself.
Kittler, McLuhan, and Estrangement
AvdO: Would you consider Kittler a pupil of McLuhan, and if so, possibly his
brightest one, as Thomas Elsaesser once said in a 2011 conference in Montréal
hosted by André Gaudreault and Martin Lefebvre?
GWY: I have difficulties with the label “pupil” if it implies the dependence, con-
tinuation, and/or indebtedness that constitute pupil/teacher relationships, even if
they never shared a room. Derrick de Kerkhove is a pupil of McLuhan’s, Kittler is
not.
AvdO: To provide a bit more of a context to you: Thomas Elsaesser and I were in
fact talking about the branches which sprang from the McLuhan school, and
Canada of course saw quite a bit of offspring and followers... And not only Cana-
da. It was within this context that he suggested that the much later work on
remediation by Bolter and Grusin springs from that same Canadian tree – but
that Kittler was the more brilliant (or most brilliant) scholar to pick up on McLu-
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han’s work. Who would not agree? If one only allows an evocative and productive
thinker as McLuhan to also present some mistakes and underdeveloped
thoughts, one must still value his work and acknowledge the revolutionary and
evocative force of his thinking, the productivity and relevance of his insights. The
pivotal question is not: What smaller mistakes did he make? or Where is his
thinking underdeveloped? But rather: Where did he really miss the point? And
the same goes for Kittler of course.
GWY: Indebtedness to McLuhan – Kittler’s or anyone else’s – is a tough topic. It
requires that we identify what McLuhan said, which is not an easy task. It also
requires that we move beyond the bipolar mood swings that have dictated our
evaluation of McLuhan. Historically, McLuhan’s ideas were like a highly fertile
layer of manure spread across a wide array of approaches and disciplines. We
did not like the smell, we did not care for many of the ingredients, so we were
happy to forget the fertilizer when harvesting and eating the products. But after
decades of disdain some are now approaching the other extreme by turning
McLuhan into the fountainhead of all modern media theory. Yet McLuhan him-
self was a bustling relay station drawing on many sources. The bigger the pedes-
tal we put him on, the more it obscures the view of those behind him, including
Innis.
But let’s lay the groundwork for Kittler/McLuhan. The main and obvious simi-
larity is the programmatic rejection of message in favor of medium. When Kittler
analyzes Pink Floyd’s “Brain Damage” as a “discourse on discourse channel con-
ditions,” he is saying that the message of the song is its own medium. It’s McLu-
han’s mantra with a Franco-German accent; and both are riffing off the basic
information-theoretical tenet that organization is information.
The main dividing line, frequently drawn by Kittler, is anthropocentrism. For
McLuhan (to quote the standard objection which is also the famous subtitle)
media are “extensions of man.” Of course, if you read McLuhan you quickly dis-
cover that he has a keen, quasi-Kittlerian eye for feedback processes in the course
of which media work over their human creators, as in the famous case of the
driver becoming the servomechanism of his car. But regardless of what hybridi-
zations it may lead to, this prosthetic logic has its point of origin in the human
body and nervous system. From Kittler’s point of view, McLuhan still subscribes
to the anthropocentric delusion that man is the measure of all media, even when
the latter reshape the former. This has obvious implications for the ways in
which the theories handle the media/senses nexus. McLuhan is interested in
how media affect the sense ratios of pre-given senses, Kittler is interested in
how media and senses mutually emerge and map each other – you only under-
stand the latter in terms of the former. That is one of the red threads of Gramo-
phone, Film, Typewriter and the second part of Discourse Networks. In short, McLu-
han’s media theory has the tendency to inch toward a theory of perception; in
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Kittler’s case, the question of human perception enters as a contingent by-prod-
uct of media.
So far, so unproductive. But let’s push the envelope. One of the great concerns
of the older, Greek Kittler was that “media make sense when media make
senses.” Translated into a discourse accessible to modern mortals: Under the
right circumstances (e.g., Magna Graecia in Southern Italy, around 400 BCE),
using the right epistemic objects (e.g., a cithara) and the right notation system
(the Greek vowel alphabet simultaneously acting as a numerical and thus musical
notation system), and performed in the right spirit of love, music and numbers,
interacting with these media and multifunctional sign systems will allow us to
enter a domain – rephrased in Black Forest lingo: will grant a truth event, an
unconcealing of being – that we have been missing out on ever since prudish,
tone-deaf, and mathematically ignorant Athenian philosophers started to clutter
our unfortunate minds with lumbering ontological distinctions like form and
matter, soul and body, glowing ideas up there and base things down here. Is
there not a basic similarity to McLuhan in the sense that media theory is to break
the narcotic spell of mindlessly accepted media environments to open up a richer
experiential domain? You’re the expert, so I submit to you: Isn’t McLuhan’s me-
dia-theoretical update of the Formalists’ ostranenie a bit like Kittler’s take on Hei-
degger’s aletheia?
AvdO: This is a very interesting connection indeed. The point which many media
scholars missed in the post-war era is that perception – as in McLuhan’s and
Kittler’s media theories – was also a key issue for the so-called Russian Formal-
ists, who, ironically, were wrongly labeled since “form” was not their concern.
GWY: If I recall matters correctly, we have Trotsky to thank for the label “formal-
ism,” which is as misleading as “technodeterminism.” Maybe “perceptualism,”
though equally ugly a term, would have been better.
AvdO: The Russian Perceptualists – that label would indeed have been spot on
for the Shklovsky circle. They focused on “ostranenie” (making strange): that
interesting phenomenon that foregrounds new techniques (in art, in Shklovsky’s
case) that turn the normal into the strange; percipient viewers/hearers keenly and
readily take in the “strange” in a perceptual process which is notably slowed
down, complicated and deepened, as Viktor Shklovsky explained in “Art as Tech-
nique.”25 He did not use the words technology or medium since he was inspired
by the poetry performances his friend, the poet Vladimir Mayakovsky, provided in
the early 1910s. Interestingly, Mayakovsky’s model was the new cinema machine,
which, as he had been quick to notice, created strong effects in viewers by mak-
ing everything look strange. Strange and evocative, just as Mayakovsky’s own
“Futurist” performances would soon become: this tall poet recited with a radish
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in his buttonhole, making strange gestures and using lyrical as well as silly
words and nonsense; thus, he typically created an “art experience,” as Shklovsky
already explained in 1913. Similarly, new media technologies are able to de-auto-
matize the perceptual process and create a prolonged (art) experience of things
“as they are perceived and not as they are known.”26 Automatization and de-
automatization of perception, conceptualized by Shklovsky in terms of the art
experience, obviously provide a basis for a media theory that helps to explain
(media) sensitization and desensitization, moreover, why media effects first are
strong, then disappear. Why is all this interesting material for media scholars?
Because it helps to understand how we relate to old media. Being desensitized to
them means that the initial sensitivity to the medium’s technological makeup
vanishes as the strangeness effects wear off due to automatization (or algebraiza-
tion, as Shklovsky also called it). This inevitably leads to a decrease of sensitivity
to the distorting powers of these once new techniques to the degree that viewers
become almost fully insensitive to them. It automatically leads to a point where
the presence of techniques in the perceptual process is not noted anymore: a
swift shift from medium to mediated may become not only habitual, but even
natural or “second nature.” Just note how we relate to television. Interestingly,
this also suggests that the twin mechanisms of de-automatization and automati-
zation help to constitute the fields of art and media respectively, and that the two
are inherently connected. Art is made for, and experienced by the senses,
whereas media are simply there to be used. A medium is a means that functions
only when it steps back, as media phenomenologists keep repeating.27 Neverthe-
less, it is a fundamental problem for media studies that media technologies are
easily overlooked. In other words, that automatization renders them transparent,
thus facilitates a dominant research focus on the “real,” not on the medium. That
is the realist fallacy in research: desensitized to its effects, realists basically leave
the medium understudied. Overlooking the medium is a recurring phenomenon
in the humanities. McLuhan always had my sympathy for the very reason that he
put perception and the materiality of the medium back on the research agenda
after WWII in evocative and provocative ways. As Kittler did some decades after
him. There is something cyclical to it, don’t you agree? Shklovsky, McLuhan, and
Kittler provided (media) theories in the three major new eras that marked the
20th century: film, television, and computers. Their theories forced a focus on
the materiality of the medium. All three had to provoke their readers. They had
to break (as you wrote) the narcotic spell of the mindlessly accepted (old) media
environments they found themselves in. And each of them indeed had a keen
interest in the richer experiential domains created by new media technologies
and art. But they are relevant for the field in different ways. There are things their
theories can, and cannot do. If you had to indicate to your students how these
(media) theories can best be made productive, including some clear instructions
and warnings and an implementation schedule, as a pharmacist would on a med-
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icine label, what would you write on Kittler’s label? (I am not so sure you would
want to write the McLuhan label…)
GWY: A label? Like on a medical ointment? How about: “Handle with care. Do
not only apply to sore spots but also to allegedly healthy parts of your body.
Warning: This product will not cure you of any disease, only of your mistaken belief in the
healing power of other ointments.”
But seriously: your remarks on art, media and estrangement – which deserve a
discussion of their own – make me think of a book-length interview from 1996
that was republished on the occasion of Kittler’s death.28 Kittler (we touched
upon this in connection with Warhol) was not too fond of discussing video and
computer art – a reticence that some of his critics in the academic art scene will
neither forget nor forgive. My sense is that he viewed these discussions, if not the
art objects themselves, as attempts to recycle under a souped-up technological
veneer bygone notions of artistic subjectivity and romantic creativity. But in this
particular interview he is pretty talkative. As if to illustrate your point – that is,
the refunctionalization of a media technology in order to arrive at new, unex-
pected, “rejuvenating” performances that let us re-experience hitherto somnam-
bulantly accepted media environments – the interviewer mentions scratching. In
violation of established technological and artistic presets and standards, turntab-
list scratching is an abuse, an estrangement of analog recording technologies for
the purpose of generating new sonic experiences. Kittler responds by pointing
out that the corresponding phenomenon in his generation was the way in which
performers like Jimi Hendrix or Syd Barrett took technology out of the hands of
the technicians and corporate employees and started to fiddle with amplifiers,
controllers, feedback circuits, and so on, and then made this technoexplorative
experimentation an integral part of their music. We all know the Kittlerian man-
tra that rock music is an abuse of army equipment. This would be a case of
double estrangement, the mind-altering abuse of an abuse.
But then he moves on to the computer, and things change. Indeed, how do you
estrange a universal machine? What new stuff can you do with a machine defined
by its ability to simulate and replace all the old ones? Ridiculing some of the
more rambunctious instances of computer art, Kittler says that of course you can
throw a computer out of the window and hope for a pretty result. But what
comes of that? Kittler: “Nothing comes of that, that’s simply destruction. Ulti-
mately, it will come down to programming, in the course of which you automati-
cally operate on the level on which the apparatus is constructed.”29 In ways
which undermine the liberating, distancing gesture we associate with estrange-
ment, beneficial abuse is already programmed into that which is to be abused.
The divide between analog and digital, then, is expressed in terms of differing
estrangability (in Brechtian German, Verfremdbarkeit). Or, to phrase this the other
way round: the potential for estrangement, the very possibility of ostranenie, is
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radically altered by changing technological environments. In the digital world –
and it is imperative to hear the political undertones of this argument – resistance
is futile if it is located outside of the machine. In ways that come close to ideas
Flusser developed in Towards a Philosophy of Photography, resistance involves work-
ing inside the machine with the machine against the machine.30 “With numbers,”
Kittler wrote, “everything goes.”31 And that, I guess, includes their own estrange-
ment.
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Revisiting Christian Metz’s “Apparatus
Theory” – A Dialogue
Martin Lefebvre and Annie van den Oever
French film theorist and critic Christian Metz (1931-1993) is well-known for his
“apparatus” theory, which he developed in the 1970s. His works, in English
translation, had a major impact on international film theory: Language and Cinema
(1971), Film Language: A Semiotics of Cinema (1974), and The Imaginary Signifier: Psy-
choanalysis and the Cinema (1977).
Martin Lefebvre is the only researcher to have accessed the entire Metz archive of
the Bibliothèque du film (BiFi). He is a Québécois film scholar, editor of Re-
cherches sémiotiques/Semiotic Inquiry (RS/SI) as well as Professor and Concordia Uni-
versity Research Chair in Film Studies (Montréal, Canada). As Director of the
Advanced Research Team on the History and Epistemology of Moving Image
Studies (ARTHEMIS), he is interested in the theoretical and epistemological
changes in the field of film and moving image studies over the decades, hence
his interest in Metz, who played a crucial role in making film and cinema studies
part of the academic curriculum at universities in Paris in the 1970s and 1980s.
As he was aware that BiFi housed a Metz archive that had been bequeathed by his
son, Michael Metz, after his father’s passing in 1993, Lefebvre was given permis-
sion to get a glimpse of the archival material in 2008-2009 while he was working
on the history of the Filmology movement for a special issue of Cinémas: Journal of
Film Studies he was editing with François Albera.1 He knew Filmology had been
important for Metz and wanted to see if any traces of it could be found in the
Metz archive. Though the archive is difficult to access since it is not yet cata-
logued due to staff shortages at BiFi, and impossible to photocopy for legal rea-
sons, nonetheless, Lefebvre realized it was a substantial archive and decided to
seek legal authorizations and some research funds from the Social Science and
Humanities Research Council of Canada thus enabling him to consult the entire
archive (close to 45 boxes of materials). Since 2012 Lefebvre has been doing re-
search in the Metz archive as part of his work on the history and the epistemol-
ogy of film and moving image studies. In an upcoming essay for October, co-
authored with Dominique Chateau,2 Lefebvre used Metz’s personal notes (e.g.,
quotations from his study of Mikel Dufrenne’s Phénomenologie de l’expérience esthé-
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tique) to re-evaluate the role phenomenology played in Metz’s conception of cin-
ema and in his theoretical work. Furthermore, the archive contains unpublished
manuscripts, which Lefebvre intends to edit and make available for public use.
One of those, a conference paper from 1971 on the relation between semiology
and aesthetics (“Existe-t-il une approche sémiologique de l’esthétique?”) will be
published in issue no. 70 of 1895.3 Lastly, some of Metz’s seminars will be edit-
ed, annotated, and published in the coming years.
In the context of this book on cinema and media technologies and while reas-
sessing the research done on it, a dialogue with Martin Lefebvre on Metz and
“apparatus” theory was initiated by me for three reasons: first, apparatus theory
marked Metz’s (and the field of film studies’) pivotal shift from a linguistically
oriented study of film to theorizing the technologies of the cinema and their im-
pact on viewers; second, the archive allows a new assessment of the context from
which apparatus theory emerged with the help of materials that were not open to
research so far; and third, Metz’s theory needs to be revisited and reassessed in
terms of the new interest in film and media technologies today, to determine if
and how Metz’s premises, concepts, and findings could (or perhaps should) be
made productive in current research. In other words, there are historical, theore-
tical, and epistemological arguments to want to revisit Metz’s work of the 1970s.
As to the format of this dialogue: it will start with some introductory questions
regarding the archive and Martin Lefebvre’s first impressions of Metz’s personal
notes. Secondly, Metz’s relation to Baudry will be explored as he played a crucial
role in the (intellectual and political) context in which the first notes on the ap-
paratus were written. Thirdly, crucial insights from Metz (in part diverting from
Baudry’s, who seems to have been more ideologically oriented) will be assessed
in more detail. Lastly, Metz’s relevance for the field today will be discussed.
– Annie van den Oever
The Metz Archive
AvdO: If you allow me, here are some introductory questions regarding Metz’s
archive before we reassess Metz’s “apparatus theory.” What made you want to
revisit and rethink Christian Metz’s work?
ML: Metz’s name, as you know, is synonymous today with the rise of modern,
truly academic film theory. Metz, of course, was a die-hard structuralist and in
the current climate where scholars are starting to historicize film studies and
film theory, I thought it important to look at Metz with a fresh pair of eyes.
Indeed, there has not been much historical work done so far on the structuralist
moment in film studies. In a sense, therefore, this is a form of disciplinary in-
ward-looking. However, I also realized, as soon as I opened the first box in the
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archive, that this inward-looking was more personal than I thought. You see I
initially came to film studies through Metz and semiology and though my work
moved on to the philosophical semeiotic of C.S. Peirce (I’m still a card-carrying
semiotician!), working on Metz, on his archive, was also a way for me to reflect
on my own connection with what I do as a film scholar and teacher of film stud-
ies and on what got me interested in film studies (and not just in films) in the first
place.
AvdO: And what are your first overall impressions of his archive?
ML: As we speak, I have not completed reading all the materials I have gathered
from the Metz archive. In fact, I’ve only had a few months to peruse the materi-
als. I can tell you, for instance, that there are hundreds of “film reviews,” which
are often 1 to 2 page summaries of films Metz had seen. He was indeed an avid
moviegoer, seeing several films a week, and all sorts of films: American
blockbusters, classical Hollywood and French films, European art cinema, Asian
films, etc. In an age before IMDb and the web and before DVDs, these notes
obviously served the role of aides-mémoire. And yet, one also finds interesting – if
short – aesthetic judgments in them.
AvdO: There was a conference on Metz in Zurich in June 2013.4 Did you present
some of Metz’s personal notes and “reviews” there?
ML: Indeed, I did – as part of a larger work on Metz and aesthetics – though it’s
too early to say at this point if one can establish a “Metzian canon” or, better yet,
a “Metzian aesthetic” from the notes he kept on the films he saw. Nonetheless. I
did notice he was especially attentive to the “worldly” aspect of narrative films,
the settings – for instance, the Vienna of Ophuls’s films. Moreover, the archive
also contains some of Metz’s scholarly reading notes. Very copious notes on Sig-
mund Freud, on Rudolf Arnheim, on Jean Mitry, and several other authors he
read. Again, these were principally aides-mémoire: the notes tend to follow an
author’s argument very closely. However, there are occasional critical asides and
reflections, e.g., the notes on Mikel Dufrenne’s Phénomenologie de l’expérience esthé-
tique are especially interesting. Some of the asides in these notes ended up almost
verbatim in his first published essay, “Le cinéma: langue ou langage.”5 These
and other documents also helped me re-evaluate the role phenomenology played
in his conception of cinema and its role in his theorizing. One also finds there
the galleys for Le Signifiant imaginaire and for his unpublished manuscript L’esprit
et ses mots. Essai sur le Witz which is a sort of dialogue with Freud’s work on Witz
[the joke] but doesn’t concern cinema.
AvdO: Does the archive reflect Metz’s position in film studies in Paris back then?
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ML: Absolutely. The archive is in itself important as a document of the French film
studies scene. Because Metz kept every thesis report he ever wrote, it is fascinat-
ing to see how at one point the entire milieu of French film studies (and some-
times beyond) gravitated around him. An almost entire generation of scholars
was either supervised by him or had him sit as a jury member for their doctoral
defense. Same thing when I look at the list of people who either attended or gave
presentations at his seminar (Michel Marie, Roger Odin, Michel Colin, Alain Ber-
gala, Raymond Bellour, Dominique Chateau and François Jost, Jean-Paul Simon,
Jacques Aumont, Dana Polan, Francesco Casetti, and so many others).6 For sev-
eral years he was literally at the center of the field and therefore had a large role
in shaping it.
AvdO: In fact, “film theory” as such seems a term disseminated from the 1970s
onwards.
ML: The term, of course, originated with Canudo, though Eisenstein used it
sparingly. As for Metz, he uses it in the 1960s.
AvdO: As an inspiring theorist who liked dialogue and debate, Metz seems to
have been at the center of film studies, which, at the time, was internationally
still a young and quickly growing field of studies. His presence was felt in our
country too, where he had close friendships with Eric de Kuyper and Emile
Poppe, whom he knew from their doctoral studies in Paris; they wrote their doc-
toral dissertation with Greimas and Metz was part of their jury. After this, De
Kuyper and Poppe initiated film and performance studies in our country in the
late 1970s. They received Metz regularly at the (now Radboud) University of Nij-
megen and devoted a seminar to him and the apparatus theory in 1980.7 His first
visit should in fact have been one he would have made together with Stephen
Heath, but Metz had to cancel and was replaced by his assistant Michel Colin.
Did he take personal notes of those visits, the debates he took part in, these
seminars, the theses he read?
ML: De Kuyper attended Metz’s seminar and in L’Énonciation impresonnelle Metz
mentions his film A Strange Love Affair (co-directed with Paul Verstaten in
1984). However, there are no traces, no summaries of debates in Nijmegen or
elsewhere in the archive. I can tell you, nonetheless, that his first visit to Nijme-
gen was in October 1986, where he gave three talks: “Jokes, after Freud. Some
Remarks, Some Examples”; “Photography and Fetish”; and “Questions and An-
swers about Film Semiology.”
revisiting christian metz’s “apparatus theory” – a dialogue 243
Conceptualizing a Theory of the “Apparatus”: Baudry and Metz
AvdO: Considering the shift in Metz’s work in the 1970s, my impression is that,
coming from a background in phenomenology and structuralist linguistics and
after having explored the study of film in terms of a language, a grammar, and a
time-based art driven by narration (in “La grande syntagmatique du film narratif”
and other works),8 Metz went on to analyze the best ways in which the consider-
able impact of film images on the viewer’s imagination could be understood.
From his publications in Communications in the 1970s, one gets the impression
that Jean-Louis Baudry may have played an important role in Metz’s shift from
studying film in terms of a grammar to conceptualizing the cinema experience in
terms of an apparatus, a dispositif. Now my question is two-fold. First of all, what
was the impact Baudry had on Metz’s theorizing of the cinema in terms of an
“apparatus”? Was he in fact a starting point and an inspiration to Metz? Second,
was the direction of Metz’s thinking in the end not crucially different from Bau-
dry’s, in that Metz was far less discourse-oriented, less political, less ideologi-
cally oriented than Baudry (and many of their Parisian intellectual contempor-
aries, for that matter), if only because Metz’s primary concern was not the
analyses of the power relations inscribed in the cinema apparatus but rather the
unveiling of the mechanisms and processes working on the cinema viewer’s ima-
gination?
ML: Before I answer your question, I think it’s important to mention that al-
though Metz was trained as a linguist, he was not formally trained as a philoso-
pher and therefore his interest in phenomenology was not technical, say, unlike
Husserl and his followers. Also, the move from linguistics to psychoanalysis as a
model to think about cinema was not a break for Metz. Sure, it opened up new
objects and new perspectives, but Metz saw them as complementary with his
previous “filmo-linguistic” work. Common to both is a concern for language
and the symbolic. And in France at the time, both could be joined under the
umbrella of structuralism.
Now, the issue of Metz’s relation to Baudry is a complicated one. Baudry was
not a “professional” scholar but a novelist who earned his living as a dentist. Of
course, he was also a member of the Tel Quel group between 1962 and 1975,
along with Julia Kristeva, Philippe Sollers, Marcelin Pleynet, and Jacques Derrida.
In reading The Imaginary Signifier next to Baudry’s essays, I’ve always had the im-
pression that Metz’s overall argument was more subtle than Baudry’s. Of course,
Metz, who knew Baudry well (theirs was a relatively small intellectual circle),
speaks highly of him (in The Imaginary Signifier he mentions Baudry’s “remarkable
analyses” and adds that he sets up the problem of Freud’s optical metaphors
“very well”);9 and it’s obvious that he saw an ally in him (Baudry ended up ded-
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icating his book, L’Effet cinéma, to Metz in a collection, Ça cinéma, edited by an ex-
student of Metz’s, Joël Farges).10 Yet, at the same time, there are only five very
brief allusions to Baudry in The Imaginary Signifier and, more importantly perhaps,
they hardly have anything to do with the problem of ideology or power relations
per se. Baudry, let us recall, worked on two fronts at once, combining, like Althus-
ser, Freudo-Lacanian psychoanalysis and Marxist ideology critique. And it is
chiefly around the issue of ideology that, it seems to me, Metz was more careful
than Baudry.
In the heated post-’68 context, it was Marcelin Pleynet, who, if I recall cor-
rectly, first launched an attack on the apparatus (l’appareil) – understood here
chiefly as the camera – that determines cinema. In an interview conducted in the
third issue of the very political journal Cinéthique, Pleynet explained that before
any discussion regarding the political content of a film, or questioning their mili-
tancy, filmmakers (and critics) should question the ideology produced by the
camera itself: “the cinematographic apparatus is a properly ideological appara-
tus, it is an apparatus that disseminates bourgeois ideology before disseminating
anything else. Before it produces a film, the technical construction of the camera
produces bourgeois ideology.”11 The culprit, it seems, is the “perspectival code
directly inherited [and] constructed on the model of the Quattrocento’s scientific
perspective.”12 The camera, is “scrupulously constructed to ‘rectify’ any perspec-
tival anomaly, to reproduce in its authority the code of specular vision as it is
defined by Renaissance humanism.”13 A year and four issues later, Cinéthique
published Baudry’s first essay on cinema: “Effets idéologiques produits par l’ap-
pareil de base” [Ideological Effects Produced by the Basic Apparatus].14
AvdO: The Parisian post-’68 context – which you label as “heated” – certainly
was deeply political, and the critical focus on ideology must in part have sprung
from that context. An attack on the camera as an ideological “apparatus” or as
part of an ideological “apparatus” as Pleynet articulated must have fitted into that
context quite well. Would you say that Marcelin Pleynet was important for Baudry
in this phase?
ML: Pleynet is briefly referenced by Baudry, and it is hard to miss the connection
between the claims of the two Tel Quelians regarding the camera (l’appareil) and
its ideological effects, with Baudry adding a key psychoanalytic turn to the argu-
ment. Perhaps a terminological note is in order here. The French word “appareil”
(apparatus) has been in common usage to designate the camera (among other
things) since 19th-century photography. However Baudry is, at least at first,
somewhat equivocal in his use of the term. In the 1970 article, he includes under
it all the “technical” aspects and machinery of filmmaking (indeed his diagram
for l’appareil de base also includes the script and découpage, the film stock, mon-
tage, the projector, the screen, as well as the spectator); and yet, throughout the
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piece he especially emphasizes the role of the camera. In the second essay of
1975, he tries to clarify the situation by stating: “In a general way, we distinguish
the basic apparatus (l’appareil de base), which concerns the ensemble of the devices
and operations required for the production of a film and its projection, from the
dispositive (dispositif) which solely concerns projection and which includes the sub-
ject to whom the projection is addressed. Thus the basic apparatus comprises the
film stock, the camera, film developing, montage considered in its technical as-
pect, etc., as well as the dispositive of projection.”15
AvdO: Was Baudry important for Metz in this early phase?
ML: There is no doubt that Baudry’s work often overlaps with Metz’s own find-
ings, sometimes preceding them as in the case of his discussion of “primary”
and “secondary” identifications, of the mirror-stage analogy, of the cinematic
construction of a transcendental subject/spectator. And, in turn, it is likely that
Metz’s early work also had an impact on Baudry: the latter’s idea that cinema is a
machine that “represses” its film frames (and shots) was stated by Metz, though
in non-psychoanalytical terms, as early as “Le cinéma: langue ou langage” and
served to some extent to ground the development of the grande syntagmatique. Did
Metz share his ideas with Baudry while he was working on the essays that make
up The Imaginary Signifier? According to Raymond Bellour, they saw each other
“semi-regularly” in those days, and it is Metz who requested Baudry be invited to
submit an article to Communications 23. Metz himself published his first two psy-
choanalytical articles in that same issue. Metz and Baudry tread very common
metapsychological ground: analysis of the cinema’s impression of reality, of the
dream state and regression of the viewer caught in a situation of reduced mobil-
ity and heightened visual attention, a critique of idealism or idealist film theory,
etc. And yet, beyond the commonalities and points of contact, there are also
some real differences. Perhaps this was what Metz had in mind when he men-
tioned in passing, in The Imaginary Signifier, that he was following Baudry “obli-
quely.”
AvdO: Where do Metz’s and Baudry’s analyses of the apparatus become distinctly
different enterprises?
ML: Beyond obvious small variations in theory and beyond the equally obvious
fact that Metz’s psychoanalytic intervention in film studies is meant to cover
much more ground than that of Baudry, there are more distinct differences.
When we consider Baudry’s two essays, we find him trying to make two separate
though related points: 1) the cinema, through its basic apparatus, creates a
“phantasmatization of the subject” as transcendental ego by calling on Quattro-
cento perspective and by repressing what it does technically, i.e., by repressing
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the difference between individual film frames and, therefore, enabling narrative
continuity. The effect of which is to “transfer” this continuity onto the viewing
subject, maintaining it “whole” or “unified” and therefore maintaining the ideal-
ism that dominant ideology requires (namely the notion that consciousness is
independent from its objects and from social relations); and 2) the idea that the
success of this apparatus rests on a specific desire whose assouvissement requires,
within the apparatus, a specific dispositive (dispositif), one akin to that described
by Plato in his myth of the cave, but also by Freud in the Traumdeutung. Baudry
describes this to be a regressive desire for an earlier moment in psychic life
where perceptions and representations are undifferentiated, a form of wish-ful-
fillment fantasy that mixes perception and representation: one where real percep-
tion paradoxically turns into the perception of representations (rather than offer-
ing itself as the perception of reality). This second point, of course, is very close
to Metz’s own analysis of spectatorship. Now, as I mentioned earlier the key
distinction between Baudry and Metz concerns the social sphere (ideology), or
better yet, the relation between the “symbolic” and the “social” and Metz’s cau-
tion with regards to the way they interact and coalesce. But there is also a second
important difference which concerns the place of phenomenology in Metz’s ar-
gument. Let me begin by this second point.
As Dominique Chateau and I have tried to show,16 Metz spent his entire career
finding ways to accommodate phenomenology and semiology, including when
semiology merged with psychoanalysis. In an unpublished book manuscript,
Metz even referred to The Imaginary Signifier as a work of “phenomenological psy-
choanalysis” – a claim Baudry would certainly not have made regarding his own
work! Metz’s analysis of spectator identification, the analogy with the Lacanian
mirror, the study of the scopic drive from Sections III and IV of The Imaginary
Signifier are in fact a reiteration, through psychoanalysis, of the phenomenologi-
cal argument first given a decade earlier in his paper on the impression of reality
(“A propos de l’impression de réalité au cinéma”).17 The same terms of reference
are used: the specificity of cinema as related to its perceptual regime, its uncom-
mon perceptual richness, the fact that it nonetheless gives us shadows instead of
“real” objects, the comparison with theater, etc. Like Baudry, Metz claims that
the spectator is led to misrecognize himself as the transcendental ego of Husser-
lian phenomenology. This leads to a critique of the idealist-phenomenological
tradition in film studies for being blind to the deception it falls prey to, for failing
to recognize the alienated nature of the spectatorial self as subject of pure per-
ception. And yet – and here Metz distances himself considerably from Baudry’s
analysis – just like the ego (in Lacanian terms) cannot escape being deluded in front
of the mirror, Metz argues that without the transformation of the spectator’s perceptual
consciousness into a “false consciousness” (the latter translating itself phenomenally in the
spectator’s alienated consciousness as cinema’s impression of reality), film would be incom-
prehensible. The point, then, is not so much to politically combat alienation (the
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“mirror effect ”) as to explain it, to see its function in the overall experience of
cinema (at least narrative fiction film). Perhaps this is also a way to disarm it, but
not so much to denounce and oppose it, since this would amount to oppose the
pleasure film brings which is the source of Metz’s writing. Interestingly, this is
how Metz (symptomatically) read Laura Mulvey’s famous piece of 1975, “Visual
Pleasure and Narrative Cinema.”18 In his undated notes on the essay he writes:
“[…] the article speaks very little, barely at all, of the means to be used to destroy
the old cinema. Could it be that the article is an alibi to study and love the latter?”
AvdO: And then there is the different attitude toward ideology?
ML: We’ve just briefly touched on it. The other key point indeed has to do with
ideology. The social – which is the domain of study of history, political economy,
sociology, anthropology, etc. – is for Metz the source of all symbolism, with the
latter being the object of study of semiology and psychoanalysis (the one investi-
gating what Freud called the secondary process and the other the primary pro-
cess). Metz however refuses the vulgar Marxist temptation to look at the symbolic
as a superstructure whose only task would be to reproduce the infrastructure
from where it arises. In fact, the symbolic for Metz is neither wholly superstruc-
tural nor entirely infrastructural: he calls it, following Marxist philosopher Lu-
cien Sève, a juxtastructure. That is to say, it is distinct from the social infrastructure
and, yet unlike the superstructure, interacts with it at the same level, even in part
adding itself to it. The example Metz takes from Sève being biology in relation to
the social base. This, in fact, is an interesting example if one considers a manu-
script I found in the Metz archive at BiFi. These are notes, entitled “Vision bino-
culaire et vision monoculaire (idéologie et données psycho-physiologiques)”
written for his seminar of 1973-1974.19 The manuscript considers in detail depth
perception in mono- and binocular vision, describing the inverse square law of
distance, the law of consistency of size and shape and other principles that en-
sure a good gestalt. However, the manuscript concludes by asking, “In what
measure and in what way is perspective ideological”? The simple answer is that
perspective is and is not ideological. The key here is to distinguish between the
discovery (or invention) of perspective, its functioning and its use (for what ends
or purpose?). First, Metz explains, perspective was a discovery (the discovery of
certain mechanisms of vision) and an invention (the integration of these mecha-
nisms to the production of a visual stimulus). This means that the code of per-
spective “contains within it a scientific knowledge,” such as the knowledge of the
inverse square law, as well as the knowledge that this law, which is active in
natural perception, is unknown to its natural “users.” Consequently, in the func-
tioning of perspective not everything is a deception. First, the depth we feel (the
“impression of depth”) isn’t simulated (not an illusion or a deception) but is
really present: “because it results from the same mechanisms that produce it in
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real vision.” Indeed, Metz shows that there are several monocular factors (mask-
ing, movement, axial movements involving the law of inverse square) that play an
important role in depth perception in binocular vision. These factors are mono-
cular in that they are optically independent of the fact that both eyes perceive
bidimensional images that are slightly different. Secondly, true binocular vision
as we experience it with both our eyes is really absent – and really felt to be
absent – from bidimensional perspectival representations. We don’t mistake per-
spectival images for 3D stimulus, and though they reconstruct some of the
mechanisms of real depth perception they don’t pretend to do more than that.
However, in the functioning of perspective there are also forms of ideological
deception. For one thing, perspective imagery functions on the basis of “hiding”
the very code it relies on. The functioning of the code gives the illusion of its
absence due to the resemblance or impression of reality it fosters. This is a key
Metzian idea: the code, when it “works,” always suppresses itself as code. Also
ideological is the (psychological) denial that accompanies perspective imagery:
the viewer knows that true depth is absent, and yet the presence of an impression
of depth due to the monocular factors mentioned above, drives him/her to do as if
real depth were present. However maximum ideology resides in the use that is
made of the perspective code, namely in the fact that it is most often used with
“the sole end to represent stories (or visual spectacles, as in painting) by endow-
ing them with an air of truth.” It’s this sort of subtle response to the problem of
perspective that ultimately distinguishes Metz’s approach from Baudry’s notwith-
standing all they do share. Furthermore, if I may, Metz was a true cinephile, even
though he was fully aware of how the love of film risks short-circuiting theory
(he discusses this in the opening pages of The Imaginary Signifier). I would go so
far as to say that this cinephilia forms the repressed side of The Imaginary Signifier.
It’s “symptoms” are fairly obvious to one who knows his work well. Not so much
I think for Baudry (at least in the two essays discussed here), which, paradoxi-
cally (perversely perhaps?), may well have been something Metz appreciated in
Baudry’s work.
AvdO: Interestingly, both Baudry and the love for cinema are mentioned in the
opening pages of The Imaginary Signifier. It always seemed to me that his reflec-
tions on the cinema as an apparatus were triggered by both: Baudry’s theorizing;
and Metz’s wish to determine how the “love for the cinema” affects theorizing.
As to his love for cinema: when Metz discusses the different relations to the
“equipment of the cinema” in the small chapter on the “The cinema as techni-
que,”20 he explains that “a partial component of cinematic pleasure is to be car-
ried away by the film (or the fiction, if there is one),” another “to appreciate as
such the machinery that is carrying [one] away.”21 The filmic pleasure of connois-
seurs or cinephiles specifically “lodges in the gap between the two”: the appareil de
base (which is concealed or absent) and its effects (which are overwhelmingly
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present).22 This triggers and facilitates the interest for technique in cinephiles. It
is not accidental that all sorts of professionals, such as directors and critics, do
often “demonstrate a real ‘fetishism of technique,’” as Metz argues, adding that
he uses the word “fetishism” here in an ordinary sense.23 A fetish always being
material, there is an obvious concern amongst cinephiles with the “cinema in its
physical state.” Furthermore, of all the arts “the cinema is the one that involves
the most extensive and complex equipment”; the language of the cinema is
greatly dependent on the “hardware.”24 Regarding his concern with theorizing
the apparatus of the cinema, it seems to me that Metz’s primary objective –
slightly different from Baudry’s indeed – was to explain the powerful effects cre-
ated by the cinema, more particularly the mechanisms and processes working in
viewers when they go to the cinema, talk about the cinema, love the cinema…;
moreover, to lay bare the ways in which these very powerful mechanisms might
affect or were affecting the new scholarly enterprise they were all engaged in:
introducing the study of film as an academic discipline in Paris’s universities in
those days. Most of those studying film were cinephiles to begin with. They sim-
ply “loved cinema,” classical cinema. As opposed to academic scholars in the
other arts, the problem was not how to understand film. Film is difficult to explain
because it is easy to understand – a statement by Metz that always stuck. Studying
film was a new and wholly different matter. The complex mechanisms which
made film so easy and effective needed explaining, and perhaps those in classical
films in the first place. Was one function of his apparatus theory not simply: to
point out that the study of film would need to live up to the very specific demands
of an art of which “the ‘technical’ dimension is more obtrusive […] than else-
where”?25 For sure, I see in Metz no love for gadgets as was often apparent in
the (then new) study of new media in the early 1990s.
Furthermore, would you argue that his background in phenomenology may in
some ways have prepared him well for this new enterprise? I specifically think of
Merleau-Ponty and the one observation which is always the focus of interest of
phenomenological media theories: the transparency of the medium or the self-
denial of the medium; the observation that “media display something without
displaying themselves” (Wiesing).26 The paradigmatic example of a medium
being transparent is language: when successfully used, the meaning comes
across and the signs are immediately forgotten. “The perfection of language lies
in its capacity to pass unnoticed” (Merleau-Ponty).27 Obviously, it is quite a chal-
lenge to try to explain the transparency of an art form which (certainly when
compared to languages and literature) is so heavenly loaded with hardware as
the cinema is; moreover, the film medium is subject to constant technological
innovations which make themselves felt as part of the apparatus of the cinema,
and do create medium awareness, if only momentarily. One way to explain the
process of rendering the techniques transparent for Metz was in terms of codes
which created (restored) the reality effects of film. As you just put forward as a
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key Metzian idea: the code, once it “works,” always conceals itself. As does the
medium.
ML: Firstly, I think technology, per se, is not a key concern for Metz even though,
materially, the cinematic signifier as he understands it is determined by it. We
can come back to the idea of juxtastructure mentioned above. In discussing Mer-
leau-Ponty’s notion that cinema is a “phenomenological art,” Metz writes the
following:
It can only be so because its objective determinations make it thus. The posi-
tion of the Ego in cinema does not derive from a miraculous resemblance
between cinema and the natural characteristics of all perception; on the con-
trary, it is anticipated and marked in advance by the institution (equipment,
layout of film theatres, mental apparatus [dispositif] that interiorizes all of
this), and also by the more general characteristics of the mental apparatus
(appareil) (such as projection, the mirror structure, etc.). which, although less
strictly dependent on a period of social history and a technology, by no means
express the sovereignty of a “human vocation,” but rather inversely, are them-
selves fashioned by certain particularities of man as an animal (as the only
animal that is not an animal): his primitive Hilflosigkeit, his dependence for
care (long lasting source of the imaginary, of object relations, of the great
oral figures of feeding), the motor prematurity of the infant which condemns
it to first recognize itself through the sense of sight (and therefore in a way
exterior to itself) anticipating a muscular unity that it does not yet possess.
In short, phenomenology may contribute to the knowledge of cinema (and
it has done so) insofar as it happens to resemble it, and yet it is cinema and
phenomenology, in their common illusion of perceptual mastery that need be
brought to light by the real conditions of society and man.28
So part of the institution of cinema is dependent on technology (equipment, lay-
out of film theaters) as a condition of society (in Marxist terms, the infrastruc-
ture), but next to it, juxtaposed to it, are psycho-physical determinations. It is the
connection, the juxtastructure, between these two determinations that is of inter-
est to Metz in studying the institution of cinema which he defines as the meeting
of three “machines”: the industrial machine which is “external” (industrial and
business practices of filmmaking, film distribution and exhibition, but also film
technology, equipment, etc.); the psychology of the spectator, which is an “inter-
nal” machine (it interiorizes aspects of the industry – the political economy of
cinema – through a libidinal economy in a juxtaposed circuit of exchanges); and
finally film criticism as a third machine further juxtaposed to the other two ma-
chines. In this scheme, it is true, Marxism and (semio-)psychoanalysis, political
economy and libidinal economy are on the side of “science” and “knowledge,” as
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they independently – or semi-independently – shed light on the determining con-
ditions of the cinema institution. In short, with regards to psychoanalysis, tech-
nology is only of interest to Metz in terms of its juxtastructural relation to the
psycho-physiological determination of the cinema institution.
In the brief section of The Imaginary Signifier you mention, the analogy is be-
tween the structure of fetishism and the situation of cinephiles who “know” how
much the cinema requires a heavy investment (in both senses of the term: finan-
cial/industrial and libidinal) in equipment or technique and yet nonetheless ap-
preciate the (classical) film as if it were an immediate transcription of a world
that gives itself over to contemplation. The point being that the more one knows
about film (not just technique, but everything connected with the enunciative
side of filmmaking writ large: contractual details of the production of a film,
directorial intentions, etc., but also scholarly knowledge of film history, film aes-
thetics, and theory), the more one has to disavow this knowledge in order to
achieve the kind of “fetishistic” pleasure classical fiction cinema is capable of
procuring. Even here, however, the argument isn’t a deterministic one: film tech-
nology doesn’t necessarily lead to such psychic structuring as Metz is describing.
Take the case of very early spectators. It seems they were interested in the projec-
tion equipment almost as much as they were in the images (or “world”) it pro-
jected. The projector and its exhibition were part of the overall spectacle of mo-
tion pictures, along with the projected images even though, one could argue, the
projector ”faded” from sight (and mind – or at least from attention) as soon as
the lights went out and the screen began to register the moving shadows (the
projector could still be overheard, however). This said, the coming of encased
projection booths in nickelodeons (in part for security reasons) implied that the
projector, now conceptually “domesticated,” was no longer part of the “show”
and could be construed as evidence that it’s presence might in fact disturb those
attending the spectacle. Its disappearance, if you will, enacting (or helping enact)
at an institutional level the sort of disavowal that characterizes the fetishistic
structure Metz claims for the spectator and especially the cinephile, the spectator
“in the know.” For Metz, who is interested in classical cinema’s ability to con-
struct a world, interested in what he calls the romanesque (the novelistic), the plea-
sure the film affords is always shaded by some degree of disavowal and therefore
by perversion.
In the manuscript I mentioned earlier which will be published in 1895 (“Ex-
iste-t-il une approche sémiologique de l’esthétique?,” a conference paper from
1971), Metz compares the tasks of semiology and psychoanalysis in trying to an-
swer the question of what sort of cinema, if any, semiology could endorse. He
writes:
Every film effectively engages primary processes (for example, condensation
and displacement), but usually they remain ignored (by the filmmaker as
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much as by the audience). And this is why (see Lyotard) they can accomplish
desire (not fulfil it, but accomplish it hallucinatingly)
Now it is obvious that an expanded semiology would be led to pursue to
some extent a film that would take as its subject, as its goal the analytical exhibi-
tion of the way condensation and displacement function. Yet, by the same
token this film would be fatally deceptive and mobilize defenses. Desire
would find in it its un-accomplishment (except where part of the libidinal
economy has genuinely moved over to the side of a desire to unmask, a desire
to know, that is to say, in the end, an assumed voyeurism, an attitude that would
be at once perversion and its opposite. Instituting in each of us such an econ-
omy is no simple undertaking).29
That same year, 1971, Metz wrote an important essay on special effects (“Tru-
cages et cinéma”)30 where he distinguished clearly between two forms of plea-
sure in the cinema: pleasure arising from the diegesis (in this case, invisible spe-
cial effects) and pleasure arising from the “cinema-machine,” a form of pleasure
which is more closely tied with the film’s enunciation (in this case, the pleasure
concerns special affects that are recognized as such and therefore function as a
feat to be celebrated in that regard). These remarks help explain why Metz came
late to the problem of enunciation in the cinema: his pleasure lay on the side of
the diegesis which he nonetheless relentlessly and ruthlessly assaulted in seeking
to lay bare its mechanisms, its codes. This isn’t to say that his work on enuncia-
tion is devoid of “cinephilia.” Quite the opposite, in fact: it’s the book where he
cites the most films, almost at times a catalogue, and often offering loving de-
scriptions where adjectives such as “magnifique” (à propos Urgences [1988] by
Raymond Depardon), “les belles images” (à propos Le Trou [1960] by Jacques
Becker) abound. Perhaps the “displacement” of the site of pleasure, from dieg-
esis to enunciation required this new form of writing. At the Zurich conference,
Dana Polan showed very convincingly how L’Énonciation impersonnelle is a very “lov-
ing book” and I agree with him that it “goes against the argument that exposing
the apparatus breaks down ideology”31 as the people at Screen had inferred. In-
deed, in his unpublished “review” of Who Framed Roger Rabbit (Zemeckis,
1988) Metz writes: “It is the triumph of the signifier, since the story doesn’t mat-
ter anymore, and the only thing the cinema does here is to self-exhibit, but this
triumph is not what post-’68 materialism would have believed. With the “signif-
ier” it is the money-grubbers (les marchands de soupe) who triumph.”32
Now, to come back to your question, perhaps it was the phenomenologist in
him that expressed itself in that pleasure in the diegesis, the pleasure from see-
ing a world, the cinephilic pleasure – the very pleasure Bazin, among others,
expressed in his reviews. However his “attacks” on the normal working of the
code, his constant attempts to go beyond or behind perception show the dilem-
ma he was in: his discourse was not to be confused with Bazin’s. In the end, and
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this is obvious in The Imaginary Signifier, phenomenology was essential and valued
by Metz, but only as the (required) negative side (or dialectical flip-side if you pre-
fer) of the semio-psychoanalytical enterprise.
AvdO: In retrospect, how do you assess Metz’s work in the 1970s? Put differently,
would you agree that apparatus theory contributed to the constitution of cinema
studies as an object sui generis, defined by a number of concepts – the cinema
apparatus, the appareil de base, the dispositif, etc. – that changed the study of film
in that very period? Moreover, do you feel film and media scholars today may still
gain interesting insights from Metz’s reflections on the apparatus as developed
in The Imaginary Signifier (taking into account that these essays were written in the
heyday of psychoanalysis and that the latter lost much of its aura since)? Or
would you rather argue that Metz’s (and Baudry’s) apparatus theory today is
mainly interesting from a historical and epistemological perspective?
ML: In the end, the impact of 1970s apparatus theory was perhaps greater than
could’ve been anticipated at the time, even though much of it is largely pooh-
poohed today. For one thing, it gave new vigor to the study of spectatorship with-
in the orbit of film and media studies. Whereas spectator studies had always
been marginal forms of sociological and psychological interests in the discipline
(from the Payne Fund studies all the way to the Filmology movement), apparatus
theory was instrumental in initiating a move away from the film itself (or from
cinematographic codes as manifested in films) as sole object of study. And while
it was certainly guilty of the very idealism it sought to critique, offering a univer-
salizing conception of the spectator, as it was soon pointed out, it nonetheless
opened up an new area of study. Furthermore, by offering a target for histori-
cized, local-specific, gendered as well as cognitive accounts of spectatorship –
all of which criticized apparatus theory in part or in toto – one could say it was
also dialectially/negatively valuable and important for our field. Thus, there can
be no doubt that it had a profound impact on film and media studies. That’s for
the historical value of apparatus theory.
AvdO: Agreed, the historical value cannot be denied, but looking from an episte-
mological perspective, would the apparatus theory still be important to the field
of film studies today?
ML: If one looks at the issue epistemologically, then I think one of the questions
raised by apparatus theory concerns the good usage of analogy in theory. Let’s go
back to Baudry for a minute. There is no denying that the canonical ideal of
Western film going – a situation we find today in cinémathèques more so than
in any suburban multiplex – shares a number of features with Plato’s myth of the
cave. One question, then, is What are we to make of such (suggestive) likeness?
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And more importantly, What are we to make of the differences – what are the
“limits” of the analogy? In short, How are we to productively make use of analo-
gies (keeping in mind that this is what they are)? Now to put it simply: Plato’s
cave is an allegory, film going isn’t. What Baudry’s analogy was inadvertently
doing was turning film going into an allegory, hence the idealistic, universalizing
traits that clung to it. What Baudry produced, then, was an image. But is this
image, in itself, useful? And to what end? One problem with this image, as media
archaeologists and historians have shown us through their work, is that it kept
hidden important historical facts about various apparatuses, spectatorial situa-
tions, different dispositives which have played a role in the emergence of cinema.
Images show us things, but they can also turn out to hide things away.
I think this is also where Metz is more interesting, in this regard, than Baudry.
To be sure, Metz uses analogies – there’s nothing intrinsically wrong with that,
quite the opposite. But his analogies are properly structural. This is always how he
worked. If you look at the wonderfully rich essay that ends The Imaginary Signifier,
the long piece on metaphor and metonymy, you see that he’s not really interested
in these terms, “metaphor” and “metonymy,” per se. What interests him is the
deep semantic and logical structure they stand for, a structure which is independent
of their surface manifestation in rhetoric or verbal language. A deep structure
that seems to manifest itself also in dreams (according to psychoanalysis) and in
films. This is why his isn’t an attempt to “map” linguistics or classical rhetoric
onto film. The point for him, moreover, is always to account for an impression film
leaves on the viewer, in this case the impression that films mean more than what
they show, than what is given to visual perception alone. The same holds true for
the other essays of that book, including “The Imaginary Signifier” where a good
deal of what is at stake concerns classical cinema’s impression of reality and its
involvement in the pleasure that films can provide – in good measure due to the
machinery of cinema, whereby the world of fiction is doubly imaginary, doubly
absent – and the forms of desire they rely on. Metz’s work does not “criticize”
the cinema (as Baudry does), he offers a critique of it (in an almost Kantian sense):
studying the (psychic) conditions of possibility for the pleasure it affords and
how they merge with or juxtapose technical conditions.
AvdO: Metz’s interest in the “conditions of possibility” for providing “pleasure,”
as you say, was made possible by cinema’s technical aspects, its apparatus. Yet in
your reflections on Metz’s theory, the technological seems to be outweighed by
the psychoanalytical…?
ML: If it appears like I’m downplaying the technological, apparatus side of
Metz’s work in the 1970s, it’s because I want to avoid mechanistic/deterministic
readings of it which I don’t think properly echo his project. The material aspects
of the cinematic signifier reflect desire and pleasure as much as they dispense it.
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And in as much as pleasure and desire are what is at stake in Metz’s psychoana-
lytic account of the apparatus, I think there are still insights to be gained from it,
even today. Indeed, if one avoids reifying it, avoids the implicit (and in, naïvely,
an almost Hegelian sense) historical scheme posited by Baudry (from Plato, to
Renaissance perspective all the way to cinema, as the only trajectory or lineage
for projected moving images), there is no reason why Metz’s overall perspective
couldn’t cross-pollinate with some of the more historical and media archaeologi-
cal work being done today. Do the same desire and pleasure occur in watching a
film on my iPhone or iPad? I think Metz would argue that they do, for the signif-
ier is equally imaginary there as it is when a traditional movie screen and projec-
tor are used (I know for a fact that Metz watched a lot of films on television and
on videotape!). Of course, the sort of pleasure Metz discusses may be harder to
achieve or sustain when the iPhone starts ringing or when emails come in while
I’m watching a film – does this mean that we’re back to a situation akin, if only
in this respect, to that of early film goers likely disturbed by sitting next to the
projector? But then again with so many people nowadays using their smart-
phones in commercial film theaters, achieving and sustaining pleasure may be a
difficult project there as well…
AvdO: Is the signifier indeed equally imaginary if the screen size and other ele-
ments of the appareil de base and the dispositif are radically changed? What happens
when we remove the traditional movie screen, the projector and its light beam,
the dark cinema auditorium? That certainly is a Metzian question. Of course such
a question was not asked in the heyday of classical cinema. But we may indeed
wonder. What about film viewers in a train on a bleak winter day bending over
their phones to watch, say The Wizard of Oz? It has struck me many times
that viewers when bending over their phones would suddenly put this typical
soft smile on their faces, as if seeing something innocent and cute. In art history
this type of effect is addressed in relation to miniature art, miniature portrait
painting, doll houses, etc. Would miniature artifacts – or IMAX screens, for that
matter – exist if they would not affect viewers? Then: Do phones affect the imagi-
nary status of the seen? Do they affect the imagination of viewers in a radically
different way? One can argue that, in the end, they do not, that is, when viewers
have become users who are used to watching like this, to phrase it tautologically.
In other words: the film experience may end up being not all that different in
terms of the imagination for viewers who shift screens habitually.
ML: It is obvious that the phenomenal conditions of film watching on, say, a
miniature screen are different from those offered by mainstream large-screen
film theaters. One could claim that there is a loss of impact in image and sound,
for instance (however, one could equally ask whether there are gains “elsewhere”
in the experience). The counterpoint, of course, is that individuals now have
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home theaters built to recover part of that impact. It’s difficult to say how Metz
would have theorized these changes in the material and perceptual conditions of
viewing films and it’s unfair to him to speculate what his views would be. How-
ever, Metz was not insensitive to technological change in the cinema. In notes
that he took on Rudolf Arnheim’s Film as Art, Metz wrote: “Perhaps, as of 1980,
the cinema in its entirety is dead at the benefit of TV and new media.” Now Metz
was very fond of Arnheim’s work and he devoted an entire seminar to him.
Further on in his notes, however, he critiques Arnheim for failing to consider
cinema’s technological evolution:
The blind spot, the closing of the mind is that he [Arnheim] didn’t under-
stand this: that, because it is technological, the cinema is fatally subject to
evolution. The latter can only lead to improving cinema’s impression of real-
ity, and also render the latter more automatic. It is true that this eliminates the
coarse and childish “signifying effects” Arnheim loved (a gigantic shadow
used symbolically doesn’t fare well in a strongly “realistic” film), but it is also
normal (and this Arnheim also rejected) that, when a young art develops sig-
nifying effects become much more subtle, and, by the same token, compatible
with the complete reproduction of reality, such as the true or false alternating
and repetition effects in Hitchcock that R. Bellour studied. Arnheim didn’t
want to see – simply for a biographical reason, that of a self-attachment to
his own era – that inseparably linked to the technical progress he abhorred,
the anonymous collectivity of filmmakers was becoming ever more clever,
ceaselessly recomposing its margins of creativity.33
Notice, however, that the argument concerning technology here is an aesthetic
one. If we come back to the problem of the apparatus, it’s important to recognize
that Metz’s theory of the dispositif as vehicule of the cinematic signifier is depen-
dent on a number of principles (especially the specific regime of absence/presence
that the cinematic signifier ensures) that still hold when watching a film on a
miniature screen. In short, in Metzian terms, and keeping in mind that the sig-
nifier is not the machine, the real question one should be asking here is the fol-
lowing: with the proliferation of screens and formats, has the nature of the cin-
ematic signifier changed?









This article began as my contribution to a panel at the 2012 Society for Cin-
ema and Media Studies (SCMS) conference in Boston entitled “The Disciplin-
ary History and the Identity of an Academic Discipline: Historicizing Film
History.” In his invitation, the panel organizer had explicitly asked me to ex-
plore the ideas found in my most recent research into the “digital revolution”
and the question of the “death of cinema.” The task was to “conclude a panel
with some thoughts about the future of film history” by attempting to gauge
the possible impact on future film historiography by the promised disappear-
ance of celluloid and the recent changes to the entertainment available in
movie theaters, where it is now commonplace to consume work normally in-
tended for the small screen, such as filmed operas, stage plays, and ballets.
I quickly realized that it would be quite risky, at an academic conference, to
engage in reading the future and to appear, without a safety net, to be making
predictions to which could be applied none of the rules for validation to which
scholars are accustomed, even in the humanities. And so I opted for a relative-
ly playful approach, that of letting people attending the panel imagine that it
was not André Gaudreault speaking to them in the present but rather some-
one from a brand new generation (Paul-Emmanuel Odin, a young scholar who
exists in real life and who I thank for allowing me to give him a fictitious role
in my presentation) speaking to them from the future.
Now that the digital turn has shattered to pieces the very idea of cinema as a
linear and monolithic medium, we may truly wonder about the future history
of this almost boundless medium that is in the process of taking shape and
which we still call “cinema.” One thing is certain: cinema is in crisis; it is in
the process of changing, of mutating even, here and now, in our presence,
live, right before our eyes. But it’s not just cinema, it’s not just media, which
is changing and mutating. We too are also in the midst of a process of mutation. We
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as film viewers, but also as active members of the small community of film
studies scholars. The boundaries of cinema-as-medium are not the only ones
constantly shifting; there are also the boundaries of what we call film studies.
And, by extension, the boundaries of that discipline within film studies we
call film history. What will become of film history if “films” disappear and
the movie theater is no longer devoted only to films? What will remain of film
history after the “digital revolution”?
The intuition I had when I was asking myself this kind of question was that
the telos of the new historians would have to rely on the proliferation and
hybridity of cinema, its multiple territories, its fragmentation. I came to the
conclusion that the paper I would deliver at Boston should tend to show how
the historians of the near future would be obliged to pass from a kind of uni-
fied history (the history of the cinema) to a fully fragmented one (the history,
say, of the “variants of cinema” that exist today (“cinema” films but also mu-
seum installations, television series, films for smartphones, etc.) – variants
that have gained ground since the boundaries became so blurred between
genres and media that our center of interest has shifted from a close-up on
“classical narrative” cinema, as it is known, to that more overarching and en-
compassing reality known as “moving images.”
In this light, I came up with an approach which threw my audience off
guard a little, at the same time as I asked for their cooperation by putting
them in a situation in which they would project themselves into the future
with me (or rather with my avatar), not to a Society for Cinema and Media
Studies (SCMS) conference in Boston in 2012, but to the annual conference of
the same association thirty years later (in 2042), after it had once again chang-
ed its name (a pure supposition on my part, of course) to become the Society
for Moving Image Studies (SMIS).
I ask the reader of the present text for the same sort of cooperation, which
requires a kind of intellectual gymnastics which we are not used to encounter-
ing in a scholarly presentation. The reader will understand that, while the
rules of the game usually require a text derived from a conference paper to
erase most of the signs of its verbal origins, I have not followed this rule in
the present case, for obvious reasons.
A.G.
Presentation of the Speaker
[Reminder: We are in 2042, four months after the fourth edition of the con-
ference, “The Impact of Technological Innovations on the Historiography and
Theory of Cinema”]
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We’ve just been informed that, thanks to the “Back to the Future Vision Device,”
patented recently by James Cameron, Jr., there has been a last-minute change
to the program. We were supposed to hear a paper by André Gaudreault, but
he will be ante-retro-replaced by Paul-Emmanuel Odin who, despite his ample
years, is something of a junior himself, because he is the son of the father of
semio-pragmatics, Roger Odin.
Paul-Emmanuel Odin defended his dissertation (entitled “L’inversion tempor-
elle du cinéma”) some thirty-one years ago (in July 2011), at the Université de
la Sorbonne Nouvelle. Let us now hear this specialist of retro-temporality,
Paul-Emmanuel Odin, who will share with us a paper entitled “From Cinema
to Moving Image and Then to Post-cinematic Media.”1
I would like to begin by pointing out that my paper is a follow-up to one that I
gave eleven years ago, in November 2031 [remember: we are supposedly in
2042...], at the third edition of the conference “The Impact of Technological In-
novations on the Historiography and Theory of Cinema,”2 which was held simul-
taneously in Montreal, Paris, Hollywood, and Mumbai using holo-digital tele-
presence technology. The title of that paper was “What Remains of [So-Called]
Cinema Since the Advent of Post-Cinematic Media: A Semio-Pragmatic Approach.”
I remind you that at the time we had by then all adopted the expression “mov-
ing images” in place of the word “cinema,” which had become completely obso-
lete around the year 2020, and that the “Impact” conference of 2031 was the first
time that “post-cinematic media” were conceptualized, having before that date
been in their infancy.
I remind you also that the word “cinema,” derived from the camera invented
by the Lumière brothers, which they had called the “Cinématographe,” became
current in the 20th century to describe the new art form, often at the expense of
that all-American expression “motion pictures.” Here is an exemplary case of the
word “cinema” being rejected by two major figures in the history of moving
images, Orson Welles and Peter Bogdanovich:3
Peter Bogdanovich
Was it true that one director told you not to call them “movies,” but “motion
pictures”?
Orson Welles
Ah, that was a friend of yours, Peter – that was George Cukor, and remember,
he was from the New York stage. That probably had something to do with it.
Nowadays, I’m afraid the word is rather chic. It’s a good English word,
though – “movie.” How pompous it is to call them “motion pictures.” I don’t
mind “films,” though, do you?
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Peter Bogdanovich
No, but I don’t like “cinema.”4
This brief dialogue is a compact overview of some of the names used in the 20th
century to describe moving images: “movies,” “motion pictures,” and “cinema.”
Between “cinema” and “motion pictures” the industry was always partial to “mo-
tion pictures,” while scholars often preferred “cinema.” Think of the current
name of “Academy of Moving Image Arts and Sciences” which, you will recall,
was known until 2020 as the “Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences,” a
name that lasted almost a century after being adopted by the industry in the
1920s.
What the Academy did in 2020 was to give precedence to the concept “mov-
ing” over that of “motion,” whereas the expression “motion picture” was pro-
posed 107 years earlier precisely because the concept “moving” was rejected. Wil-
liam Paul explained this in an article published in 1997,5 at a time when journals
were still printed on paper:
In the fall of 1913 The Moving Pictures News, a prominent exhibition trade jour-
nal that had been recently purchased by its competitor Exhibitors’ Times, prom-
ised among other innovations that it would soon “announce the new name of
the merged publications.” A couple of weeks later the new name appeared:
The Motion Picture News!6
One of the reasons Paul gave for the preference for motion over moving was the
latter’s relatively vulgar and popular aspect, and the fact that motion...
[...] help[s] signal the “highest aspiration of The Motion Picture News [...] to
represent the art and industry of the motion picture in a dignified, honorable
and progressive spirit.” [...] The change was also possibly a marketing strat-
egy to distinguish itself from its chief competitor, The Moving Picture World.7
By means of an ironic swing of history’s pendulum, we went, then, from moving
to motion in the 1910s and from motion to moving in the 2010s.
You will recall that it was during the digital revolution in the early part of this
21st century that the expression “moving images” began the discreet invasion
that led it to completely dominate what was still known at the time as the field
of film studies, or cinema studies. To such an extent that in 2017 the organiza-
tion hosting this week’s conference decided to face the music and, once again,
change its name. At the time of the digital revolution, our association was indeed
known as the Society for Cinema and Media Studies (SCMS), after having been
named in 1969 the Society for Cinema Studies (SCS).
Here is what the Web 4.0 site of our association has to say about this:
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The late 1990s saw the debut of digital media as a growing field of study.
During the last decade the number of Scholarly Interest Groups (SIGs) has
expanded, reflecting the growth of sub-fields in Cinema and Media Studies,
many intermedial and interdisciplinary. In 2002 the “M” for Media was added
to SCS to reflect these changes and create the Society for Cinema and Media
Studies.8
Thus what lay at the source of the change of name in 2002 was the “digital turn”
that threw things and people into confusion about the identity of the medium.
Nevertheless, 1969 was not the year of the association’s Big Bang. Its first version
was founded ten years earlier, in 1959, by a gang of visionaries:
In 1959 the Society of Cinematologists was founded with an initial council
consisting of Robert Gessner (New York University), president; Hugh Gray
(UCLA), secretary; and Gerald Noxon (Boston University), treasurer.[...] The
journal of the organization, which had been started in 1961 as The Journal of
the Society of Cinematologists, became Cinema Journal in 1966.9
The web site informs us of the French origins of the word “cinematologist,” one
worthy of the fabulous sixties:
The first name of the Society was always controversial. The term “Cinematol-
ogist” was adapted by founding president Robert Gessner from the French
“filmologie,” a term coined by Gilbert Cohen-Séat in 1948 [...]10
What those who took over the Society in 1969 did was make the word “cinema-
tologist” vanish and replace it with “cinema,” the same word that fell under the
wrecking ball in the 2020s, to be replaced systematically by “moving images” in a
manner that the two months of intensive research I have just completed has en-
abled me to trace.
While it did not succeed in dominating the field for all time, the expression
“moving images” that we adopted with such unanimity some twenty years ago
was not, of course, unknown in the 20th century.11 Here, for example, is a brief
remark by none other than the very first president of our association, Robert
Gessner himself, in an article published in The Journal of the Society of Cinematolo-
gists, the ancestor of our beloved Moving Image Journal, which took over from the
journal known as Cinema Journal at the time of the SCS and SCMS. Here is what
Gessner wrote in 1962:
For an aesthetic-historical importance, however, Life of an American
Fireman is entitled to be considered the single most important improver in
the history of the Moving Image.12
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It’s astonishing, isn’t it, to find here, word for word, the title of courses found
today in many of our universities since at least the 2030s: “The History of the
Moving Image!” They were visionaries back then, I tell you...
Let’s move on to my hypotheses as to why the term “cinema” was rejected in
the 2010s in favor of the expression “moving image.”We all know it was the fault
of the digital revolution, which began in the final years of the 20th century and
had an enormous impact on all media, and especially cinema. At least that is
what my research has enabled me to ascertain. So much so that that the ensuing
paradigm shift pushed “film studies” and “cinema studies” aside in favor of
“moving image studies.”
The first thing to note is that the digital revolution upset the kinematography
apple cart more than is generally acknowledged. This revolution was not just the
convergence of media and the multiplication of platforms; it was also a shift in
perception that shook the pillars of the temple to such an extent that the social
users of media went through an almost chronic period of instability more intense
than anything the world of moving images had seen before. The arrival of sound
and the advent of television were tempests in a teapot compared to the tsunami
of the digital revolution.
Beginning around the year 2000, the media universe began a period of unpre-
cedented turbulence. The classical media lost almost all their bearings, setting
each one in search of its identity.
You may have noticed that I am using the word “media” in the plural. I should
point out, for younger readers that it was still customary as late as the early 2020s
to distinguish media from each other, something more or less inaugurated by the
patriarch of what was still known as “media studies,”Marshall McLuhan, with his
groundbreaking study whose title, Understanding Media,13 used the plural form of
the Latin word “medium.” This was before total convergence took hold with the
release of “Grand Digital HypeMedia” in the year 2025, which changed everything.
The first decade of the 21st century, let me remind you, was a time when the
definition of cinema was as uncertain, shifting, elusive, imprecise, unstable, vari-
able, etc., etc., as could be. One of the questions that scholars were constantly
asking, believe it or not, was the then already age-old question posed by André
Bazin some time earlier, “What is cinema?” This also took various other forms:
“When is it cinema?,” “Where is cinema headed?,” “Is it cinema?,” etc., a fact
corroborated by the titles of film books being published during this period. Here
is a selection of volumes which all share this anxiety over the future of cinema:
Cherchi Usai: The Death of Cinema14
Cinergon film journal: “Où va le cinéma?”15
Rodowick: The Virtual Life of Film16
Dubois et al.: Yes, It’s Cinema17
Tryon: Reinventing Cinema18
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Make special note of the more recent one, by Dudley Andrew, who inverts the
terms of Bazin’s question to proclaim loud and clear: What Cinema Is!19
On the ground, two camps faced off: some people in the media camp an-
nounced the imminent death of cinema, while the others proclaimed on the con-
trary that cinema was shining brighter than ever and that its future was assured.
Those in the former camp are the victims of what Philippe Marion and André
Gaudreault called the DEAD CINEMA syndrome.20
Many others at the time saw cinema, on the contrary, as expanding and ex-
tending widely. So much so that there was a shift from Gene Youngblood’s Ex-
panded Cinema21 to the Extended Cinema of Philippe Dubois and company.22 These
two seemingly contradictory syndromes co-existed and waged a titanic battle for
people’s hearts:
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Fig. 1: Cover page of issue no. 226 of the magazine Paris Match, dated July 18 to
25, 1953.1 © Paris Match/Scoop.
What is remarkable in this title, is not the term “extended”; it is to continue
calling new forms like installations, performances with projections, closed-
circuit television, the computer processing of images, holography, and all
which has happened to the image since the arrival of the computer and the
telephone. [...] Cinema is not in the process of declining, of disappearing, or
sinking into oblivion, but rather, in the infinite variety of its forms and prac-
tices, it is more alive than ever, more multiple, more intense, more omnipre-
sent than it ever has been. 23
As for the opposite idea of the death of cinema, that is nothing new. It was even a
recurring theme throughout the 20th century. In July 1953, the magazine Paris
Match asked the question “Will cinema disappear?”24 (Fig. 1). It fingered those
responsible: Hollywood’s dramatic crisis and the desperate battle between new
techniques and television.
The crisis cinema was going through at the turn of the century is not the first it
has known. The history of the seventh art has been punctuated fairly regularly by
intense moments when the medium has been radically called into question. Be-
fore the crisis brought on by the appearance of television, there was the one
caused by the transition from silent to sound film. In each case, a few doom and
gloom types took the opportunity to announce the death of cinema. And yet cin-
ema did not die: not in 1930, nor in 1950, nor in 2010, even if at the time news-
papers sometimes carried apocalyptic stories, as in the particularly over-the-top
example shown in Fig. 2.
It’s true that between 2010 and 2012 there was reason enough to worry. Those
in the “cinema” camp sometimes seemed like chickens with their heads cut off,
running around in every direction on the planet “cinema.” Cinema, a word in-
creasingly garnished with scare quotes!
Here, in no particular order, are some of the symptoms of the 2010s blues:
– University programs which no longer dared to openly call themselves “cin-
ema” studies programs. It’s always “Cinema and this,” “Cinema and that,”
“Cinema and I don’t know what all else!” For example, Concordia University,
Montreal: “Film and Moving Image Studies”; Université du Québec à Mon-
tréal: “Cinéma et images en mouvement”; York University, Toronto, “Cinema
and Media”; University of California at Santa Cruz: “Film and Digital Media.”
– In other instances, the word “cinema” starts to take a back seat; it becomes a
mere adjective. University of Southern California: “Cinematic Arts”; Oakland
Community College: “Cinematic Arts Program.”
– In some cases, things split open!!! The word “cinema” is abandoned and out
and out replaced by “Moving Images.” It’s the beginning of the end. Georgia
State University: “Moving Image Studies.”
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– There are also lots of examples of this identity crisis outside of academia. In
late 2010 in France, the Centre national de la cinématographie got a makeover by
changing its name to the Centre national du cinéma et de l’image animée...
– On the other side of the pond, there was also the case of the Cinémathèque
québécoise, hitherto known for its exclusive love of cinema. It surreptitiously
changed its vocation from that of a “Cinema Museum” to the less specific and
less glamorous “Museum of the Moving Image.”25
To give an idea of the disorientation that reigned in the first decade of the pre-
sent century, I have chosen a case study, which was documented, in 2010 pre-
cisely, by a scholar who had participated, decades before, in the famous Brighton
conference, André Gaudreault.
In fact the case documented by Gaudreault concerns the Cinémathèque québé-
coise, whose management staff, questioned by him, revealed the extent to which
they felt confined on planet “cinema” at the time, and how they felt completely
the future history of a vanishing medium 269
Fig. 2: Cover page of the French daily newspaper Libération, May 12, 2011.
© Libération. Photo credit: Benjamin Rondel/Corbis
lost and disoriented. Here as evidence is a statement by one of the curators of the
institution:
Over the years we have often discussed various names to describe the Ciné-
mathèque [...] soliciting the opinion of members of the board of directors,
the director, the communications department, or of external consultants. To
such an extent that I have lost my bearings. [...] Already back in the 1990s we
tried the expression “Museum of the Moving Image,” then we went back to
“Museum of Cinema” and now we have gone back to “Museum of the Moving
Image.”26
And this statement by the executive director:
I heard [this suggestion] this week: “Museum of Cinematographic Diversi-
ties.” A little “politically correct,” no? For my part, I sometimes talk of film
variants, but I would never say “Museum of Film Variants”!27
We can see how urgent it had become to settle things in people’s minds. We also
see the lay of the land –mined land – on which “moving image” was soon to take
hold in people’s minds.
Before concluding, I would like to share with you a final hypothesis. I believe I
have found one of the turning points (perhaps the turning point...) which, his-
torically, pushed “film studies” to become “moving image studies.” I refer to an
international conference organized in May 2010 by the ARTHEMIS research
group (the “Advanced Research Team on History and Epistemology of Moving
Image Study”28) of Concordia University in Montreal. Headed by Martin Lefebvre,
ARTHEMIS is a research infrastructure which, as it defines itself, is “dedicated to
the study of the evolution of film studies as a discipline,” and which exists since
2007.29 In June 2010, ARTHEMIS organized a major conference (in which the
cream of film studies participated30) under the title “The ARTHEMIS Interna-
tional Conference – Moving Images Studies: History(ies), Method(s), Discipline
(s).”31 We might say that the die had now been cast: not only did the conference
make no mention of “film studies”; it was more concerned with the history,
methods, and discipline of “moving image studies.”32 The ARTHEMIS group
has thus surreptitiously passed from the study of a phenomenon (“moving image
studies”) to something that begins to have every appearance of a discipline:
“moving image studies.”
We can see once again, in a highly emblematic way, the concern that gave rise
to the present text: that a group which declares itself to be devoted above all to
the study of the evolution of “film studies” has made its focus (according to the
title of its conference) not, precisely, “film studies,” but what some people might
see as a competitor: “moving image studies.”33 With hindsight, at a distance of
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32 years, we might think of this as the date when the discipline whose name our
association now promotes was born.34
I will now conclude in the form of a wish. I believe it is time, today in 2042, to
change the name of our association once again, and I hope great numbers of you
will support the proposition I have formulated which will be voted on at the
General Assembly tomorrow to the effect that the Society for Moving Image Stud-
ies (SMIS) henceforth be called the Society for Post-Cinematic Media Studies
(SPMS) in order to reflect the compromise that has been worked out over the
past ten years between those in favor of a return to the term “cinema” and the
members of our association who are firmly opposed, seeing in the term no more
than a cheesy Romanticism. At the same time, this name change would confirm
the validity of our association’s decision, in 2002, to open our community to the
media reality and intermedial reality of moving images...
THE END35
Translated by Timothy Barnard
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Experimental Media Archaeology:
A Plea for New Directions
Andreas Fickers and Annie van den Oever
Preamble
The history of media archaeology has been a history of discourse-oriented analy-
sis. Friedrich Kittler, the intellectual father of media archaeology, inspired a fo-
cus on the materiality of the medium from the early 1980s onwards to lay bare
the epistemological structures underpinning studies in the humanities.1 While
this tradition has produced interesting studies focusing on the discursive con-
struction and symbolic meaning of different media technologies, the materiality
of media technologies and the practices of use need more attention.2 Media are
widely acknowledged as utterly important in the formation of knowledge, cul-
tures, and media-saturated everyday life, and urgently in need of further study.
While media archaeology positively helped to constitute the field of media stud-
ies, and contributed considerably to the broader awareness of how important
media are and have been in the past, we feel though that a further step is needed
now in terms of studying the materiality of the medium to live up to the expecta-
tions raised. Instead of investing our energies in discursive enterprises, we opt
for an investment in experimental media archaeology. Experimental media ar-
chaeology is inspired by the idea of historical re-enactment, acknowledging the
historian’s (the experimenter’s) role as co-constructor of the epistemic object.
Experimental media archaeology is driven by a desire to produce experimental
knowledge regarding past media usages, developments, and practices. To do so,
it will be practical as well as philosophical, empirical as well as theoretical, con-
ceptual as well as experimental, drawing from psychology as well as sociology,
ethnography as well as cultural anthropology, image theory as well as history.
Lastly, experimental media archaeology has an archival drive; it aspires to use
the immense collections of media apparatuses (l’appareil de base)3 waiting in film
and other archives for further research.
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Re-Enactment as Heuristic Methodology
Experimental media archaeology is inspired by the idea of historical re-enact-
ment as a heuristic methodology. As such, it is well established in the field of
experimental archaeology4 and in the history of science.5 The idea of re-enact-
ment as a heuristic concept of historical understanding has been introduced by
the historian and philosopher of history R.G. Collingwood in his seminal study
“The Idea of History”:
Historical knowledge is the knowledge of what mind has done in the past,
and at the same time it is the re-doing of this, the perpetuation of past acts in
the present. Its object is therefore not a mere object, something outside the
mind which knows it; it is an activity of thought, which can be known only in
so far as the knowing mind re-enacts it and knows itself as doing so. To the
historian, the activities whose history he is studying are not spectacles to be
watched, but experiences to be lived through in his own mind; they are objec-
tive, or known to him, only because they are also subjective, or activities of his
own.6
Acknowledging the informative role of re-enactments in the historian’s mind in
the construction of her historical imagination, we propose to expand Colling-
wood’s idea of “experiencing history” in doing historical re-enactments in prac-
tice not only as “Gedankenexperimente.”7 In engaging with the historical artifacts,
we aim at stimulating our sensorial appropriation of the past and thereby criti-
cally reflecting the (hidden or non-verbalized) tacit knowledge that informs our
engagement with media technologies. In doing experimental media archaeology,
we want to plead for a hands-on, ears-on, or an integral sensual approach toward
media technologies. As the French philosopher Michel Serres argued in The Five
Senses, we need a “second tongue” in order to grasp the complex meaning of
things. Using the example of wine-tasting, Serres shows that our analytical ap-
proach toward things – even to such a highly sensitive thing as “wine” – is domi-
nated by our “first tongue”: the tongue of language, speech, and words. This first
tongue constantly rules out the analytical skills of our “second tongue,” the ton-
gue that tastes, that explores, that keeps silent. “Sapidity slumbers beneath the
narcosis of speech,” Serres writes.8 This linguistic anaesthesia dispossesses peo-
ple of their aesthetic sensation. In order to revitalize this aesthetic quality of
things, we need our second tongue, that is: all our senses.
Anaesthetics is a word that should be taken seriously in the world of media stud-
ies, for at least two reasons. One, a pivotal feature of media usage is that the
initial aesthetic effects wear off in the process of use up to a point where the
awareness of the materiality of the medium may disappear almost fully. Two, the
acquired experience of “transparency” affects media studies in profound ways,
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including the ways in which the object of study is defined. The re-sensitization of
expert observers is needed to construct the epistemic object; to define what a
“medium” is; and to create consensus in the field with regard to it. It has already
been noted in a series of studies that the definition of “media” has become so
broad that it is now in danger of losing all meaning altogether.9 Providing a
workable definition of its object is nevertheless crucial to any field of studies and
perhaps even more so for the field of media studies as it aims at understanding
cultural practices which constantly and rapidly change, and media products of
which the impact tends to be ephemeral, first sensed and then forgotten, on and
off, in an ongoing process of use that automatically and inevitably conceals the
traces media technologies initially create in users in terms of sense responses
and awareness. In fact, the study of medium-awareness cycles should help to
explain why the construction of the epistemic object and an operational defini-
tion has been such a challenge to the field.
Re-Sensitizing the Observer
We believe that doing historical re-enactments with old media artifacts is a heur-
istic approach that will offer new sensorial experiences and reflexive insights into
the complex meanings and functionalities of past media technologies and prac-
tices. It aims at going beyond the “aesthetics” and “hermeneutics of astonish-
ment” of media archaeology10 by turning “observers” into “experimenters.” In
creating such a space for creative exploration and tinkering with either original
artifacts or replicas, the researcher will get a first-hand experience of the heuris-
274 andreas fickers and annie van den oever
Fig. 1: Robert Capa with a 16mm Bell & Howell Filmo camera. The photo is
made by Gerda Taro during the Spanish Civil War, May 1937.
tic difference between studying textual and visual representations of past media
technologies and experiencing their performative qualities and limitations in
real-life interaction and re-use. In engaging with the material artifacts in a la-
boratory environment, experimental media archaeologists actively co-construct
their epistemic object.11
As we have learned from so-called “laboratory studies” in the sociology and
anthropology of science, scientific “facts” or “findings” are always the specific
result of a combination of concrete temporal, spatial and social factors and radi-
cally historical (that means: open to change).
The heuristic value of doing historical re-enactments lies therefore not in the
(impossible) reconstruction of an “authentic” historical experience, but in creat-
ing a sensorial and intellectual experiment that will demonstrate the differences
between textual, visual, and performative approaches to the past.12 In other
words, it is not so much the “correctness” of these re-enactments that is at stake,
but their productivity; generally speaking, their usefulness in research is what
really matters, as Jonathan Crary has passionately pointed out.13 The hands-on
approach, we believe, might help to solve the “observer’s dilemma” of classical
media archaeology and hopefully create new forms of collaborations between
archives, museums, media artists, and media scholars.14 Moreover, it may help
to close the epistemological gap in the research of media that has been left by the
explanatory models assuming the transparency of media as explained above.
De-Auratizing Artifacts
One can actually observe a kind of melancholic retrospection of our analog past.
This melancholic retrospection might on the one hand be the result of a genera-
tion gap or tension between the “analog born” and “digital born.” On the other
hand, it might be the product of a tension between the loss or stealthy disappear-
ance of the material evidence of analog technologies in our daily lives and the
massive resurrection of “analog-born products” in digital technologies and the
Internet. While the generation gap between analog and digital is basically a de-
mographic and therefore a temporarily delimited problem, the stealthy disap-
pearance of material evidence of analog technologies constitutes a specific chal-
lenge for cultural heritage institutions such as museums and film and media
archives.15 As media scholars we should make sure that the material traces of
these artifacts will not disappear from the digital radar of media scholars.16
While we are enthusiastic about the possibilities of new digital research infra-
structures, we are familiar with the “analog born” and historically minded en-
ough to be aware of the danger of sacrificing the material cultural heritage of
“old” media and memory technologies.
As media historians, media archaeologists, or media scholars in general we
need the material traces of analog and digital memory technologies not only as
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physical “witnesses” or “proof” of a period gone by, but as objects that can en-
lighten and educate our own analytical skills when it comes to the study of past
usages of media technologies. A pure focus on “mediated memories” (or media
texts) bears the danger of a reductionist perspective on media technologies, re-
ducing the historical evidence of things to their textual tradition. Of course we
are aware of the fact that the display of physical objects in a museum does not
offer a “direct” or “unmediated” access to things. The objects in museums are
staged artifacts. The visual gaze offered to a visitor of a museum is often that of a
highly aestheticized view, and “things” or “objects” are staged as “master pieces”
– even in museums of science and technology.17 Yet the “aura of the original,”
which museums and archives try to stage, is of course a faked one.18 The “aura”
– at least in the sense of Walter Benjamin – is destroyed from the very moment an
object is detached from its original environment. And it is exactly because of this
inevitable “loss” of aura that museums try to create a new narrative framework,
aimed at staging a mediated experience of the “aura.” This re-auratization of
objects in (white cube) museums is in fact a process of black-boxing, turning
things into “objects of desire.”19
Experimental media archaeology aims at opening the black boxes and turning
museums and archives into laboratories for experimental research. In order to do
so, the apparatuses (“artifacts”)20 have to be taken out of the aestheticized and
glass-cased exhibition environments of museums and archives and transferred
into the exploratory space of a media-archaeology laboratory. Such a lab creates
a research environment needed to substantiate the claims of media studies re-
garding the impact of media technologies on audiences empirically and experi-
mentally. It helps to close the gap between media research in the humanities and
the sciences.
A New Research Agenda
This plea for an experimental approach to media archaeology aims at offering
new perspectives to a better historical understanding of past media practices by
pleading for “re-enactment” as a new methodological approach in media re-
search. Doing re-enactments with old media technologies in an experimental
media-archaeology lab will produce new historical, ethnographic, and empirical
knowledge about past user practices and media experiences. It will advance our
classical repertoire of sources generally used to study past user generations by
the co-production of experimental data and ethnographic observations. Experi-
mental media archaeology goes beyond:
– The discursive re-construction of the “configured user” (as staged in adver-
tisements)
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– The literary study of the “expert users” (as found in technical and consumer
association journals and professional publications)
– The analysis of “amateur users” (as staged in “how to” manuals, popular
journals, amateur club publications)
– The co-construction of “remembered usages” (as in oral history sources or
performed in ego-documents)
Historical re-enactment (experimenting with old media technologies)21 will:
– Provide new insights in the sense of time and temporality inscribed in the
materiality of media technologies (e.g., the limited amount of recording time
in home movie technology or the extensive exposure time of early photogra-
phy)
– Enhance awareness of the spatial and topographical information inscribed in
media practices (both of production and consumption)
– Enable a better understanding of the “constructivist nature” of media tech-
nology products (photographs, films, audio recordings, etc.) as historical
sources (e.g., handling them as “staged performances” rather than “snapshot
versions of life,” that is, questioning the “visual” or “sonic” evidence of
audiovisual sources)
– Make scholars of past media technologies “experience” rather than intellec-
tually appropriate the acts of making and screening film as social and cultural
practices
In offering these new insights and experiences, experimental media archaeology
will inform us about the “tacit knowledge” involved in the use of media technol-
ogies and will thereby sensitize us to the role of our senses and our body in the
human/machine interaction. This sensorial awareness will re-sensitize the media
scholar to the social and cultural inscriptions in the materiality of media technol-
ogies beyond the discursive level.22 Playing and tinkering with the material ob-
jects in a research lab will de-auratize the artifacts and help to decode the critical
role of design as “mediating interface” between technology and the users.23 In
reconstructing and re-enacting idealized “how to” user scenarios, the experimen-
tal media archaeologists will be able to analyze and experience the differences
between the social dynamics of media usages (“ensemble play”), and performing
practices (“collective viewing”/“hearing”/“commentating”) and their idealized
discursive narratives and commercial staging. In promoting a hands-on philoso-
phy concerning the collections of film and media archives and museums, experi-
mental media archaeology aims at turning artifacts into research objects and to
re-establish the experimental tradition of museums. In short, it aims at turning
archives and museums into research laboratories rather than mausoleums of past
masterpieces.24
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In doing so, we would like to initiate a dialogue between the academic com-
munity of film and media scholars with engineers, curators, archivists, and the
millions of media amateurs, collectors, and other technical experts who – in a
steady growing number – wish to share their expertise and knowledge in online
platforms and home pages. While this incredible source of information is rarely
used and even less appreciated by professional scholars, we envision an interac-
tive and participatory online database which gathers all kind of “information”
regarding the development, use, invention, imagination, design, rejection, intel-
lectual appropriation, and resistance of media devices of all times and places.
Media Scholars and Amateurs of All Countries and Disciplines, Hands-on!
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“philosophemes” such as “archi-writing” (see Bernard Stiegler, Ben Roberts, Jer-
emy Gilbert and Mark Hayward, “A Rational Theory of Miracles: On Pharmacology
and Transindividuation,” trans. Ben Roberts, New Formations no. 77 (2012): 164-184
(quotation from p. 165). In an earlier essay on Derrida’s work, however, Stiegler
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rance, 2006).
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courses of the so-called “post-human” pathways opening up today via biotechnolo-
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2013), 104-106.
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son” (85, my translation).
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sciousness in the final chapter of Technics and Time 2, a commentary which is re-
sumed and provides the platform for the account of cinema and cinematic con-
sciousness in the opening chapters of Technics and Time 3: Cinematic Time and the
Question of Malaise, trans. Stephen Barker (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
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mension of the constitution of the temporal object that Husserl ignores or avoids
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technology, see Alexander Galloway, The Interface Effect (Cambridge & Malden, MA:
Polity Press, 2012).
6. Brian X. Chen, Always On: How the iPhone Unlocked the Anything–Anytime–Anywhere
Future – and Locked Us In (Philadelphia: De Capo Press, 2011), 147. Initially coined
in 1990 by Boeing researcher Tom Caudell, the term described “a head-mounted
digital display that guided workers through assembling electrical wires in aircraft”
(148). The device aimed to augment, or engage, a person’s perceptions through the
intersection of virtual and physical realities by means of a layering or blending of
digital visuals and the real world.
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7. James Farman, Mobile Interface Theory: Embodied Space and Locative Media (London &
New York: Routledge, 2012), 39. Lev Manovich has spoken of augmented space – a
notion of enhancing “reality” by addition – while Adriana de Souza e Silva prefers
to speak of hybridization – the integration of different registers of reality. While we
appreciate the inherent conceptualization of relationships between different origins
or materialities of data and the hierarchies that the name for the technology aug-
mented reality invokes, we are specifically interested here in how spatial layering by
location-aware technologies informs subjective positioning. See Lev Manovich,
“The Poetics of Augmented Space,” Visual Communication 5, no. 2 (2006), 219-240;
Adriana De Souza e Silva, “From Cyber to Hybrid: Mobile Technologies as Inter-
faces of Hybrid Spaces,” Space and Culture 9, no. 3 (2006), 261-278. About the op-
eration of the mobile screens as a layered interface and the use of AR for archives
and museums, see Nanna Verhoeff, Mobile Screens: The Visual Regime of Navigation
(Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2012).
8. We remind our readers that Charles Sanders Peirce’s triadic theory of the sign
distinguishes between icon, index and symbol. For Peirce an icon is representa-
tional; it signifies by means of likeness or verisimilitude. In contrast, a symbol
conforms to rules and conventions that establish the conditions that make signifi-
cation possible: there is no “natural” or intuitive relation between, for example, a
word and its referent. As for an index, it manifests meaning materially, either as a
physical trace (a fingerprint or photograph) or a real-time indication of some event
(the wind’s direction or a finger’s directional pointing). See Charles Sanders Peirce,
Peirce on Signs: Writings on Semiotic by Charles Sanders Peirce, ed. James Hoopes (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991); Charles Sanders Peirce, “Lecture
Three: The Categories Defended,” in Pragmatism as a Principle and Method of Right
Thinking: The 1903 Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism, ed. Patricia Ann Turrisi (Albany:
State University of New York Press, 1997), 167-188; Charles Sanders Peirce, The
Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings, vol. 2, ed. Nathan Houser (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1998). See also: Cheryl Misak, ed., The Cambridge Compa-
nion to Peirce (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Cornelis de Waal,
Peirce: A Guide for the Perplexed (London: Bloomsbury, 2013); Samuel Weber, Institution
and Interpretation (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987).
9. Mary Ann Doane, “The Indexical and the Concept of Medium Specificity,” Differ-
ences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies 18, no. 1 (2007): 136. While often used in
conjunction, indexicality and deixis have a different background, the first in philo-
sophy and the latter in linguistics. About deixis, see Émile Benveniste, Problems in
General Linguistics (Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami Press, 1971). For an over-
view of the ins and outs of deixis, see Stephen C. Levinson, “Deixis,” in The Hand-
book of Pragmatics, ed. Laurence R. Horn (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 97-
121. Levinson sees deixis as coextensive with indexicality, which he considers a
larger category of contextual dependency and reserves deixis for linguistic aspects
of indexicality (97-98).
10. For this principle we do not need a screen as such. For example, we contend that
with the development of Google Glass, which is currently considered a very inno-
vative technology for making the screen “disappear” into the frame of wearable
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glasses, the principle of deixis remains the same. Directing one’s gaze is the same
as pointing, or holding up the screen in a certain direction.
11. Zoltán Dragon, “The Augmented Subject: Technological Interfaces of Subjectivity,
Geography and the Moving Image,” Americana: E-Journal of American Studies in Hun-
gary 9, no. 1 (2013). Available at http://americanaejournal.hu/vol9no1/dragon. About
performative cartography in AR and digital screen-based navigation, see Verhoeff,
Mobile Screens. From a critical geography perspective, Jeremy Crampton has written about
performativity in “Cartography: Performative, Participatory, Political,” Progress in Hu-
man Geography 33 (2009): 840-848.
12. The photographic image as indexical trace has long interested film and media
studies scholars – especially those whose object of study is documentary. Quintes-
sential, in this regard, is Andre Bazin’s claim that the photograph “embalms time.”
André Bazin, “The Ontology of the Photographic Image,” What Is Cinema?, trans.
Hugh Gray (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), 9-16. See also: Elizabeth
Cowie, Recording Reality, Desiring the Real (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 2011); Bill Nichols, Representing the Real: Issue and Concepts in Documentary
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991); Michael Renov, ed., Theorizing Docu-
mentary (New York: Routledge, 1993); Philip Rosen, Change Mummified: Cinema, His-
toricity, Theory (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001); Brian Winston,
Claiming the Real: The Documentary Film Revisited (London: British Film Institute,
1999).
13. See Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography, trans. Richard Howard
(New York: Hill and Wang, 1981).
14. Heidi Rae Cooley has argued that the deictic gesture is also the site of another
mode of expressivity. Expressivity, in this context, refers to the proliferation of
texts, mobile-images, updates and posts, etc., all of which circulate streams of
data providing a rhythmic (and potentially continuous) account of where a person
is and what she is doing. These traces are evidence of every person’s spontaneous
relationship to her surroundings while having a smartphone, or similar mobile
screenic device, in their hand. See Cooley, Finding Augusta: Habits of Mobility and
Governance in the Digital Era (Hanover, NH: Dartmouth College Press, 2014, forth-
coming).
15. Peter Morville, Ambient Findability: What We Find Changes Who We Become (Sebastopol,
CA: O’Reilly Media, 2005), 9. The same principle informs how credit card compa-
nies detect instances of unusual spending and how AR applications know to popu-
late a screen with information overlays appropriate to a particular spot. Important
to make clear, however, is that those who are findable are not necessarily visible to
those doing the finding, nor do they necessarily see themselves as potentially
“found out” (e.g., in the sense of surveillance). Rather, the constant monitoring
that makes AR technologies functional registers, or tracks, its participants. See
Cooley, Finding Augusta.
16. And because the streams of information that the mobile subject disseminates are
signs, they acquire meaning. In which case, findability is an interpretive process, in
the Peircean sense, one that renders persons manageable. For more about the poli-
tical implications of a culture of surveillance based on visibility and tracking based
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on connectivity, see Cooley, Finding Augusta. It is worth noting other media theor-
ists who consider the relation between [new media] technologies and governance.
Addressing fiber optics and coding protocols, respectively, Wendy Chun and Alex-
ander Galloway have focused on how computer technologies participate in rela-
tions of power. Lisa Parks has examined how satellite reconnaissance systems and
global media platforms, such as Google Earth, articulate visual, military and corpo-
rate economies of power. Richard Grusin has discussed how post-9/11 media prac-
tices along with governmental techniques have served to manage, in anticipatory
fashion, the “public’s collective moods and perceptions” and Eugene Thacker has
observed a turn to a logic of biodefense as a tactical response to risks (explicitly,
bioterrorism and emerging infectious diseases, e.g., swine flu, avian flu and SARS)
that have manifested as a consequence of transportation (e.g., air travel) and com-
munications networks (e.g., postal systems). See Wendy Chun, Control and Freedom:
Power and Paranoia in the Age of Fiber Optics (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006); Alex-
ander R. Galloway, Protocol: How Control Exists after Decentralization (Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 2004); Richard A. Grusin, Premediation: Affect and Mediality after 9/11 (Ba-
singstoke & New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Lisa Parks, “Zeroing In: Over-
head Imagery, Infrastructure Ruins, and Datalands in Afghanistan and Iraq,” in
Communication Matters: Materialist Approaches to Media, Mobility and Networks, ed. Jer-
emy Packer and Stephen B. Crofts Wiley (London: Routledge, 2012); Eugene
Thacker, “Nomos, Nosos and Bios,” Culture Machine 7 (2005), available at http://
www.culturemachine.net/index.php/cm/article/view/25/32.
17. The University of South Carolina is the site of one of the most intact “landscapes
of slavery” in the United States. What is known today as the “historic Horseshoe”
is situated at the heart of the modern campus and is what remains of the original
South Carolina College (1801-1865) campus. Ghosts is based on the scholarship of
nine graduate students enrolled in Robert Weyeneth’s spring 2011 public history
seminar. See: Allison Baker, Jennifer Betsworth, Rebecca Bush, Sarah Conlon,
Evan Kutzler, Justin McIntyre, Elizabeth Oswald, Jamie Wilson and JoAnn Zeise,
“Slavery at South Carolina College, 1801-1865: The Foundations of the University
of South Carolina” (University of South Carolina, Spring 2011), available at http://
library.sc.edu/digital/slaveryscc/index.html. The current design team for Ghosts in-
cludes Heidi Rae Cooley, Duncan Buell, Richard Walker, Amanda Noll, Celia Ga-
lens, Casey Cole and Ananda Frank. A prototype of the Ghosts application was pre-
sented and demonstrated on December 4, 2012 by undergraduate and graduate
students enrolled in a cross-college course called “Critical Interactives.” The project
has received bridge funding (USC College of Arts and Sciences) and an internal
ASPIRE II grant (USC Office of the VP for Research). The University Libraries hosts
the server that houses the Ghosts database and website (http://calliope.tcl.sc.edu/).
Please see the website to view a short video and a local WIS television segment
about the project. See also: Heidi Rae Cooley and Duncan Buell, “Ghosts of the
Horseshoe, a Mobile Application: Fostering a New Habit of Thinking about the
History of University of South Carolina’s Historic Horseshoe,” in Annual Review of
Cultural Heritage Informatics (forthcoming); Duncan Buell and Heidi Rae Cooley, “Cri-
tical Interactives: Improving Public Understanding of Institutional Policy,” Bulletin
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489-496.
18. The work was commissioned to accompany the book project Else/Where: Mapping
New Cartographies of Networks and Territories, ed. Janet Abrams and Peter Hall (Min-
neapolis: University of Minnesota Design Institute, 2006). In the collection, the
artist writes about the experience of making the work in “Can’t Be Elsewhere
When GPS Drawing,” (274-275).
19. Tim Ingold, “Against Space: Place, Movement, Knowledge,” in Being Alive: Essays on
Movement, Knowledge and Description (London & New York: Routledge, 2011), 148.
Rethinking the Materiality of Technical Media: Friedrich Kittler, En-
fant Terrible with a Rejuvenating Effect on Parental Discipline – A
Dialogue
1. Recently, he edited the special issue on cultural techniques for Theory, Culture &
Society (with Ilinca Iurascu and Jussi Parikka), and translated an essay collection by
Bernhard Siegert. See also: Geoffrey Winthrop-Young, “Hunting a Whale of a State:
Kittler and his Terrorists,” Cultural Politics 8, no. 3 (2012): 399-412.
2. As to the field of film studies more specifically: some recent publications provide
introductions, overviews and analyses of the impact of media archaeology and Kit-
tler’s work on the fields of film studies, curating and archival practices, media art,
etc. See for example, Media Archaeology: Approaches, Applications, and Implications, ed.
Erkki Huhtamo and Jussi Parikka (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012),
and Wanda Strauven, “Media Archaeology: Where Film History, Media Art, and
New Media (Can) Meet,” in Preserving and Exhibiting Media Art: Challenges and Perspec-
tives, ed. Julia Noordegraaf et al. (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2013),
59-80.
3. Geoffrey Winthrop-Young, Kittler and the Media (Cambridge: Polity, 2011), 2.
4. For a more extensive personal account see Geoffrey Winthrop-Young, “‘Well, What
Socks Is Pynchon Wearing Today?’ A Freiburg Scrapbook in Memory of Friedrich
Kittler,” Cultural Politics 8, no. 3 (2012): 361-373.
5. Further see Geoffrey Winthrop-Young, “Krautrock, Heidegger, Bogeyman: Kittler in
the Anglosphere,” Thesis Eleven 107, no. 1 (2011): 6-20.
6. Friedrich Kittler, Discourse Networks 1800/1900, trans. Michael Metteer and Chris Cul-
lens, intr. David Wellbery (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 125.
7. Winthrop-Young, Kittler and the Media, 59 [my italics].
8. Ibid., 58.
9. See Friedrich Kittler, “Ein Verwaiser,” in Anschlüsse: Versuche nach Michel Foucault, ed.
Gesa Dane et al. (Tübingen: Diskord, 1986), 141.
10. Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: Archaeology of the Human Sciences [1966] (Lon-
don: Routledge, 2001).
11. E.g., Friedrich Kittler, “Heidegger und die Medien- und Technikgeschichte,” in
Heidegger-Handbuch, ed. D. Thomä (Stuttgart: Metzler, 2003), 500-504; and Kittler,
“Zum Geleit,” in Der Foucault-Reader: Diskurs und Medien, ed. J. Engelmann (Stuttgart:
Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1999), 7-9.
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12. Friedrich Kittler, Gramophone, Film, Typewriter, trans. and intr. Geoffrey Winthrop-
Young and Michael Wutz (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 4.
13. Winthrop-Young, Kittler and the Media, 59.
14. Arnheim quoted in Kittler, Gramophone, Film, Typewriter, 11-12.
15. Winthrop-Young, Kittler and the Media, 60.
16. Further see Eric Schatzberg, “Technik Comes to America: Changing Meanings of
Technology before 1930,” Technology and Culture 47, no. 3 (2006): 486-512.
17. Kittler, Gramophone, Film, Typewriter, xl.
18. Friedrich Kittler, Optical Media, trans. Anthony Enns (Cambridge: Polity, 2009).
19. See Frank Hartmann, “Vom Sündenfall der Software. Medientheorie mit Entlar-
vungsgestus: Friedrich Kittler,” available at http://www.heise.de/tp/artikel/6/6345/1.
html.
20. See the lecture online at http://www.egs.edu/faculty/friedrich-kittler/videos/the-rela-
tion-of-art-and-techne/.
21. Kittler, Discourse Networks 1800/1900.
22. See the dialogue on Christian Metz and apparatus theory in this book. Christian
Metz, The Imaginary Signifier: Psychoanalysis and the Cinema (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1977).
23. Christian Metz, “La grande syntagmatique du film narratif,” in Essais sur la significa-
tion au cinema, vol. 1 (Paris: Klincksieck, 1968).
24. These lectures are assembled and translated [by Anthony Enns] under the title Op-
tical Media.
25. Viktor Shklovsky, “Art as Technique,” in Russian Formalist Criticism: Four Essays
[1917], trans. Lee T. Lemon and Marion J. Reis (Lincoln & London: University of
Nebraska Press, 1965), 3-57.
26. Shklovsky, “Art as Technique,” 12.
27. See Lambert Wiesing, “What Are Media?” in this book.
28. Friedrich Kittler, Platz der Luftbrücke. Ein Gespräch mit Stefan Banz (Nürnberg: Verlag
für moderne Kunst, 2011). For the following see pp. 41-46.
29. Kittler, Platz der Luftbrücke, 44.
30. On this point further see Kittler, Gramophone, Film, Typewriter, 108; Geoffrey Win-
throp-Young, “Drill and Distraction in the Yellow Submarine: The Dominance of
War in Friedrich Kittler’s Media Theory,” Critical Inquiry 28, no. 4 (2002): 825-854;
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31. Kittler, Gramophone, Film, Typewriter, 2.
Revisiting Christian Metz’s “Apparatus Theory” – A Dialogue
1. Martin Lefebvre and François Albera, eds. “La filmologie de nouveau,” Cinémas:
Journal of Film Studies 19, no. 2-3 (2009).
2. Dominique Chateau and Martin Lefebvre, “Dance and Fetish: Metz’ Epistemological
Shift,” October (forthcoming). Parts of this article were presented as a paper in a
panel on Christian Metz at the Film Philosophy Conference in London in Septem-
ber 2012.
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3. Martin Lefebvre, “Existe-t-il une approche sémiologique de l’esthétique?” 1895, no.
70 (forthcoming). Please note that all quotations from Metz’s manuscript have
been translated from the French by Martin Lefebvre, unless indicated otherwise.
4. “The semiological paradigm and Christian Metz’s ‘cinematographic’ thought” [Le
paradigme sémiologique et la pensée‚ ‘cinématographique’ de Christian Metz],
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articles were translated by and published in Versus, the academic film journal De
Kuyper and Poppe founded and edited until late 1992. For an integral digital pre-
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tion au cinema, vol. 1 (Paris: Klincksieck, 1968).
9. Christian Metz, Le Signifiant imaginaire (Paris: UGE, coll. 10/18, 1977), 12, 329n14.
10. Jean-Louis Baudry, L’Effet cinéma (Paris: Editions Albatros, coll. Ça cinéma, 1978).
11. Marcelin Pleynet, “Économique, idéologique, formel,” Cinéthique no. 3 (1969): 10.
12. Ibid.
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14. Jean-Louis Baudry, “Effets idéologiques produits par l’appareil de base,” Cinéthique,
no. 7-8 (1970).
15. Jean-Louis Baudry, L’Effet cinéma, 31n1.
16. See Chateau and Lefebvre, “Dance and Fetish.”
17. The text was originally published in Cahiers du cinéma and Metz refers to it in the
opening pages of Le Signifiant Imaginaire/The Imaginary Signifier. Christian Metz, “A
propos de l’impression de réalité au cinéma,” Cahiers du cinéma, no. 166-167 (1965).
18. Laura Mulvey, “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema,” Screen 16, no. 3 (1975).
19. Christian Metz, “Vision binoculaire et vision monoculaire (idéologie et données
psycho-physiologiques,” (unpublished manuscript, Metz archive at Bibliothèque du
film (BiFi), Paris, 1973-1974). Subsequent quotes are all taken from this manu-
script.
20. Christian Metz, The Imaginary Signifier: Psychoanalysis and the Cinema [1977], trans.






26. For a concise reflection on phenomenological media theories and Merleau-Ponty
see Lambert Wiesing, “What Are Media?” in this book.
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27. For the whole quote, see “What Are Media?” in this book.
28. Metz, Le Signifiant imaginaire, 75.
29. Christian Metz, “Existe-t-il une approche sémiologique de l’esthétique?” (unpub-
lished manuscript of a conference paper, Metz archive at Bibliothèque du film
(BiFi), Paris, 1971). The paper will be published in 1895, no. 70 (forthcoming).
30. Christian Metz, “Trucages et cinéma,” in Essais sur la signification au cinéma, vol. 2
(Paris: Klincksieck, 1972).
31. In a private email.
32. Christian Metz, (unpublished review, Metz archive at Bibliothèque du film (BiFi).
33. Christian Metz, from notes on Rudolf Arnheim’s Film as Art (unpublished notes,
Metz archive at Bibliothèque du film [BiFi], Paris).
The Future History of a Vanishing Medium
1. Notice: some footnotes are from the present (by the author of the text, André Gau-
dreault), others are supposedly from the future (by the avatar of the author of the
text, Paul-Emmanuel Odin). This will be indicated by one of the two following
tags: [Note by the author] and [Note by the avatar of the author].
2. [Note by the author] Only the first edition of this conference has taken place, in
November 2011 at the Cinémathéque québécoise in Montreal, organized jointly by
André Gaudreault (Université de Montréal) and Martin Lefebvre (Concordia Univer-
sity). See the conference report by Daniel Fairfax in Cinema Journal 52, no. 1 (Fall
2012): 127-131, available at http://muse.jhu.edu/login?auth=0&type=summary&url=/
journals/cinema_journal/v052/52.1.fairfax.html.
3. [Note by the avatar of the author] Peter Bogdanovich and Orson Welles, This Is
Orson Welles, ed. Jonathan Rosenbaum (New York: Da Capo, 1998), 23. It should be
noted that Welles and Bogdanovich are not much fonder, it seems, of the expres-
sion “motion pictures” than they are of “cinema.”
4. [Note by the author] Ibid. My thanks to Timothy Barnard for bringing this quota-
tion to my attention.
5. [Note by the avatar of the author] William Paul, “Uncanny Theater: The Twin In-
heritances of the Movies,” Paradoxa 3, no. 3-4 (1997): 321-347.
6. Paul, “Uncanny Theater...,” 231 [in note]. The “Announcement” was originally
published in The Moving Picture News, September 27, 1913, vol. 8, 13, 15.
7. Ibid., “An Acknowledgment,” originally published in The Motion Picture News, Octo-
ber 25, 1913, vol. 8, 16, 14.
8. [Note by the author] This quotation is in fact drawn from the present-day website:
http://www.cmstudies.org/?page=org_history.
9. [Note by the author] Ibid.
10. [Note by the author] Ibid.
11. [Note by the avatar of the author] See in particular, as early as 1996, the title of
two books by Noël Carroll: Theorizing the Moving Image (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1996) and Interpreting the Moving Image (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1998).
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Cinematic Motion: An Analysis of ‘The Life of an American Fireman,’” The Journal
of the Society of Cinematologists 2 (1962): 1-13.
13. Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man (London & New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1964).
14. [Note by the avatar of the author] Paolo Cherchi Usai, The Death of Cinema: History,
Cultural Memory, and the Digital Dark Age (London: BFI, 2001).
15. [Note by the avatar of the author] “Où va le cinéma?” Cinergon 15 (2003).
16. [Note by the avatar of the author] David Norman Rodowick, The Virtual Life of Film
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007).
17. [Note by the avatar of the author] Alessandro Bordina, Philippe Dubois and Lucia
Ramos Monteiros, eds, Oui, c’est du cinéma: Formes et espaces de l’image en mouvement/
Yes, It’s Cinema: Forms and Spaces of the Moving Image (Pasian di Prato: Campanotto
Editore, 2009).
18. [Note by the avatar of the author] Chuck Tryon, Reinventing Cinema: Movies in the Age
of Media Convergence (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2009).
19. [Note by the avatar of the author] Dudley Andrew, What Cinema Is! (Malden: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2010).
20. [Note by the avatar of the author] See André Gaudreault and Philippe Marion, The
Kinematic Turn: Film in the Digital Era and Its Ten Problems, trans. Timothy Barnard
(Montreal: Caboose, 2012). See also Gaudreault and Marion, “Measuring the ‘Dou-
ble Birth’ Model against the Digital Age,” Early Popular Visual Culture 11, no. 2 (May
2013).
21. [Note by the avatar of the author] Gene Youngblood, Expanded Cinema (New York:
Dutton, 1970).
22. [Note by the avatar of the author] Philippe Dubois, Frédéric Monvoisin and Elena
Biserna, eds, Extended Cinema/Le cinéma gagne du terrain (Pasian di Prato: Campanotto
Editore, 2010).
23. [Note by the avatar of the author] Ibid., back cover.
24. [Note by the avatar of the author] Paris Match 226 (18-25 July 1953).
25. [Note by the avatar of the author] All reference to the “Musée de l’image en mou-
vement” has now disappeared from the website of the Cinémathèque québécoise
(http://www.cinematheque.qc.ca/fr). Until quite recently, one could find the follow-
ing statement there: “Devoted to the past and headed for the future, the Ciné-
mathèque québécoise is Montreal’s museum of the moving image.”
26. [Note by the author] Pierre Jutras, then program director and curator of interna-
tional cinema, television and new media, in an email to the author on May 27,
2010.
27. [Note by the author] Yolande Racine, then executive director of the Cinémathèque
québécoise, in an email to the author on October 15, 2010.
28. [Note by the author] Research group headed by Martin Lefebvre, Concordia Univer-
sity, Montreal. See: http://arthemis-cinema.ca/. [my italics].
29. [Note by the author] [my italics].
30. [Note by the avatar of the author] In particular Noël Carroll, Francesco Casetti,
Dominique Chateau, Tom Gunning, Laurent Jullier, D.N. Rodowick and others.
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31. [Note by the avatar of the author] See: http://arthemis-cinema.ca/en/news/596. The
author of the present text participated in this conference, where he gave the Martin
Walsh Memorial Lecture (Association canadienne d’études cinématographiques/
Film Studies Association of Canada, at the annual Congress of the Humanities and
Social Sciences) entitled “Home cinema et agora-télé: deux oxymores de notre mod-
ernité médiatique” (unpublished).
32. [Note by the avatar of the author] In order to maintain uniformity in the present
text, even though the word “image” is plural in the title of the conference (“Mov-
ing Images Studies”), I speak here of “moving image studies.”
33. [Note by the author] In an email exchange on January 4, 2013, Martin Lefebvre
explained to me that, in the beginning (around 2007-2008), film studies was the
subject of the group’s research. The initial name of ARTHEMIS was “Groupe de
recherche sur l’histoire et l’épistémologie des études cinématographiques” (there
was no corresponding English name). Lefebvre added: “In the meantime, I began
work on a doctoral program [A.G.: Which began in the fall of 2008] and it was
clear that its name was not going to be limited to Film Studies [A.G.: As I men-
tioned above, it is called ‘Ph.D. in Film and Moving Image Studies’]. [At the same]
time, we were looking for an acronym for the research group. [...] As the Ph.D.
was lining up to be Moving Image Studies, we began to play with different acro-
nyms and we ended up with ARTHEMIS. [...] To the extent that ARTHEMIS’s man-
date concerns ‘Moving Images’ we are, in principle, opening research up to some-
thing other than cinema in a ‘strict’ sense of the term (meaning a certain agreed-
upon meaning that has been more or less ‘stable’ in the language since the ‘classi-
cal’ period, before the issues raised by the arrival of new media).” On the question
of the paradox that I raise, Lefebvre adds: “[I]t is only a residue of the previous
version of the group, the pre-ARTHEMIS version. It is thus not really a paradox.
[...] It’s a leftover, no more and no less.” The fact that the expression “film stud-
ies” owes the fact that it has been present on the home page of the group from
2007 to the present day to a slip-up speaks volumes, it seems to me, about the
new realities facing film studies. Lefebvre acknowledges this, and writes: “[I]n the
end, if we neglected to revise the description of our research objectives and distin-
guish between ‘Film Studies’ and ‘Moving Image Studies,’ it’s because the theore-
tical unconscious didn’t see any urgency, especially given that ‘Film Studies,’ from
a certain point of view, can constitute a sub-set or province of ‘Moving Image
Studies.’” To which I would add: there is no doubt that such a slip, if it was one,
is a demonstration (thank you, Freud!) of the return of the repressed.
34. [Note by the avatar of the author] There already existed, for at least a decade, a
field known as “moving image studies,” in which cognitive studies dominated (see
the journal called The Journal of Moving Image Studies [see http://www.avila.edu/jour-
nal/index1.htm] and the “Society for Cognitive Studies of the Moving Image” –
SCSMI [see http://scsmi-online.org/]) but there was no pretention at the time
amongst their promoters to replace “film studies.”
35. [Note by the author] All the websites referred to in this article were consulted a
final time on February 27, 2013, the date my manuscript was submitted.
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technologies of governing, govern-
ment 137, 147-149, 169, 175
governmentality 147, 152, 174
governmentality studies 147
GPS 216
GPS system-oriented data 210
GPS tracking 211
grammar 160, 231, 244
grammatization 83-84, 86, 92



















hands-on, ears-on approach 273, 275
haptics 39
hardware 16-17, 20, 98, 136-138, 141,
144, 224, 250
harmony 23, 156, 162
hedonistic pleasure 147
Hegelian teleology 230
Heideggerian poetics 19, 66
hermeneutics 19, 65, 224











High Dynamic Range imaging 135
high fidelity (hi-fi) 22, 154
index of subject 389
hi-fi and lo-fi apparatuses, devices
22, 163-164




hi-fi vs. lo-fi 155
high fluency 156




historical re-enactment(s) 26, 272-275,
277




historical understanding 273, 276
historiography 18, 50, 177, 262-263
crisis historiography 189
film historiography 54
future film historiography 26, 261
historiography of techniques 60
historism 97
history 18, 36, 40, 46, 59, 134, 187, 225,
248, 262, 270, 272-273
alternative history 150
art history 62, 188, 256
concept of history 55
cultural history 31, 113
experiencing history 273
film history 16-17, 150, 152, 178,
188, 252, 261-262
history of film style 23, 162
history of literature 188
media history 109, 113, 232
study of history 113
“history of vision”-debate 20-21, 107,
112, 114
Hollywood 89-91, 127, 160, 181, 190,
268
classical Hollywood 242
Hollywood 3D wave 123
Hollywood animation 194
Hollywood films 143
Hollywood Golden Age movies 163
Hollywood tradition 120
holography 133, 135, 268




home theater systems 43
home viewing 139
home-movie 157




human biological organism 82
human body 146, 156, 181
techniques of the body 22, 56, 136,
138, 149
human existence 102
human eye 106, 112, 127, 194






Italian film humanism 186
humanities 26, 113-114, 187-188, 221,
228, 233, 237, 261, 272, 276
humanity 160
technology and humanity 18
hunting and fighting 83
Husserlian phenomenology 247




idealism 186, 194, 246-247, 254
idealist film theory 246
idealistic sources 186
Italian idealism 24, 187
390 index of subjects
identification, empathic identification
213
primary and secondary identifica-
tion 246
spectator identification 247
identity 85, 143, 150, 266
gender identities 141
identity crisis 269
identity of cinema 150
identity of the medium 22, 142
Italian film culture identity 186
national identity 221
processes of identification 146
ideographic 84
ideology 31, 47, 163, 245, 248, 253
dominant ideology 247
ideological abstraction 138
ideological apparatus theory 89
ideological apparatuses 112
ideological deception 249




ideology as worldview 107




image(s) 46, 100, 102
bidimensional images 249
film image 34, 67, 142, 175, 232,
268
image carrier 100
image quality 139, 144, 149
image size 137
indexical image 142
live and recorded images 146
operational images 169, 175




stereoscopic X-ray images 131
televisual image 143
visual or auditory images 33
image and sound 256










IMDb user reviews 159
immersion 115, 134
immersive and interactive devices
135
impact 25, 257, 262, 266, 274
human impact 233
impact of media technologies 16, 18,
138, 276
impact of technological innovations
263








improvability of content 149
improvability of technology 148
index 210
index of destination 210
indexical deixis 208
indexical nature of the image 184
indexical traces, tracing 208, 211



















industrial reconfiguration (of the
audience) 143
industrial robotics 175
industry 54, 190, 264
entertainment and leisure industry
22
high-tech industry 186





infrastructure(s) 31-32, 145-146, 151,
153, 248
inner processes (of thought and
feeling) 122
innovation(s) 15, 43, 50, 144, 264
cinematic innovations 18
technical innovations 54, 142-143,
190
input 223
input and output 186
inscription 61, 207, 209
analog photochemical inscription 51
cultural inscription 221















interior, interiority 83, 86
interior monologue 122
recordings of interiority 84
intermedial, intermediality 63, 265
intermedial import 160
intermedial reality 271
Internet 38, 42, 70, 137, 210, 275
intervention 144, 149
alternative strategies of intervention
148
field of intervention 148
interventionist notion of technology
143
modes of intervention 147
strategies of intervention 144
interwar period 24, 185, 187








Italian film theory 24, 185-188, 191-192,
195
Italian masters, the 155
Italian philosophy 187
Italian school system 188
Italian scientific culture 190
Italian theoretical debate 193
J
Japanese art 67
Japanese Kabuki theater 121
Japanese literary traditions 68
392 index of subjects
journal(s) 264-265
cultural journals 193
exhibition trade journal 264














knowing mind, the 273
knowledge 107, 173-174, 181, 187, 251
experimental knowledge 272
field of knowledge 175
formation of knowledge 272
hierarchy of knowledge 188
historical, ethnographic and empiri-
cal knowledge 276
historical knowledge 150, 224, 273
knowledge processes 187
knowledge production 149-150, 153
knowledge values 188
non-empirical knowledge 187











language 16, 20, 83, 94, 98, 226, 231,
244, 250
cinematic language 44, 250
conceptual language 99
language acquisition 224
language, speech and words 273
lantern, the 61
laws 146, 173






life 169-170, 172, 175
capture of life 172
forces of life 173-174
life intervention 148
media-saturated life 26
real-life interaction and re-use 275





structuralist linguistics 231, 244
literary field 52
literary studies 221-222, 231, 277
German literary studies 222
literature 42-43, 157, 180, 221-223, 228,
250










London Stereoscopic Company, the 129
low fidelity (lo-fi) 22, 154, 157
lo-fi apparatus 22, 157-160, 163
index of subject 393
lo-fi device 22, 158
lo-fi egocentric hand-held cameras
22, 154
lo-fi movie 157
lo-fi shaky shots 158





machine(s), machinery 22-23, 50-53,
57-58, 63, 141, 143-144, 146, 151-
152, 155, 169, 181, 186, 192-193,
206, 238-239, 246
cinematic machinery 192, 255
evolution of the machines 18, 50
graphic self-recording machines 23
industrial machine 203, 251
internal machine 251
image-shooting machine 171
machine and technique 52
machine vision 175
study of machines 51
“the last machine” 51
magic lantern 129
magic theaters 23, 169
magnetic-resonance imaging (MRI) 131
mainstream narrative 159













mass medium, media 21, 56
commercial mass medium 105
mass medium of television 139
mass production 59, 203
masses, the 43, 46-48
master pieces 276
match move artists 154
match move effect 161
material 178, 183, 187, 191
everyday material 180
existing material 178-180, 182
material evidence, traces 275
material technologies 138, 152
raw (expressive) material(s) 183, 191




materiality, materialities 16, 24, 52,
100, 147, 177, 194, 224, 233, 237,
273
materialities of communication 225
materiality of media technologies
272, 277
materiality of the medium, media






mausoleums (of past masterpieces) 277
meaning, meaning-making 183-184
mechanic arts 53, 191
mechanical recording 169
mechanical reproduction 84, 191, 193
mechanical text production 228
mechanistic/deterministic readings 255
mechanization 50-51, 53, 58, 63
debates on mechanization 51
problem of mechanization 57
reflection on mechanization 56
mechanology 57
mechanological science 58
media 19-20, 26, 44, 63, 83, 93-94, 96,
98, 100-101, 105, 112-113, 136-137,
394 index of subjects
152, 190-191, 221, 226, 229, 231-
232, 261-262, 266, 274




concept(s) of media 20, 95
digital audiovisual media (forms)
16, 19-20, 22, 81, 85, 108, 136,
265
distribution media 99






post-cinematic digital media 19, 82
storage media 99
system-theoretical concept of media
93-94
technical media 16, 220, 226-227
media amateurs 26, 278








history of media archaeology 272
media constellation 153
media culture 137, 151, 153
media environments 236-238
media history 109, 113, 232
media historians 255, 275
media practices 26, 277
media reception 21, 114
media research 275-276
media scholar()s 25, 219, 223, 275,
277-278
media studies 19, 26, 93, 114, 136, 138,
150, 219-220, 225-226, 232-233,
237, 266, 272-274, 276
media system(s) 24, 129, 186
media technology 16-17, 19, 139, 144,
147, 169, 225, 227, 234, 238, 272-
274, 276-277
media technical experts 26, 278
old media technologies 274, 276-
277
media texts 276
media theory 20, 95, 106, 228, 232, 235
institutionalized media theory 233





mediality 24, 95, 177
medial process 100
mediated content 139





mediation 19, 57, 164







Medienwissenschaften 222, 226, 232
medium 17-18, 20, 23, 43, 50-51, 83,
93, 95-96, 98-99, 116, 136, 141, 144,
148, 151, 169, 178, 180, 182, 189,
221, 231-232, 236-237, 250, 261,
262, 266, 268, 273
domestic medium 152
everyday medium 22
identity of the medium 136, 265
individualistic medium 142
index of subject 395
linear and monolithic medium 261




awareness cycles 250, 274
medium close-up 155
memoir 161
memory 86, 91, 161
cultural memory 82
memory aids 82
mental activity 24, 177
mental acts 97
metaphor and metonymy 255
cave metaphor 146
optical metaphors (Freud) 244
metaphysics 68-69










mind and matter 170
miniature 185, 195
miniature art, artifacts 256
















mnemotechnical fictioning of reality
90







mobile micro screen 207, 209, 212-213,
216
mobile micro screen interface 208
mobile phone(s) 38, 157
mobile phone applications 136
mobile present 207
mobile privatization 139, 147
mobile screen(s) 25, 144, 208
mobile screen practices 208
mobility 139, 152, 207, 211-212, 215
dispositif of mobility 25
mass mobilization 40
mobile technologies 25, 152, 207
mobility of digital media 152
reduced mobility 246
modelization 155
modern age, the 19
modern era 120
modern life 24, 186
modern man 108
modern metropolis 105, 108-109
modernism 48, 111, 180
modernity 19, 23, 40-41, 65, 68, 70, 73,





modernist art forms 180
modernist audience 162
modernist cinephilia 162
modernity theorists (first genera-
tion) 105, 108
396 index of subjects
modernity theorists (second genera-
tion) 105-106






moments of rupture 150-151
Mona Lisa 155
monitoring 212
mono- and binocular vision 248
monocular factors 249
monochrome media 134
montage 24, 44-45, 56, 63, 180, 183,
205, 245
debate on montage 24
formal aspects of montage 182
intellectual montage 177
montage experiments 178, 181
moral evaluations 156
moral propositions 146
motion 109, 117, 172, 264
illusion of motion 110








movement 23, 55, 58, 85, 90, 109, 169,
172-174, 175, 184, 193, 249
economy of movement 174
impression of movement 110
patterns of movement 170, 175
recording of movement 23
movie theater(s) 38, 43, 146, 261-262
movie theater economics 38
moviegoing experience 115
moving binocular system 106
moving images 226, 262-265, 268
moving image studies 240, 266,
268, 270
moving pictures 116, 126, 129
multi-platform world 135
multifunctional vowel alphabet 234
multimedia development 144
museums 275-277
experimental tradition of museums
277
museum installations 262
museums of science and technology
276
white cube museums 276
music 42-43, 156, 193
music history 188
music hall(s) 130, 179










narrative feature film 150





national cultural debate 186
natural sciences 187
natural selection 119
nature 41, 70-72, 74, 78, 101







index of subject 397
neo-Luddism 70
nervous exhaustion 109








new materialism 25, 207
new media 20, 38, 137, 228, 257
new media technologies 25



















object(s) 111, 273, 276
audiovisual temporal object 89
industrial object 58-59






objects of desire 276




Octagonal Disk Stereo Device 126
oikonomia 174
online data-base 278
online platforms 26, 278
ontology 64, 69, 150
ontological category 174














optical metaphors (Freud) 244
optical phonography 61
optical shows 169
optical spectacle(s) 23, 175
optical truthfulness 155
opus 206




mnemotechnical organon 86, 89
promotional organon 86




painting 32, 34, 39-40, 42-43, 111, 127,
155, 193, 200, 230, 249
Caravaggio paintings 227
medieval paintings 112
398 index of subjects
miniature portrait painting 256




paradigm 51, 113-114, 145
neuroscience paradigm 21, 114
paradigm shift 114, 266
paradigmatic terms 189
technological paradigm change 133
paratexts 148
pareidolia 107
Paris Exposition (of 1855) 130
past media practices, technologies 276
past user generations 276





Payne Fund studies 254
pedagogical role (of the state) 188
Peircean semiotics 25, 207
Pentax cameras 132
perception 16, 21, 23, 35, 40, 47, 58-59,
60, 71, 77, 86-87, 89, 95, 105, 107-




cognitive impenetrability of percep-
tion 107
definition of perception 21, 105, 235
historical theories of perception 105
human perception 170
logistics of perception 16
mode of perception 111
natural perception 248
natural 3D perception 133







physiology of perception 127
process of perception 21, 236-237




performativity 25, 207-208, 211, 215
performance(s) 208, 224, 268
performative agency 208


















20, 66, 69, 77, 86-87, 96, 102, 119,
172, 231, 241-242, 244, 247, 250,
254




phenomenological account (of con-
sciousness) 86
phenomenological approach 19, 94
phenomenological art 251
phenomenological media theories
20, 93-94, 97, 250
phenomenological psychoanalysis
247
index of subject 399
phenomenology of internal time
consciousness 82
phenomenology of the temporal ob-
ject of consciousness 86
post-phenomenological 82
phenomenon 87, 97





philosophy 62, 111, 187
idealistic philosophy 193
Italian idealistic philosophy 187
modern philosophy 79
philosophical concepts 188
philosophical conceptual tools 186






philosophies of technology 16, 18
philosophy of cinema 19
philosophy of science 60
phonetic scripts 84
phonogram 90
phonograph 57-58, 60, 126, 129, 138





photogénie 16, 24, 185, 194
photographic gun 169-170, 172, 174-
176
photography 19, 36-37, 44, 55, 60, 65-




animated photography 116-117, 129
early photography 277
instantaneous photography 171
objectness of photography 67
photograph 155, 211, 213, 277
photographic apparatus(s) 59, 90,
169
photographic reproduction 192
standard photographic format 131
still and motion photography 106







physical reality 77, 101
physics 58, 60, 99-100, 102
laws of physics 101
physiology 172
physiological arousal system 108
physiological elements 183
physiological processes 170
pictorial and plastic art (history of) 134
picture postcards 129
Pink Floyd 222, 230, 235




Plato’s cave 146, 255




Heideggerian poetics 19, 66
historical poetics of stereoscopy 119




poiēsis 25, 71, 75-76, 79
cinematic poiēsis 77, 79
“poietics” 35
points of access 152
400 index of subjects
points of interest (POI) 209
polarization lenses 131




politicization (of art) 48





political economy 248, 251
political effect 183
political forces 143
political frames 24, 186
political regime 188
political regulation 140
popular film press 192
Pordenone retrospective (1989) 177



















postmodern thought 40, 43
power 23, 139, 173
mechanisms of power 174
mode of power 174
networks of power 175
notion of power 150
power relations 181, 223, 233, 245
power technologies 147
television’s power effects 149
questions of power 145
practice(s) 25, 137, 140, 142, 144-145,
148, 153, 181, 183-184, 274
alternative film practices 24, 193
artistic practices 137




new practices of usages 20
past media practices 272
past user practices 276
patterned practices 142, 145
practices of communication and
representation 19
practices of the audience 141

















familial private sphere 139
mobile privatization 139
private and public 25, 141-142, 151
private, the 140
problematizations 148, 153
production 31, 37, 45, 89, 99, 112, 175,
189
index of subject 401
early sound and color production
134
film production 177-178, 184, 186,
189, 193
mass production 59, 203
modern industrial production 181
production and consumption 72,
277











program flow(s) 139, 141, 143




notion of projection 175
projecting apparatus 89
technology of projection 17, 23
stereo projection 126, 130
projective geometry 232
projector 126, 245, 252, 256
proletariat 222
Proletkult collective 121, 181
prolonged exposure 111
promotion 190






psyche 86, 177, 181, 184
modern psyches 108
psychic effects 174











psychology 106, 113, 272
biological psychology 114
cognitive and evolutionary psychol-
ogy 21, 105
current psychological research 107





psychological processes 21, 114
psychological research 106, 157
psychology of the spectator 251
psychotechnics 24, 177
psychotechnique 184
public and private 25, 140-142, 151
publishing 24








radio 58, 65, 81, 84, 128, 138, 190
state radio broadcasting system 186
rationality 40, 58, 98, 148
re-auratization (of objects) 276
402 index of subjects
re-construction, discursive re-
construction 276
re-editing 178, 180, 183





theory of re-montage 179
re-sensitization 274
real, the 231, 237
real and symbolic, the 231
real depth 249
real vision 249
real world 157, 165
real-time 208-209
real-time image 210-211, 213
realism 17, 22, 122, 125, 133-134, 155
elementary realism 45




realist fallacy (in research) 237




feigned reality statements 160
historical reality 223
impression of reality 247, 249, 255,
257
media reality 271
physical reality 77, 101





reception 35, 45, 145, 184
active and passive reception 146
collective reception 48















reform (of school teaching) 188
refrigerator 140-141
regime of absence/presence 257




releasement [Gelassenheit] 65, 80
relief 117, 125
remediation 163, 234






representation 19, 113, 119, 145, 155,
189-191, 197, 228, 247
cinematic representation 192
mode of representation 111
symbolic representations 112
textual and visual representations
275
reproducibility 42, 48, 59, 112
technical/mechanical reproducibility
63, 76
technological reproducibility 30, 42,
44, 63, 76
reproduction 32, 37, 61, 194
ideology of reproduction 48
photographic reproduction 192
index of subject 403
process of reproduction 37, 46
reproduction technologies 36
research 20, 26, 122, 265, 272, 275
contemporary technological re-
search 133
current cinema research 20
experimental research 276
historical research 151, 186
industrial research 190





research of media 275-276





resurrection (of analog-born products)
275
retention 87-88
interior retentional processes 87
primary retention 87-89
protentional projections 88
retentional modes of perception and
recollection 87
secondary retention 87-88
tertiary retention 87, 90
retina 110
receptors of the retina 112
retrospection 275
reversal film 131
reversal of hierarchy 179









run-and-gun style 22, 154-155, 158, 160
rupestral art, graphics 84-85
Russian formalists 179, 236
S
sanctification 192
satellite, satellite TV 142, 149
scheduling 144
scholar(s), scholarly, scholarship 16-17,
19, 21-25, 38, 66, 105, 219, 252
feminist scholarship 224
film and media scholars 16, 19, 23,
25-26, 219, 223, 275, 277-278
scholarly enterprise 250
Scholarly Interest Groups (SIGs)
265
scholarly presentation 262
scholarly reading notes 242
school reform 188
science(s) 26, 50, 61, 181, 184, 187-188,
251, 275-276
antiscientific attitude 187
history of science 273
mechanological science 58
science and technology studies 25
science of the media 224




scientific apparatuses 170, 194
scientific concepts 187
scientific culture 188
scientific curiosity 18, 117
scientific discourse 187, 192




scientific knowledge 187, 189, 248
scientific speculation 187
scientific statements 146
scientific technologies of visualiza-
tion 23
404 index of subjects
scopic drive 247
score 157
screen 118-120, 127, 208, 245
computer screen 112
miniature screen 256-257


























semiology 241-242, 247-248, 252
semiotics (Peircean) 25, 207
semiotic issues 46









sensory acuity 105, 109
sensory judgment 134








hand-held shaky camera 22, 155,
159
shaky camera lo-fi scenes 164
shallow focus 156
sharp focus 156
Shklovsky circle, the 236
shock 33, 39, 111
moral shock effect 34
physical shock effect 34
shock effects 40, 108








track-in shots 155, 160, 162
zoom shots 160, 162
sign 208
cinematographic sign 90
multifunctional sign systems 236
signifier 256
cinematic signifier 251, 255, 257
silent era 190
silent and monochrome cinema 120
silent film 116
silent to sound film 268




simulation of motion 172
situation (cinema as a) 165
index of subject 405
skill 181
slavery 38, 54, 213
slice radiography 131
slow and fast motion 61, 193, 197, 201
smart bombs 175




social and cultural inscriptions 277







social network 73, 114
social practice of cinema 127
social processes 190
social reality 197
social relations 141, 145, 152, 247
social sphere (ideology) 247




sociology 46, 248, 272, 275
interactionist sociology 165
sociological inquiry 163
software 20, 137, 144, 209-210
sogenannt (so-called) 228
sound 116-117, 127, 134, 158, 189, 191,
226
recorded and reproduced sound 189




sound technology 84, 189, 190-191
stereophonic sound 126
synchronized sound 110, 116, 127
synchronized sound and color 119,
122
transition to sound 189, 266
sound era 127, 193
sound film, cinema 85, 89, 110, 191
soundtrack 156, 161
Soviet cinema 177-178, 180, 183-184
Soviet debate on the cinema 185
Soviet experiments 183
Soviet filmmakers 181, 183
Soviet montage school, cinema 179,
181
Soviet montage theory 44
Soviet production 180
Soviet culture (1920s) 179
Soviet film culture 181-183
space 111
“imaginary space” 62
on- and offline space 209
space and time 97






temporal and spatial orientation 135
spatialized, spatialization 83, 175
special effects 115, 193, 253
species becoming 82
spectacle 42, 157, 252
larger-than-life spectacles 163
spectator(s) 22, 34, 91, 119-120, 146,
156, 164-165, 177, 184, 245, 252,
254
perverse spectators 162

















stereo-cinema 119-120, 122, 127






stereoscopy see also 3D 21, 116-117,
125-127, 130
future of stereoscopy 135
historical poetics of stereoscopy 119
industrialization of stereoscopy 129
medical applications of stereoscopy
131
sound and stereoscopy 117
stereoscopic installations 123
stereoscopic shots 118
stereoscopic cinema 119, 125
stereoscopic culture 128
stereoscopic entertainment 130
stereoscopic film(s) 118, 123
stereoscopic illusion 124
stereoscopic technologies 22, 38,
191, 197
stereoscopic theory 117
stereoscopic X-ray images 131
stimulation 111
stimulus, stimuli 33, 114, 157, 248
3D stimulus 249
















French poststructuralism 19, 65
structuralist 241
structuralist linguistics 231, 244
structuralist tendencies 222
style, stylization 24, 143, 178
history of film style 23, 162
mainstream style 160
post-cool style 160
run-and-gun style 22, 154-155, 158,
160
subject 25, 208
mobile subject 208-209, 211, 215
mobile subject (relations + experi-
ences) 208
perceiving subject 106
unity of the subject 193
subjectivity 25, 69, 150, 160, 207-208,
211, 216
metaphysics of subjectivity 69
mobile subjectivity 207-209




superimposition(s) 197, 201, 204
superstructure 31-32, 37, 248
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reform of school teaching 188
teaching and learning 182
teasers 141
technē 23, 25, 41, 52, 74-75, 79, 173,
181
technesthesic 36, 40, 45




technics 19, 68, 81, 83, 91-93
cinematic technics 90
modern technics 71, 73, 77
production technics 83
“technikos” 16
technique(s) 16, 19, 42, 51, 53, 60, 81,
83, 91, 120, 122, 147-148, 156, 174,
179, 191, 196, 198, 204, 250
camera and editing techniques 106,
179
conception of technique 61
costly techniques 154
cultural techniques 219
digital techniques 20-21, 30, 36, 63,
128, 142-144, 275
discourses on technique 63
historiography of techniques 54
new techniques 268
philosophy of technique 53
photographic technique 62
reproductive technique 43
technique and technology 52, 63
technique as transformation 61
techniques of programming 144





technocultural form (cinema as) 19





technological apparatus 57, 63, 186
technological base (of cinema) 186
technological change 138
technological determinism 54, 136,
138, 145
technological innovations 22, 24, 144,
190, 250, 262
technological inventions 15-16, 154









technology 18, 22, 24-25, 31-32, 35, 37,
41, 43, 48, 51, 53, 61, 63, 65, 70,
109, 136, 140, 142, 152-153, 157,
162, 165, 169, 174, 177, 181, 185-188,
190, 193, 197, 207, 209, 213, 226-





408 index of subjects
concept of technology 64
definitions of technology 22, 145
digital technology 20-21, 30, 36,
128, 142-144, 275
domestic technologies 22, 141-142,
136, 146
history of technology 16, 50
holo-digital tele-presence technol-
ogy 263
mobile technologies (affordances +
practices) 208
modern technology 71, 73, 79
philosophy of technology (Stiegler)
82
pre-cinematic technologies 23
recognition of technology 193
technology and humanity 18
technology as social practice 22
technology as technical system 22
technology (knowledge of skilful or
artful use) 16
technology (knowledge of techni-
ques) 16
technology studies 207
technology vs. social adaptation 145
traces of technology 187
sound technology 84, 189, 190-191




Tel Quel group 244
Telecinema, the 123, 131
telegraph, the 60
telegraphic strip, the 61
teleology 137
Hegelian teleology 230






television 16, 18, 20-21, 33, 38, 60-61,
65, 81, 84, 109, 116-117, 128, 137-
138, 140, 149, 151, 190, 227, 237,
256, 268
3D television 131-132
advent of television 266
closed-circuit television 268
cultural impact/function of televi-
sion 139-140
debates on television 137
domestic character of television 22,
136
early television 137
educational use of television 138
genealogies of television 150
HDTV 133
historical television research 150
matrix television 142
medium in transition 151
post-network television 142
reality TV 148
spatial and temporal dynamics 142
spectacular events 140
technological characteristic of tele-
vision 138-139
televisual image 143
television industry 143, 145
television regimes 148
television research 136-139, 142, 145
television series 262
television set 152
television studies 145, 147-148
television technology 143, 151, 153
television’s ecology 139
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textual structures 140, 146
theater(s) 120, 180, 182
conventional theater 121, 123
first phase of theater 120
Japanese Kabuki theater 121
large-screen film theaters 256
“machine theaters” 51
magic theaters 23, 169
multiplex theaters 38
second phase of theater 120
theater experiments 182
theater production 180
third phase of theater 122
theatricality 197
theory 181, 184










third machine (film criticism as) 251
thought 198, 203-204, 206, 273
time 19, 97
modern concept of time 109
sense of time 277
time-based art 231, 244
tomography 131
tool(s) 20, 82, 93, 95-96, 148
















traditional film cultures 181
traditional movie screen 256
traditional theater 123




transformation(s) 22, 137, 145, 149,
152, 178
media induced transformations 191
transformation patterns 149
transient film 183
transition 149, 151, 153
process of transition 149
transmission 56, 61, 137, 147, 223
digital transmission 143
live performance transmission 127
transmutation 191
transparency 20, 160, 250, 273




trial and error 203
trompe l’oeil 134
true art 194
truth 75-76, 98, 158
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turntablist scratching 238












past media usages 272, 276
remembered usages 277
social dynamics of media usages
277




how-to user scenarios 277
individual user 140
past user generations 276




validity 20, 96-99, 101, 271
medial validity 99
nonphysicality of validities 97






video 25, 36, 127, 140, 142, 149, 200,
204, 206





video camera project 197
video game console 152
gaming console(s) 132, 144






viewer(s), viewing 21, 111
regression of the viewer 246







mono- and binocular vision 248




VistaVision 125, 127, 135
visual and sound apparatuses 61, 63,
110
visual art(s) 180, 230
visual or sonic evidence 277
vocabulary 44









Western cinema literature 122
Western culture 111
index of subject 411
Western European thinking 187
Western ideology 118








wide-angle 28mm lens 120
widescreen 134
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